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Abstract
Accounts of economic development during mid-twentieth century have been dominated
by import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) and/or state-led industrialisation frameworks.

is literature attaches considerable importance to such policy areas critical to manufac-
turing as: trade and tariffs, foreign exchange and the promotion of credit. According to
this view, industrialisation became an official goal and in many developing economies
governments committed to it seriously. Focusing on Colombia, this dissertation chal-
lenges conventional wisdom. It demonstrates that the Colombian state did not provide
financial aid, or implement deliberate trade-protectionist support, for industrialists to the
degree hitherto argued. A distinct political-economy configuration, in which small-scale
agriculturalists, particularly coffee exporters, wielded significant power within the state,
meant that the type of distortive pro-ISI macro policies pursued in other Latin American
economies were eschewed. Industrialisation proceeded apace in Colombia, but this was
chiefly a market- or private-led phenomenon.

e methodology employed to substantiate this claim is not comparative, yet fre-
quent references are made to other Latin American nations to serve as benchmarks and
counterpoints. New archival material, both quantitative and qualitative, is combined in
novel ways to substantiate the original, revisionist interpretations advanced in the thesis.
Policy-makers, targeting the twin challenges of managing external-account pressures
and sustaining fiscal revenue, rather than promoting inward-looking development, best
explain moderate levels of tariffs and slight overvaluation of the currency observed in
Colombian trade policy. 
e heretofore untold history of the Institute for Industrial
Development, a direct supplier of venture capital, shows a government agency with major
organisational weaknesses, incapable of fulfilling its legal mandate, least of conforming to
the major role attached by the literature as key agent for industrialisation. Findings regard-
ing credit demonstrate that neither ordinary nor subsidised credit flowed to manufacturing
to the extent previously thought. Patterns of legislated credit, sector-targeted banking and
privileged access to the Central Bank, all show that agrarian ventures, not industrialists,
were the recipients of subsidised official financing. A growing incompatibility between
the financial requirements of advanced industrialisation and the clientelistic nature of the
domestic polity that had to cater for the needs of agrarian groups, prevented policy elites
from adopting a pro-manufacturing stance in financial and credit policies, even had they
so wished.
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Introduction
‘Believe me, do not fear crooks or evil people, fear the honest person who is wrong.

at person is in good faith, he wishes everyone well, and everyone has his confidence:
But unfortunately his methods fail to get out the good in humans’
Ferdinando Galiani, Italian economist, 
Colombia’s experience with import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) is a case of the
dog that didn’t bark. For historians, economists and political scientists alike the statement
must come as a shock. But it should not. 
e notion that Colombia, like other Latin
American nations, chose ISI as development model became scholarly certainty mainly
through unscrutinised mutual repetition and failure to see the woods from the trees. 
e
historical narrative of ISI, in which successive governments (invariably) since either the
Great Depression or WWII opted to develop domestic manufacturing by means of trade-
protectionism, generous financing and direct public involvement in the promotion of
industrial ventures, has become so entrenched that irrespective of the ideological hue, ISI
is treated as fact. Reference works in economics, history manuals and specialised studies
on industry and industrialisation, from Marxists accounts to mainstream neo-classical
interpretations, implicitly or overtly consider the /– period as the period of
ISI, and typically underscore its omissions, excesses and failures, exalting it as textbook-case
of wrong practices.
See for example Avella, M., Bernal, J., Errázuriz, M. and Ocampo, J. A. ‘La Consolidación del Capitalismo Moderno,
–’ in Ocampo, J. A. (Ed) Historia Económica de Colombia ().
Mayor Mora, A. ‘La Historia de la Industria Colombiana’ in Tirado Mejía, A. (Ed) Nueva Historia de Colombia ()
Vol. .
See for instance, Berry, A. and 
oumi, F. ‘Import Substitution and Beyond: Colombia’ in World Development ()
Vol. , No./, or more recently, Vejarano, C. ‘Industrialization and Industrial Policy in Colombia: A Tale of Economic
Development’ () Serie Documento. Borradores de Investigación, No. .
Commendable exceptions are the edited volume by Cárdenas, E., Ocampo, J. A. and 
orp, R. (Eds) ‘An Economic
History of Twentieth-Century Latin America’ () Vol. .; and 
orp, R. ‘A Reappraisal of the Origins of Import-
Substituting Industrialisation, –’ in Journal of Latin American Studies () Vol. . As will be discussed
below, however, the edited collection also exhibits shortcomings when examining the Colombian case.
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e failure to reconstruct history accurately is disappointing in itself. But the conse-
quences of misconstruing the past are serious. In assuming the path taken was akin to that
of other ISI-nations, the literature has ascribed to the Colombian experience assessments
and characterisations on the role of the state issued on its regional counterparts. Exces-
sive and misguided state interventionism compounded with substantial rent-seeking and
incapable bureaucratic apparatuses led to economy-wide distortions, perverse incentives,
inadequate investment levels, and the retreat from the international economy, for which
ISI-nations paid a high price, not least in terms of ‘missed opportunities’. States that tried
ISI, the story goes, by and large failed at attaining the transformations that industrialisation
was expected to bring about, in fact, often the kind of industrialisation achieved has been
questioned (artificial, inefficient, welfare-hindering). In short, states that failed at ISI
represent cases of ‘state- or government-failure’. Because Colombia has been customarily
included as member of the ISI-club, its state has accordingly received pejorative epithets.

is is somewhat unjustified, as is discussed below.

e wider significance of a re-examination of the state’s protagonism in late-industrialisa-
tion lies in the lessons to be drawn from a more precise reading of history for policy-making.
If contrary to conventional wisdom, the Colombian state did not provide financing
support for domestic industrialisation, which is a cornerstone of ISI strategies, then clearly
interpretations about the state’s record of intervention have to be revisited. Such review
should prompt both critics of state action and detractors of unfettered markets with
ammunition to further their cases. Market advocates can point out that the inaction of
the state regarding ISI prevented Colombia to get caught in the inflationary spirals and
macro-economic imbalances that affected actual ISI followers. Market critics, on their
part, could argue that this case of endogenous or market-led industrialisation is an instance
of ultimate failure to attain developed status because of the lack of a pro-active industrial
Such accounts can be found in Edwards, S. ‘Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope’ ()
Ch.; and Bulmer-
omas, V. ‘
e Economic History of Latin America since Independence’ () Chs.  and ; and
Taylor, A. ‘On the Costs of Inward-Looking Development: Price Distortions, Growth and Divergence in Latin America’
() Vol. , No. .
For influential works on state/government-failure; see Krueger, A. ‘Government Failures in Development’ in Journal of
Economic Perspectives () Vol. , No. ; Krueger, A. ‘
e Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’ in American
Economic Review () Vol. , No. .
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policy, or following Amsden, an ‘inability to industrialise when markets work’ type of
situation.
Either way, the priority once the historical facts are straightened is to explore and to
understand the singularity of the arrangements that led the state to keep its hands off the ISI
strategy. Space for a distinct contribution to the knowledge on the political economy of late-
development is made, by considering an alleged case of state-failure at ISI where actually
there was none. In explaining the non-event, generalisations about the political economy
of non-ISI supply further judging criteria for the industrial policy debate. 
e originality
of the dissertation stems from two of its defining features; first, the unearthing of new facts
and narratives, such as the history of the Institute for Industrial Development as a direct
promoter of industry, the comprehensive calculations on industrial financing or the display
of primary evidence revealing the dire credit-shortages faced by industrialists at various
points during the period studied. Secondly, the position from which the author departs
on this thesis is a revisionist one, not as just ‘another revisionist’ interpretation, but a solo
one, for the ‘take’ offered constitutes a novel interpretation of Colombia’s industrialisation
in mid-twentieth century.
Two important clarifications must be made at this point. First, pointing out that the
state could not have failed at ISI, because in fact it did not attempt such a developmental
path, is not to claim that this was a capable, effective, modern state. No apology about state
failings in other areas or at different endeavours is intended. Secondly, the object of study
in this dissertation might be a ‘non-subject’, i.e. ISI as the ‘dog that didn’t bark’, but it is
no straw man. 
e view that Colombian governments actively pursued it is widespread;
actually, prominent authors have come to claim that industrialisation there was pushed “at
any cost”.

e thesis claims that state support for industrialisation was limited at best and certainly
less prominent than the literature to date has assumed. It emphasises funding and financing
policies, yet other areas crucial to the ISI strategy, such as trade and foreign exchange
policies are also examined. 
e range of themes covered is broad by necessity, for what
Fajardo, C. and Rodríguez, N. ‘Tres Décadas del Sistema Financiero Colombiano: –’ in Cabrera, M. (Ed)
Sistema Financiero y Políticas Anti-Inflacionarias: – ().
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is being scrutinised is a long-run model of development, and the actions of governments
pursuing it have been said to be diverse enough as to deserve the label. 
us, it is imperative
to review the core elements of the model. Efforts then turn to explain the absence of
ISI. It will be argued that the distinct political-economy configuration, in which small-
scale agriculturalists — particularly coffee exporters — wielded significant power within
the state, meant that distortive pro-ISI macro policies were eschewed. Industrialisation
proceeded apace, but this was chiefly a market- or private-led phenomenon.
Although the initial motivation driving the dissertation did not change greatly, that is,
the pressing need to understand why industrial policies fail, the original line of enquiry
altered as research got underway and became dynamic. 
e earlier, and not so exciting
queries, aimed at calibrating the rents that presumably powerful industrialists had extracted
thanks to polices they imposed on society after colonising the state. 
is trail got cold as
the evidence found during fieldwork failed to substantiate this view; instead, hinting at the
more interesting questions that came to guide the dissertation in its current form: Why were
credit policies not being directed at the industrial sector during the alleged era of ISI? Why
was the developmentalist agency that epitomised the commitment to industrialisation from
the state so poorly funded? What kind of political economy prevented elected politicians to
implement strong pro-industry measures? Why did a de jure centralised and presidentialist
political system fail to push for industrialisation?

e selection of the case study was made on the grounds that Colombia is atypical.
Its polity, in particular, exhibits characteristics distinctly enough for a study favouring a
political economy approach to late-industrialisation. Amongst these feature the lasting
dominance of politics by two of the oldest parties in the world, the absence of populists in
power and of corporatist state structures, a record of democratic elections much higher-
than-average in the region, and a remarkable history of macro stability; all in a polarised
context of notable rural violence. 
e choice of case study surely seems to have paid off, as
the findings reported in the dissertation confirm Colombia’s uniqueness is not confined to
politics, but can now be extended to its economic trajectory, as a middle-sized economy
that avoided embarking on the fashionable development strategy of the day. 
e point of
departure, , was chosen for both substantive and practical reasons. It is in this year that
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the government rolled out the first comprehensive economic plan with a view to rationalise
the country’s resources, and in which a specific path was delineated for the manufacturing
sector. It was also at this juncture that the Institute for Industrial Development was
founded. In this sense, a landmark was set insofar as planning and industrial development
concerned. 
e fact that critical pieces of data, such as the distribution of banking loans
across economic activities, were available from this year onward also pressed the case for
starting at this point. Ending the study in  was motivated by two considerations.
First, managing the amount of variables studied, for after this year, there is an increase in
the number of agents acquiring growing importance within the financial system, such as
mutual funds, development banks and investment funds; as well as more financial schemes
or arrangements like the Central Bank’s administered funds for exports, urban development
and private investments. A comprehensive picture of the financial system after  ought
to include all of the above. Desirable as it was to further this enquiry, it would not have
been feasible to do it in the detailed manner required. In this sense, depth prevailed over
scope, in what was an already ‘big picture’ dissertation. Secondly,  marks the year
when under the government of Lleras Restrepo reforms in the exchange regime re-direct the
economy even more towards a potential export-led growth path, serving as closure for the
alleged ISI attempts. In short, mid-twentieth century Colombia offers a distinctive period
and an opportunity for a new periodisation of its political-economic history, as defined by
its variety of industrialisation. Colombia is different, as is already known amongst Latin
American experts, but it seems to be different in a different way.

e methods of research chosen to answer the questions posed were largely defined by
two guiding practices: historical research and the need for benchmarking. Awareness of
the need to draw constant comparisons with other Latin American nations pursuing ISI
was deemed vital, for the only sensible way to establish whether or not (or to what extent)
Colombian governments pushed for industrialisation could only be answered with a mirror
in sight — what other ISI-states have done. 
ough desirable, fieldwork conducted in
Bogota would not have been possible to replicate in Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Sao Paulo
and for these reasons a strict comparative study was not attempted. However, continuous
comparisons serving as benchmarks and counterpoints, reliant on secondary literature,
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were instrumental in reaching the conclusions presented below. 
e choice of ‘thick’
historical and empirical approach was largely defined by the purpose of this study. Unlike
neo-classical methodological individualism, which adjudicates economic agents (public
and private) rational-maximising behaviour seeking to explain aggregate outcomes, the
approach privileged in this thesis aims at understanding the intentionality of governments.
Departing from the assumption that institutional and other structures in place are key
factors in shaping the preferences of decision-makers — particularly in the public sphere
— necessitates a type of inquiry that does not easily lend itself to econometric testing.

ough plenty of quantitative evidence (new and existing) is deployed to substantiate the
claims advanced, the label that best describes the approach employed is the ‘state-in-society’
approximation. Efforts at tracing policy to its roots encountered towering difficulties
(unavailability of evidence), therefore, triangulations of evidence were made wherever
relevant and possible.

e thesis utilised a wide range of primary sources whose vast majority is of public access
in principle. In Bogota, archival work focused at first on the minutes of the Institute for
Industrial Development and of the Banco de la República (Central Bank), as well as on
legislation — both decrees and laws — by parliament and the executive office, available
at the respective institutional libraries. 
e presidential library, as expected, was a useful
supplier of ministerial memoirs, presidential speeches and other official documents and
publications. 
e Archivo General de la Nación complemented these materials, particularly,
with governmental non-published pieces. Trawling through the archives of the Finance
Ministry for executive decree-drafts yielded a poor catch, as did visits to the Colombian
banking association when searching for lobbying evidence. Despite the existence (at least
nominally) of a network of archivists aimed at facilitating research in private-bank archives,
access to the two most important organisations was denied on confidentiality grounds in
. Insights into private banking came through the official organ, the banking association
bi-monthly bulletin, held at the Luis Ángel Arango public library. Other journals held
there allowed the reconstruction of the balance sheets of national manufacturing firms
(limited-liability companies). Statistical series displayed in the appendix support the figures
presented in the main text. 
e accompanying notes explain to the reader how the material

I
was assembled and assist in understanding the more dense and slightly technical calculations
(especially in Chapter ) backing the arguments therein.
In London, data on national accounts for Colombia and Latin America were retrieved
from the IMF’s International Statistics series at the British Library of Economics & Political
Science (LSE library). 
ere, the monthly and annual publications of the Banco de la
República, as well as of other financial institutions, such as the Central Mortgage Bank
(BCH), permitted the compilation of various series on the sectoral distribution of loans and
discounts, of differentiated discounting by the Central Bank (CB), and of the proportions
of subsidised lending by public banks, to name a few examples. A generous invitation
to use international press-cuts once collected by Chatham House on Colombian affairs
was extended by a scholar of Latin American history at UCL. Findings from this source
assisted the arguments in chapter four. A small number of interviews with first-hand
protagonists or well-positioned witnesses of the events of the time, such as Minister of
Finance, Luis Morales Gómez, and Julio Manuel Ayerbe, Intern/Assistant to the general
manager at IFI in /, offered insights into policy-making decisions that the official
sources simply do not. In short, new and existing archival as well as secondary sources, of
both quantitative and qualitative material, have been combined in novel ways to advance
the revisionist interpretations presented in the dissertation.

e thesis is structured along seven chapters. 
e first reviews the relevant litera-
ture on late-industrialisation and the state, and the importance of finance for economic
growth/development. 
e aim of the chapter is twofold: first, to note the political
economies of industrial-transformation successes and failures to provide a frame with
which to proceed with the actual case study; and secondly, by reiterating the importance of
financing and funding for industrialisation to explore the politics surrounding preferential
credit schemes, and the nature of the institutions involved. Chapter two provides the
historical background and the contexts in which the Colombian state sought to promote
(or not) industrialisation. 
e next chapter, the first substantive research piece, places
the case study in regional context and sets out to examine the first components of ISI.
Underscoring the problems policy-makers faced with the external variables, as well as the
absence of the typical macro imbalances and inflationary spirals that ISI-strategies are
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well-known for, the piece seeks to crack the prevailing consensus by re-interpreting the
intentionality behind fiscal and foreign exchange measures and their effects on the trade
profile of the country. Chapter four traces the hitherto untold history of the Institute for
Industrial Development (IFI) between  and . Revelations about its organisational
weakness and its financial muscle place a decisive challenge to conventional views about the
role of this agency on industrialisation. A close examination of the structure of the financial
system along with the identification of the winners in the creation of public banks and of
legislated credit, as well as of the direct operations of the CB, is the substance of chapter
five. 
is helps to establish the new fact: industrialists were not preferred over agrarian
interests when it came to borrowing from public sources. Qualitative evidence from various
corners confirms that inadequate financing was a serious concern for industry and that
it possibly retarded its development. Chapter six offers a political economy explanation
of why industry was not the favoured economic sector when it came to credit/financial
policy. It also refines the findings of the previous section by assessing the investment needs
of several economic activities, according to fixed investment criteria. 
e last section
concludes with a review and discussion of the findings and a wider consideration of the
implications for the relevant area of knowledge.

1 Relevant Literature Review
“For real and sustained development there is no substitute for industrialisation”. 
e
statement by O’Brien gathers what the historical record shows: for most developed nations,
wealth has been attained via industrialisation. Ever since England’s first spontaneous In-
dustrial Revolution brought about modern economic growth the rest followed. Industrial
expansion was seen to equate economic growth and many nations forewent their natural
comparative advantages to foster industrialisation, albeit with mixed results. Industrialisa-
tion as an object of study became popular, justifications for it abounded, models inspired
in England were sketched for others to replicate. As the spontaneity of the first industrial
nation did not realise in the followers’ economies, governmental and other institutional
arrangements were put in place to nurture industrial transformation. 
us, a great part of
the scholarly effort has focused on the protagonism of the state in promoting (or hindering)
development and on the mechanisms utilised towards it. Closely related to this have been
studies dedicated to the politics underlying industrial growth, such as the relationships
between state and business, and the political conditions for effective industrial policy. A
preferred comparative path of enquiry has evolved around the economic ‘miracles’ of East
Asia implementing export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) and the less fruitful attempts by
Latin Americans with the ISI variety. 
is review assesses these branches of the literature.
Industrialisation is characterised as a process in which the proportion of national income
derived from manufacturing activities increases, as does the proportion of the working
population engaged in the secondary sector, leading to a structural change in the economy
from agriculture to industry. 
e process entails sustained investment and continuous
O’Brien, P. K. (Ed) ‘Industrialisation: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy’ () Vol. , p. xiv.
Eatwell, J. (Ed) ‘
e New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics’ () Vol. , p. .
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improvements in production technologies. Schematically, industrialisation can take place
in three broad ways: as by-product of wealth in a dynamic primary sector, via ISI, or
through EOI. 
e first kind, as modelled by Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, is caused by
increases in agricultural productivity or by an export boom that raises income generating
demand for domestic manufacturing. 
e second, ISI, aims at reducing imports in order
to promote the production of domestic substitutes. 
e ISI path, if pursued fully, is said to
consist of two parts; primary ISI, entailing the shift from imports to the local manufacture
of basic consumer goods, and; secondary ISI, involving the domestic production of capital-
and technology-intensive manufactures: consumer durables, intermediate and capital
goods. Lastly, EOI concentrates on speeding up the process of industrialisation through
exporting manufactured goods for which the economy in question has (or develops) a
comparative advantage. It often involves a relatively more open economy (than that of
ISI) and relies heavily on foreign markets.

e chapter comprises three parts. 
e first segment starts examining the logics for state
action in latecomers. Attention then turns to the political-economy conditions helping to
explain success or failure at industrial transformation, at which point emphasis is given
to the nature and the kinds of states pushing for industrialisation, their structures of
power, and the choices of industrial regime made (ISI or EOI). 
e next part focuses on
ISI, assessing its critics and the accuracy of alternative conceptualisations, namely state-
led industrialisation. 
e last sub-section identifies scholarly works on Latin America’s
industrialisation that offer approximations closer to the one offered in this dissertation
and maps the potential for the historiographical contribution of the thesis advanced here.
Part two, on the finance-growth/development link, focuses on the aspects of this relation
relevant for economic history. 
ree core bodies of literature are reviewed: the pioneering
works by Gerschenkron and Cameron recognising the importance of finance, the effects of
financial development and of certain financial structures upon growth and industrialisation,
especially the role and relevance of external finance; and the politics of financial-resources
mobilisation and allocation. Last part concludes.
D’ Costa, A. ‘Industrialization’ in O’ Hara, P. Encyclopaedia of Political Economy () Vol. , p. .
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. ‘Income Distribution, Market Size, and Industrialization’ in Quarterly Journal
of Economics () Vol. , No. , p. .
Gereffi, G. ‘Paths of Industrialization: An Overview’ () p. .
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Late-Industrialisation and the State
In exploring the benefits of relative economic backwardness, Gerschenkron proposed that
states in late-industrialisers intervene to substitute for missing ‘prerequisites’. 
e state’s
role, given the patterns of late-industrialisation stress by Gerschenkron, was likely to loom
large: the more backward a country’s economy, the more likely its industrialisation will
come as a sudden spurt, the greater the emphasis on producers’ goods, the more pronounced
the stress on bigness of both plant and enterprise, the greater the part played by special
institutional factors designed to increase the supply of capital to nascent industries.
Because interventions have been extensive, analyses of late-industrialisation have examined
the actions and motivations of state action in successful and failed instances.
A prominent stream of this literature confers the state a pivotal role in the compressed
late-industrialisation of East Asia, a view challenging opinions that emphasise the operations
of free markets as the sole responsible for their economic ‘miracles’. 
e justifications for
state action vary. Amsden highlights the absence of pioneering technology in latecomers,
as the fundamental constraint leaving developing countries with no other option than to
force lower real wages to be able to compete in world markets. In the long-run, however,
low wages might not be low enough to compete against products embodying productivity-
based gains. 
is inadequacy of low wages as a competitive asset prompts states to influence
the other factor in the production function: capital. Hence, and “a fortiori, in industries
requiring greater skills and capital investments, governments have to intervene and prices
deliberately distort to stimulate investment and trade. Otherwise, industrialization won’t
germinate”. As said earlier, the market to be intervened in is that of capital, and the price
to be distorted, or ‘got wrong’, is the interest rate, i.e. credit has to be subsidised. By means
Gerschenkron contested the theory of economic growth by Rostow, which argued that for the ‘take-off into self-
sustained growth’ a series of ‘prerequisites’, such as social overhead investment, institutions mobilising capital and
entrepreneurship, and a dynamic agricultural sector, were necessary; see Rostow, W. W. ‘
e Stages of Economic Growth:
A Non-Communist Manifesto’ () Ch. .
Gerschenkron, A. ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective’ () pp. –.
See for the latter; Chen, E. K. ‘Hyper-growth in Asian Economies: A Comparative Study of Hong-Kong, Japan,
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan’ () and Aikman, D. ‘
e Pacific Rim: Area of Change, Area of Opportunity’ ().
Amsden, A. ‘A 
eory of Government Intervention in Late Industrialization’ in Putterman, L. and Rueschemeyer, D.
(Eds) State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? () pp. –.
Amsden, A. ‘A 
eory...’ p. .
Amsden, A. ‘A 
eory...’ p .
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of a reciprocity mechanism, state intervention in the allocation of subsidies is critical in
preventing the subsidies turning into give-aways. In exchange for intermediate assets, the
state imposes upon business recipients performance targets in relation to exports, output,
product quality, and investment in research and development. In other words, the state
acts as a disciplinarian for capital. Here, according to Amsden, is where the key to the
successful industrialisation lies.

e call for state intervention has different roots for Rodrik. He argues the presence of a
coordination failure consisting of huge inequalities in the rates of return to investment.

at is to say, while investment returns to individual firms are low, returns to coordinated
investments are extremely high. State involvement is required to alleviate such failure
and subsidise investment through negative interest rates for business, tax exemptions,
and selective investments in industries with significant linkages. Ultimately, Rodrik
asserts, the removal of the coordination failure by the state in East Asia made capital
expenditure profitable, prompting a boom in investment, which underlay the rapid growth
of economies, such as South Korea and Taiwan. In short, it was investment-led growth
the factor driving their performances.
A third author, Wade, claims, that the superiority of economic performances was due
to a combination of: ) very high investment levels that allowed for fast technological
transfer, more investments in key industries than would have occurred in the absence of
government intervention; ) a set of government economic policies — incentives, controls,
and risk-spreading mechanisms — that enabled the state to govern the market process of
resource allocation, generating different production and investment levels than would have
occurred with free market policies, and; ) policies that were supported by a certain kind
of state organisation and private sector (often a corporatist state keen on authoritarian
political arrangements). 
us, Wade legitimises state intervention (not the nature of
the regimes) with a counterfactual: had the government not intervened investments in
Rodrik, D. ‘Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich’ in Economic Policy () Vol.
, No. , p. . 
e idea behind coordination failure is that many projects require simultaneous investments to be
viable, and if these investments are made by independent agents, there is little guarantee that each agent, acting in its
own self-interest, would choose to invest; see Pack, H. and Saggi, K. ‘Is 
ere a Case for Industrial Policy? A Critical
Survey’ in 
e World Bank Research Observer () Vol. , No. , p. .
Rodrik, D. ‘Getting...’ pp. –.
Wade, R. ‘Governing the Market’ () pp. –.
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key industries and production outcomes would have been inferior, and economic growth
slower. His emphasis is placed upon the specific industries or sectoral policies where
government intervention acted as a ‘big leader’, namely plastic, metals, artificial fibres,
shipbuilding, automobiles, machine tools, and semiconductors.
Amsden, Rodrik, and Wade all three assign the state a major role in the successful
industrialisation of East Asia. Although the logics behind state intervention differ among
them — lack of pioneering technology, coordination failure, and need for industry-specific
leadership, respectively — their accounts share one key thing in common: the absolute
importance of high investment levels. 
is defining characteristic, which can be said to
describe their interpretations as ‘capital-centred’, reflects in Amsden’s reciprocity principle
aimed at disciplining capital; Rodrik’s requirements to make aggregated investment
profitable; Wade’s necessity to elevate investment in certain key industries beyond that of
what free markets would dictate. 
e three explanations are not mutually exclusive at all,
but rather complementary.
Accounting for the diverging trajectories of Latin America and East Asia, Taylor also
stresses the role of investment. Differences in physical capital accumulation, resulting
from high investment levels in East Asia vs. lower levels in Latin America, explain the gap
in economic performance. Taylor notes the damaging interventionist policies of Latin
American governments, and that, he argues, distorting prices hindered growth; yet he fails
to acknowledge that similar interventions in East Asia underpinned their investment-led
growth path. Fortunately, Akyüz and Gore, balance out interpretations on the protagonism
of the state, uncovering the ‘investment-profit nexus’. 
ey sustain that corporate profits
and other profit-related incomes were the main source of investment in most East Asian
economies, and critically, that governments played a major role in promoting capital
Wade, R. ‘Governing...’ p. .
In addition to Amsden, it is possible to identify a distinctive sub-branch of the literature on late-industrialisation
highlighting the critical role of discipline in the catching-up process. Chapter  will consider some of the most illuminating
insights. Important works are those by Chibber, V. ‘Locked In Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India’
() which prioritises industrial planning discipline; Davis, D. ‘Discipline and Development: Middle Classes and
Prosperity in East Asia and Latin America’(), which stresses the social origins of disciplinary capacity; and Kahn,
M. and Blankenburg, S. ‘
e Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Asia and Latin America’ in Cimoli, M., Dosi,
G. and Stiglitz, J. (Eds) Industrial Policy and Development (), which emphasise compatibilities between systems of
institutional compulsion and development strategies.
Taylor, A. ‘On the Costs...’ pp. –.
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accumulation. 
e ‘nexus’ consisted of high profits increasing the incentives of firms
to invest and their capacity to finance new investment; higher investment in turn raised
profits by enhancing rates of capital utilisation and productivity. 
e specific mechanisms
used to animate the ‘nexus’ will be discussed below, for now what needs to be addressed
are the conditions under which states intervene. In other words, the particular political
economy arrangements under which states intervene.
What are the political-economy conditions for successful industrialisation? Amsden
provides a bold answer connecting the issue of income distribution with that of the
quality of state intervention, declaring: “a more equal distribution of income raises the
probability of industrial success for a host of reasons related to class struggle, worker
motivation, expected returns to investments in education, and other micro and macro
variables”. Crucially, she goes on, “a relatively equal income distribution is a necessary
condition for late-industrialisation because it empowers the state to discipline business
and facilitates the state bureaucracy’s monitoring of the disciplinary process”. Although
Amsden supports this statistically with a regression of income distribution on the growth
rate of manufacturing labour productivity, she fails to specify the mechanisms by which
more equal income distribution increase the quality of government intervention, which
in turn accelerates industrial growth. Rodrik, advancing a similar argument fills in the
void, arguing that high degrees of income equality and wealth were important because it
meant governments needed not to contend with either powerful industrialists or landlords,
in turn insulating the policy-making process from vested interests. 
is dispensed the
state from undertaking redistributive policies (usually growth-retarding) and it also freed
political leaders to focus on economic goals and to supervise the bureaucracy closely.

e Rodrik’s and Amsden’s complementary take on equity and distribution and quality
of state intervention is not problem-free. First, the picture of all insulated policy-making
state agencies is difficult to accept given the presence, from early days, of large business
Akyüz, Y. and Gore, C. ‘
e Investment-Profit Nexus in East Asian Industrialization’ () in World Development
() Vol. , No. , p. .
Akyüz, Y. and Gore, C. ‘
e Investment...’ p. .
Amsden, A. ‘A 
eory...’ p. .
Amsden, A. ‘A 
eory...’ p. .
Amsden, A. ‘A 
eory...’ p. .
Rodrik, A. ‘Getting...’ p. . Rodrik also adds the pool of educated workforce as an important factor increasing state
effective intervention.

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conglomerates in South Korea (their case study), which grew from large to gigantic as
industrialisation deepened. Second, close relationships between Park Chung Hee and the
heads of some of the largest groups, suggest influences on policy from businesses took place
at the highest of levels. 
ird, Rodrik neglects the highly repressive and labour-excluding
policies practiced throughout; policies which may well have incurred costs that had not
been considered in terms of growth, let alone democratic concerns. In this aspect of
the political economy of East Asia, Wade is clearer, as he states: “... government actions
to constrain and accelerate the competitive process ... were carried out by a relatively
authoritarian and corporatist state.” He acknowledges that these regimes often declared
unions illegal, managed strikes heavy-handedly, and provided very incipient or no social
security or safety nets to workers until the arrival of democratisation. Although Wade does
not elaborate this point, there should be little doubt that this tough approach to labour,
repressed when not co-opted, meant more profits to industrialists.
Kohli zooms in on the state and the structure of power. He argues that the way state
power is organised and used decisively influences rates and patterns of industrialisation, and
distinguishes three ideal types of states: cohesive-capitalist or developmentalist states, char-
acterised by centralised and purposive authority, a competent bureaucracy with tight links
with producer groups, and a solid commitment to economic growth; neopatrimonial states,
with weakly centralised and barely legitimate authority structures, personalistic leaders,
and bureaucrats that treat public resources as their personal patrimony; and fragmented-
multiclass states, where power is diffused, policy formulation and implementation is
politicised, yet which command some authority and whose leaders are held accountable for
poor public policies and performances. Now, state intervention in rapid industrialisers is
often market reinforcing in the sense of supporting profitability for private investors. For
Kohli, the setting most conducive to rapid industrial growth is one in which the state’s
near-exclusive commitment to high economic growth coincides with the profit-maximising
needs of private entrepreneurs; a ‘marriage of profits and repression’ aimed at growth. It is
Kohli, A. ‘State-Directed Development’ () p. . For a stimulating study on corruption in South Korea, that
further challenges the ‘autonomous-policy’ view; see Kang, D. ‘Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in
South Korea and the Philippines’ ().
Wade, R. ‘Governing...’ p. .
Kohli, A. ‘State...’ pp. – and –.
Kohli, A. ‘State...’ pp. –.
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precisely cohesive-capitalist states, like South Korea under Park or Brazil under Vargas, the
kind of public apparatuses that can create such political economies. Kohli’s basic concern,
thus, is with the state, and how can states be developmentally effective.
In answering this he examines states in the long-run, their patterns of construction and
development. His is a quest for continuity, continuities that characterise some states and
the relations of those states with their societies. For example, when explaining how South
Korea devised its high growth post-war political economy, Kohli goes back to the Japanese
rule to trace historical patterns. He finds that a highly authoritarian and penetrating state,
a brutal, repressive and systematic control of the lower classes, and a state-dominated
alliance of state and property owners for production and profits were all key legacies from
colonial days, that helped shaping the more contemporary political economy of rapid
industrialisation. Kohli’s account for the less than impressive performance of Brazil also
stresses the state. 
is time, the fact that Brazil had not been a fully developmentalist
state throughout, and had often exhibited fragmented-multiclass and neopatrimonial
features, explains its long cycles of stop-and-go economic growth. As a cohesive-capitalist
state the regimes of Vargas and Kubitschek pursued ISI effectively by boosting public
investment, welcoming foreign capital, maintaining labour discipline, creating demand
for consumer durables and subsidising private investments. 
e downsides, such as the
inability to expand the tax base, increasing dependence on foreign resources, continuous
fiscal and balance of payments crises, reflected the non-developmentalist characteristics
and limitations of that same state. Kohli’s analysis is original, insofar as it downplays the
orientation of the industrialisation processes (inward-looking or export-oriented), which
have dominated many an interpretation, and instead focus on the nature of state-directed
Kohli, A. ‘State...’ pp. –, –, –.
Kohli, A. ‘State...’ p. .

e ability to erect a modern fiscal state has been associated with growth via the provision of economically significant
public goods in the English case. O’Brien states: “Revenues... sustained protection for property rights, and above all
funding for the pursuit of an effective mercantilist strategy that provided a commercialising economy with extraordinary
shares of the gains from servicing an expanding global economy. 
is might be the single most important of several
factors that led over time to the jack up of English wages to levels that induced technological progress.” See O’Brien, P.
K. ‘
e Nature and Historical Evolution of an Exceptional Fiscal State and its Possible Significance for the Precocious
Commercialization and Industrialization of the British Economy from Cromwell to Nelson’ in Economic History Review
() Vol. , No. , p. . For an account of why Latin American states failed to construct solid fiscal states; see
Centeno, M. A. ‘Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth Latin America’ in American Journal of Sociology
() Vol. , No. .
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development as the main component of the success or failure of each experience. Even more
importantly, his approach is neither society- nor state-centred, but a carefully balanced
‘state-in-society’ approximation, which also inspires this thesis.
In similar fashion, Evans contends that in a world of constructed comparative advantage,
differences in economic performance are connected to differences in state structures.
His taxonomy of states divides in two: predatory and developmental. States that extract
large amounts of otherwise investable resources and provide little in the way of collective
goods, thus actually impeding economic transformation belong to the former; those able to
foster long-term entrepreneurial perspectives among private elites by increasing incentives
to engage in transformative investments are of the second kind. He selects Zaire and
Japan to illustrate the above categories and an intermediate case through the experience of
Brazil. Zaire’s is labelled predatory as result of its incapacity to formulate and implement
goals independently. It lacks autonomy because public decisions are ‘up for sale’ to private
interests. Japan, on the other end, is a fully developmental state. A highly trained and
meritocratic bureaucracy with effective capacity to intervene, autonomous from vested
interests, yet embedded with private, especially industrial, capital provided the basis for
the type of state involvement that led to the rapid industrialisation of Japan’s economy.
So-called ‘embedded autonomy’, that “apparently contradictory combination of corporate
coherence and connectedness” is, according to Evans, the basic state structure that sustains
successful industrial transformation. From this ideal type, however, most developing
countries deviate or only approximate it feebly. Brazil is a case in point. With a relatively
fragmented bureaucracy but with ‘pockets of efficiency’ in certain state agencies, and with
personalised and informal links between small numbers of industrialists and state officials,
Brazil’s capacity to construct global embedded autonomy was limited. However, as Evans
For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of state- or society-approaches and state-in-society methodologies; see
Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol T. (Eds) ‘Bringing the State Back In’ () and Migdal, J., Kohli, A. and
Shue, V. (Eds) ‘State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the 
ird World’ ().
Evans, P. ‘Predatory, Developmental, and Other State Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on
the 
ird World State’ in Sociological Forum () Vol. , No. , pp. –.
Evans, P. ‘Predatory...’ pp. –.
Evans, P. ‘Predatory...’ p. .
Evans, P. ‘Embedded Autonomy’ () p. .
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has pointed out, there were a number of areas where state industrial interventions proved
successful (steel and automobiles for example).
In both Kohli’s and Evans’ analyses, the drive towards industrialisation is ‘state-led’ or
‘state-directed’, yet despite this fundamental similarity an important difference in their
approaches is notable. Evans emphasises the close relationship between the Weber-like
bureaucracy and private industrial capital as the key bond between state and society
underlying success. For him, this state-industrial capital link is pivotal. Kohli, for his part,
concedes that such a bond matters, but stresses another equally significant relationship,
that of state and labour. For him, a high-growth political economy is grounded on the
‘marriage of repression and profits’. Controlled, malleable, and cheap labour matters more.

us, two and not one, are the crucial relationships underpinning rapid industrialisation,
that, highlighted by Evans, state-industrial capital, and the one added by Kohli, state-
labour. Both acknowledge instances of policy coherence, successful industrialisation, and
accelerated economic growth, for instance in Brazil, despite having pursued ISI sequencing
for most of its recent history. 
is is telling for none take the differences in industrial
strategy or orientation (import-substitution or export-led) to be crucial. Others, however,
emphasise precisely this distinction.
In this respect the literature has tended to make a regional distinction: East Asia followed
EOI, whilst Latin America pursued ISI. 
e differentiation in the ‘broad’ strategy or
orientation of industrialisation is said to account for the divergence in performance. A
key representative of this literature is Haggard, who brings forward a complex explanation
including international factors, social forces (be it classes, interest groups, or economic
sectors), political elites’ preferences, the state’s own structures, and ideas and ideologies.

e argument is ordered and sophisticated and not a mere mixture of the latter. For
instance, his account of Korea’s adoption of EOI starts with a decline in US aid and a
growing awareness of the benefits of self-sufficiency on the part of state officials. However,
the response to the new situation and objectives rest on the delivery of new institutional
and political arrangements. Key among them are a strengthened executive branch, a more
Evans, P. ‘Embedded...’ pp. –.
Haggard, S. ‘Pathways from the Periphery’ () pp. –.
Haggard, S. ‘Pathways...’ p. .
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centralised process of economic decision-making, and the display of new economic policy
tools for steering investment and promoting exports, such as short-term export loans, long-
term and foreign currency loans, and industry targeted support. 
e account for Brazil
and Mexico in pursuing secondary ISI also begins with international factors and ideologies
at play: import disruptions during World War II and balance of payments problems
during the s, combined with the ascent of structuralist ideas to legitimise wider state
economic involvement and the need for deepening industrialisation. However, the most
important factor here is the ability of ruling political elites in integrating a distributional
coalition made out of manufacturing capital, labour movement and middle classes to their
political domain and to use secondary ISI to their political advantage. 
us, Haggard is
concerned with change, transition, and economic policy reform from ISI to EOI in East
Asia and from primary to secondary ISI in Latin America. Institutions are ultimately at
the core of his explanation because it is thanks to the development of new institutional
arrangements that South Korea successfully embarked on EOI. Political elites and their
coalition-building abilities, on the other hand, account for ISI sequencing in Brazil and
Mexico. In other words, for Haggard, although international factors may ignite or prompt
policy change, it is the political and/or institutional responses of the state and its political
elites that define the industrial trajectory to be adopted, which can be either more ISI or a
switch to EOI.

e work of Kaufman, who covers Latin America’s largest economies and examines how
countries change or retain developmental models, follows a similar line of thought. In
explaining the different strategies chosen (ISI or EOI), Kaufman emphasises the patterns
of alliance and conflict amongst critical sets of actors: agricultural-mercantile exporters,
‘anti-oligarchical’ coalitions, state elites, and domestic and foreign industrial-capitalists.
Like Haggard, Kaufman advances insights to the debate on the role of the state; and most
relevant for this dissertation are two: the recognition that the industrial path chosen might
not necessarily have been the result of ‘grand design’ but rather of “too much pragmatism
Haggard, S. ‘Pathways...’ pp. –.
Haggard, S. ‘Pathways...’ pp. –.
Kaufman, R. ‘How Societies Change Developmental Models or Keep 
em: Reflections on the Latin American
Experience in the s and the Postwar World’ in Gereffi, G. and Wyman, D. (Eds) Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of
Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia () p..
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in selecting policies that most clearly reflected the converging short-term interests of state
officials themselves and of their key constituencies”; and identifying Colombia as distinct
in its developmental path, for implementing more cautious fiscal and monetary policies
than other ISI nations. Whilst the frameworks and arguments of both Haggard and
Kaufman are instructive (the factors shaping the orientation of industrial policy), this
dissertation takes issue with the left-hand side of their equation, that is, with the very
outcome they intend to explain. 
eir independent variable, the choice of sustaining ISI
or shifting to EOI, has been either under-examined or taken for granted. 
e oft-repeated
assumption of works examining ISI is that this strategy was pursued throughout, sometimes
deliberately, at other times as the result of improvisations and political expediency, but
ultimately implemented by successive governments — to the extent of tolerating the broad
characterisation and the label that makes it a regular object of study.
Just as much as the experience of East Asia with EOI has been widely praised, that of
Latin America with ISI has received harsh criticisms. Taylor, as noted above, exemplifies
this approach. He explains the slow economic growth of Latin America in the latter part of
the twentieth century ‘in the classic tradition’; that is to say, as obstacles to the process of
physical capital accumulation. 
e main argument is that the strategy of ISI generated
profound and economy-wide distortions. Among the most prominent ones are those in
foreign exchange and financial markets, and in the prices of investment goods. He claims
to capture the effect of distortions on growth by regressing three variables — black-market
premium, relative price of capital, and rate of devaluation — on growth. 
e logic behind
it is clear-cut. Policies adopted during ISI generated distortions that affected negatively
the rate of accumulation, which in turn translated into lower rates of economic growth for
the region — this is particularly striking when compared to the rates exhibited by East
Asian latecomers. In other words, policy-induced distortions of market prices meant lower
investment levels. “
e distortions were ‘legendary’, if judged by endurance”, according to
Taylor.
Kaufman, R. ‘How Societies...’ p. .
Kaufman, R. ‘How Societies...’ p. . Mexico is also singled out in this respect.
Taylor, A. ‘On the Costs...’ p. .
Taylor, A. ‘On the Costs...’ p. .
Taylor, A. ‘On the Costs...’ p. .
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Following this view that ISI was too costly, are Chong and Zanforlin, who wonder why
Latin American countries “not only kept pursuing old inward-looking industrialization
projects but also kept investing in new ones even when it was quite clear that such policies
were not sustainable.” ‘Market critics’ of ISI like the above abound. 
ey stress the costs
of foregoing one’s own comparative advantage and underline the inefficiencies incurred
in the breeding of domestic manufacturing sectors. Critics from the left, or ‘Structural
critics’, for their part, highlight the low levels of labour absorption created by ISI and
the related adverse effects this created on the distribution of income and wealth. Few
comments need be made at this point. First, inevitably, when compared with the record
of the East Asia, Latin America’s performance looks humble. However, when judged
against its own history, the ISI period has been the one with the highest and more or less
sustained rates of economic growth. Secondly, this era exhibits absolute improvements in
a wide range of socio-economic indicators, such as literacy rates, life expectancy and infant
mortality rates. Lastly, for all the virtues and opportunities that EOI brought about in
East Asia, not all countries could have simultaneously adopted EOI and reaped the benefits
to the extent that South Korea and Taiwan did. 
ere is a limit to the demand capacity
of foreign markets. Market share would have diminished had Latin American economies
successfully competed in world markets, which in turn would have decelerated the pace of
export-led growth followers. Because Latin America’s experience with industrialisation was
not as dismal as has often been judged by ISI critics, more balanced views of these decades
have started to emerge.
Chong, A. and Zanforlin, L. ‘Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats and Economic Growth in Latin America:
An Empirical Exploration’ in Public Choice () Vol. , No. , p. . Further to the explanations discussed
above, Galiani and Somaini sustain that ISI policies exhibit strong path dependence; see Galiani, S. and Somaini,
P. ‘Path-Dependent Import-Substitution Policies: 
e Case of Argentina in the th Century’ () unpublished
manuscript. Alternatively, Galiani et al. propose, that in natural resource abundant economies, with a significant
import-competing industrial sector and diverging political parties, trade policy tends to be protectionist and unstable;
see Galiani, S., Schofield, N. and Torrens, G. ‘Factor Endowments, Democracy and Trade Policy Divergence’ ()
unpublished manuscript.

is label is part of a grouping of ISI-critics by Baer, who distinguishes between ‘market’ and ‘structural’ critics;
see Baer, W. ‘Import-Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations’ in Latin
American Research Review () Vol. , No. , p. .
See for instance; Bulmer-
omas, V. ‘
e Economic History of Latin America since Independence’ () Ch. ;
and Haber, S. ‘
e Political Economy of Industrialization’ in Bulmer-
omas, V., Coatsworth, J. and Cortés-Conde, R.
(Eds) 
e Cambridge Economic History of Latin America () Vol. .
Baer, W. ‘Import...’ pp. –. For a devastating critic of ISI outside of Latin America; see Lal, D. ‘
e Hindu
Equilibrium’ () Vol. , Part .
Astorga, P., Berges, A. and Fitzgerald, V. ‘
e Standard of Living in Latin America during the Twentieth Century’
() in Economic History Review () Vol. , No. .
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Successfully attempting to reverse the leyenda negra of post-war development in the
region, Cárdenas et al. propose the rejection of the ISI label altogether, and its replacement
with the concept of ‘state-led industrialisation’, which, they argue, captures best the
essence of the period. Solid grounds to drop ISI as a guiding framework to examine
this era are: first, the substitution of imports in many instances was not the main driver
of industrialisation; secondly, industrialisation did not start after WWII (or after the
Great Depression); thirdly, in several countries the ‘strategy’ was ‘mixed’, combining
domestic manufacturing growth with export promotion. At the core, however, lies a
new and expanded role of the state, which explains the adoption of the label ‘state-led
industrialisation’. In attaching the state the role of leading industrialisation, Cárdenas et
al. make explicit the assumptions of ‘ISI’, that is, that industrialisation was the outcome of
state policy. 
e case study examined in this dissertation gives strong reasons to challenge
the alternative label.
Insights from prominent scholars indicate that the possibility of industrialisation occur-
ring largely unassisted by public policy or indifferently of the preferences of policy elites is
plausible. Hirschman sustains that it was possible for “industrialisation to penetrate into
Latin America and elsewhere among the latecomers without requiring the fundamental
political and social changes which wrought about among the pioneer industrial countries”,
resulting amongst other things, in the lack of political power by the new industrialists.
Similarly, Ocampo notes: “Socio-political elites did not quit their primary-exporting
calling ... the dominant idea continued to be that industrialisation and export-led develop-
ment were not antagonistic ... the facts more than industrialist ideology dominated the
process.” Finally, Haber offers a reinterpretation of Latin American industrialisation,
advancing three arguments: first, there is no neat divide between the export-led growth and
the ISI periods; secondly, industrialisation began as an endogenous outcome of the growth
of the export sector; finally, once it got underway, governments enacted protectionist
Cárdenas, E., Ocampo, J. A. and 
orp, R. ‘Introduction’ in Cárdenas, E. et al. An Economic... p. .
Cárdenas, E. et al. ‘Introduction’ p. .
Hirschman, A. ‘
e Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America’ in Quarterly Journal
of Economics ()Vol. , No. , p. .
Ocampo, J. A. ‘Hirschman, La Industrialización y la Teoría del Desarrollo’ in Desarrollo y Sociedad () No. , pp.
–.
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policies at the behest of manufacturers. 
is study aligns itself more closely with these
interpretations, but it aims to make clear contributions on two fronts. It will go beyond
reinterpretation, substantiating with empirical evidence why economic-policy making
efforts were not directed at industry and where (and how) these efforts went. It will also
challenge Haber’s view that trade protectionist policies were the prize of industrialists
and industrial unions — going further, it will also question the very notion of ‘trade
protectionism’. In doing so, the dissertation presents the case for a political economy of
non-state-led industrialisation or non-ISI, an approach previously unexplored.
Finance and Economic Development

at there is a relationship between finance and economic growth and development is
not controversial. On the contrary, there is a near consensus amongst academics that
finance matters — and for this reason deserves to be studied. Nevertheless, it is not so
clear-cut how. 
us, the obvious questions are how and why these relationships emerge,
how finance affects growth and vice versa, and how the structure of a financial system
promotes or retards growth. Before starting with the literature review it is necessary to
explain briefly why financial systems arise and what their core economic functions are.
Levine’s comprehensive review provides sound definitions. Following in North’s steps,
he sustains that financial markets and institutions emerge to ameliorate transaction and
information costs in uncertain environments (the real world). Financial systems fulfil
five key economic functions: mobilise resources for investment by agglomerating capital
from disparate savers; two, allocate these resources; three, exert corporate control and
monitor managers; four, facilitate the exchange of goods and services; five, ease the trading,
hedging, pooling, and diversification of risk. 
e efficient functioning of the financial
Haber, S. ‘Development Strategy or Endogenous Process? 
e Industrialization of Latin America’ () SCID
Working Paper, No. , p. .
Haber, S. ‘Development...’ p. .
North, D. ‘Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Development’ ().
Levine, R. ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’ in Journal of Economic Literature
() Vol. , p. .
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system in turn promotes economic growth by increasing the rate of capital accumulation
and via the encouragement of technological innovations.
Gerschenkron was not the first to suggest that finance matters, but as noted above, he
was a pioneer in highlighting the problem of finance — that is of providing capital to
industry — as a critical condition for backward economies to catch up and in including
it in a theory of development. It was Cameron and Patrick, however, who theorise or
schematise some of the important interactions between finance and industrialisation. 
ese
authors suggest three type-cases: “() the case in which inadequate finance restricts or
hinders industrial and commercial development; () the case in which the financial system
is purely permissive and accommodates all ‘credit-worthy’ borrowers; and finally () the
case in which financial institutions either actively promote new investment opportunities
or encourage applicant for finance to come forward, provide them with advice and extra
services, etc.” Clearly, financial institutions matter for economic development, potentially
affecting the pace and progress (or not) of industrialisation. 
e advantages of a type
() financial system are evident, but the concrete problems that inadequate financing
brings about to manufacturing are not so straightforward, and the cited authors do not
hypothesise much on this.
Fortunately, Schwarz traces some generalisations about the consequences of inadequacies
in both the availability and the terms of industrial financing, drawing on extensive empirical
knowledge from developing countries. 
e first failing, insufficient access to financing
unsurprisingly generates the most obvious adverse downside: the formation of a reduced
and suboptimal level of industrial development. Also important are recurrent episodes of
boom-and-bust cycles of growth — resembling the effects caused by shortages of foreign
exchange. Further problems come in the form of discrimination against small enterprises
and new undertakings, plant-operations inefficiencies, working-capital bottlenecks, and as
result of reliance upon foreign funds, country-tied aid that create biases against labour-
Levine, R. ‘Financial...’ p. .
Cameron, R. and Patrick, H. ‘Introduction’ in Cameron, R. (Ed) Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization ()
p. .
Schwarz, H. ‘Problems of Industrial Financing in Latin America’ in García-Zamor, J. and Sutin, S. (Eds) Financing
Development in Latin America () p. .
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using technologies — where there might be natural comparative advantages. Outgrowths
of the second kind, particularly conditionalities attached to the interest rate and/or the
repayment timeframe, are likely to impact the choice of technology, the optimality of the
production-factors ‘mix’, and the structure of incentives to which industrial entrepreneurs
respond. It is through the study of actual historical experiences, that the insights offered
are grounded.
Gerschenkron presents valuable insights on how England financed its Industrial Revolu-
tion and how economically backward nations overcame the problem of providing capital
for industrialisation. On this case Gerschenkron stated: “the industrialisation in England
had proceeded without any substantial utilisation of banking for long-term investment
purposes. 
e more gradual character of the industrialisation process and the more consid-
erable accumulation of capital, first from earnings in trade and modernised agriculture,
and later from industry itself, obviated the pressure for developing any special institutional
devices for provision of long-term capital to industry...“ For England, following this line
of reasoning, capital came largely from ploughed-back profits and unfettered financial
markets. Cameron, however, noted the role of country banks, arguing that “the statistics on
the growth of country banking provide circumstantial evidence bearing on the relationship
between banking and industrialization.” 
ese organisations did play a role by means of
transfers through the banking system, from areas with surplus savings to areas with savings
deficits. Still, these organisations were relatively untouched by state intervention.

e case for Continental Europe was different. 
e less gradual industrialisation and
the relatively more scarce the capital, sustains Gerschenkron, were key in pressuring for
the practices of industrial investment activities there. In mid-nineteenth century France,
Crédit Mobilier was the forerunner of the great ‘mixed banks’, authorised to accept deposits
on current accounts for twice its paid capital and to issue both short-term obligations and
Schwarz, H. ‘Problems...’ pp. –.
Schwarz, H. ‘Problems...’ pp. –.
Gerschenkron, A. ‘Economic...’ p..
Cameron, R. ‘England, –’ in Cameron, R. (Ed) Banking... p. .
A useful review of the financial agents in the English case is Neal, L. ‘
e Finance of Business during the Industrial
Revolution’ in Floud, R. and McCloskey, D. (Eds) 
e Economic History of Britain since  () Vol. .

R L R
long-term bonds. 
e ability to borrow short and lend long made this bank to specialise
in big financial projects both at home and beyond, critically, in railways and public works.
Alas, the prominence of Crédit Mobilier was fleeting. Immersed in the boom-and-bust
of a real-estate bubble, the entity was forced into liquidation in . 
e return of the
monopolistic position of the Bank of France in financial markets and of the restrictive
banking legislation and practices it fathered, according to Cameron, had the most damaging
effects on the French economy. 
e progress of France’s industrialisation continued to be
stunted because of its banking system: an inadequate number and distribution of bank
offices, little financial specialisation, artificial constraints on credit, and an inelastic and
expensive stock of money. Crédit Mobilier faded away without materialising a concrete
finance-industry link.
It was the emergence of German ‘universal’ or ‘mixed’ banks, combining short-term
commercial financing with long-term industrial investment what turned to be the key and
lasting institutional device substituting for missing prerequisites, which latecomers needed
to spur industrial growth. Banks substituted for missing efficient capital markets. According
to Tilly, there were two dimensions to the banking functions of these organisations: first,
the entrepreneurial or promotional aspect, by which banks organise new enterprises, and
identifying them with their own credit standing, succeeded in attracting savings to these
ventures directly; and secondly, the funding side, by which short-term financing created by
the bankers was converted into long-term investment. Like Credit Mobilier, the German
banks had extensive deals in infrastructure investments, but unlike the former, notable
associations with manufacturing firms also evolved, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia
and Silesia. It is from these cases that the reputation of German banks as the financiers of
industry came to prominence. In short, though the institutional innovation of the ‘mixed’
bank was not pioneered in Germany, banks there were first to channel significant financial
resources and entrepreneurship to support industrial development.
Cameron, R. ‘France, –’ in Cameron, R. (Ed) Banking... , p. . A well-documented and powerful critique
to Cameron has been advanced by Hoffman et al. who demonstrate that impersonal lending was abundant in late
th-century Paris (through the mediation of notaries); and in doing so, also challenging the view that industrialisation
was necessarily linked to the rise of capital markets or banking systems; see Hoffman, P., Postel-Vinay, G. and Rosenthal,
J. L. ‘Priceless Markets: 
e Political Economy of Credit in Paris, –’ ().
Cameron, R. ‘France...’ p. .
Tilly, R. ‘Germany, –’ in Cameron, R. (Ed) Banking ... , p. .
Tilly, R. ‘Germany...’ p. .
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e Russian case for providing capital for industrialisation is distinct from that of
Continental Europe. 
is time the degree of economic backwardness was so accentuated
and the scarcity of capital of such magnitude that Gerschenkron pointed out: “no banking
system could conceivably succeed in attracting sufficient funds to finance a large-scale
industrialisation; the standards of honesty in business were so disastrously low, the general
distrust of the public so great, that no bank could have hoped to attract even such small
capital funds as were available, and no bank could have successfully engaged in long-term
credit policies...” Russia’s backwardness made the Continental European institutional
arrangements that substituted for capital markets unworkable. In Russia, a different device
was tried, namely direct state intervention. Remarkable success in directing incomes from
consumption to investment was achieved through severe governmental exactions from an
already impoverished population.
To summarise, in Gerschenkron’s view, different degrees of economic backwardness
called for diverse institutional arrangements in the methods with which each nation tried
to provide capital for industry. Previously accumulated surpluses and market forces in
England needed to be replaced by development banks that supplied long-term borrowing
in Continental Europe, and onerous tax efforts that allowed direct state intervention in
Russia. Now, in Latin America, and more specifically in Colombia as will be seen later, dis-
tinct institutional arrangements were made, combining the direct entrepreneurial qualities
of universal banks with the subscription of venture or equity capital for industrial under-
takings, as illustrated and examined in chapter four, where the history of the Colombian
Institute for Industrial Development is reconstructed.

e approach and findings of Gerschenkron did not go unchallenged. Sylla’s compilation
of criticisms include: the view that banks mattered only in countries with moderate
economic backwardness (they mattered everywhere), the lack of evidence linking only
spurts in industrial growth with the appearance of banks, and the timing of the emergence
of banks with industrialisation itself. More recently, Edwards and Ogilvie pose a head-
on challenge to the view that the relationship between universal banks and industrial
Gerschenkron, A. ‘Economic...’ p. .
Gerschenkron, A. ‘Economic...’ p. .
Sylla, R. ‘
e Role of Banks’ in Sylla, R. and Toniolo, G. (Eds) Patterns of European Industrialisation () pp. –.
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companies was pivotal in Germany’s late-nineteenth century rapid industrialisation by
analysing the empirical evidence of that relationship. 
eir challenge is grounded on
three findings. First, universal banks accounted for a relatively small proportion of the
total assets of financial institutions; second, the industrial firms on which universal banks
concentrated were joint-stock companies, but their contribution to their financing was
much more limited than previously thought; third, industrial joint-stock firms accounted
only for a small share of overall industrial activity. From the above follows that other
financial institutions, such as savings banks, mortgage banks, and credit cooperatives
supplied external finance to the industrial firms which were not joint-stock companies, but
which accounted for most of the industrial capital stock in Germany. In other words,
the role of universal banks in the industrialisation spurt of pre-war Germany has been
over-estimated, in turn, raising doubts about the conventionally-held belief that a bank-
based system of investment finance is superior to a market-based one. 
e criticisms are
relevant for this study, insofar as they call for the need to go beyond the actions of private
commercial banks in identifying the suppliers of industrial finance. 
is is particularly
relevant with respect to the contributions of semi-private institutions, such as the CB and
the biggest mortgage institutions, as well as the role of the largest financial institution
in the Colombian banking system, the Agrarian, Mining and Industrial Bank, a fully,
publicly-owned intermediary.
Despite the valid criticisms, the work of Gerschenkron has been enormously influential
on how economic historians think about the relationship between finance and economic
development. 
e most evident signal of this is the avalanche of studies directed at
supporting, challenging or extending his hypotheses and findings. Doubtless, his most
significant contribution to economic history remains that of the provision of a framework
to analyse the process of economic development in general. For the purpose of this review,
Edwards, J. Ogilvie, S. ‘Universal Banks and German Industrialisation: A Reappraisal’ in Economic History Review
() Vol. , No. .
Edwards, J. Ogilvie, S. ‘Universal...’ pp. , –.
Edwards, J. Ogilvie, S. ‘Universal...’ p. .
See for example Frydman, R. (Ed) ‘Needed Mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Finance in Eastern Europe’ in
Economic Transition () Vol. , No. .
See for example Good, D. ‘Backwardness and the Role of Banking in Nineteenth-century European Industrialisation’
in Journal of Economic History () Vol. , No. ; and Davis, J. and Mathias, P. (Eds) ‘
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().
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his identification of the need for capital investment and its institutional substitutes in the
process of rapid late-industrialisation is a key insight. A field of significant importance
that Gerschenkron neglected, however, was that of the environment in which banking
institutions operate; that is to say, the laws, regulations, and customs governing the financial
system. 
is historiographical void drew the scholarly attention of Cameron.
Like Gerschenkron, Cameron utilised a historical, comparative analysis to approach the
finance-growth relationship. His broadest preoccupation was that of how the structure
of the financial system, and the way in which it operated, contributed (or retarded) the
process of industrialisation. Cameron acknowledged the existence of various factors at play
in determining the efficiency of that system, such as legal, institutional, administrative
and even geographical. Chief among them, however, was the legislation that governed
it. Cameron also recognised that the most relevant function of the financial system
for the purpose of industrialisation was the mobilisation of capital — a system typically
dominated by banks. Hence, banking legislation concerning the mobilisation of capital
lay at the core of his study. 
e structural features of the financial system were defined
by the legal status of banking regarding freedom of note issue, freedom of incorporation,
legal recognition of financial assets, and obstacles to the formation of companies coupled
with state actions shifting resources from consumption to production, and in the form
of the size of government deposits in banks. 
e capacity of any banking system to
contribute to industrialisation depended, in turn, on the density of banks, their size, and
the concentration and level of competition amongst them. In a stylised way, the higher
the density, the larger the size, and the more competitive the banking system, the more
likely that banks would serve industrial growth.
In short, Cameron accounted for the determinants of the structure of the banking
system, stressing the system’s features and linking them to its capacity to contribute to
industrialisation. Two consequences derived from this analytical approach. 
e first was
thematic. His pioneering effort at unearthing the determinants of the structure of the
Cameron, R. ‘Banking...’ p. .
Cameron, R. ‘Banking...’ p. .
Cameron, R. ‘Banking...’ p. .
Cameron, R. ‘Banking...’ pp. –, .
Cameron, R. ‘Banking...’ pp. –.
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banking system and its relationship with industrialisation inspired a growing number of
scholars to further that line of research. 
e second was interpretative. By assigning banks
an active role in the process of industrialisation and the acceleration of economic growth,
he revised the entrenched view that took banking as a passive and mechanically-driven
supplier of funds. A group of scholars that has followed closely the lead of Cameron in
studying the legal framework of banking and its impact on economic growth has made a
noticeable contribution, which is assessed next.
La Porta et al. seek to establish whether laws pertaining to investor protection and their
enforcement differ across countries and whether these differences have consequences upon
corporate finance and hence on economic performance. 
e authors divide a sample of
 countries into four broad legal families based on their historical background, sources
of law, and jurists’ methodology amongst other features. 
e four legal families broadly
speaking are: one, common law countries (UK, US, and former British colonies); two,
French civil law countries (France, Italy, Spain and its former colonies); three, German
civil law countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan); and
last, the Nordic civil law countries. Focusing first on shareholder and creditor rights, the
authors find that common law countries protect investors the most, French civil law the
least, and Nordic and German civil law ones do so somewhere in between. 
ey further
argue that in response to such relatively investor-unfriendly laws, countries with French
legal tradition might practice strict enforcement of law and exhibit high levels of ownership
concentration of shares. Regression analyses and means tests suggest that, indeed French
civil law countries have the highest levels of ownership concentration, but fail to confirm
the assumption about strict enforcement. 
us, an investor in a French civil law nation
is neither protected by the laws nor the system enforcing them. 
e opposite is true in
common law nations, whilst in German and Nordic law ones concentration of ownership
is less acute and enforcement sound.
For a review of this literature, see Levine, R. ‘Financial...’
La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. ‘Law and Finance’ () NBER Working Paper, No.
.
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Why do these findings matter? Essentially, La Porta et al. hold the view that investor
protection contributes to the external financing of firms, which in turn enhances economic
efficiency. So, poor enforcement of law and inadequate protection of shareholders and
creditors rights in French civil law countries should translate into fewer opportunities in
these countries for firms to access external financing. In other words, the kind of legal
family a country develops (or inherits) is likely to determine a central characteristic of
corporate finance, i.e. external financing. But does external finance matter for growth?
Before providing an answer to this question three criticism can be levelled at La Porta
et al. study. First, the importance the authors attach to company and bankruptcy laws
and their impact on growth via external financing might be overestimated. 
is is so
because other sets of laws, for instance those affecting the banking and other financial
institutions or those concerning disclosure rules, may well have bigger impacts on the
relationship between financial structure and economic performance, than the one the
authors concentrate on. In other words, laws on other aspects governing the financial
system may overshadow the effects of company and bankruptcy laws. Second, their focus
on publicly listed companies to account for the concentration of ownership and of poorly
functioning capital markets might fit better the actual structure of ownership in developed
nations than in developing ones. 
is is due to the fact that the number of publicly
traded firms in the latter is substantially smaller. 
e number of family-owned companies
in developing nations is large, hence their sample might not be representative for these
countries. 
ird, it is reasonable to argue that despite belonging to different kinds of
legal families, all Western European nations have, broadly speaking, attained the status
of developed economies, which minimises the significance of legal family as independent
variable. Having made these qualifications it is time to return to the above question: does
external finance really matter? 
is is a critical question for this thesis.
Rajan and Zingales hint at answers. 
ey examine whether financial development
facilitates economic growth with the following logic in mind: nations with developed
financial systems are capable of reducing the costs of external finance to firms, especially
for capital-intensive sectors. 
is contributes significantly to these firms’ faster growth.
Rajan, R. Zingales, L. ‘Financial Dependence and Growth’ in American Economic Review () Vol. , No. .
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us, firms in industries such as pharmaceuticals, plastics, electric machinery, ships, and
computing, when operating in economies where financial development is deep grow
comparatively faster than the same industries in countries where the financial systems
are less developed. 
us, external finance matters for growth, at least in the context of
firms with substantial needs of capital and technological innovation. Similarly, research
by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic find that firms with access to more developed stock
markets grow at faster rates than they would have without such access. But do these
cross sectional studies based on regression analyses establish clear cut causality? Levine
argues that they do not because financial development may predict growth simply because
financial systems develop in anticipation of economic growth. A richer basis to establish
causality may come from country-case studies and historical approaches. Haber’s and
Hanley’s studies represent this stream of the literature.
Haber researches the links between capital market development and degrees of intra-
industry concentration. Significant differences in capital access for textile industries
between Brazil, Mexico and the US help to account for their differences in structure,
namely levels of concentration. Whilst in the US, access to institutional finance was never
a major obstacle, in Mexico and Brazil, for most of the nineteenth century, the majority
of cotton textile industrialists had to rely on kinship networks for credit. Only at the
end of the century, liberalisation of financial market regulations in Brazil gave firms easier
access to external finance. What were the consequences of differential access to external
finance? Haber argues, first, that the problems of capital mobilisation in Brazil and Mexico
explained the relatively slow development of textile manufacturing in particular, and of
industry in general. Secondly, the existence of highly imperfect capital markets in these
countries translated into higher levels of industrial concentration than in the US. 
irdly,
the empirical finding of fallen rates of industrial concentration and a parallel boom in
production in the Brazilian textile sector after the liberalisation of financial markets in
As measured by domestic credit to private sector over GDP and total capitalisation over GDP.
Rajan, R. Zingales, L. ‘Financial...’ pp. –, –.
Cited in Levine, R. ‘Financial...’ p. .
Levine, R. ‘Financial...’ p. .
Haber, S. ‘Industrial Concentration and the Capital Markets: A Comparative Study of Brazil, Mexico, and the United
States, –’ in Journal of Economic History () Vol.  No. .
Haber, S. ‘Industrial...’ pp. , .
Haber, S. ‘Industrial...’ pp. –.
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the late s, suggests the role of external, impersonal finance in a country’s industrial
structure and its growth rate is rather important.
Another work by Haber adds to the list of virtues that freer and developed capital markets
generate for industry via increases in firm size and productivity. 
is time reforms in
the regulation of financial markets, more specifically shareholders’ limited liability and
mandatory disclosure laws, are said to have encouraged the spurt in industrial growth.
Likewise, Hanley’s study of the Sao Paulo stock-exchange in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries broaden the positive effects of well-functioning capital markets on
economic growth. Again, focusing on reforms to legislation regarding investors’ liability,
and on lowering the minimum thresholds for the formation of joint-stock companies,
the s saw a transformation in the Sao Paulo stock-exchange, a period known as
Enchilamento. Outstanding features of this change were: the emergence of new urban and
industrial firms, a dramatic growth in shareholding, and the appearance of markets for
bonded debt. Hanley argues that despite the ensuing stagnation of the stock market
after , the most significant effects of its thriving years were not macro, but micro
and institutional. 
at is, the exchange funded large firms that survived the decline of the
stock exchange and some of them turned into larger industrial conglomerates. Moreover,
it broadened its reach beyond traditional sectors, and introduced financial innovations.
Finally, this was essentially a domestic phenomenon independent of the whims of foreign
capital flows. To be fair, Haber’s and Hanley’s studies represent substantial contributions to
the relationship between finance, industrialisation and economic growth well embedded in
the territory of New Institutional Economic History. Haber does it by looking at the impact
of the institution of capital markets and its regulations, and Hanley by concentrating on
the laws governing investor and firms behaviours. Returning to the question of whether or
not external finance matters for industrial and wide-economy growth; the answers from
Haber, S. ‘Industrial...’ pp. –.
Haber, S. ‘
e Political Economy of Financial Market Regulation and Industrial Productivity Growth in Brazil,
–’ in Haber, S. (Ed) Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America: Essays in Policy, History and
Political Economy () pp. –.
Haber, S. ‘
e Political...’ p. .
Hanley, A. ‘Business Finance and the Sao Paulo Bolsa, –’ in Coatsworth, J. and Taylor, A. (Eds) Latin
America and the World Economy since  ().
Hanley, A. ‘Business...’ p. .
Hanley, A. ‘Business...’ pp. –.
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both cross-sectional and case-specific and comparative studies is that it does, and to a
significant extent.
Brazil’s short-lived Enchilamento, however, came to be neither representative nor repli-
cated to any significant and lasting extent in Latin America. Dynamic stock exchanges,
as characterised by liquid, deep and wide markets for securities (both in shares and in
bonds) did not emerge. Basch and Kybal succinctly describe the state of these markets in
the late s: “... generally speaking, stock exchanges in Latin America do not yet play
an important role as instrument for increasing the liquidity of the capital market and for
facilitating the mobilization and channeling of financial resources.” 
e situation seems
not to differ from the norm in other less developed regions, where, as McKinnon notes,
the prime role in financing development falls to banking organisations: “
e absence of
open markets in primary securities means that the monetary system has a much more
important role as intermediary between savers and investors.” 
e fact that banking, in
particular private commercial banks, represented the most important component of the
financial system had also been the historical experience of the early- and late-industrialisers
in Europe, as Cameron highlights. 
erefore, banks are given extensive attention in this
dissertation.
A first glance at the regional picture in banking would suggest that the state of industrial
financing in Latin America was complicated. 
e Economic Commission for Latin America
(CEPAL) reports in the s, according to Schwartz, give reason to doubt financing was
adequate. Rehearsing the findings of the UN body, that author indicates: “... prevalence of
short-term credit, high interest rates, and loans with little or no foreign exchange content
led CEPAL to conclude that conditions for industrial financing in Latin America were
highly unfavourable...” 
e latter may have been the case for private credit, but not
necessarily for public lending. In the absence of comprehensive comparative studies dealing
with the evolution of banking in Latin America, brief individual snapshots of the largest
Basch, A. and Kybal, M. ‘Capital Markets in Latin America: A General Survey and Six Country Studies’ () pp.
–.
McKinnon, R. I. ‘Financial Policies’ in O’Brien, P. (Ed) ‘Industrialisation: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy’
() Vol. , p. .
Cameron, R. and Patrick, H. ‘Introduction’ p. .
Schwartz, H. ‘Problems...’ p. .
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economies, certainly ISI-nations, help in putting this dissertation’s case study in context, as
well as supplying another justification for the endeavour. Schwartz recognises the major
role of state-owned financial institutions in supplying manufacturing credit in Argentina
and Mexico, where the ratio of publicly financed industrial credit to GDP rose above the
ratio of all bank credit to GDP in some of the most developed economies. In the case
of Argentina, a recent revisionist trend questions the traditionally-held view of an alleged
anti-industrial bias of financing institutions before . For later periods, the evidence
indicating that industry was a net winner in terms of ordinary and preferential financing
is solid. Rougier’s data show that loans advanced by the Industrial Bank during the late
s and until the mid-s, entailed annual implicit subsidies ranging from moderate
 to a substantial . Under Peronism, in the words of Barbero and Rocchi: “the
financial environment could not have been better for industry.” 
is tendency did not
seem to have been seriously reversed following Peron’s fall, and by the late s and early
s subsidised credit for very large domestic industrial firms or sectors were deemed
crucial to compensate for high wages and diminishing profitability.

e Mexican case appears not to have been different. First, a gigantic public develop-
mentalist agency, Nacional Financiera S.A. (NAFINSA), who for long monopolised the
right to contract foreign debt, directed substantial amounts of subsidised resources to
industrialists. 
e accomplishments of NAFINSA at promoting economic development
have been also noted by Marichal. Secondly, a discrimination of loans and securities held
by public and private intermediaries (including private and government banks, common
Notable exceptions are studies on central banking; see for instance Tamagna, F. ‘Central Banking in Latin America’
().
Schwartz, H. ‘Problems...’ p. .
Barbero, M. and Rocchi, F. ‘Industry’ in della Paolera, G. and Taylor, A. (Eds) A New Economic History of Argentina
() p. .
Rougier, M. ‘La Política Crediticia del Banco Industrial durante el Primer Peronismo, –’ () CEEED
Documento de Trabajo, No. , p. .
Barbero, M. and Rocchi, F, ‘Industria’ p. .
Rougier, M. ‘Estado, Empresas y Crédito en la Argentina. Los Orígenes del Banco Nacional de Desarrollo, –’
in Desarrollo Económico () Vol. , No. , p. .
For a comparison of the balance sheets of Latin America’s largest developmental institutions in the s; see Bach, A.
and Kybal, M. ‘Capital...’ p. . For works on NAFINSA; see Ramirez, M. ‘Development Banking in Mexico: 
e
Case of Nacional Financiera, S.A.’ () and Blair, C. ‘Nacional Financiera: Entrepreneurship in a Mixed Economy’ in
Vernon, R. (Ed) Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Mexico ().
Marichal, C. ‘El Papel de la Banca de Desarrollo en México’ in Comercio Exterior, Revista de Análisis Económico’ ()
Vol. .
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trusts and NAFINSA), indicates that between  and , on average, a stunning 
of the resources allocated flowed to industry. Del Angel Mobarak, in regards to the role
of finance in economic development, remarks: “Between  and  Mexico fashioned
a financial system that spurred its economy to unprecedented and sustained growth levels
and earned it high praise from US and Mexican scholars of that time.”
Evidence of financial support for Brazil’s industry comes from Leff, who demonstrates
that between the late s and the mid-s allocation policies strongly favoured a
heavily-influenced and government owned public industrial sector — and not only in
terms of preferential credit. 
e work of Tyler corroborates these findings, emphasising
that large subsidies flowed to big private and public enterprises, as well as to transnational
corporations. In short, Brazil too seems to have escaped from serious industrial financing
constraints. 
is very brief review of the Argentinian, Brazilian and Mexican cases, suggests
that manufacturing in general enjoyed wide access to credit and that it often did so on
privileged terms, especially from public sources. 
e question then is: How was the
situation of industrial financing like in Colombia? No study known to this author has
comprehensively examined both private and public credit suppliers for the –
period, and perhaps even more critically, no efforts at disentangling the political economy
motivations underlying the arrangements in place have been made. 
is latter point is a
weakness plaguing several of the works cited here. 
us, having put the case study in the
regional context and having identified the potential area for this thesis’ contribution, the
turn is to analyse the literature on the politics behind the allocation of financial resources.
Most of the literature dealing with the politics of finance revolves around the state and
the power of interest groups. 
e state’s actions and omissions, and its role as an arena
where different sectors of the society and the economy compete for resources and push
for their interests stand out as main research topics. Rajan and Zingales are among those
who favour political theory to account for the differences in financial development across
Calculations by this author based on the study by Del Angel Mobarak, G. ‘Paradoxes of Financial Development: 
e
Construction of the Mexican Banking System, –’ () Table ., p. .
Del Angel Mobarak, G. ‘Paradoxes...’ p. .
Leff, N. ‘Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, –’ () Ch. .
Tyler, W. ‘
e Development and Financing of Small-Scale Industry in Brazil’ in García-Zamor, J. and Sutin, S. (Eds)
Financing... pp. –.
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countries and over time. 
eir main argument holds that it is the strength of political
forces in the form of interest groups what effectively blocks financial development. More
specifically, they claim, it is vested interests in finance and industry standing to lose from
increases in competition that wide and open access to financial resources breed, what
makes these groups hostile to arm’s length markets. Essentially, a more efficient financial
system is likely to facilitate entry of new firms in markets where incumbents prevail 
is
in turn lowers the latter’s profit margins and consequently generates an urgent interest in
preventing financial development. In other words, it is against the competition-enhancing
effects of financial development that industrial and financial incumbents mobilise. 
e
logic underlying this ambitious theory of financial underdevelopment does not exhibit
major shortcomings. 
e formidable challenge consists of capturing a variable that can
represent the enormous diversity of interest groups (both from finance and from industry)
across countries and throughout the twentieth century that the authors need to fit in
their theory. Not surprisingly, they do not select one that directly represents the strength,
power, or political clout of industry-finance interests. Instead, openness to trade in product
and capital markets is said to represent such interests. With this proxy for interest
groups the authors regress openness to trade (trade volume over GDP) on the dependent
variable, financial development (captured by equity market capitalisation over GDP) and
find it to be positively correlated and statistically significant. Ultimately, what Rajan
and Zingales argue is that financial and industrial vested interests determine the levels of
financial development by mounting barriers to trade and capital flows between nations.

ere are three major problems with this approach. First, the heroic underlying assump-
tion is that a country’s commercial code regime depends exclusively on the monopoly
of political power held by a narrow coalition of finance and industry. However, there
is a wide range of other factors that can alter such grip, including political institutions,
development ideologies, and international wars to name the most obvious. Second, the
premise that financiers could only oppose financial development for fears of competition
Rajan, G. and Zingales, L. ‘
e Great Reversals: 
e Politics of Financial Development in the th Century’ ()
NBER Working Paper, No. .
Rajan, G. and Zingales, L. ‘
e Great...’ p. .
Rajan, G. and Zingales, L. ‘
e Great...’ pp. –.
Rajan, G. and Zingales, L. ‘
e Great...’ pp. , .
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from abroad neglects the possibility that they themselves can make profits. Free inter-
national flows of financial resources increase their opportunities for arbitrage and from
fees earned arranging international transactions. 
e need of Rajan and Zingales to
find a proxy capturing differences in interest group strengths across time and space to
fit in their model is understandable; however, this also leads them to make the highly
reductionist claims on behaviour which very much undermines the explanatory power of
their analysis. 
ird, their approach leaves virtually no room for agency on the part of the
state. A historical reappraisal of views that see states as mere instruments of certain social
groups, together with views that states are structurally constrained by economic conditions
to act independently, suggests flaws in these conceptions. In sum, a thin and sophisticated
statistical quest for patterns in the politics of finance does not replace thick history.
A less ambitious yet more insightful approach to the subject is offered by Sikkink, who
does not focus on the role of interest groups preventing financial development, but rather
highlights one key aspect of the state involved in financing developmental objectives: the
capacity to achieve them. Sikkink selects two historical cases, Brazil under Kubitschek
and Argentina under Frondizi, to compare their respective state’s capacities in the context of
developmentalist politics. 
e question is about the performance of two key organisations
designed to promote economic development, as represented by two state-owned banks, 
e
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico (BNDE) in Brazil and the Banco Industrial
Argentino (BIA). Sikkink notices that even though the responsibilities of both institutions
were similar, their actual contribution to the process of economic development was very
different. 
e BIA failed to become a vehicle for developmentalism in terms of long-
term credit support to transport and energy infrastructure and the promotion of new, and
expansion of existing, basic industries. Sikkink draws this conclusion from looking at
the patterns of the composition of loans granted by BIA during the s. 
e absence
of a shift in credit away from light industries into the production of capital and basic
goods, coupled with the fact that interest rates were often negative due to high inflation
Maxfield, S. ‘Bankers’ Alliances and Economic Policy Patterns: Evidence from Mexico and Brazil’ in Comparative
Political Studies () Vol. , No. , p. .
Sikkink, K. ‘Las Capacidades y la Autonomía del Estado en Brazil y la Argentina: Un Enfoque Neoinstitucionalista’
in Desarrollo Económico () Vol. , No. .
Sikkink, K. ‘Brazil...’ p. .
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leads her to argue, that what the BIA did was to subsidise indiscriminately horizontal
industrialisation. 
ough some of Sikkink’s conclusions are debatable, a common
denominator in the literature is the existence of a gap between the operations on the
ground of the bank and the missions trusted in its mandate.

e BNDE fared better, as the bulk of its portfolio exhibits concentration in three main
areas: electric energy, railways and basic industries. In this sense the BNDE, unlike
BIA, is said to have fulfilled its role within the context of developmentalism. Yet, what
explains the differences in performance between BNDE and BIA? In one word: politics.
BIA lacked institutional autonomy. First, its directorship was stacked with representatives
of industry, agriculture, and others directly appointed by the president. 
is wrested
autonomy from the institution in the process of credit allocation. Second, dependence
on the CBs’ resources for its operations made it even more vulnerable to government
political requirements that needed not be economically sound. Although BNDE directors
were also appointed by the president there was no requisite to include representatives of
producer groups, and often its staff were recruited from a pool of technocrats formed
in the civil service body. In short, the BNDE enjoyed more relative autonomy when it
came to pursuing its developmental purposes; this in turn made it more effective. To
sum up, unlike Rajan and Zingales, Sikkink does not claim that interest group politics
prevented financial development in Argentina or Brazil. Instead, she suggests, that the lack
of institutional autonomy from government politics and producer interests affected the
direction of the flow of financial resources. 
is insight will resurface when the historical
examination of the Colombian BNDE and BIA equivalent is conducted.
Lukauskas follows Sikkink’s line of thought (examining the Spaniard case), but exagger-
ates the purposiveness of the state in the utilisation of finance for political aims. Lukauskas
contends that public officials intervene in financial markets to advance their own self-
interest, not to promote aggregate social welfare. Specifically, he asserts: “self-interested
public officials implement financial restriction to further their personal goals.” 
e key
Sikkink, K. ‘Brazil...’ p. .
Sikkink, K. ‘Brazil...’ pp. –.
Lukauskas, A. ‘
e Political Economy of Financial Restriction: 
e Case of Spain’ in Comparative Politics () Vol.
, No., p. .
Lukauskas, A. ‘
e Political...’ p. .
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question is: what are the characteristics of financial repression and why do governments
pursue them? Among the most important features are: First, controls on deposit and loan
interest rates; second, selective credit policies; third, subsidised credit to favoured sectors;
finally, imposition upon banks of heavy reserve requirements and asset restrictions.
Governments seek to implement these measures, Lukauskas claims, because it allows them
to solve two serious problems facing all regimes; revenue generation and the buying of
political support from strategically important constituencies. For the purpose of this
review the chief outcome of financial restriction is the capacity it gives state officials to
politicise the allocation of credit through its allocation. Although Lukauskas does not
specify which particular sectors enjoyed the benefits of subsidised credit, he asserts, that
among the winners of privileged credit circuits were the domestic banks, large industrial
companies, firms owned by friends and relatives of Franco and its allies, and the regime
itself, which regularly accounted for around a third of the credit allocated through the
banking system. In short, Lukauskas advances an explanation of the politics of financial
restriction decisively led by state officials with the purpose of remaining in power. A
repressed financial system allows the regime to finance itself, and also gains the support of
the economic groups that benefit from directed programs of credit, which offer resources
at heavily subsidised rates.
Logical and well argued, the study by Lukauskas ignores three issues that make his
explanation incomplete. First, because of his emphasis on how the Franco regime uses
the banking system to buy support and retain political power he neglects the issue of
whether or not, taken as a whole, Franco’s financial policies enhanced dynamic industrial
development and rapid economic growth. 
is is important because one of his opening
premises is that intervention in financial markets not only served the purposes of personal
interests, but that they do so at the expenses of aggregate welfare. 
ere is plenty of
evidence and discussion about the first part of this claim, but nothing about the latter in
his analysis. Second, Lukauskas relies too much on the political supply-side of financial
repression, i.e. the Franco regime, but fails to mention its demand-side, namely, the
Lukauskas, A. ‘
e Political...’ p. .
Lukauskas, A. ‘
e Political...’ pp. –.
Lukauskas, A. ‘
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proactive role of industrialists and groups with vested interests in pushing for such an
arrangement. Finally, Lukauskas underestimates the potential benefits of interventions in
financial markets. 
ere is an important body of literature arguing that the experiences of
late-industrialisers with credit-control policies and other heterodox interventions in the
financial system positively affected the performance of their industrialisation processes
and quickened the paces of their economic growth. Woo offers a critical study on the
subject.
Woo examines the interrelations between finance, industrialisation, and the state in
the context of the successful industrial transformation of South Korea. She argues
that South Korea’s position in the global geopolitical system of the Cold War era put it
in a privileged position, as security concerns permitted the Rhee and Park regimes to
mobilise financial resources for economic development with Japan and the US acting as
guarantors. 
e most important characteristics of the Korean financial system were that
it was bank-based and state-owned. 
e implication of being bank-based was that firms
had to rely heavily on credit from banks only if new investments were to go beyond what
retained earnings permitted them. Since banks were state-owned and the regime promoted
policies of industrial upgrading, the state was interested in lending private businesses
profusely and at subsidised rates. 
e commitment of the state to industry is best captured
in the unprecedented, towering levels of leverage that Korean firms reached around the
s. By one account, the debt-to-equity ratio of firms oscillated between  and
, double those of Taiwan and Japan, and surpassing four times that of firms in Mexico
and Brazil, who were already borrowing heftily in international markets.

ere were downsides to such largesse. First, firms had to conform to macroeconomic
policies as minor changes in discount rates or changes in the terms of preferential credit
had magnifying effects on their financial flows. Second, efforts to maintain good relations
with the regime were crucial to avert chances of credit severance. 
ird, sectors and
See for instance; Amsden, A. ‘
e Rise of the Rest: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies’
(); Johnson, C. ‘MITI and the Japanese Miracle: 
e Growth of Industrial Policy, –’ ().
Woo, J. ‘Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialisation’ ().
Woo, J. ‘Race...’ p. .
Woo, J. ‘Race...’ pp. –.
Woo, J. ‘Race...’ p. .
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firms not prioritised by the state found it harder and dearer to access credit. Fourth, state
mobilisation of credit on preferential terms drove down bank interest rates, which had a
direct effect on household savings, causing them to flee to the curb market. Fifth, when
non-performing loans originated in a conglomerate, the need to avoid huge bankruptcy
often implied that the state had to bail them out. So, what was the political pact behind
the state-led policies of industrial financing in Korea? In one word: coalition. 
e success
of Korean business in upgrading their industries would not have been possible without
the ample and deep commitment that the Park regime offered them through the state-
owned credit-based support of the banking system. 
is conditional support, ensuring that
businesses conformed to state policies, cemented a tight coalition between business and
state, which was largely responsible for the Korean economic ‘miracle’. Briefly, the South
Korean case provides an example to counter Lukauskas’ pessimism in which state-induced
repression of the financial system positively served the wider goal of economic growth.

ese illustrations for and against successful state interventionism in industrial funding
serve as references in which to place the Colombian historical experience.

e literature reviewed so far has shown insights and problems accounting for the politics
underlying the mobilisation and allocation of financial resources for economic growth.
Rajan and Zingales are over-ambitious with their model of interest groups preventing
the development of financial markets throughout time and across space. 
ey neglect
international factors and confined the state to a passive role as victim at the hands of
financial-industrial incumbents. Sikkink brings the state back in, highlighting differences
in public developmental institutions and their performances due to issues of state capacity
and autonomy. Lukauskas also privileges the role of the state, and pushes further by
contending that practices of financial restriction only serve the personal interest of state
officials to retain political power and buy off strategic constituencies. Woo demonstrates
that those same practices of financial repression can be directed to good purpose and
fuel the process of industrial upgrade and rapid economic growth. 
ese contributions
can be seen in terms of political demand and supply determining the nature and kind
of financial system an economy develops. Rajan and Zingales offered as demand-side
Woo, J. ‘Race...’ p. .
Woo, J. ‘Race...’ p. .
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based explanation an all-powerful incumbent alliance of finance and industry perpetuating
financial underdevelopment. Sikkink is first to include the key actor in supply-side accounts,
the state, but portrays it with potentially serious deficiencies. Lukauskas also prefers the
supply-side explanation, but goes to the other extreme in that state officials’ greediness
explain all outcomes in a financially repressed system, muting the voice and power of
economic groups demanding credit. Woo strikes a balance, by acknowledging the existence
of a coalition between business and the state, but in her analysis the state is all pervasive
and finance demandeurs remain silent. What is missing is a framework that offers both
the political demand-and-supply sides of the story, and also recognises the influences of
international factors in determining the structures and functioning of financial systems
and the consumers of their services. Such framework has been devised.
Haggard and Maxfield starting point is the consideration of international factors. More
precisely, they are concerned with the (non)availability of external financial resources.
Access to foreign resources enhances the opportunities of governments to expand their
role as intermediaries with concomitant chances to extend support to preferred sectors.
Once international factors are considered, they move on to find the political equilibrium
that shapes the financial system. On the political demand-side lies the political power
of credit demandeurs, which depends on the relative size of industry in the economy, its
organisational strength and financial needs. 
e power of other groups competing for
resources, especially agriculture, and of those bearing the costs of cheap credits — e.g.
savers facing low deposit rates — is also likely to counter the strength of industrialists
appetite for finance. On the supply-side, the authors identify the intentions and interests
of ruling politicians and the structure of government institutions. 
e former concerns
the degree of insulation of the policy-making processes of key public institutions, such
as central banks and finance ministries. 
e latter allows for agency. Politicians mostly
concerned with macroeconomic stability, i.e. tamed inflation, are less likely to interfere in
the financial system, whereas leaders whose top priority is growth intervene by supporting
Haggard, S. and Maxfield, S. ‘Political Explanations of Financial Policy in Developing Countries’ in Haggard, S., Lee,
C. and Maxfield, S. (Eds) 
e Politics of Finance in Developing Countries () p. .
Haggard, S. and Lee, C. ‘
e Political Dimension of Finance in Economic Development’ in Haggard, S. et al. 
e
Politics... pp. –.
Haggard, S. and Maxfield, S. ‘Political...’ pp. –.
Haggard, S. and Lee, C ‘
e Political...’ p. .

R L R
preferential credit schemes. In other words, Haggard and Maxfield bring forward a
more complete and sophisticated theory to explain the politics underlying the functioning
of financial systems that features three broad elements: international conditions, a political
demand-side, and a political supply-side. On the demand-side argument, the political
clout of interest groups is taken into consideration, whilst on the supply-side the agency of
politicians and the structure of institutions in charge of monetary and financial policies is
also included. 
e dynamism and the flexibility of this framework to account for variations
in the functioning of different financial systems and the patterns of industrial financing
make this approach most useful when conducting research on the political aspects of
finance; hence the Haggard/Maxfield scheme will guide the empirical research of chapter
six.
Conclusions

e examination of the bodies of literature conducted above offers different paths and
lessons for research in the field of finance and growth. 
is review should conclude by
recalling the most important issues brought forward by the scholars of late-industrialisation.
First, it is clear from the experience of East Asia that high levels of investment are a
necessary condition for successful late-industrialisation. Second, it is the appropriate
political and institutional environment or a certain political economy, that guarantees that
these necessary investment levels are reached and that the resources are utilised productively.
Among the characteristics of this particular setting, a relatively equal distribution of
income, a competent and meritocratic bureaucracy, and a close relationship between
state and industrial capital are important. Historically, the constant repression of labour
under fairly authoritarian regimes seems to have served the purpose of inflating private
profits; naturally, the desirability of this condition in democratic environments is more
than questionable. 
ird, differences in economic performance among latecomers have
frequently been associated with variations in the type and quality of state intervention. A
growing taxonomy of states indicates that authoritative, purposive, and centralised states
exhibiting Weberian-like bureaucracies are more likely to be effective at economically
Haggard, S. and Maxfield, S. ‘Political...’ pp. –.
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developmental tasks. Finally, when comparing East Asia and Latin America, critics of
ISI tend to minimise the achievements of the latter and often reduce the problem to a
matter of development-strategy selection between ISI and EOI. 
e distinction is useful
but not particularly suitable for the purposes of this dissertation. Retaining a political
economy approach to explain Colombia’s experiences of industrialisation and of industrial
policy, a framework favouring both political supply- and demand-side variables with a
clear institutionalist bias will be applied.
Finance matters for growth, as pointed out early by the works of Gerschenkron and
Cameron. As both these authors suggest, the historical experiences of rich Western Euro-
pean countries show that there is no one way or model of financial system that fits all sizes.
Economies struggling to provide capital for industry must not copy others uncritically. On
the contrary, success with a wide range of institutional arrangements across nations hints
at the fact that each nation has to devise a model of its own, one that takes into account its
own political institutions, legal frameworks and culture. Equally, researchers working on
these topics must be careful with overstressing similarities among economies, and also look
for the distinctiveness and unique aspects of each financial system, the politics underlying
it, and its relationships with economic growth. Second, there are limits to what can be
said on the causality between finance and economic growth. As suggested by Levine,
one needs to be sceptical when faced with statistical accounts claiming causality between
finance and growth, whatever its kind, external finance and growth, capital markets access
and growth, or universal banks development and growth. Detailed historical accounts
registering changes in the structure, determinants, and functioning of financial systems and
their relationships with economic growth, à la Haber or à la Hanley, have more powerful
explanatory bases than regression analyses. 
ird, the politics surrounding the emergence
and functioning of financial systems remains fundamental. Haggard and Maxfield present
a framework that allows for agency of actors, such as politicians, a sectoral logic explaining
the behaviour of industrialists and their demands for financial resources, and an institu-
tional setting that mediates the clash of interests between the state and private interests. In
sum, one promising way to approach the field seems to be through an historical account
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that allows for agency mediated by institutions, and is not immune to the events of the
international context.

2 Colombia Since 1850: Endowments,
Economics and Politics

is chapter provides the historical background for the substantive research chapters of
the dissertation and locates these in the wider political, economic and social context of
mid-twentieth century Colombia. To achieve this objective it offers a stylised history
of the most relevant processes and events influencing the dependent variables of study:
state and industry. 
e task implies relying extensively on secondary literatures, although
occasionally, primary sources valued for their ‘first-handedness’, illustrate and complement
the arguments. 
e chapter is divided in six sections. It opens with a general picture of the
physical traits of the country and discusses how these have influenced broad social processes
from colonial times. Particular importance is given to the challenges that geography has
posed to market integration and economic development. 
e second part reviews the roles
foreign capital and labour, violence, the colonial legacy and international trade played in
the decades preceding the period of analysis, assisting in the characterisation of the broad
political economy of the country. Section three describes fleeting attempts at economic
integration with world markets, until the exportation of coffee. Assessments of the most
important impacts of the coffee-boom are also offered, stressing its effects on manufacturing.

e next section concentrates on industrial growth and development from the ‘take-off’
of the s to the late s. Emphasis is given to the Great Depression and the policy
responses it provoked. Section five concerns the nature of the Colombian state, its political
parties, regimes and the powers and limitations of the presidency with a view to understand
the polity in which industrial policies take place. 
e last section concludes.
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Colombia
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Basics: Geography and Transportation
Geography has played a central role in Colombia’s economic and political history. 
ough
there is no consensus about how and to what extent climatic, topographic and hydrologi-
cal characteristics have affected wider political and socio-economic patterns, a point of
convergence in the literature is that Colombia has always been a divided nation. Romoli
points at the most obvious: “All Colombia is divided into two parts, the mountainous and
the flat.” 
e division refers to the flat east and south east parts of the territory and the
mountainous parts to the west. 
e mountainous territory comprises the Andes range that
north of Ecuador and into Colombian territory break up in the Pasto knot, branching
out into three cordilleras running south to north — eastern, central and western. 
e
topography has set the pace for the pattern of settlements, for it is there, in the mountains,
or the hinterland highlands, that most of the country’s population settled during colonial
times and continues to live to the present day. 
e tropical lowlands, which account for
over  of the territory, have been sparsely populated.
Palacios and Safford divide the nation since pre-Columbian times into three main
regions: the East, including the intermontane valleys and the flanks and immediate
watershed regions of the Eastern Cordillera, plus the upper Magdalena Valley; the West,
consisting of the Central and Western Cordilleras and the Cauca Valley between them;
and the Caribbean coast. 
ey argue that Spanish conquest and settlement only served to
reinforce these regional divisions, so that the three zones developed their own particular
economies, distinct racial and cultural features, and characterised by political antagonism
and commercial competition between them. 
e forested lands of Choco and the Pacific
coast along with the Putumayo constitute a fourth physical region, yet scantly populated.
In ecozone terms, the country exhibits humid tropics, dry winter tropics, steppe/desert and
Bushnell, D. ‘Colombia: Una Nación a Pesar de Sí Misma’ () p. .
Romoli, K. ‘Colombia: Gateway to South America’ () cited in Fluharty, V. ‘Dance of the Millions: Military Rule
and the Social Revolution in Colombia, – ’ () p. .
Palacios, M. and Safford, F. ‘Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society’ () pp. –. According to census data,
the country’s population, increased from . million in  to  million by , having experience a ‘demographic
explosion’ during the s and s; see GRECO. ‘El Crecimiento Económico Colombiano en el Siglo XX’ ()
pp. –.
Palacios, M. and Safford, F. ‘Colombia...’ pp. –.
Palacios, M. and Safford, F. ‘Colombia...’ pp. –.
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humid temperate regions; whilst in geographical zones it contains Amazonian, lowland
Atlantic coast, lowland Pacific coast and tropical highlands varieties.
Located close to the equator and fully in the tropics, the mountains generate a wide
gamut of climates. In the words of Bell: “climate is a matter of elevation, and, where
elevations vary from sea level to the snow line at , feet, all varieties of climatic
conditions are encountered.” 
is fact has important economic consequences. First, since
colonial times Spaniards searching for cooler lands in the altitudes of the hinterland —
avoiding hot, damp weather and tropical diseases — set a pattern of settlement in reverse:
from the interior to the lowlands. Crucially, such a colonisation model located the largest
urban centres away from coastal ports, and thus further away from trade opportunities
with the outside world. Secondly, in the absence of seasons a wide range of thermal climate
floors — warm, temperate, cold and páramo — create so-called ‘vertical’ climates. In
relatively small pieces of territory different climatic conditions, at significantly diverse
elevations, prevail. 
is type of climate facilitates the production of a wide range of crops
in zones that are not far apart from each other, allowing for a sufficient availability of
diverse agricultural produce within relatively close distances, that made for moderately
rich diets and rendered long-distance interregional and international trade less urgent.
Economic fragmentation has been a long-standing national trait.
Bell’s handbook considered Colombia as a group of nine commercial districts, “each
different from the other and each possessing its distinct features with respect to climate,
transportation, living conditions, character of the people, and other economic and social
factors.” 
irty years later, another foreigner, Lauchlin Currie, distinguished four main
economic zones: Atlantic littoral, Eastern cordillera, Cauca Valley and Antioquia. It is
difficult to know if the reduction in economic zones, from nine to four, that exists between
the two observations is the result of integration between certain regional markets or if it is
Gallup, J., Gaviria, A. and Lora, E. ‘Is Geography Destiny? Lessons from Latin America’ () pp. –.
Bell, P. L. ‘Colombia: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook’ () p. .
Jaramillo, J. ‘La Personalidad Histórica de Colombia’ () p. .
Lafond, G. ‘Geographie Économique de I’Amerique’ () p. .
Bell, P. L. ‘Colombia...’ p. . His division of Colombia by commercial districts includes: Santa Marta, Barranquilla
and Magdalena, Cartagena, Bogota, Cali, Medellin, Bucaramanga, Cucuta and Manizales. For a detailed account of
each district; see pp. –.
Currie, L. ‘Bases de un Programa de Fomento para Colombia’ () p.  cited in Fluharty, V. ‘Dance...’ p. .
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down simply to non-comparable approaches. What is certain is that the twentieth century
saw processes of regional market integration, yet not of national markets. 
is was true for
both product markets and for factor markets. What caused this economic fragmentation?
Was it all down to topographical and climatic characteristics? Were other factors at play?
Given high levels of geographical fragmentation and the great distances between main
ports and large population centres, Colombia faced serious challenges if it were to attain
economies of scale, mass markets, regional specialisation and vibrant internal and exter-
nal trade. Significant improvements in transportation were indispensable to overcome
geography. How was transportation like in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century?
“Transportation is made extremely difficult and costly” and it was time-consuming and
unreliable. Bell, advised: “As in the case of all other journeys... time is the main factor,
and the trip from Medellin to Bogota is subject to many conditions and circumstances, all
making for delay en route.” Of particular concern for most journeys to and from the
interior, was the condition of the Magdalena River, “the main highway of traffic...” — well
into the twentieth century. 
e amount of water in the river during the dry season made
navigation obstacles, such as sand bars, mud banks and snags more frequent. From March
to April, navigation was practically suspended. If the picture of river transportation was
discouraging, terrestrial communication was not much better. According to McGreevy:
“At mid-century many of the principal overland routes had to be traversed by human
carriers because the poor quality of the ways prevented passage by mules or other beasts
of burden.” Pack mules were the preferred and most appropriate means to carry freight
in the interior, but this was neither safe nor quick. And the costs of such transportation
were very high. Safford estimates that from the s to s, the rate was between 
and  cents per tonne-mile, rising up to  cents during the rainy season; meanwhile,
overland freight costs over wagon in the US averaged  to  cents per tonne mile. As
for speed, a British consul noted in : “
e time occupied in transporting the goods
over that short distance [Honda-Bogota] has been greater than that taken from Europe to
Bell, P. L. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
Bell, P. L. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
McGreevy, W. ‘An Economic History of Colombia, –’ () p. .
Safford, F. ‘
e Emergence of Economic Liberalism in Colombia’ in Love, J. and Jacobsen, N. (Eds) Guiding the
Invisible Hand () p. .
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Honda.” 
ere is no reason to believe that the Bogota-Honda road was atypical, most
likely, other interior routes faced similar conditions. Within this context of transportation
backwardness, the advent of railways was a more than promissory development.
Construction of the first railway took place in the early s connecting the Atlantic
and the Pacific oceans. Despite the early start, progress was slow. 
e number of railway-
kilometres in use grew from around  in  to  in  to , ten years later and
peaked around , in . Certain railways had large socio-economic impacts. For
example, the Pacific line had a tremendous impact reducing transportation costs for coffee
exporters — connecting Cali and the Cauca Valley with the Pacific coast and its port in
Buenaventura. 
ere is little doubt that the expansion of railways facilitated the growth of
coffee exports, via ‘coffee-lines’ in Antioquia, Cucuta, and Tolima. McGreevy estimates that
the social savings accruing to the economy from transportation improvements amounted
to . of GDP by . Ramirez’s calculations for all railways in  suggest higher
savings: between . and . of GDP. Synthesising, the introduction of railways
had a number of positive effects on the economy of the early-twentieth century. Railways
reduced not only the transportation costs of coffee exports, but also of imports and of
domestic trade. 
ey also connected regions internally, made certain journeys faster, and
most probably facilitated the movement of labour for economic and leisure reasons.
Despite progress in the expansion of railways there were important shortcomings. Rail-
ways clearly lagged behind developments elsewhere in Latin America. In terms of social
savings, they were far below the savings attained by countries such as Brazil and Mexico.

erefore, for authors like Ramirez, as a means of transportation that communicated
Quoted in McGreevy, W. ‘An Economic...’ pp. –.
See Palacios, M. and Safford, F. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
McGreevy, W. ‘An Economic...’ p. .
Bushnell, D. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
McGreevy, W. ‘An Economic...’ pp. –.
Ramírez, M. T. ‘Efectos del Eslabonamiento de la Infraestrucutra de Transporte sobre la Economía Colombiana,
–’ in Robinson, J. and Urrutia, M. (Eds) Economía Colombiana del Siglo XX: Un Analisis Cuantitativo () p.
.
Ramírez, M. T. ‘Efectos...’ pp. –. For example, in  Colombia exhibited the lowest length of open railway
lines, expressed in kilometres, among eleven countries.
See for Mexico, Coatsworth, J. ‘El Impacto de los Ferrocarriles en el Porfiriato: Crecimiento Contra Desarrollo’
(); and for Brazil, Summerhill, W. ‘Transportation and Economic Growth in Brazil and Mexico’ in Haber, S. (Ed)
How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, – ().
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rapidly and at low cost the country’s regions, railways constituted failure. Amongst
several reasons for such failure, lack of capital, doubtful profitability, political meddling
and poor efforts at coordinating and connecting a railway grid seem to stand out. In
short, railways, the most important transport innovation of the time, failed to overcome
the biggest obstacle to economic development in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century: high transportation costs. And it was not the only one.
Further Obstacles to Growth
Factor flows, the colonial legacy, violence, and weak international trade links constituted
other causes arresting growth. 
e impression that Colombia had been neglected by
foreign capital and immigration was for some one of the reasons why development did not
materialise. 
e observation was accurate for the country did not see anything similar in
kind or magnitude to the flows of labour that flowed to the US or Argentina. Nor was it
an important recipient of large amounts of capital in direct or indirect form. Among the
strongest deterrents for immigrants figured the equatorial climate and plenty of tropical
diseases. As for capital, geography did not favour railway ventures; a backward economy
and low income levels for the majority of the population made for unattractive markets. It
was in mining, and in the way of government loans, that small amounts of foreign capital
entered the country.
History, too, supplied obstacles to economic development. 
e economic legacy of
colonial times did not alter dramatically with independence. 
e country inherited a
predominantly agricultural non-export economy with extremely low levels of productivity
that continued well into the twentieth century. 
e governing structure of production,
traditional haciendas and small-scale subsistence farming retarded the spread of waged
Ramirez, M. T. ‘Efectos...’ p. .
See for instance; McGreevy, W. ‘An Economic...’ pp. –; Póveda, G. ‘El Primer...’ pp. –; and Palacios, M.
and Safford, F. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
Bell, P. L. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
For a review of migration trends in Latin America, see; Sánchez-Alonso, B. ‘Labour and Immigration’ in Bulmer-

omas, V., Coatsworth, J. and Cortés-Conde, R. (Eds) 
e Cambridge... Vol. .
For a regional perspective; see Bulmer-
omas, V. ‘
e Economic...’ () pp. – and Ch. .
For a description of the haciendas and its regional differences; see Kalmanovitz, S. ‘Economía y Nación: Una Breve
Historia de Colombia’ () pp. –.
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Table .: Colombia–Latin America: Integration to the World Economy
Exports Per Head (US Dollars)
Country Circa  Circa  Circa  Circa 
Argentina . . . 
Bolivia . . . .
Brazil  . . .
Chile . . . .
Colombia . . . .
Costa Rica . . . .
Cuba . . . .
Ecuador  . . .
Mexico . . . .
Peru . . . .
Uruguay . . . .
Venezuela . . . .
Latin America . . . .
Australia . . . 
United States   . .
Source & Note: Bulmer-
omas, V. () p. . 
ree-year averages.
labour, the stimuli for regional product-specialisation and trade, and the introduction of
modern machinery and technologies to agricultural enterprise. On this last point, Bell,
commented: “With two or three notable exceptions, agriculture is carried on in Colombia
in the most primitive manner. Modern machinery and implements are almost unknown,
and there are entire regions without a steel plow of modern make, the only implement
being the universal machete.” To the picture of technological backwardness had to be
added the widespread use of slash and burn techniques. Other problems, however, were
man-made.
Diverse manifestations of social conflict and their effects on economic growth have
recently become a subject study in the Latin American context. North et al. argue
For a brief discussion of types of work and labour regimes in the second half of the nineteenth century; see Melo, J.
‘Las Vicisitudes del Modelo Liberal, –’ in Ocampo, J. A. (Ed) Historia... pp. –.
Bell, P. L. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
For a sample of this literature; see Dye, A. ‘
e Institutional Framework’ and Prados de la Escosura, L. ‘
e Economic
Impact of Independence in Latin America’ both in Bulmer-
omas, V., Coatsworth, J. and Cortés-Conde, R. (Eds) 
e
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that political order is a public good and a necessary condition for economic and political
development. 
ey sustain further, that the  years of widespread political instability
and violence that followed independence in Spanish America was the result of the inability
of these societies to establish institutions that provided credible commitments to rights
and property, and their absence to share a belief system about the role of government,
the state, corporate privilege, and citizenship. Following this line of argument, Bértola
and Williamson, stress that: “Latin America experienced almost continuous war and civil
strife between s and the s... practically all experienced episodes of massive and
prolonged civil strife. In six countries, internal civil wars raged more or less continuously
for decades after independence.”
Figure .: Colombia: Evolution of Main Exports, – (percentages)
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Source: Adapted from Ocampo, J. A. () pp. –.
Cambridge... Vol. ; and North, D., Summerhill, W. and Weingast, B. ‘Order, Disorder and Economic Change: Latin
America Versus North America’ in Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Root, H. (Eds) Governing for Prosperity ().
North, D., et al. ‘Order...’ p. .
North, D. et al. ‘Order...’ pp. – and –.
Cited in Deas, M. ‘Inseguridad y Desarrollo Económico en Colombia en el Primer Siglo de Vida Republicana
Independiente: Unas Consideraciones Preliminares’ Unpublished manuscript, p. .
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It is necessary to check Colombia’s own record of political disorder: rebellions, civil
wars, coups, external conflicts and levels of violence for the nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries. 
e  Days War, the Melo coup of  and the War of the Supremes are
well known. A more thorough review offered by Tirado Mejía, argues: “the real fact is
that of permanent violence expressed in eight great civil wars, two international wars with
Ecuador and dozens of regional revolts”. Gustavo Arboleda, a contemporary historian
in , counted nine national wars and  local revolts. On the basis of these facts it
is reasonable to expect disorder and violence to have produced negative effects on the
economy. Kalmanovitz associates the poor economic performance during the nineteenth
century with political anarchy and civil wars. At a more specific level, Palacios notes
the effect of the  Days War and the disastrous consequences it brought about on the
production of coffee. A similar study by Sánchez et al. quantifies the costs of insecure
property rights, as result of land conflicts in agricultural frontier zones, to conclude that
export production could have doubled in the absence of conflict. Notwithstanding
the formidable critiques of new institutionalist interpretations and the well-targeted
qualifications on views that equate the political past with one of endemic and perpetual
violence, it is still sensible to argue that the relatively high incidence of episodes of
political disorder and insecurity affected actual and potential economic performance.
Last, and perhaps the most convincing argument about obstacles to economic growth
and development, is failed integration with the world economy. In the words of Ocampo:
“
e greatest hindrance to economic development was the inability to develop a stable
and sizable export sector.” 
e colonial legacy in terms of exports basically came down
to gold, which in the immediate post-independence decades amounted to  of total
Quoted in Posada-Carbó, E. ‘La Nación Soñada’ () p. .
Kalmanovitz, S. ‘La Evolución Económica de la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XIX y las Condiciones Políticas del
Crecimiento Moderno’ in Kalmanovitz, S. (Ed) Nueva Historia Económica de Colombia ().
Palacios, M. and Safford, F. ‘Colombia...’ pp. , , .
Sánchez, F., Fazio, A. and López, M. ‘Conflictos de Tierras, Derechos de Propiedad y el Surgimiento de la Economía
Exportadora en el Siglo XIX en Colombia’ () Documentos CEDE, No. , pp. –.

e most incisive is by Deas; see Deas, M. ‘Inseguridad...’
A stimulating work is Posada-Carbó, E. ‘La Nación...’ especially Chs.  and .
Ocampo, J. A. ‘
e Transition from Primary Exports to Industrial Development in Colombia’ in Blomström, M. and
Meller, P. (Eds) Diverging Paths: Comparing a Century of Scandinavian and Latin American Economic Development ()
p. .
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exports (see Figure .). Declining gold exports since the late s left the country in
relative isolation from international trade until well into the twentieth century. As seen
from Table ., Colombia consistently ranked bottom among Latin American exporters
throughout the nineteenth century and well below the region’s average, as compared to
the US and Western offshoots. A poorly developed export base, unsurprisingly, translated
into limited import capacity.
Relative failures at economic integration with the world economy did not preclude
Colombia from experiencing export booms, however. 
e nation’s entrepreneurs at one
time or another engaged in the production and/or exploitation of a wide range of agri-
cultural, mineral and forest products with different degrees of success and durations.
Opportunities via the opening of new international markets, the qualities of natural
endowments and geography, as much as sudden shifts in the then emerging global supply-
chain of commodities created prospects for exports and wealth. 
e underlying causes of
the growth of the international economy were the twin effects of significant reductions
in transportation costs and the impulse of the industrialisation process of the Western
European and US economies, in terms of both the inputs industry demanded and the
higher disposable incomes it generated for mass consumption of products from overseas.
Colombians responded partially to these opportunities.
Trade and Growth
A series of export-growth episodes took place from the s until the early-twentieth
century in products varying from tobacco to cinchona bark, from cotton to indigo and
coffee (see Figure .). Despite the fact that these items made a significant contribution
to the export matrix and each, if in different magnitudes, generated foreign exchange
for imports and some revenue for the state from trade duties, none of these products
put the economy on an export-led growth path. 
e booms were relatively short-lived
For reliable statistics on Colombia’s nineteenth century external trade; see Ocampo, J. A. ‘Colombia y la Economia
Mundial, –’ ().

e expansion of the world economy since the early-nineteenth century and its determinants can be studied in
Kenwood, A. and Lougheed, A. ‘
e Growth of the International Economy, –: An Introductory Text’ ().

e exception is coffee, which will receive separate treatment below.
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and were followed by busts; making more for volatile export cycles than for a sustained,
upward growth pattern. Equally important, these episodes had relatively circumscribed
impacts in terms of linkages and multipliers. Further features of these exporting experiences
have been examined by McGreevy, and Ocampo. 
e former points out that the leading
sector (say, tobacco) did not perform well beyond an initial spurt, and that the failure to
sustain the growth rate related to the character of the production process. Ocampo adds
three features to the limits of the expansion: the lack of capital and financing/funding
means for domestic entrepreneurs, the tendency of Colombian capitalists to behave as
‘producer-speculators’ (lacking commitment to productive investment), and inappropriate
forms of production resulting in poor-quality products.

e trajectory of the different products confirms the validity of such insights. 
e
tobacco boom of the s and late s constituted the first experience of the post-
independence economy at economic integration with the world. 
e opportunity arose
from the rise in the global consumption of cigars to which domestic entrepreneurs, mainly
in the Ambalema and Carmen de Bolivar regions along the Magdalena River, responded
swiftly. 
e decline that ensued was the result of a combination of land exhaustion and
poor processing and packaging, which made tobacco exports vulnerable to competitors.
New producers from East Asia priced out domestic efforts. Cotton and cinchona bark
underwent similar cycles of rise and fall. In the case of cotton, the American Civil War
caused disruptions in production and a disequilibrium of prices in world markets; whilst
a hike in demand of quinine from Europe in tandem with a reduction in its supply by
Bolivian sources, opened the way for Colombian producers to seize opportunities in both
these export markets. A short-lived success for cotton exports in the mid-s was ended
by the recovery of US suppliers post-bellum, and complaints about the quality of the fibre
— its short length and poor cleanliness. For cinchona bark, where the country enjoyed a
longer boom and for a few years held the dominant position as one of the world’s main
suppliers, decline came at the hands of more competitive production in Java and the British
McGreevy, W. ‘An Economic...’ pp. –.
Ocampo, J. A. ‘Export Growth and Capitalist Development in Colombia in the Nineteenth Century’ in Bairoch, P.
and Levy-Leboyer, M. (Eds) Disparities in Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution () pp. –.
See Ocampo, J. A. ‘Colombia . . . ’ pp. –.
Ocampo, J. A. ‘Colombia...’ pp. –.
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East Indies, where alkaloid content was increased and prices cut. Minor export booms
with rubber and indigo suffered a similar fate, as primitive and inadequate production and
extraction methods made for fleeting positions in world markets.
Export booms did not amount to export-led development. A strong and dynamic
sector capable of leading the economy by delivering high and sustained rates of growth
over the long-run was not present before the rise of coffee exports at the turn of the
twentieth century. An export sector that could transform a relatively backward and little
developed market-economy through the transfer of productivity gains to the non-export
sector, the establishment of backward and forward linkages, and the generation of a
notable fiscal linkage that could strengthen the abilities of the state to intervene in the
economy effectively was a process that very few Latin American nations managed to attain.

ough Colombia’s historical experience was far from the targets the export-led growth
model prescribed, the booms had significant economic and political effects. A visible one
constituted improvements in physical infrastructure, such as steamship transportation on
the Magdalena River, port improvements in Barranquilla and the construction of small
single carriageways and of short railroad stretches. A stimulus to market production and
relations, the fiscal strengthening of the state, some accumulation of capital that paved
the way for the development of banking organisations, and the rise of a of a social class
that identified itself with capitalism are characteristics considered to be related to the
export experience of the period between  to the s. In short, even if these
export experiences did not amount to export-led development, they did have significant
effects. More importantly, out of these experiences Colombia propelled itself toward
becoming more of an export economy in the twentieth century, via the most important of
all developments in her history: the rise and ascendancy of coffee.
Bell, P. L. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
See Ocampo, J. A. ‘Colombia...’ Ch. .
For Bulmer-
omas only Argentina and Chile exhibited the rates of export growth deemed required to fit in the
export-led growth model; see Bulmer-
omas, V. ‘
e Economic...’ pp. –.
Palacios, M. and Safford, F. ‘Colombia...’ pp. –.
For an overview of the effects of export growth on the economy see Ocampo, J. A. ‘Colombia...’ pp.–.
Kalmanovitz discusses how nineteenth-century export experiences laid the basis for the integration of the national
economy to the world economy; see Kalmanovitz, S. ‘Economía...’ p. .
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Figure .: Coffee Exports, – (thousands of -kg bags)
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Source: Palacios, M. () p.  and Ocampo, J. A. () p. .

e importance of the coffee expansion after the end of the  Days War is well
acknowledged in the literature. In essence, the coffee-led export growth can be seen as
a structural break that put Colombia on the path to economic growth. 
is process
allowed the transition from a largely subsistence-production based economy without much
specialisation and exchange to one of market-oriented agriculture with greater division of
labour and more extensive network trade. It laid the basis for the ‘original accumulation
of capital’, the rise of agrarian capitalism, and acted as the ‘leading sector’, at least until
. 
e US trade commissioner saw in the expansion of coffee of the s the
“economic salvation of this mountainous country”. Urrutia goes further, considering
that: “prior to the coffee era, Colombia was not yet a nation”. Even though this may be an
McGreevy, W. ‘An Economic...’ pp. –.
Kalmanovitz, S. ‘Economía...’ p. .
Palacios, M. ‘Coffee...’ p. .
Bell, P. L. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
Quoted in GRECO. ‘El Crecimiento...’ p. .
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overstatement, there is little disagreement on the view that the growth of coffee production
during the first half of the twentieth century was “the most decisive phenomenon in the
recent economic history of Colombia.” How did such expansion take place and what
consequences did it bring about?

e rise of coffee exports was possible thanks to two processes: first, the expansion
of production in large estates in well-established coffee regions, such as Santander and
Norte de Santander; secondly, and crucially, the emergence of new and dynamic centres of
production towards the west in Antioquia, Viejo Caldas, Tolima, Valle and Cundinamarca.

e so-called antioqueño colonisation featured the massive private appropriation of public
lands through four mechanisms: a) gaining title to public lands via legal processes of
adjudication; b) special concessions; c) transfer of titles, and; d) extra-legal occupation.

e actual land-tenure pattern that resulted does not support completely some of the leyenda
rosa interpretations surrounding the issue, namely that it was predominantly, a process of
small, independent property-owners and producers. However, this was admittedly one
of its most significant characteristics. 
e key point is that the expansion of cultivation
in existing coffee zones and the introduction and widespread plantation of the crop in
new regions underlay the accelerated growth in exports after . 
e construction
of the Antioquia and Pacific railways, the inauguration of the aerial cableway between
Manizales and Mariquita, and the opening of the Panama Canal, all constituted important
transportation improvements that saved time and money and contributed to increasing
exports. Export production effectively surged: from around , bags in the s
to more than , at the turn of the century and to more than five million by the
mid-twentieth century (Figure .). Between  and  — the decades of fastest
growth — the average growth per annum was around seven percent. 
is coffee production
record placed coffee firmly as the leading export item and made Colombia one of the largest
exporters in the world. Such events generated important economic and socio-political
effects.
In the economic sphere, the most cited effect is the way the coffee expansion accentuated
further the foundations of capitalist development and sustained economic growth, which
Palacios, M. ‘Coffee...’ p. .
For a detailed study of the relationship between antioqueño colonisation and coffee; see Palacios, M. ‘Coffee...’ Ch. .
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occurred through various mechanisms. First, the increase in demand for free labour in
coffee areas and the use of wages to remunerate it hastened the emergence of a mobile,
waged working class. Secondly, the atomisation of a part of the production in tens
of thousands of small-scale coffee-farmers receiving cash for their crops created another
independent social class with disposable incomes and purchasing power. 
irdly, the
export boom pulled the modernisation of transport infrastructure, which brought prices
down, and by physically connecting regions encouraged regional specialisation and the
expansion of internal markets. Fourthly, taxation on rising external trade strengthened
the fiscal capacity of a centralising state that began to intervene and to spend more on
public works. Finally, and most importantly, coffee generated the largest economic surplus
Colombia had known until then; that is to say, coffee exports had laid the basis of the
country’s first significant experience of capital accumulation. 
is surplus is said to
have been crucial in accounting for the origins of industrialisation, for the development
of a modern banking system and quite possibly, for the rapid growth of commercial
enterprises and the diversification and specialisation of other agrarian sectors, such as
livestock farming.
From Coffee to Industry: Origins, ‘Take-Off’ and Development
Colombia’s industrialisation was delayed — even by the standards of other Latin Ameri-
can latecomers. Nineteenth-century economy-wide stagnation, resulting from regional
physical isolation, low external payment capacity, little foreign investment and a large
subsistence-agricultural sector, all caused the development of modern manufacturing to be
See Kalmanovitz, S. ‘Economía...’ Chs.  and .
Colombia’s experience with coffee as a most successful case of an export boom leading to industrialisation is formally
modelled and discussed in Murphy, K. et al. ‘Income...’ See also McGreevy, W. op. ‘An Economic...’ pp. –.
See Ocampo, J. A. ‘Colombia...’ pp. –; and Bejarano, J. ‘El Despegue Cafetero, –’ in Ocampo, J. (Ed)
Historia... pp. –.
See Kalmanovitz, S. “La Evolución Económica de  a  y las Condiciones Políticas del Crecimiento Moderno’
in Kalmanovitz, S. (Ed) Nueva Historia Económica de Colombia () p. ; and Bejarano, J. ‘El Despegue...’ p. .
Kalmanovitz, S. ‘Los Orígenes de la Industrialización en Colombia’ in Cuadernos de Economía () Vol. , No. ,
pp. –.
See for instance Ocampo, J. A. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
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very limited. Not until the advent of coffee and the financial and foreign exchange means
to import and effect a transfer of resources across economic sectors did industry begin
to flourish. In the words of Harbison: “
ere can be no doubt, that the initial stages of
industrialization in Colombia... were a response to the early coffee-export expansion...”
Representative of manufacturing ventures that were financed by coffee capital were the
sector-dominant textile companies of Coltejer and Fabricato, Cervunión in beer, Coltabaco
in cigars and the machinery and equipment of the Taller Industrial. Export-led industri-
alisation also encouraged the development of a few sub-sectors: coffee packing incentivised
the domestic manufacturing of bags and sacks from native fique and different species of
henequen and defiberating machines. Similarly, coffee processing included threshing,
toasting and de-pulping; all of them demanded machinery, a small part of which was
domestically produced. 
e same was the case for some tools and basic equipment. A less
tangible effect, for some allegedly very important, was that coffee introduced the “Industrial
Revolution to the nation in mass form... since it took the Machine to farms and towns.”
Yet for all the forward/backward linkages, demonstration effects and inter-sectoral transfer
of resources that the coffee expansion could have induced, it was in its sustained ability to
generate foreign exchange to buy and import raw materials, machinery and equipment
that its largest contribution to industrialisation materialised. 
e origins of industry did
lie with coffee, but industrial development rapidly displayed a dynamic of its own.
A number of factors converged to make the s an age of prosperity for the economy
as a whole, and the ensuing s for manufacturing in particular. 
e three decades
of internal stability and largely non-violent politics following the civil war of the 
Days provided the framework for a “new era of peace and coffee”. Continuous and rapid
expansion of coffee production came with a sustained recovery in international prices
For a discussion of the causes of the delay of industrialisation; see Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive History of Colombian
Industrial Development in the Twentieth Century ‘ in Berry, A. (Ed) Essays on Industrialization in Colombia ()
especially pp. – .
Harbison, R. ‘Colombia’ in Lewis, A. W. (Ed) Tropical Development, –. Studies in Economic Progress () p.
.
For arguments about the coffee-industry link in general; see Bejarano, J. ‘El Despegue...’ p. .
Bell, P. L. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ p. .
Urrutia, M. ‘La Creación de las Condiciones para el Desarrollo: El Café’ in Revéiz, E. (Ed) La Cuestión Cafetera
() p. .
Bushnell, D. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
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Table .: Industrial Ascendancy
Sectoral & Total GDP Growth, – (-Year Averages)
Period Agrarian Industrial GDP
–  . .
– . . .
– . . .
–  . 
– . . .
– . . .
Source: Calculations based on Londoño, J. L. () p. .
— courtesy of Brazil’s harvest-withholding schemes. Export growth was led by coffee,
but was also accompanied by the rise of new products such as oil and the recovery of
traditional ones, such as gold. A solid export performance underpinned the country’s
recent creditworthy status in world financial markets and underwrote unprecedented levels
of public debt. Export growth and foreign loans, in addition to US million received in
compensation by the US for the loss of Panamá, made the s a decade of accelerated
economic growth, expansion of public works and the monetisation of the economy.
Although modern manufacturing firms were scarce their numbers were on the rise.
According to Echavarría and Villamizar, the creation of modern industrial plants went
from a mere  in the s to  in the s,  in the s and  in the following
decade. No reliable estimates are available for the growth of manufacturing before the
mid-s, but it is well accepted that these years saw the real first boom of the non-
agricultural economy. CEPAL’s calculations for manufacturing-output growth in the
period – show an annual average of ., the leading sub-sectors being foodstuffs,
For an overview of the period; see Bejarano, J. A. ‘El Despegue...’ pp. –. For a detailed examination of
government expenditure level and its composition, see Avella, M. ‘El Crecimiento del Gasto Público en Colombia,
–. Una Visión à la Wagner o à la Peacock y Wiseman?’ in Revista de Economía Institucional () Vol. , No.
.
Echavarría, J. J. and Villamizar, M. ‘El Proceso Colombiano de Desindustrialización’ in Robinson, J. and Urrutia, M.
(Eds) Economía... p. .
Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ p. . Berry accepts guesstimates by McGreevy, suggesting that manufacturing output
remained roughly constant between  and .
Calculated from CEPAL. ‘El Desarrollo Económico de Colombia. Anexo Estadístico’ () Table No. 

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beverages, wood products, wooden furniture, and clothing and footwear. 
e main
source of the expansion in manufacture was the growth in total domestic demand, though
substitution of cottage production for home consumption and import substitution also
occurred on a minor scale. In sum, the s were extraordinary years for primary exports
and positive for manufacturing. 
e Great Depression of the s shifted this scenario.

e global slump first affected the external sector. As capital inflows stopped and foreign
credit was suspended (loans were re-called), the international price of coffee collapsed,
causing a significant worsening of the terms of trade. 
is in turn forced a sharp decline in
imports. 
e then obliging rules of the gold standard meant the adjustment was felt via a
fall in international reserves and a strong monetary contraction that resulted in deflation
from  to . A need to re-balance the fiscal accounts to attain a surplus and
thus hope to re-access external loans meant ruling out government spending as tool for
reactivation. Overall, the years of full-blown crisis were not as severe as for other Latin
American countries but GDP fell by  from the beginning of the depression to the lowest
point in . Recovery came after . Aided by anti-cyclical policies, economic
growth resumed; this time, however, it was domestic manufacturing, which acted as ‘engine
of growth’.
As shown in Table ., impressive manufacturing growth, well above both agrarian
and total GDP, suggests the sector was becoming the leading activity in the economy.
What factors account for this ‘take-off’ of Colombian industrialisation in the s?
Explanations abound and the debate is still open. Interpretations from a neoclassical
angle emphasise the role of relative prices and exogenous forces. Chu, for instance, claims
that ‘depression industrialisation’ in non-traditional manufactures is explained by changes
in relative prices. As prices of industrial imports rose relative to both export prices
and to prices of non-traded and import-competing goods, the domestic production of
manufactured items received a great impulse. For Chu, the devaluation of the peso raised
Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ p. .
For a detailed analysis of this period see Ocampo, J. A. and Montenegro, S. ‘Crisis Mundial, Protección e Industrial-
ización’ () especially Chs.  and .
See Caballero, C. and Urrutia, M. ‘Historia del Sector Financiero Colombiano en el Siglo XX’ () pp. –.
Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ p. .
Chu, D. ‘
e Great Depression and Industrialization in Colombia’ in Berry, A. (Ed) Essays on Industrialization in
Colombia ().
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Figure .: GDP Composition: Structural Change Underway – (percentages)
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the prices of all imports, sending a general signal from the international marketplace to
which industrialists responded effectively by substituting imports. Similarly, stressing
the role of external events, Berry suggests, that the sharp decline in import capacity
prompted by the  Crisis left no option but to increase the opportunity costs of
imports relative to home goods through a combination of devaluation, tariff increases and
quantitative restrictions. Prioritising exogenous events, Echavarría also favours a market-
based explanation demonstrating how the negative external shock, in the absence of price
controls and quantitative restrictions, determined a new configuration of relative prices.
Industrial prices tripled between  and  making for high returns, encouraging
production and stimulating investment. Devaluations were key in that they affected directly
the shift in relative prices.
Chu, D. ‘
e Great...’ pp. –.
Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ p. .
Echavarría, J. J. ‘Crisis e Industrialización: Las Lecciones de los Treintas’ () pp. –, –.
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Table .: On Track to Industrial Sequencing, –
Composition of Industrial Value-Added by Goods (Percentages)
Year Non-Durable Intermediate Capital & Durable
 . . .
 . . 
 . . 
 . . .
Source: Ocampo, J. A. () p. .
Challenges to the views attaching prime roles to the market and relative prices have been
effectively posed by more Keynesian interpretations that assign a pro-active role to the state
in the industrial ‘take off’. Ocampo and Montenegro sustain that there were four interacting
factors at play: first; a condition of under-expansion of manufacturing — the potential
advantage of being a latecomer in a Gerschenkronian framework — and the presence
of the prerequisites for industrialisation, namely, expanding internal markets, experience
of previous industrial growth and installed capacity; secondly, a shift in the pattern of
demand associated with the urbanisation process, which favoured manufactured goods;
thirdly, the impact of foreign exchange constraints on industrial imports; and finally; the
effective reorientation by government of domestic production via trade and exchange rate
policies. According to this version, devaluation was central to the industrial spurt since it
expanded exports and internal demand. Finally, Kalmanovitz, in a Marxist approach,
prefers to embed the juncture of the Great Depression and the policies it stimulated in
the wider process of the consolidation of capitalist development. In this context, the
industrial acceleration of the s is only the outcome of an adjustment between demand
and a market fuelled by the expansion of new social relationships in western Colombia
— previously met with imports and now increasingly supplied by domestic capitalists.
Summing up, with the exception of Marxist analyses, the  Crisis is rightly seen as
a major watershed in the industrial trajectory and the decade that follows it one where

e studies by Berry, Chu, and Echavarría also take into account these three factors, but do not give them equal value
or emphasis.
Ocampo, J. A. and Montenegro, S. ‘Crisis...’ pp. – and –.
Echavarría, J. J. ‘Crisis...’ p. .
Kalmanovitz, S. ‘Economía...’ p. .
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industrialisation finally ‘takes off’. 
e crisis induced industrialisation via the interaction
of market forces. Critical policies enacted by government, such as the devaluations of
the early s, were reactive in nature, and following market-led adjustments aided the
process further. Industrialisation proceeded apace.
Growth rates in industry from  to  were more than three times those of total
GDP, led by cotton and rayon textiles, beer, sugar and cement (Table .). During the
export bonanza of the mid-s and mid-s industrial growth experienced a gilded
age and annual average growth rose above . It slowed down the following decade to
 due to external constraints; but then climbed back to , as the foreign exchange
constraint eased. 
roughout the post-war period, industrial production outpaced the rest
of the economy averaging growth rates that double those of agriculture. Effectively, this
was the period when the economy underwent structural change at the hands of industry,
which became the leading sector in terms of output growth, productivity, technology and
generation of employment. Structural change took place as the share of manufacturing in
total GDP increased and that of agriculture shrunk. Figure . shows how from the early
s to s the share of industry doubled from  to  of GDP, whilst that of
agriculture lost  percentage points from roughly  to . 
e proportion of mining
and construction remained roughly constant at  each and that of utilities and services
(not in the figure) passed from  to  of GDP.
Within industry itself, significant changes occurred as the sector’s structure grew more
complex and diversified. 
e industrial base of the s, dominated by non-durable con-
sumer goods, gradually lost ground to intermediate goods (Table .). Equally important is
to stress the development since the mid-s, if substantially more limited, of the capital
and consumer-durable goods sector, pulled by metallic products, transport equipment and
electric and non-electric machinery. As Colombia attempted transiting from the ‘easy’ ISI
phase of non-consumer durables and light industries to the ‘hard’ stage of capital goods
and consumer durables, the requirements became more demanding in terms of bulkier
imports, more sophisticated technologies, and most importantly, larger capital investments.
Not surprisingly, foreign capital, which had until the s mainly been limited to mining,
For a detailed discussion see Ocampo, J. A. and Montenegro, S. ‘Crisis...’ pp. –.
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oil and railways, begun to participate in heavy industry projects. Notwithstanding the
development of a more complex industrial base displaying capital-intensive lines and the
entry of foreign capital, one fact remained: an underdeveloped industrial sector. According
to CEPAL, controlling for income, market size and levels of urbanisation, the sector’s
output was more than  below the predicted value on the basis of the experience of
other Latin American economies.

e role of the state and of public policy in industrial development is subject of extensive
analysis in chapters ,  and ; yet to understand the origins and features of industrial policy
in mid-twentieth century Colombia one has to examine the kind of state that designed
and implemented it and the polity context in which it was embedded. 
e formation
of the state, its key features, the role of political parties, the presidentialist nature of the
political system and the context of sustained political violence that took place during most
of the period under consideration are a necessary background to understand industrial
policy-making and are treated next.
The State and Politics

e Constitution adopted in  — and one lasting a century — permits identifying the
winners from Independence’s internal conflicts. Catholics restored their ascendancy. 
e
new charter opened up with the epigraph: “In the Name of God, Supreme Source of all
Authority”; the antipode of the previous: “In the name and by the authority of the People
of the United Colombian States...” Likewise, centralists claimed victory over federalists.
Article  read: “
e Nation is reconstituted a unitary Republic” as opposed to the previous:
“
e Sovereign States of Antioquia, Bolívar,... unite and confederate... to form a free,
sovereign, and independent nation.” However, concessions to the departments and
municipalities were made in terms of how national legislation and policy should be
locally implemented. In practice, the centralist-federalist dispute in the  Constitution
See Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ p. .
CEPAL. ‘
e Process of Industrial Development in Latin America’ () p. .
For an account of constitutional changes from  to ; see Gibson, W. M. ‘
e Constitutions of Colombia’
(). 
e comparison is between the  Constitution with that of .
Gibson, W. M. ‘
e Constitutions...’ pp. , .
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contained a principle of agreement between the two sides, synthesised by contemporaries as
“political centralisation and administrative decentralisation.” 
us, the lack of separation
between state and church and a tendency towards centralisation were two important
features of the organisation of public power since the late-nineteenth century.
More critically, the state that formed was fiscally feeble. 
is was due in part to design
and in part to circumstance. Governing elites adopted economic liberalism from the s
to the mid-s continuously and dogmatically. Safford declares: “...they [the elites]
went extremely far in giving expression to the tenets of free market liberalism in domestic
institutional arrangements and policies, deliberately restricting the fiscal capacity and
policy purview of the national state. Indeed, between  and , Colombian elites
probably were unequalled in the Western world in the extent to which they intentionally
fragmented and minimized the power of the national state.” Liberal party leaders,
such as Florentino González, Miguel Samper and Jose Hilario López endorsed policies
inspired by the principles of economic liberalism during the hegemony of the party.
Notwithstanding the role of economic policy, there were more structural reasons to explain
fiscal weaknesses. First, relative isolation from the international economy until the early-
twentieth century made for meagre custom duties. Secondly, revenue generated from this
source suffered from acute fluctuations and from extensive illicit trade or contraband.

irdly, the ability to levy taxes on internal commerce in a geographically fragmented
economy with poor physical transportation was limited — and counter to liberal tenets.
Finally, as highlighted by Deas, regional geographic fragmentation was compounded by
people’s resistance to taxation. Ever since the colonial period, tax evasion was considered a
civic duty. In short, the roots of a weak fiscal state were the outcome of policy design
Gibson, W. M. ‘
e Constitutions...’ p. .

e trend towards centralisation is supported with evidence on the state’s bureaucracy. Uricoechea shows that central
bureaucrats started to catch up with departmental and municipal equivalents since the s and eventually outsized
them in ; see; Uricoechea, F. ‘Estado y Burocracia en Colombia’ () Table No. .
Safford, F. ‘
e Emergence...’ p. . From a sociological perspective, traits of the laissez-faire tradition of the state can
be examined in Uricoechea, F. ‘Estado...’ Ch. .
A qualitative survey of the sources of revenue of the Colombian state in the nineteen century is offered by Deas, M.
‘
e Fiscal Problems of Nineteenth-Century Colombia’ in Journal of Latin American Studies () Vol. , No. .
Detailed historical studies on contraband on nineteenth century are rare; a notable exception emphasising legal and
social perspectives is the work by Laurent, M. ‘Contrabando en Colombia en el Siglo XIX. Prácticas y Discursos de
Resistencia y Reproducción’ ().
Deas, M. ‘
e Fiscal...’ p. .
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on the one hand, and of the relative backwardness of the economy and the difficulties
inherent to any government lacking legitimacy to tax its citizens, on the other.
Around  government tax revenue was approximately  of GDP. Some sixty
years later, in the s, the proportion was still only . At least until the s, the state
apparatus was rudimentary and public administration fragile. Bureaucratically, internal
differentiation among administrative agencies was embryonic and public functions were
limited to guarantee — by means of judicial legitimacy — the material transactions of the
private sphere, as well as providing the minimum of indispensable services required for
them to take place. 
us, the state of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
did show a remarkable resemblance to the laissez-faire, minimalist state of the ideal versions
theorised by Smith and Ricardo. 
is legacy survived well into the twentieth century.
Fiscal reforms in the s and s established taxes on corporate dividends and created
the sales tax, increasing the tax take to roughly  of GDP. In terms of tax collection,
Colombia was close to neither the international nor the Latin American median, as reports
by foreign missions noted in the s and early s. 
e consequence of a narrow
fiscal base ought to be structural: a weak state. 
is became a key and permanent feature
of the state throughout the twentieth-century — one that exhibited many faces.
An idea of the ability that any state possesses to administer the subject population can be
obtained by examining the size of its public sector. As crude a measure as it is, for it does
not say anything about its efficacy/efficiency, the share of aggregate public employment to
total employment hints the state’s administrative capacity. Whitehead’s data shows that
amongst  Latin American nations, in  Colombia ranked along with Bolivia, Brazil,
Costa Rica and Peru in the group showing low ranges of public to total employment —
between . and . By , it exhibited the lowest percentage of all countries,
a mere , followed by Chile with  and Peru with . Similarly, the shares of
output and investment of non-financial public enterprises in GDP and gross fixed capital
Deas, M. ‘
e Fiscal...’ p. .
Uricoechea, F. ‘Estado...’ p. .
Junguito, R. and Rincón, H. ‘La Política Fiscal en el Siglo XX en Colombia’ in Robinson, J. and Urrutia, M. (Eds)
Economía... pp. . 
is study offers a comprehensive account of the evolution of taxation during the twentieth-century.
Whitehead, L. ‘State Organisation in Latin America since ’ in Bethell, L. (Ed) Latin America: Economy and
Society since  () p. .
Whitehead, L. ‘State...’ p. .
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formation, respectively, serve to gauge the extent to which states exert command over
their own resources. According to these indicators, Colombia confirmed its status as one
of the smallest Latin American states, exceeding only Guatemala in the public share of
total output — far below the region’s average. In this respect, a report published in
 by the US National Planning Association illustrates further the relative position
of the Colombian state in Latin America. On the issue of public versus private in the
ownership of productive enterprise, the report stated: “Government ownership is highest
in Mexico, lowest in Chile and Colombia. Private ownership is highest in Colombia,
lowest in Mexico.” In summary, the Colombian state, in the wider regional picture, was
a small state; wielding less command over resources than its regional neighbours.

e boom of the s, the slump that followed it in the s and the disruptions
caused by World War II, all prompted wider and deeper state intervention in the economy.

e well-known role of public capital, financing transportation infrastructure expanded in
the s, mainly through the construction of railways. Probably as important was the
establishment in  of the Banco de la República, the CB, which as a semi-autonomous
entity was designed to limit speculative banking, anchored the country to the rules of the
gold standard, and served as the government’s chief tool in monetary-policy matters.
But it was the reaction to the Great Depression that propelled state action into new policy
areas and by way of novel instruments. Macroeconomic regulation in the external sector
saw the introduction of exchange controls, the creation of differential exchange-rates, and
the design of import-deposit schemes. On the credit front, the foundation of public
financial institutions took the centre stage along with ceilings on interest rates and reserve
requirements. Coffee regulation took on new forms too, as taxes on exports were imposed
once international prices recovered, financial assistance was provided for coffee growers to
Whitehead, L. ‘State...’ p. . 
e output share of non-financial public enterprises in GDP at factor cost for Latin
America (excluding Venezuela) was . against . for Colombia. 
e share in gross fixed capital formation was
. for the region and only . for Colombia.
By their own standards an independent, non-political, and non-profit organisation aimed at maintaining
and strengthening private initiative and enterprise.
Brandenburg, F. ‘
e Development of Latin American Enterprise’ () p. .
Abel, C. ‘Política, Iglesia y Partidos en Colombia’ () p. ; and Ocampo, J. A. ‘Crisis Mundial y Cambio
Estructural, –’ in Ocampo, J. A. (Ed) Historia... p. .

is section draws heavily from Ocampo. J. A. ‘Crisis...’ pp. –.
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set up and run general-deposit warehouses to intervene in the domestic market, and the
country participated in the first international coffee agreement.

e rise of modern state interventionism consolidated in the s and s. 
ree
processes underpinned this; first, the institutionalised legitimacy of state actions in the
economy, as enshrined in the national constitution since  and subsequent codifications
in  and . Secondly, the establishment of ad-hoc planning bodies and more formal
organisations charged with the elaboration of plans with a view to rationalising economic
processes, amongst which the most important became the National Planning Department
(DNP) and the National Council of Economic and Social Policy (CONPES). Lastly, the
accelerating growth of both state-owned enterprises and of decentralised public institutes,
which increased from around an average of  per decade the s to the s, to 
in the s,  in the following decade and peaked at  during the s. 
e latter
implied state action expanded to areas previously untouched by public interest, ranging
from oil to rural housing, social security and agricultural technology and research. In short,
the Colombian state of the mid-twentieth century grew in size, functions and complexity,
and its rising interventionism in the economy suggested the state’s eagerness to actively
participate as an agent for economic development.
Along with the size of the state, the power of presidents grew. Within the realm of
constitutional systems world-wide, Latin America had been dubbed “the continent of
presidentialism”, in turn, Colombia was classified as a “pure presidentialist” regime in
the s. 
e formal powers of the president were impressive, so much that some
authors see the president as a ‘demi-God’ representing “almost the totality of the state”.

ough this is an exaggeration, under the Constitution of  — in force until  — the
For a detailed discussion see Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ pp. –.
Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ pp. .
Hartlyn, J and Valenzuela, A. ‘Democracy in Latin America since ’ in Bethell, L. (Ed) Latin America: Politics and
Society since  () p. . Authors, such as Dix, suggest it would be more appropriate to classify Latin American
polities in a third category, that of “presidential dominance”, given that “... in practice they eschew the sort of balance of
power among the three separate branches of government that characterise the archetypical case of presidentialism, that of
the United States.” See Dix, R. ‘
e Colombian Presidency: Continuities and Change’ in DiBacco, T. (Ed) Presidential
Power in Latin American Politics () p. .
Colombia was not alone in this group; other countries included Argentina and Brazil.
Cited in Archer, P. and Shugart, M. ‘
e Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia’ in Mainwaring,
S. and Shugart, M. (Eds) Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America () p. .
Vásquez, A. ‘El Poder Presidencial en Colombia’ () p. .
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executive’s appointive, fiscal, legislative and emergency powers were formidable. Pertaining
to appointive powers, the chief executive enjoyed ample prerogatives, freely appointing
and dismissing cabinet ministers, other medium-and-top-level officials, ambassadors and
directors of decentralised institutions and of various financial institutions. Further, given
the unitary government structure, the president named the departmental governors, who
in turn appointed the mayors of the municipalities, “thus giving direct and indirect control
over positions high and low throughout the national, departmental, and even municipal
bureaucracies.”
Regarding legislative capacity, Kline notes: “An important actor, if not the most impor-
tant in the Colombian congress, is the president of the republic. It is in the presidency
where most of the law projects originate.” Constitutional arrangements granted congress
the ability to delegate to the president the authority to issue decrees with the force of
law and decree-laws, along with the executive’s own right to issue regulatory decrees.

at the president ended up legislating on a wide range of economic, financial and social
areas, at first not of intended competence, was largely the outgrowth of broader changing
political conditions. For instance, the aforementioned codifications of the constitution in
 and  granted the powers to intervene by means of legislation “in the exploitation
of public and private business and industries for the purpose of rationalizing production,
distribution and consumption of goods, or to give labour the just protection to which it
has a right” and “to draw up plans and programs for the improvement of the national
economy as well as plans and programs for all public works.”
Dix, R. ‘
e Politics of Colombia’ () p. .
Kline, H. ‘Orientación hacia el Ejecutivo’ in Hoskin, G. (Ed) Estudio del Comportamiento Legislativo en Colombia
() Vol. , p. . Congressmen themselves accepted that ministerial interventions and messages of urgency
represented the two main mechanisms by which the executive influenced congress; see Dix, R, ‘
e Politics...’ p. , fn.
. Kline sustains that this was key among the factors making congress be orientated towards the executive power; see
Kline, H ‘Orientación...’ passim; pp. –. Leal also identifies a growing trend of predominance of the executive
branch over congress in terms of political power throughout the second half of the twentieth century; see Leal, F. ‘Estudio
del Comportamiento Legislativo en Colombia’ () Vol. , pp. –.
Kline argues that the importance of Congress upon policy-making was mainly negative, as laws there were either
changed significantly or simply not acted upon at all; see Kline, H. ‘Interest Groups in the Colombian Congress: Group
Behaviour in a Centralized Patrimonial Political System’ in Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs ()
Vol. , No. , p. .
Gibson, W. M. ‘
e Constitutions...’ p. .
Gibson, W. M. ‘
e Constitutions...’ p. .
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ough at the time the Supreme Court made clear congress and not government had the
powers to intervene, shifts in the political arena rendered this setup ineffective. President
Ospina dissolved congress in November  and remained closed for two years until
his successor re-opened it. Soon after, however, in , the Rojas regime closed it again
and it did not resume proper functions until the National Front in . Further, the
president’s faculties to declare states of siege and of economic emergency (the latter since
) and use the extraordinary powers that these junctures provided him with, often
meant presidents ruled by decree. According to Findley, among the first to govern by decree
was Ospina Pérez (who declared a state of siege in ), but given the state of exception
lasted until , he was not alone in using this tool as governing technique. During the
National Front (–) and until , the state of siege was invoked in all or in parts
of the territory for about  of the time and the powers it conferred were increasingly
used as a policy-making tool to bypass congressional opposition on matters other than the
‘restoring order’ clause for which it was originally intended. Some authors sustain that
states of exception, from the late s onward, became not the exception, but the regular
and daily course of action. 
is aggravated further the absolute discretion and lack
of control with which the president could order (and terminate) the siege without being
subject to judicial review. Summarising, both constitutional arrangements and political
During the Rojas regime functioned the National Constituent Assembly; however due to its sui generis organisation is
not considered a substitute for congress; see Leal, F. ‘Estudio...’ p. .
For a historical study on the rise of presidential interventions on the economy from a law perspective; see Findley, R.
‘Presidential Intervention in the Economy and the Rule of Law in Colombia” in American Journal of Comparative Law
() Vol. , No. . 
e state of economic emergency was a legal figure granting the president extraordinary power
to issue decrees with the force of law to restore ‘economic order. 
ough only until  was the state of economic
emergency enshrined in the constitution it had antecedents worth mentioning, for it was under these conditions that
substantial pieces of legislation affecting industry, banking and agriculture were issued. In , the Supreme Court
upheld one of Rojas’ decrees and decided that Article  of the constitution empowered him to attack economic as
well as political causes of public disorder. [
is article founded the legality of many a government actions since ;
see Dix, R. ‘Colombia: 
e Political Dimensions of Change’ () p. .] Following the legislative paralysis that
the consociational regime of the National Front fostered, presidents resorted to extended states of siege to deal with
long-term economic problems and refused to terminate them unless congress enacted as permanent law the decrees they
considered essential. For detailed review of this subject; see Findley, R. ‘Presidential...’ especially pp. –
Findley, R. ‘Presidential...’ p. .
A discussion about the normative and deviance of states of exception with references to Colombia is offered by
Barreto Rozo, A. ‘Normalidad y Excepcionalidad: La Indescifrable Regularidad Contemporánea de la Excepción’ in
Poder Ejecutivo (). For the use of states of exception as an increasingly authoritarian feature of the Colombian polity;
see Iturralde, M. ‘Guerra y Derecho en Colombia: El Decisionismo Político y los Estados de Excepción como Respuesta
a la Crisis de la Democracia’ in Revista de Estudios Sociales () No. .
Dix, R. ‘
e Politics...’ p. , fn. .
Ariza, L., Cammaert, F. and Iturralde, M. ‘Estados de Excepción y Razón de Estado en Colombia’ ().
Iturralde, M. ‘Guerra...’ p. ; and Findley, R. ‘
e Presidential...’ p. .
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junctures allowed for presidents to intervene in nearly all areas of legislation, including the
rationalisation and planning of the economy — and so they did.
A last formidable power of the presidency, for some the most decisive in sustaining
political dominance, is control over the national budget and the jobs governments can
provide. Without a comprehensive civil service program to staff the state bureaucracy
in meritocratic form, the presidents’ highly partisan recruitment practices for public office
gave them the power to place thousands of people in and out of employment. In ,
one academic memorably remarked: “the budget is the only industry in a country without
industries”, a decade later a foreign scholar wrote: “
e parties have treated government
as an objective to be seized and, once won, as a bastion in which to entrench themselves
like armies of occupation, subsisting on the bureaucratic booty of battle.” 
ough
the metaphor overstates the issue, it reveals the significance of state funds and jobs for
politicians and supporters. State spoils empowered the presidency; in fact, some sustain
that this was especially the case for building coalitions in support of executive policies.
In short, the patronage powers that the president enjoyed through the nation’s budget
might well have turned into his most effective political tool.
Notwithstanding the fiscal, legislative, appointive and extraordinary prerogatives of
presidents, they did not exercise absolute power, quite the contrary; their powers en-
countered very finite limits. First, constitutional and other institutional constraints
played a role. Presidential terms were kept at four years and immediate re-election was

is is a point emphasised by various authors; see Payne, J. ‘Patterns of Conflict in Colombia’ () Ch. ; Hartlyn,
H. and Dugas, J. ‘Colombia: 
e Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation’ in Diamond, L., Hartlyn, J. and
Linz, J. (Eds) Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America ) p. ; Dix, R. ‘
e Colombian...’ pp. –;
and Archer, R. and Shugart, M. ‘
e Unrealized...’ pp. –. Obviously, this is not a feature unique to Colombian
politics. Geddes, for instance, argues that “[p]atronage is the glue that holds [government] coalitions together in Latin
America...” see Geddes, B. ‘Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America’ () p. . However, the
extent to which the budget and public jobs can be used for patronage purposes by the president seems to be particularly
pervasive in Colombia — and despite it being a relatively small state.
Despite the fact that the constitution provided for an “adequate and equitable” distribution of public jobs amongst
parties and most of the times this rule was abided, it was not uncommon to see partisan violence during inter-party
transfers of power; see Bushnell, D. ‘Colombia...’ Ch. –.
Santa, E. ‘Sociología Política de Colombia’ () p. ; quoted in Wilde, A. ‘Conversations Among Gentlemen:
Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia’ in Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (Ed) 
e Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis,
Breakdown and Reequilibration () p. .
Quoted in Geddes, B. ‘Politician’s...’ p. .
Hartlyn, J. and Dugas, J. ‘Colombia: 
e Politics...’ p. .
For a historical perspective on the limits to presidential power; see Posada-Carbó, E. ‘La Nación...’ Ch. 
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not permitted. Moreover, compared to most of Latin America, absence of recurring,
long-lived dictatorships meant the leeway of presidents to govern was kept within a system
of checks and balances, if far from perfect. For the most part, congress remained a check
on the executive, performing at least three sizeable tasks: scrutinising the president and
cabinet ministers, redistributing power (and resources) from the centre to the regions and,
providing (subtracting) political legitimacy for a regime. Further, congress could block
or modify legislation. Secondly, the very weakness of the Colombian state stressed above
constituted another limit to the president’s execution of policy. Chief among these were a
poor, if improving, provision of public goods (physical infrastructure, communications,
education system, internal security and order) along with a fiscal system that extracted few
economic and financial resources from its citizens.

irdly, despite the clear supremacy of two main traditional parties throughout the
twentieth-century, factions within Conservatives and Liberals placed gruelling demands
on the executive in exchange for support. 
is was so acute as to consider the legislature as
one resembling more the structure of a multiparty parliamentary system. In this respect,
the partisan powers of the president were rather low. Moreover, a highly legalistic and
red-tape immersed bureaucratic culture synthesised in the “se obedece pero no se cumple”
[obey but do not comply] motto served to slow down government operations and render
technical decisions cumbersome. Partly as result of this, decentralised institutes could
slack, shirk and slip away from both presidential and ministerial instructions. Lastly, the
power of any president was checked by the strength and multiplicity of local actors. As
said earlier, Colombia was a country of regions and even as presidents appointed regional
governors, appointments represented local political bosses, as much as they reflected the
correlation of forces both in congress and in departmental assemblies. As Posada-Carbó,
succinctly puts it: “governors were never exclusive agents of the national executive”. 
e
For the absence of strong-men/caudillos in Colombia’s history; see Jaramillo Uribe, J. ‘’La Personalidad...’ pp. –.
Dix, R. ‘
e Politics...’ p. .
Cárdenas, M., Junguito, R. and Pachón, M. ‘Political Institutions and Political Outcomes in Colombia’ in Stein, E.
and Tommasi, M. (Eds) Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies () p. ; and Archer, R. and
Shugart, M. ‘
e Unrealized...’ p. .
For a characterisation of the Colombian bureaucracy; see Dix, R. ‘
e Politics...’ pp. –. For a brief discussion
of bureaucratic reform; see Geddes, B. ‘Politician’s...’ pp. –.

is argument is well explained in Posada-Carbó, E. ‘La Nación...’ pp. –.
Posada-Carbó, E. ‘La Nación...’ p. .
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ways in which local powers have participated in central clientelistic practices, is the subject
of the next section, for now it suffices to say that the regions effectively fragmented further
the powers of presidents. In sum, presidential power was far from absolute and this can
probably best be seen in the few successful instances where heads of state have achieved
radical shifts in policy. Also as result of this, the country avoided the economic and
political extremisms of other Latin American nations.
What kind of political regimes have Colombians lived under and what constituted
the key characteristics of the polity during the second third of the twentieth century?
Hartlyn and Valenzuela classify the regimes from  to  and from  onwards as
semi-democratic. By this definition they mean there were constitutional restrictions on
contestation, on suffrage, or de facto restrictions, such as the clientelist manipulation of
electorates and fraud, but generally competitive and open elections. Democratic breakdown,
however, came in , as the political struggle between the main parties became a
clash between a majoritarian-liberal congress and a conservative president. A process of
impeachment prompted a reaction by which the president declared state of siege, closed
congress, banned public meetings and censored media. Despite this, much of Colombian
politics, according to Wilde, continued as usual: “...the system remained oligarchical, the
economy capitalist, the institutions republican, the military civilianist, [a]bove all, party
politicians continued to reign.” 
is soon changed. 
e election of the divisive Laureano
Gómez as president polarised politics further, and with violence spiralling out of control,
a solution came from the barracks. A military coup ousted Gómez in June  and
General Rojas governed until May , when a military junta eased the transition to
civilian government a year later.
Archer and Shugart suggest that presidential power has been potential more than realised; see Archer, R. and Shugart,
M. ‘
e Unrealized...’
Hartlyn, J. and Valenzuela, A. ‘Democracy...’ p. .

ere are various accounts explaining the breakdown and there is no consensus. One attaching failure to cope with
social revolution is, Fluharty, V. ‘Dance...’; others stressing the malevolent intentions of the parties are, Arciniegas, G.
‘State of Latin America’ () and Martz, J. ‘
e Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia’ ().
For the most authoritative accounts emphasising political factors; see Hartlyn, J. ‘
e Politics of Coalition Rule in
Colombia’ (); Wilde, A. ‘Conversations...’; and Hartlyn, J. and Dugas, J. ‘Colombia...’
Wilde, A. ‘Conversations...’ pp. –.
It is worth noting that the coup and military rule that followed was endorsed by various political figures and a large
segment of public opinion as the ultimate way to curb violence. Indeed, some authors recall that at the time it was
not uncommon to hear of an ‘opinion coup’ rather than a military one; see for instance Sánchez, G. and Meertens, D.
‘Bandoleros, Gamonales y Campesinos: El Caso de la Violencia en Colombia’ () p. 
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e return of professional politicians to government did not mean the establishment of
democracy, broadly defined, but by the standards of the region the political arrangement
that followed the Rojas regime may be seen as benevolent. In essence, the National Front
was a limited democratic consociational regime by which two parties agreed to alternate
the presidency, and declared parity between them for all elective and appointive posts. A
requirement of a two-thirds majority to approve legislation in all decision-making bodies
from congress to municipal councils increased both political immobilism and the need for
an ever stronger and pro-active executive. No doubt, the consociational basis of the National
Front accentuated further the moderate nature and relatively continuous characteristics of
economic and social policy. Indeed, Colombia did not seriously practice populism like
Argentina nor did it shift radically toward neoliberalism prematurely, as Chile did. 
is is
important and needs be explained.

e conditions for populism to dominate politics were largely absent. 
e most serious
contender for the kind of charismatic leader whose rhetoric connects with labour and the
urban masses, so as to lead a populist movement, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, was assassinated
in April . No political heir managed to take on Gaitán’s movement. Further, the
environment for an alliance between industrialists, labour and the state — that would have
resembled populist movements in the region — did not flourish in the Colombia of the
s or s, let alone after. Palacios argues that the junctures were not favourable: “the
displacement of the old alliance of the export-import economy integrated by landowners,
bankers and merchants seemed implausible during the administrations of Ospina and
Gómez, the coffee bonanza and the post-war era of cheap U.S. dollars.” Urrutia resorts
to more structural causes to account for the absence of economic populism. He stresses the
concentration of political power at the local level, the well-established presence of political
Adjectives for the kind of democratic regime that the National Front represented abound. A synthesis by Hartlyn and
Dugas featured the following: ‘controlled’, ‘oligarchical’, ‘restricted’, ‘traditional bipartisan elitist’, and ‘near polyarchy’.
For others it was ‘inclusionary authoritarian’ or just ‘authoritarian’; see Hartlyn, J and Dugas, J. ‘Colombia...’ pp.
–.
A point also made in Hartlyn, J. and Dugas, J. ‘
e Politics...’ pp. –.
Nor were conditions sound for the rise of corporatism either. Bailey has provided a well-informed interpretation for
it, emphasising three factors: the ideological ‘liberalisation’ of Colombian conservatism; the rather pluralist nature of
state policies toward the formation of interest associations and the characteristics of the administrative apparatus of the
central government and regional autonomous agencies. See Bailey, J. ‘Pluralist and Corporatist Dimensions of Interest
Representation in Colombia’ in Malloy, J. (Ed) Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Colombia ().
Palacios, M. ‘Entre la Legitimidad y la Violencia, –’ () p. .
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parties, the rather technocratic appointments of well-trained economists or businessmen at
the Finance Ministry, and the existence of a free press eager and ready to criticise populist
ideas. Most importantly, Urrutia notes, instead of attempting to redistribute income and
power via macroeconomic-management tools, such as the exchange rate, wage, price and
credit policies, the Colombian political class preferred redistribution at the microeconomic
level through the budget. In other words, the absence of populism is due to the presence
of a formidable substitute: clientelism.
One way to define clientelism is as the instrumental use of positions of power to distribute
jobs, goods, and public decisions to partisan supporters in order to maintain and strengthen
positions of political power. 
at relationship by which a patron (often a local political
boss) provides his client with a favour, or provides him with a service in exchange for his vote
is not unique to this case. However, what some authors sustain is atypical, is its intensity,
scope and durability. For instance, Archer and Shugart propose that within Latin America
and along with Brazil, Colombia exhibits the strongest traditional clientelistic brokering
in congressional elections. Further, Carey and Shugart rank it as the nation whose
electoral system and institutions cultivate personal (as opposed to party) reputation the
most — a proxy for clientele-based politics. Finally, that clientelism has deep historical
roots is evident from the fact that there are several studies examining the evolution of the
phenomena from its so-called ‘traditional’ variety in the nineteenth-century to the more
recent ‘broker’ or ‘party-directed’ type that emerged in the s and consolidated during
the National Front years. Patronage, thus, is fundamental to any understanding of
Colombian politics for two reasons: first; it played a key role in maintaining the political
dominance of the Liberal and Conservative political parties — or of a rather homogenous
Urrutia, M. ‘On the Absence of Economic Populism in Colombia’ in Dornbusch, R. and Edwards, S. (Eds) 
e
Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America ().
Urrutia, M. ‘On the Absence...’ pp. –.

is definition is drawn from Piattoni, S. ‘Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation: 
e European
Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective’ () p. . In this text the term clientelism is interchangeable
with ‘spoils system’ and ‘patronage’.
Archer, R. and Shugart, M. ‘
e Unrealized...’ p. .
Carey, J. and Shugart, M. ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas’ in Electoral
Studies () Vol. , No. , pp. –. Note that their survey covers countries from Europe, Asia and North and
Latin America.
For a history of clientelism in Colombia; see Archer, R. ‘
e Transition from Traditional to Broker Clientelism in
Colombia: Political Stability and Social Unrest’ (); Martz, J. ‘
e Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State
in Colombia’ (); and Schmidt, W. ‘Political Clientelism in Colombia’ ().
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bipartisan elite — for over a century. Secondly, it effectively, if not in a socially efficient
manner, brought the lower class strata of the population into the national political
arena. In the absence of corporatism, militarism and populism, the country’s political
development in the twentieth-century evolved around complex and sophisticated networks
of patrons and clients (rural and urban). Allegedly, the local political bosses operated in
the nodes of the networks and ensured the more high-profile national politicians sliced
the budget and directed other sources of state patronage to the bases. Indeed, a tangible
‘trickle-down effect’ was carried out and it befell to the two traditional parties to perform
it. Hence the need to examine the political parties in the last section.
Often and not without some justification, the long dominance of both the Liberal and
the Conservative parties has been blamed for most of the nation’s many ills. Peeler’s review
of the literature on the subject concludes, that there is “a high degree of consensus... in
evaluating the Colombian parties as instruments of a narrow and exploitative elite, which
have failed to adapt to the demands of modernization...” Irrespective of the verdict the
hard fact is that the party system has been pivotal in the country’s political history. Wilde
insightfully puts it: “Liberals and Conservatives... were the most fundamental national
institutions... [and] possessed the greatest range of ‘power capabilities,’ including symbols,
violence, electoral mobilization and economic resources (patronage).” In historical
perspective, this may well have been the case. Founded in the mid-nineteenth century
these political parties feature among the oldest in the world and consolidated themselves
before the nation did. And yet old age is not their most remarkable achievement. It is
See Archer, R. ‘
e Transition...’ ; Leal, F. ‘Un Bipartidismo en Crisis’ in Meyer, L. and Reyna, J. L. (Eds) Los Sistemas
Políticos en América Latina (); Schmidt, W. ‘Bureaucrats as Modernizing Brokers?’ in Comparative Politics () Vol.
, No. , pp. –; and Cepeda, F. ‘Factores que Contribuyen al Mantenimiento del Sistema Político Colombiano’
().
In a stimulating interpretative essay Robinson argues, that though neither populism nor clientelism are economically
efficient systems of redistribution for society as a whole; political elites in Colombia found that either clientelist practices
were cheaper or populist ones more costly, to buy political support; therefore the prevalence of the former. See; Robinson,
J. ‘Un Típico País Latinoamericano? Una Perspectiva sobre el Desarrollo’ in Robinson, J. and Urrutia, M. (Eds)
Economía... especially pp. –.
Urrutia, M. ‘On the Absence...’ p. .
Peeler, J. ‘Colombian Parties and Political Development: A Reassessment’ in Journal of Inter-American Studies and
World Affairs () Vol. , No.  p. . Peeler himself is of the view that though indeed corrupt, the party system is
viable, stable and framed the survival of the political order.
For a political history emphasising the role of the party system, see; Dugas, J. and Hartlyn, J. ‘Colombia...’
Wilde, A. ‘Conversations...’ p. .
Dix, R. ‘
e Politics...’ p. .
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their prevailing role ever since that stands out. Reds and blues, as the parties are known,
have overwhelmingly dominated legislature seats and no other political party has ever
come close to winning a presidential election.
What explains this extraordinary characteristic of the political system? First, the absence
of strong third parties, especially of labour-based socialism, resulting from the multi-class
composition of the Liberal and Conservative parties, which cuts across all social strata,
offered representation within the established framework. 
is also prevented the kind of
class polarisation that in other countries gave movements of the Left the vigour to mobilise
and turn into large and organised parties. Secondly, the incorporation of labour along
partisan lines — and not by the state — through the foundation of two major labour
federations, the Liberal Confederation Workers in , and the Conservative Jesuit
Union of Workers ten years later, divided and weakened the non-radical base of the Left
significantly. At a more structural level, certain conditions of society did not favour the
rise of the Left. Angell notes that the major belief system in Latin America — Catholicism
and the fierce hostility of the Church to Marxism — limited the appeal of radicalism
among popular sectors and women. In addition to this, there was a very low level of
European immigrants who could have brought with them radical and novel ideas and
political activism. On the economic side, the status of late-latecomer to industrialisation,
the failure to develop a broad industrial base, and the fact that the most dynamic sector
constituted the production and exportation of coffee, were all factors that hardly aided the
cause of Left.
Tirado Mejía notes, that Colombia’s political two-party system along conservative-liberal lines has been among very
few, if not the only case in the Latin American context, to have survived the twentieth century; see; Tirado Mejía, A.
‘Colombia: Siglo y Medio de Bipartidismo’ en Arrubla, M. (Ed) Colombia Hoy ()p. .
For statistics on the distribution of congressional seats from  to  — chamber of representatives — see;
Cepeda, F. ‘
e Colombian Elections of ’ in Electoral Studies () Vol. , No. , p. . For electoral results for
the presidency since ; see Dugas, J. and Hartlyn, J. ‘Colombia...’ pp. –.
A notable exception for the presidential race constitutes the challenge posed by Gustavo Rojas and his party Alianza
Nacional Popular (ANAPO) to the conservative candidate Misael Pastrana in the elections of , in which the margin
of victory for the latter was slim and in which allegations of fraud are not completely unfounded.
For a quantitative exercise on the social bases of the traditional political parties; see Sanín, F., Viatela, J. M. and
Acevedo, T. ‘Olivos y Aceitunos? Los Partidos Políticos Colombianos y sus Bases Sociales en la Primera Mitad del Siglo
XX’ in Análisis Político () Vol. , No. .
For a comparative perspective on the incorporation of labour in Latin America; see the work of Collier, D. and Collier,
R. ‘Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, 
e Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America’
().
Angell, A. ‘
e Left in Latin America since ’ in Bethell, L. (Ed) Latin America: Politics and Society () p. .
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A third factor relates to the great ability of the two main parties to contain within their
own ranks dissident movements. 
is was the case of López Michelsen’s Revolutionary
Liberal Movement in the s or the previous Independent National Revolutionary
Union of Gaitán during the s. Similarly, the skills party leaders demonstrated during
critical junctures to form coalition governments, such as in the s, s and the
National Front governments, explain the resilience of bipartisan power. Further, despite
the ideological differences that have existed between the main parties, prominently on
the role of religion and education, recurrent coalitions indicate that the ideological divide
did not cut deep, and that pragmatism and accommodation often prevailed. Conversely,
however, when party elites were fragmented and failed to reach political agreements,
partisan violence spiralled out of control, turning especially acute in the countryside, as
during the years of La Violencia between  to .
Fourthly, and as said earlier, the development of extensive clientelist practices played
a role in the lasting two-party dominance. Martz sustains: “that Colombia’s traditional
party survives essentially because of its regionally distributive policy-making style — that
is, its ability to allocate jobs, goods, and services to regional elites and supporters in a
reasonably equitable manner.” More important than redistribution, however, is the
legitimacy that both parties enjoyed, as demonstrated by a long electoral tradition in
which they dominate. Posada-Carbó leads a revisionist argument that the electoral
tradition lies at the cornerstone of the nation’s representative democracy, even if admittedly,
elections have not always been free and fair — corruption, ballot stuffing, coercion and
violence all have been practiced. If not ideal, in the main, elections have been regular,
competitive and have mobilised large segments of the population at the local, regional and
national levels. 
e parties provided the political system with the legitimacy it required
to be respected through the ballot-box. In sum, the fortitude of the traditional parties
Tirado Mejía, A. ‘Colombia...’ p. ; Angell, A. ‘Cooperation and Conflict in Colombian Party Politics’ in Political
Studies () Vol. XIV, No. , pp. –; Robinson, J. ‘Un Típico...’ p. .

is is a central argument for Wilde, A. op. cit; Hartlyn, J. “
e Politics...”; and Dugas, J. and Hartlyn, J. ‘Colombia...’
Martz, J. ‘
e Politics...’ p. .
Posada-Carbó, E. ‘Limits of Power: Elections under the Conservative Hegemony in Colombia, –’ in
Hispanic American Historical Review () Vol. , No. ; and ‘La Nación...’ Ch. .
For a detailed paper on ballot stuffing; see Chaves, I., Fergusson, L. and Robinson, J. ‘He Who Counts Elects:
Determinants of Fraud in the  Colombian Presidential Election’ ().
An interesting paper by Mazzuca and Robinson argues that a complement to the electoral tradition has been
competition regarding electoral rules. 
ey argue, that the power-sharing institutions arranged between Liberals and
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was a function of the economic and social milieu in which they operated, the persistent
weakness of the labour movement, the often formidable political skills of the parties’ leaders
at coalition-building and dissidence-containing, the patronage capabilities that being in
power granted them, and the legitimacy with which each regime accessed power, thanks to
regular and largely competitive elections.
Conclusions

is chapter provided the basic historical background and contexts in which the state of
the mid-twentieth century sought to foster (or not) industrial development. 
e opening
section stressed the geographical fragmentation and diversity of the nation, which for
generations made domestic and international trade difficult and expensive, mainly due to
prohibitive transportation costs. History, through the persistence of colonial economic
institutions, along with the inability of the newly independent neogranadians to agree
on governance structures, ensured continuous political instability that diminished the
opportunities to reap trade gains from the boom in commodities of the international
economy of the late-nineteenth century. Only when the production of coffee for exports
took hold, these obstacles to economic development began to be removed.
Since the s, as improvements in physical infrastructure accelerated, the foreign
exchange resources expanded and regional markets integrated, industry begun to flourish.
Rapid industrial growth rates during the s competed with coffee as the leading sector
and from then on, industry exhibited a dynamic of its own. 
e process concentrated in
the Antioquia region at first, though soon after, Bogota and other regions with relatively
large markets built up their own sectors. During the mid-twentieth century the structure
of manufacturing changed gradually, from an emphasis on consumer non-durables to
more intermediate goods, the development of consumer-durable sectors and to a lesser
extent of capital goods. At times and only in part, was import-substitution the main
source of manufacturing growth. By and large, industrialisation was a domestic effort.
Conservatives made for more legitimate regimes via more balanced political representation. See Mazzuca, S. and
Robinson, J. ‘Political Conflict and Power-Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia’ () NBER Working Paper,
No. .
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Most industrial start-ups at the beginning of the century belonged to Colombians and
this remained largely so thereafter, though foreign resources in certain technology and
capital intensive sectors played a role later. With regards to policy, as will be argued in
substantive research chapters, the industrialisation of the economy was a fact to which the
contribution of the state was modest. Unlike other medium and large economies in Latin
America, industrialisation in Colombia from  to  was not to be state-led.

e key characteristics of the polity constitute the substance of the closing section. A
politically centralised but administratively decentralised constitutional framework from
 guaranteed Colombia was for the practice of politics a nation of regions. 
is
influenced that the main political mechanism to incorporate the population into politics
became a sophisticated type of clientelism — which rendered other political developments,
such as corporatism and populism non-appealing. Perhaps the most important of all the
characteristics of the state was its weakness. Fiscal weakness implied a small state, and one
that commanded fewer economic resources than its regional equivalents. Nevertheless,
as the state grew in size and modernised itself to intervene in the economy its capacity
grew — and so did the powers of the presidents of the republic. Whether or not the
presidents/governments emerging from the two traditional political parties displayed these
powers to effect serious changes in economic-development policy, i.e. whether they ‘pushed’
for industrialisation, concerns the core research of this thesis. And so is the question of
whether political and economic limits to presidentialism prevented them to carry out a
full-blown pro-industry policy.

3 Colombia in Latin America: Import
Substitution and the State
Colombia is different from other middle- and large-sized nations in Latin America. In
some respects, this is hardly news. It is well recognized that its polity diverged markedly
from those of the region during the twentieth century. 
e extant literature, however,
has failed to examine the wider implications of such distinct a polity; therefore, it has
failed to notice that the nation’s economic development trajectory has been different too.
Current interpretations of the country’s modern economic history assert that it evolved
along the same lines as the large Latin American nations, that is, following a pattern that
can be broadly summarised as: a) export-led growth from mid-nineteenth century to the
Great Depression, b) import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) from the s/s to
the late s and early s, c) a neoliberal economic model from then onwards. 
is
study realises the implications that the nation’s unique political development caused on its
economic development between  and  — that is, during the alleged golden age
of ISI. It will be argued that the typical characteristics of ISI applying to other economies
in the region were either absent or not intended by governments. Neither in terms of the
policies more commonly associated with ISI nor in their macroeconomic manifestations
does Colombia’s experience fit the traditional template. 
e notion that the ISI label does
not adequately capture this historical experience — or for that matter the Latin American
one — is not new. Cárdenas et al. offer an alternative to ISI: state-led industrialisation.

e issue, however, is that the essence of this approach, the pro-active leadership attached
to the state in directing the pro-industrial strategy, is not borne out by the Colombian
Cárdenas, E. et al. ‘Introduction’.
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experience. Consequently, not only is Colombia different from other Latin American
countries in its politics but also in its economics.

e current (mis)understanding about the role of the state in Colombia’s industrialisation,
namely, the conviction that an ISI strategy was attempted and, indeed, was directed by
the state, is based on shaky foundations. Succinctly put, the current view holds that trade,
exchange rate, monetary and credit, and direct pro-developmentalist policies followed the
practically unchanging preferences of successive governments in the second third of the
twentieth century, which were fixated with the idea of fostering a domestic manufacturing
sector at any cost. As a result, the state enacted protectionist tariffs, endowed public agencies
with resources to engage in direct industrial promotion, skewed the exchange rate towards
appreciation to facilitate strategic industrial imports, and ensured that manufacturing firms
enjoyed extensive access to credit at preferential rates. 
e thrust of this dissertation is to
challenge these claims. 
is chapter, specifically, by addressing the central policy areas of
trade and exchange rate, aims at fracturing the dominant, misconstrued consensus.

e piece contests conventional wisdom and proposes that commercial policy did not
reflect the abrupt willingness of governments to raise trade barriers in order to protect the
domestic industry. Rather, trade measures followed the logic imposed by a previous set of
multiple concerns: fiscal revenue, pressures in the balance of payments and the challenges
that the economic management of very volatile external accounts posed to the authorities.
In this context, protecting manufacturers was at best another variable to be dealt with.
Consistent with this interpretation, empirical data show that the ‘apparent closure’ of the
economy was marginal during the late s to the s period, even more so, when
compared to the trajectories of the external sectors of other large Latin American economies.
Further, it is argued that if there were any concessions given to industry, these were in no
way systematic or substantial. Secondly, regarding the issue of exchange rate policy, the
chapter confronts important questions directed at establishing the role of government in
the trajectory of the Colombian peso: Did government policy cause the peso to appreciate,
and if so, to what extent? Was the exchange rate appreciation, instead, the product of
economic forces beyond the control of public authorities? Moreover, what was the actual
overvaluation of the Colombian currency in comparative perspective? In what kind of
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international and political-economic setting were governments operating, and how could
this have affected decision-making on exchange-rate systems? As will be shown below,
the evidence point at answers in favour of a non-dominant role for government policy,
exchange rates that were not far from their equilibrium, and external and internal contexts
that made the deliberate overvaluation of the Colombian peso a hard policy to be tried.

e findings in this chapter and the interpretations constructed upon them, further the
revisionist take of this dissertation on the intentionality and concrete protagonism of the
state in Colombia’s late-industrialisation.
Before continuing, a comment on the sources and methods used in this chapter is in
order. In pursuing the vast task of establishing the appropriate role of the state in the
various arenas of economic policy, this author has been forced to find benchmarks against
which to assess the Colombian performance, to obtain more robust objectivity in the
judgements and interpretations issued. 
us, although the dissertation is not comparative
in nature, it constantly seeks for comparisons with the middle- and large-sized economies
of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela), which have frequently
been considered as having opted for ISI policies. Similarly, the scale of the challenge
has dictated the need to combine extensively, and particularly in this chapter, secondary
literature with primary sources. Although the chapter does not apply econometric exercises
to the raw data gathered by this author, both sub-sections on exchange rates and tariffs, use
the works and findings of others applying such advanced quantitative analysis, to defend
and support the original theses advanced therein.

is chapter is organised in five sections. It opens up with a stylised description of
Colombia’s unique ‘broad distinctness’ and the political economy underpinning its singu-
larity. 
is aims at familiarising the reader with the wider political and economic context
in which concrete policies areas are examined in later parts. 
e second section critically
reviews the existing literature and offers a new classification of the literature that focuses
on Colombia’s industrialisation, highlighting the common underlying failure of current
studies: the assumption that the state pro-actively, decisively and deliberately led or directed
the process of industrialisation — through import substitution or otherwise. 
e following
chapters deal with two of the central fields of economic policy in which, if conventional
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wisdom is right, ISI-policies should have been apparent: trade and foreign-exchange. 
e
last section concludes.
Colombia’s ‘Broad Distinctness’
Historically, high and persistent levels of socio-economic inequality, pervasive poverty and
extensive political violence would suggest at first that Colombia is like any other Latin
American nation. A closer look at her political and economic characteristics and long-run
trends hints that it is not. In political terms the differences are salient. Many of the
nation’s democratic traits in the twentieth century have been rare in the region: extensive
civilian rule, vibrant electoral traditions, and a flair for constitutionalism (if compounded
by political violence). Other aspects, like the long bipartisan dominance of elections and
government is also atypical and is best explained by the ability of the Conservative and
Liberal leaders to convert their organisations into multi-class parties by skilfully co-opting
other popular movements, particularly labour forces. 
e absence of caudillos in power,
populism and corporatism suffice to make the Colombian polity distinct. 
e presence
of clientelistic politics, on the other hand, though certainly not unknown in other Latin
American countries, seems to have been particularly strong, notwithstanding the small size
of its public sector.
On the side of the economy, there have also been notable differences. To start with, the
country shows a remarkable record of macroeconomic stability, possibly best evidenced
by relatively low levels of inflation over time. 
e fact that the currency, the Colombian
peso, has been kept unchanged, also testifies to unusual stability. Similarly, avoidance of
large fiscal deficits, prudence in public accounts and pragmatism in economic policies
and management spared it the heavy external borrowing that characterised the region
in the s and its dire consequences; Colombia did not suffer from the ‘debt crisis’
that affected Latin America in the s. In fact, sound economic management on
the part of monetary authorities was recognised well back in the s by the likes of
Robert Triffin. At a more structural level, the country differs from the rest in the way

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in which it integrated into the world economy with long-lasting consequences. It was
coffee what turned out to fit best the tropical climate, topography and rain patterns
that characterised a great part of the country’s geography. Naturally, the characteristics
of a crop that required little capital, employed cheap family labour and permitted the
cultivation of other subsistence foods in the same plot of land made it a popular way of
making a living. In short, coffee became a ‘democratic commodity’. 
e fact is that it
was through coffee exports that the nation decisively incorporated itself into world trade.
Coffee became the most important export by the s, dominating the export matrix for
the next half century. 
e production features of the bean made for a singular political
economy that shaped its broad distinctness. Atomised into several tens of thousands of
small-scale producers, and generating the majority of foreign exchange, coffee growers
constituted an important electoral mass that evolved into a powerfully organised political
actor. Further, most of coffee marketing remained in national hands giving the sector
even more sway. Coffee interests centred on defending favourable exchange rate levels,
seeking generous credit access and terms, and watching over the maintenance of coffee’s
good internal prices. To summarise, in Diaz-Alejandro’s ‘commodity lottery’ terms,
coffee proved a relatively benign draw: democratic in its production, Colombian in its
commercialisation, empowering in the domestic politics.
ISI: Definitions, Features and Literature
ISI is conceived of as a long-run model of accumulation, a development strategy or
a path to attain socio-economic modernisation. As a development strategy, i.e. “as a
See for instance, Bates, R. ‘Open-Economy Politics: 
e Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade’ () Ch.
; Palacios, M. ‘Coffee in Colombia, –’ (); Hartlyn, J. ‘
e Impact of Patterns of Industrialization
and of Popular Sector Incorporation on Political Regime Type: A Case Study of Colombia’ in Studies in Comparative
International Development () Vol. , No. .
See; Palacios, M. ‘Coffee...’ pp. –, –.
See Diaz-Alejandro, C. ‘Latin America in the s’ in 
orp, R. (Ed) Latin America in the s: 
e Role of the
Periphery in World Crisis ().
Fitzgerald, V. ‘ECLA and the 
eory of Import Substituting Industrialization in Latin America’ in Cárdenas, E. et al.
(Eds) An Economic... Vol. .
See for example Gereffi, G. ‘Paths... ‘; Haggard, S. ‘Pathways...’; Solimano, A. ‘Economic Growth under Alternative
Development Strategies: Latin America from the s to the s’ in Solimano, A. (Ed) Roadmaps to Prosperity: Essays
on Growth and Development” (); and Felix, D. ‘Import Substitution and Late Industrialization: Latin America and
Asia Compared’ in World Development () Vol. , No. .
See Baer, W. ‘Import...’ pp. –.
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set of government policies that shape the country’s relationship to the global economy
and that affect the domestic allocation of resources among industries and major social
groups”, ISI was expected to deliver increases in economy-wide productivity, technological
upgrading, improvements in the terms of trade, positive spill-overs or linkage effects
and growing manufacturing employment. At its core, ISI intended to substitute with
domestic production industrial goods that were imported, and for doing so a number
of tools or policy instruments, according to the extant literature, were designed. Franko
distinguishes an ‘ISI toolbox’ comprised of three broad types of measures: active industrial
policy, international instruments, and fiscal and monetary policy. Active industrial
policy, according to this interpretation, seeks to form mixed- and state-owned enterprises,
requires governments to make purchases from national firms and pressures foreign firms
to establish joint ventures and increase local content. 
e imposition of tariffs on final
goods, quotas on imports, as well as the rationing of foreign exchange, the licensing of
imports and the overvaluation of the exchange rate constitute the international tools of
ISI. Finally, subsidies for cheap industrial inputs, tax breaks, preferential interest rates and
accommodating monetary measures represent the fiscal and monetary policies of the ‘ISI
toolbox’. To these measures others added price ceilings on wage goods — especially
on foodstuffs — and the construction of government-funded infrastructure especially to
complement industries. 
is was the arsenal of policies intended to make of industry
the ‘engine’ of growth of a new kind of economy, one in which manufacturing became the
leading sector in an ‘inward-looking’ path, a strategy that was to lift out of poverty and
underdevelopment the countries that embarked on it. Via industrialisation poor countries
were to catch up with rich ones. Alas, for most nations, ISI did not match expectations.

e extant literature has produced a long list of the adverse consequences attributed
to ISI. In a general sense, Bruton argued, ISI generated three kinds of unwelcoming
outcomes: distortions on the economy, the creation of activities alien to the economic and
Gereffi, G. ‘Paths...’ p. .
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e theory, historical context and rationale for ISI and the benefits it should bring about can be reviewed in Love, J.
‘
e Rise and Decline of Economic Structuralism in Latin America’ in Latin American Research Review () Vol. ,
No. , pp. –; and Fitzgerald, E. V. K. ‘ECLA...’ pp. –.
Franko, P. ‘
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social environment, and the creation of conditions which dampened productivity. In
a seminal paper, Taylor made a systematic effort to calibrate the ‘legendary’ distortions
of the ‘inward-looking model’, concentrating on currency depreciation, the black market
premium for foreign exchange and the price of capital. 
e combination of overvalued
exchange rates with high industrial prices and controls on agricultural items is said to have
harmed agriculture both domestically and in terms of exports. 
is export pessimism
and anti-export bias did at times force the curtailment of imports, which were required
for industrialisation to advance. Further, subsidies to invest in industrial projects put
pressure on government budgets, causing fiscal deficits, which were often monetised and
at other times financed with unsustainable external debt, in turn generating high and
persistent rates of inflation, and macroeconomic instability. But the negative effects of
ISI are not confined to the sectoral and macro-economic imbalances. 
e discretionary
methods by which protectionist measures were enacted, import licenses granted and credit
and intermediate assets allocated made corruption economically expedient, exacerbated
inequality and coddled business culture. Lastly, the maintenance of artificially low
interest rates in highly intervened financial systems is also said to have forced repression
and rationing in the markets for money and capital. In short, ISI-inspired policies bred
chronic macroeconomic disequilibria — high inflation, overvalued currencies, budget
deficits — sectoral imbalances — the accelerated growth of industry at the expense of
exports and domestic agriculture — and wide opportunities for rent-seeking and crony
capitalism.

e inward-looking model that ISI came to epitomise is seen by Bulmer-
omas as an
aberration. A missed opportunity whose timing could not have been worse, given that the
Bruton, J. ‘
e Import-Substitution Strategy of Economic Development: A Survey’ in Pakistan Development Review
() Vol. , No. , pp. –.
Taylor, A. ‘On the Costs...’ p. .
See for example Cardoso, E. and Fishlow, A. ‘Latin American Economic Development: –’ in Journal of Latin
American Studies () Supplement Vol. ; Baer, W. ‘Import...’; Cardoso, E. and Helwege, A. ‘Latin America’s...’ Ch.
.
Waterbury, J. ‘
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() Vol. , No. . p. ; Cardoso, E. and Fishlow, ‘Latin American...’ p. ; Cardoso, E. and Helwege, A. ‘Latin
America’s...’ pp. –.
Franko, P. ‘
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global economy experienced its fastest rates of growth during these decades while Latin
American governments opted, instead, to retreat from world markets. But just as much
as the negative consequences of the ISI model have been overstated, its achievements have
been underrated. A recent literature however, has begun to straighten up the balance of
judgements. Cárdenas et al. re-established common sense in assessments over the ISI
era: “Latin American economic performance during the three decades that followed the
Second World War was remarkable, inducing a widespread transformation of society.”

e authors note the fact that the region experienced the highest rates of GDP per capita
growth ever, that manufacturing, as intended, served as the ‘engine’ of economic growth,
and that labour productivity gains translated into higher real wages. Moreover, they argue,
Latin American economies underwent significant transformations in their productive
structures, as technological capabilities were built, and entrepreneurial, managerial and
labour skills developed. Other benefits from ISI, difficult to quantify yet without doubt
important, came in the form of the economic diversification and institution-building,
of which development banks, social security schemes and modern labour relations were
just a few. Perhaps the most convincing evidence to challenge ISI-critics comes from
the tangible and measurable changes that Latin Americans experienced in their own lives.
Astorga et al. demonstrate that standards of living increased substantially between –,
as captured by longer life expectancies, higher literacy rates and increases in income per
capita. 
ese authors dare relating this progress with industrialisation of the day.
Regardless of the views over the excesses and virtues of ISI, whether ISI-policies were
‘opted’, ‘imposed’, ‘adopted’, ‘pursued’ or ‘followed’, as the overwhelming majority of the
literature recognises, the underlying logic is that ISI was not a market-driven process. On
the contrary, as the language indicates, ISI is assumed to be a quintessentially government-
or state-sponsored affair. 
is is so much the case, that Cárdenas et al. challenge con-
ventional wisdom labelling the Latin American experience from the s to the s
Bulmer-
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Cárdenas, E. et al. ‘Introduction’ p. .
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See 
orp, R. ‘Progress, Poverty and Exclusion: An Economic History of Latin America in the th Century’ ()
Chs.  and .
Astorga, P. et al. ‘
e Standard...’
Love, J. ‘
e Rise...’ p. .

C  L A: I S   S
as ISI and described as “state-led industrialisation”. 
ey argue that the term ISI is
imperfect on the grounds that modern manufacturing appeared in several countries before
the s, because in many instances import substitution was far from being a leading
source of growth for industry, and finally because in some places import substitution
was accompanied with export promotion. 
us, ‘state-led industrialisation’ captures
best the essence of the period, one in which there was a greater and more ubiquitous
role for the state. Harsh critics of the ISI model, like Edwards, also describe the era as
one of “government-led industrialisation”. In similar fashion, Franko argues that Latin
American states acted as developmental actors during ISI and others complement that
view sustaining that governments followed ISI consciously or deliberately. In short, the
conventional literature disagrees about the merits and horrors of ISI, but converges on
the fundamental role that governments played in the pursuit of that model of economic
development. Indeed, the state became the key force in interpretations about the indus-
trialisation processes in Latin America and elsewhere. But does the role of Colombian
governments and their economic policies fit in adequately in such state-led ISI stories? In
most accounts, Colombia has so far been customarily included among the nations that in
the region attempted ISI or ‘stated-led industrialisation’.

is chapter classifies four distinguishable interpretations of ISI in Colombia: ‘big-
picture’ scholars, ‘discontinuists’, ‘transitionists’ and ‘moderates’. A wide range of studies
dealing with Latin America as a region, often synthesising historical experiences of industri-
alisation and/or of economic development, and identifying Colombia as another ‘average’
ISI nation, constitute the first group. An authoritative study by Cardoso and Helwege listed
it along with Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico as one of the economies where from the
“s to the early s ISI dominated economic planning.” Kaufman adds Uruguay to
this group, but notes a distinct periodisation for Colombia — which along with Mexico —
saw ISI becoming “an official component of governmental policy” in the s. Similarly,
Munck also prefers this label. See Munck, R. ‘Contemporary Latin America’ () Ch. .
Cárdenas, E. et al. ‘Introduction...’ p. .
Edwards, S. ‘Crisis...’ () p. .
Franko, P. ‘
e Puzzle...’ p. .
Cardoso, E. and Helwege, A. ‘Latin America’s...’ Ch. ; Munck, R. ‘Contemporary...’ Ch. ; and Diaz-Alejandro, C.
‘
e s in Latin America’ in Syrquin, M., Taylor, L. and Westphal, L. Economic Structure and Performance: Essays in
Honor of Hollis B. Chenery ().
Kaufman, R. ‘How...’ pp. –, . 
is view is shared by Waterbury, J. ‘
e Long ...’ p. .
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Solimano characterises the s-s as a period in which the development model was
“state dirigisme-cum-import substitution”. For Dietz and Street, ISI turned into the new
model of expansion for the larger countries with some existing industry; Colombia, having
the region’s fourth largest population and total GDP by , and with manufacturing
experience dating from the turn of the twentieth century, makes it comfortably in their
classification. Ffrench-Davis et al., referring to the larger economies state: “...practically
the whole orientation of economic policy and an inordinate amount of new resources were
directed towards ISI...” Likewise, Ranis, in a comparative study between Mexico and
Colombia with Korea and Taiwan suggests that the Latin American cases represent the
examples where policy moved from primary to secondary ISI with the maintenance of
prior protection controls, the prevalence of substantial subsidies and the harmful effects
that these brought about. Lastly, in more geographically encompassing fashion, Edwards
sustains: “since the s every country in Latin America had shunned free markets and
relied on massive tariff walls to protect domestic industries”. 
us, in this strand of the
literature Colombia, is typically integrated in the group of Latin American economies that
during the mid-twentieth century tried inward-looking development. 
is equates with
Colombia having implemented policies of the ‘ISI toolbox’ and having had a state-led
industrialisation project. 
is literature is not alone in its claims, however.
Solimano, A. ‘Economic...’ p. .
From Cardoso, E. and Fishlow, A. ‘Latin American...’ p. .
Dietz, J. and Street, J ‘Latin America’s Economic Development: Institutionalist and Structuralist Perspectives’ ()
pp. –.
Ffrench-Davis, R., Muñoz, O. and Palma, G. ‘
e Latin American Economies, –’ in Bethell, L. (Ed) Latin
America: Economy and Society since  () p. .
Ranis, G. ‘Contrasts...’ pp. –.
Edwards, S. ‘Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism’ () p. .

ere are more nuanced views, however. Bulmer-
omas’ classical study recognises differences between the Latin
American countries. 
at is Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay adopted the ISI model “consistently and enthusiasti-
cally”, whilst the other two — Colombia and Mexico — were more cautious, combining ISI with export promotion.
See Bulmer-
omas, V. ‘
e Economic...’ pp. –. Sheahan also pairs Colombia with Mexico and adds Costa Rica
to distinguish a group he calls the “middle-road market economies”. 
ese were in between the aggressive protectionism
and state action that promoted industrialisation in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, on the hand; and the continued reliance
of primary exports and free trade-model of the Central American republics, on the other. See Sheahan, J. ‘Patterns of
Development in Latin America: Poverty, Repression and Economic Strategy’ () Ch. . Lewis notes, that Colombia
along with Cuba were latecomers in adopting fully the developmentalist ideology of cepalismo — only in the s,
precisely when the paradigm was being challenged. See Lewis, C. ‘States and Markets in Latin America: 
e Rise
and Decline of Economic Interventionism’ () p. . Liang, working with a wider sample of countries, suggests
Colombia does not fit in well in ISI-trade typologies and proposes the label of “De Facto Import Promotion”, in which
there is a bias against import substitution as well as a bias against export promotion. His argument, that this leads to
unsustainable ‘debt-led’ growth, however, does not match the Colombian experience. See Liang, N. ‘Beyond Import
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Among the ‘discontinuists’ it is common to find studies arguing that successive Colom-
bian governments since the s pro-actively promoted industrial development. A
respected work by Avella et al. sustains that industrialisation triggered by external shocks
in the s came to be seen as the only viable alternative for development at the time,
turning into a “truly national ideology” by the end of the Liberal administrations in .
According to this view, the ISI strategy featured three distinctive elements: the channelling
of more credit resources to industry, direct investments by the state in the sector, and
growing protectionism. In the rapid industrialisation of the post-war period a central
role is given to the state by Vejarano, who argues, that: “...the third industrialization
phase [–] ...relied on protection and state promotion...” as well as on domestic
credit and foreign investment. Equally, Valderrama claims, that to talk about economic
policy in Colombia between the s and the s amounts “to talk about the different
attempts of the government to accelerate economic growth, particularly by encouraging
the industrialization process” — using mainly two instruments: trade policy and financial
policy. A similar interpretation is offered by Misas, who reduces the basis of ISI to high
protectionism and subsidised credit, as the state of the post-war period, he asserts, “decided
to deepen industrialisation via import substitution”. To complement these views, perhaps
more radically, Fajardo and Rodríguez declare that, in these years, the nation adopted the
strategy of “industrialisation at any cost”. 
us, in addition to the ‘broad Latin America’
literature that places Colombia along with the other large- and middle-sized economies
that tried state-led ISI, there is a second body of ‘Colombia-focus’ works that recognise
the s/s as years of discontinuity, as years when in a break with previous experiences
Substitution and Export Promotion: A New Typology of Trade Strategies’ in Journal of Development Studies () Vol.
, No. , pp. –.
Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ p. . 
ey also claimed that “industry was the centre of attention of policy”
from  to ; p. . For a long list of authors claiming that the Colombian state of the s and s
promoted industrialisation; see Sáenz Rovner, E. ‘Élites, Estado y Política Económica en Colombia Durante el Segundo
Tercio del Siglo XX’ in Análisis Político () No. , fn. .
Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ pp. –.
Vejarano, C. ‘Industrialization...’ pp. –.
Valderrama, M. T. ‘
ree Essays on the Relationship between Financial Regime, Trade Regime and Industrial Sector
in Colombia’ () p. .
Misas, G. ‘La Ruptura de los Noventa: del Gradualismo al Colapso’ () pp. –.
Fajardo, C. and Rodríguez, N. ‘Tres...’ pp. , .
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and policies the state committed forcefully to industrialisation and ISI and promoted it
wholeheartedly.‘
Transitionists’, for their part, concentrate the analyses on a later period, namely, the
late-s and seek to explain an alleged transition in development policy: from ISI to
export promotion or export-led growth. Representatives of this stream of the literature,
such as Júarez, maintain: “Colombia was one of the first countries in Latin America to
begin a major reorientation away from full dependence on ISI as a strategy of development”
to promote export diversification and outward orientation. In a similar fashion, Mares
argues, that “... the shift in trade and development strategy, from inward to outward, was
relatively unique in Latin America at the time...[and that] Colombia underwent a transition
similar to the East Asian with very positive, though less spectacular, results.” 
e authors’
strong emphasis on the discontinuities and changes that the economic reforms of the –
 period brought about, most notably regarding exchange rates and the introduction
of tax and credit incentives to accelerate the growth of new export products, constitute
convincing evidence for these authors that a truly different development path was taking
shape. 
at is, a different model than the previous ISI one. Under these interpretations,
however, both development strategies are understood to have been initiated and directed
by government. 
erefore they do not dissent in the conception of the role of the state in
the economic development of the nation with the views of the ‘big-picture’ analysts or the
‘discontinuists’.
See for example the works by Escorcia, J. ‘Historia de Colombia Siglo XX’ () pp. –; Arrubla, M. ‘Síntesis
de Historia Política Contemporánea’ in Arrubla, M. (Ed) Colombia Hoy () p. ; and Mayor Mora, A. ‘Historia...’
pp. –.
Juárez, C. ‘Trade and Development Policies in Colombia: Export Promotion and Outward Orientation, –’
in Studies in Comparative International Development () Vol. , No. , p. .
Mares, D. ‘Domestic Institutions and Shifts in Trade and Development Policy: Colombia, –’ in Odell, J.
and Willet, J. (Eds) International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange between Economics and Political Science ()
pp. –. For more studies stressing the ISI-EOI shift see; Hartlyn, J. ‘
e Impact...’ pp. –. See also; Diaz-
Alejandro, C. ‘Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Colombia’ () pp. , , ; and Morawetz,
D. ‘Why the Emperor’s New Clothes are not Made in Colombia: A Case Study in Latin American and East Asian
Manufactured Exports’ () p. ; both cited in Mares, D. ‘Domestic...’ p. , fn. . García also subscribes
to the ISI-export promotion characterisation of Colombia’s successive economic development models; see García, J.
‘Ensayos sobre Comercio Exterior y Desarrollo Colombiano’ () p. . An exception to this kind of interpretations
is offered by 
oumi, who sustains that “...the policy change [of ] was not a clear shift from import substitution
industrialization to export oriented industrialization”; see 
oumi, F. ‘International Trade Strategies, Employment and
Income Distribution in Colombia’ in Krueger, A., Lary, H., Monson, T. and Akrasanee, N. (Eds) Trade and Employment
in Developing Countries () p..
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e shortcomings of the three groups of literature are noticeable. In the haste to include
Colombia in the club of Latin American countries that pursued ISI, ‘big-picture’ scholars
extend and apply to Colombia judgements reached on the characterisation of economies
that in more decisive fashion implemented ISI policies, such as Brazil and Argentina.
Drawing on partial evidence about ISI manifestations, such as the prevalence of tariffs,
these studies are too quick to assume that sustained and comprehensive pro-industry
policies were standard practice in exchange rates, fiscal and credit matters. By this token,
a misleading picture of Colombia as an ISI-follower is offered. As will be shown below,
when examining the central features of state-led ISI in comparative perspective, Colombia
exhibits few of the ISI characteristics of its regional neighbours. 
us, its labelling as another
Latin American ISI-nation is built on shaky ground. 
e flaws of the ‘discontinuists’ are
more serious, however, and emerge from two issues. First, a tendency to overstate the
features of ISI that is easily disproved when set against the historical experience. On themes
like the direct action of the state to promote industry via developmentalist agencies, such as
the Institute for Industrial Development, mistaken judgements about its financial strength
and the scope of its activities are made (Chapter ). Similar interpretations regarding
developmentalist or subsidised credit, of which industry is assumed to have been a major
recipient, are equally erroneous (Chapters  and ). Secondly, these studies say next to
nothing about the intentionality of state policy. 
is is key, for policies typically associated
with state-led industrialisation, such as the adoption of protectionist measures, may well be
rooted in other contextual or ad hoc considerations, like crises in balance of payments, as
will be discussed later. 
e works of ‘Discontinuists’ tend to confuse the fact of a growing
role of the state in the economy with it having a skewed pro-developmentalist/industrialist
stance. 
e historical record simply does not bear out these interpretations. Finally,
‘transitionists’ by focusing on and explaining the shift to export promotion neglect the
characteristics of what was in place before and end up assuming it was an ISI strategy.

ese studies do not delve into the ISI period; instead, it is taken as given. But, by
emphasising the alleged shift in development strategy, they helped further in disseminating
misconstrued views about the actual features of the industrialisation process, about the
role of the state in it, and about the historical preferences of governments in regards to
growth and development options.
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To reiterate, central to the literature so far is an underlying assumption: that ISI, as
a development strategy, was state-led. Neither the policies of the ‘ISI toolbox’, nor the
excesses typically associated with ISI, took hold in Colombia. More interestingly, policies
that superficially seemed to have been implemented to foster industrial development were
more often than not the result of exogenous pressures. 
e myth the extant literature
has spread is that the Colombian state of the mid-twentieth century decisively promoted
industrialisation. 
erefore, the questions to be asked are: Did the Colombian state really
intervene as widely and deeply argued to decisively promote the industrialisation project?
Did the Colombian state possess the capacity required to design and implement industrial
policies that threatened other influential and well-established economic sectors? At a more
basic level: Is it correct to start with the presumption that governments since the s
unequivocally saw ISI as the preferred development option? 
is thesis provides answers
to these key questions. In doing so it challenges the conventional wisdom on the role of
the state in the country’s late-industrialisation and on the preferences of Colombian rulers
regarding such a project, as evinced forcefully by the analysis of credit and promotional
policies between  and . 
e Colombian state, contrary to what the existing
literature holds, did not promote industrialisation. Further, it is not clear at all that the
industrialisation project had been an apparent preference of governments in the first place.
In contrast to the aforementioned strands of literature, there are more carefully crafted
interpretations. ‘Moderates’, like Berry, argue that state support for industrialisation merely
became relatively more pro-active. He states: “
e postwar period saw a more conscious
pursuit of industrialization in Colombia... [as the] government’s desire to industrialize
for its own sake appears to have been stronger...” Berry and 
oumi add that as in
most of Latin America, industrialisation became “a goal to which more policy instruments
were applied.” Qualifications follow these remarks. For example, they go on to state
that while ISI was partly deliberate, it was also partly a reaction to the periodic balance
of payments crises... [and]... [w]hether the continuing expansion of industry received
more impulse from government policy in this period [ to late s] than in the
Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ p. .
Berry, A. and 
oumi, F. ‘Import...’ p. .
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previous one [–] is a matter for analysis”. 
ey also recognised limitations to
their assertions: “It is difficult, if not impossible, to disengage the deliberate from the
unplanned in retrospect.” It is the awareness with which they approach the issue of
state and public policy toward industrialisation, and the resistance to assume that the
undeniable rise of state interventionism of the post-war period was inextricably linked
to, or at the service of, manufacturing interests, that earns them the label of ‘moderates’.
More decisively, others, such as Ocampo and Tovar, argue that: “...the usual description of
the development model that prevailed during these years as ‘inward-looking’ or ‘import-
substitution’ does not reflect its global features.” Consequently, these authors appear to
describe Colombia’s industrialisation as accelerated rather than ‘state-led’ and propose
to characterise economic policy as one reflecting a mixed model, with export promotion
measures and plans shaping it as early as . 
e view of a balanced growth strategy
as a more accurate description of the economic model is equally shared by Berry and

oumi — albeit at a slightly later time. Further de-emphasising the role of the state
during the alleged ISI-era, Ocampo sustains: “...while economic policy did play a role in
the structural transformation, it was not the determining factor, nor was it always based
on the abrogation of price signals.” In other words, industrial policy played a subsidiary
role in industrialistion.
Notwithstanding the above more balanced and mixed views, it is perhaps Kalmanovitz’s
succinct judgement, that challenging the very notion of ‘a model’ of capital accumulation
at all, which is closest to the historical record. Capital intensitivity, according to him,
took place “without the spurts that accompany complex industrial processes and large
production scales... accumulation then, received little state support: for its own sake,
an ‘industrialising’ will within the local dominant class has not existed.” However,
Kalmanovitz leaves the issue unresolved. Neither he nor the literature have dug deeper to
Berry, A. and 
oumi, F. ‘Import...’ p. .
Berry, A. and 
oumi, F. ‘Import...’ p. , fn. ; and Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ fn. .
Ocampo, J. A. and Tovar, C. ‘Colombia in the Classical Era of ‘Inward-Looking Development’, –’ in Cárdenas,
E. et al. (Eds) An Economic . . . p. .
Contributors in the same edited volume use the ‘state-led industrialisation’ label freely to describe the essence of the
period for Chile, Mexico and Brazil; see Cárdenas, E., et al. ‘An Economic...’ Ch. ,  and .
Ocampo, J. A. and Tovar, C. ‘Colombia...’ pp. –. Ocampo also notes that the first time preferential exchange
rates were offered for non-traditional exports dates ; see Ocampo, J. A. ‘
e Transition...’ p. 
Ocampo, J. A. ‘
e Transition...’ p. .
Kalmanovitz, S. ‘La Industrialización...’ p. .
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explain why Colombian governments decided not to pursue decisively an industrialisation
strategy that, at the time, promised to lift the country out of poverty and underdevelopment.
In short, what the existing literature has misconstrued, though ‘moderates’ have partially
admitted, is that neither the intentions nor the actions of state policies from  to 
suggest that Colombian political leaders committed themselves and public institutions to
installing a developmental state with a pro-ISI strategy geared towards long-run economic
development. 
rough a review and an assessment of the key components — trade,
credit, exchange and promotional policies — of the typical ‘ISI-toolbox’ and its expected
outcomes, the thesis demonstrates that in Colombia the state did not push for ISI. 
e next
section surveys the kind and magnitude of state support to industry through an analysis of
policies in different fields.
Alleged Commercial Protectionism

e theoretical foundation for commercial protectionism under the ISI framework is
well-known and is synthesised in the so-called infant industry argument. Its economic
rationale holds that the unrealised potential of profitable domestic manufacturing sectors
might materialise if barriers to foreign competition are erected (temporarily), to allow
industrial firms to attain large-scale production and lower costs. Eventually, protective
walls are removed, as firms ‘learn the business’ and, having ‘grown up’, become capable
of competing in world markets. Another element in the argument is that as imports are
substituted with domestic products, pressures in the balance of payments ease. Leaving
aside the debate over the merits and misfortunes of the theory and practice of ISI and infant
industry, it is useful to map the mechanisms designed by policy-makers when pursuing
trade-protectionist policies. Standard classifications identify two sets of mechanisms in
Todaro, M. ‘Economics for a Developing World’ () p. .
Assiduous critics of ISI and associated protectionism in both theory and in practice have pointed out multiple harmful
effects on the economies and societies pursuing such path: anti agriculture- and export-bias, excessive price distortions, the
skewing of production towards capital-intensive sectors, worsening income distribution, and the generation of extensive
rent-seeking opportunities; see for instance Balassa, B. and Associates. ‘
e Structure of Protection in Developing
Countries’ (), Krueger, A. ‘
e Political...’ and Bhagwati, J. ‘Protectionism’ (). 
ere are also authors stressing
the notable achievements of protectionist policies, namely the attainment of industrial-exporter status and developed
economy, thanks to the application of the infant industry formula; see for example, Amsden, A. ‘Escape from Empire:

e Developing World’s Journey 
rough Heaven and Hell” () p. , and Chang, H-J. ‘Kicking Away the Ladder:
Development Strategy in Historical Perspective () p. .
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commercial policy: tariff and non-tariff barriers. Tariffs are divided into specific ones,
aforos, and ad valorem. 
e first, which levy a set monetary amount on a given quantity
of goods (e.g.  on a ton of steel), are subject to serious erosion if domestic prices
increase steeply; whereas the second, which specify a percentage of the imported price on
the commodity in question, are not. 
e concept of nominal protection rate, arising from
the application of tariffs and other import or customs duties, of a particular commodity or
a group of goods, refers to the percentage excess of the domestic price over the world price.

e related effective protection rate expresses the margin of protection on value added.
Consequently, this is defined as the percentage excess of domestic value added, calculated
by reason of the imposition of tariffs and other measures on the product and its inputs,
over the world market value added.
As for non-tariff barriers, the use of import quotas, licenses and foreign exchange controls
are amongst the quantitative restrictions that are easiest to identify — and probably easiest
to measure. Quotas have often been preferred over tariffs, according to Dye, because
they can be increased without abrogating existing trade treaties. Other charges, such as
variable levies, and particularly advance deposit requirements, are known to have become
powerful import deterrents, because they escalate in value, and also are used to attain other
policy goals. Government enterprise regulations and legal interventions are perhaps
harder to track, and it is conceivable that exemptions made when dealing with public
bodies partly account for the divergence between the ‘theoretical’ or ‘expected’ incidence
of custom duties and other charges, and the actual amounts collected. Although there
is well-known recognition of the difficulties in measuring non-tariff barriers to trade,
a study by CEPAL cited below, serves as a good example of an attempt to estimate the
effects of both tariff and non-tariff barriers on the trading profile of a country.
As indicated in the previous sub-section, it is commonplace to argue that the founda-
tion of the state-led ISI strategy of twentieth-century Colombia lies in the strong and
intentionally ‘inward-looking’ protectionist turn of its economy in the aftermath of trade
Balassa, B. and Associates, ‘
e Structure...’ p. .
Dye, A. ‘Commercial Policy’ in Mokyr, J. (Ed) 
e Oxford Encyclopaedia of Economic History () Vol. , p. .
For instance, as will be discussed below, prior deposits can serve for monetary control.
Dye, A. ‘Commercial...’ p. .
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disruptions caused by the Great Depression of the s and World War II. 
e problem
with this view is that the historical record confirms that neither was there a state-led ISI
strategy, nor was trade-protectionism a preference of state policy, nor did it begin then.
Colombia did not adopt such type of protectionism in the s: tariffs had been a central
feature of commercial policy since the nineteenth century. According to Coatsworth and
Williamson, Latin America was the region in the world with the highest tariffs during the
‘first globalisation’, and as Colombia in turn possessed the highest tariffs in the area, it
follows that the country was the most closed economy on the planet. Does this mean that
the origins of Colombia’s weak insertion into the world economy lie with self-consciously
seclusive and pro-autarkic politicians that favoured strong protectionist policies early on?

is is difficult to sustain. Safford has argued that economic liberalism was an unchallenged
economic doctrine from around  to the s and that it remained “an important
force ... well into the twentieth century.”
Moreover, that Colombia had a protectionist economy by the early-twentieth century is
not surprising. As Esguerra and Villar note, to a large extent such policies resulted from the
lack of a developed export base. 
e country lacked rich and diversified foundations for
exports. According to Bulmer-
omas, on the eve of WWI, Colombia exhibited the lowest
level of exports per head of the region. To a weak import capacity owing to low exports,
structural fiscal penury rendered high tariffs necessary at a time when access to external
financing was intermittent and limited. Protectionist policies, thus, were not exogenous,
neither the product of politics nor of ideologies; on the contrary, commercial policy was
endogenous — import liberalisation coinciding with export booms and foreign exchange
Notable exceptions are studies by Montenegro, and Abel and Palacios, who rightly sustain that the Liberal administra-
tions of the s and s did not promote industrialisation. So does Sáenz Rovner, claiming, that only until the
presidency of Laureano Gómez in  did the alliance of industrialists and politicians arrive in power; see respectively,
Ocampo, J. A. and Montenegro, S. ‘Crisis...’ pp. –; Abel, C. and Palacios, M. ‘Colombia, –’ in Bethell,
L (Ed) 
e Cambridge History of Latin America () Vol. ; and Sáenz Rovner, E. ‘Industriales, Proteccionismo y
Política en Colombia: Intereses, Conflctos y Violencia’ in Historia Crítica () No. , p. .
Coatsworth, J. and Williamson, J. ‘Always Protectionist? Latin American Tariffs from Independence to the Great
Depression’ in Journal of Latin American Studies () Vol. , No. , p. ; and Coatsworth, J. and Williamson, J.
‘
e Roots of Latin American Protectionism: Looking Before the Great Depression’ in Estevadeordal, A., Rodrik, D.,
Taylor, A. and Velasco, A. Integrating the Americas: FTAA and Beyond () p. .
Safford, J. ‘
e Emergence...’ p. .
Esguerra, P. and Villar, L. ‘El Comercio Exterior Colombiano en el Siglo XX’ () pp. –.
Bulmer-
omas, V. ‘
e Economic...’ p. . In fact, only second to Haiti by a small difference, but far from the
levels of similar-sized economies.
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Figure .: Colombia: Evolution of Tariff Rates & Fiscal Yields, – (percent-
ages)
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surpluses. In other words, Colombia’s apparent commercial-protectionist profile emerged
out of necessity rather than volition. Free trade, in circumstances like those of the late-
nineteenth century- and large part of the twentieth — was a luxury that could not be
afforded.
As stated above, enduring high tariffs were not first introduced after the Great Depression
or some time thereafter. Historically, the high tariff levels of the nineteenth century
continued up until the early s, and on average stood at  of the total value of
imports. During WWI, the rates declined massively and though by the mid-s they
rose up again, they stabilised significantly below their pre-war levels. 
e Depression only
forced a temporary peak in rates, but did nothing to counter the most important trend of
Esguerra, P. and Villar, L. ‘El Comercio...’ pp. –.
For a good study on free trade as a policy that poor nations cannot afford, see; Reinert, E. ‘How Rich Countries Got
Rich and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor’ ().
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the whole period, a gradual reduction that by the mid-s was less than half the rate of
the s (see Figure .). Further, effective protection, which takes into account the
effects of tariffs levied on raw materials and intermediate goods, suggest Colombia was a
moderately ‘protected’ economy. According to Wogart, manufacturing effective protection
rates for the late s stood at ., which is well below the Argentinian () and
Brazilian () levels. Ocampo reinforces this view, stating: “... effective protection in
Colombian manufacturing was, in fact, relatively low by 
ird World standards...[the]
structure was more akin to that of a small open economy than to a large import-substituting
country.” It is undeniable that fiscal tariffs can have a protectionist impact even if this
is not the objective; but that tariff rates were driven by fiscal imperatives is substantiated
by the evident association between the major recalibrations the rates underwent in ,
 and , and the concomitant spikes in their share of total government revenue, as
observed in Figure .. A more comprehensive assessment of the extent to which Colombia
was a protected economy demands regional comparisons.
A study conducted by CEPAL allows tentative comparisons regarding restrictions of
imports across Latin America for the late s. Specifically, the incidence of import duties
and other duties or charges of equivalent effect on the value of imports, including prior
deposits, were calculated. 
e results (Figure .) suggest different groupings. In a class
of its own is Argentina with a total arithmetic mean averaging ., followed by Ecuador
and Venezuela with incidences of around . Chile, Colombia and Brazil constitute a
third group in the  to  range, and last is Mexico exhibiting a remarkably low rate
of .. Does this mean that Argentina’s economy was the most protectionist, Mexico’s
the least, whilst Colombia’s was somewhere in the middle? Definitively not. Aspects such
as the level of exemptions and difficult to quantify mechanisms to check imports, such
as bans and prior permits, as well as the effects of over- and under-valued exchange rates
must be taken into consideration for a comprehensive assessment. CEPAL calculated the
scale of exemptions from custom duties for  by obtaining the proportion between
the weighted average of theoretical incidence of duties and the approximate average of

is not to say, that overall, protectionism declined concomitantly, for this says nothing about non-tariff barriers.
Wogart, J. ‘Industrialization in Colombia’ () p. .
Ocampo, J. A. ‘
e Transition...’ () p. .
Except for the Chilean case.
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Figure .: Latin America: Incidence of Custom Duties & Other Charges, –
(On Import values, c.i.f. — Percentages)
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their actual incidence. In this respect, Ecuador appears as an effective enforcer with 
as the proportion between the actual and theoretical incidence, followed by Mexico (),
Argentina () and Venezuela (–). Brazil and Colombia had less than half of
the expected revenue (), whilst Chile exhibits the lowest actual incidence ().
Further, given that Mexico preferred the extensive use of permits over tariffs as a means
of controlling imports and Chile imposed prohibitive demands on imports via prior
deposits and additional taxes; Colombia’s protectionist profile looks rather moderate.

ough the issue of exchange rates is dealt with below, it is worth noting that adjustments
on the level of import duties due to this variable entailed significant increases for Argentina
and modest ones for Brazil. Summarising, in a regional perspective, Colombia’s relatively
United Nations. ‘Multinational Economic Cooperation in Latin America’ () p. .
Applied to some  of imports; see United Nations. ‘Multinational...’ p. .
United Nations. ‘Multinational...’ p. .
Brazil, for its part, prominently favoured the system of exchange controls as a brake on imports; see United Nations.
‘Multinational...’ p. .
United Nations. ‘Multinational...’ pp. , .
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moderate use of both quantitative and qualitative barriers to imports, combined with
generous exemptions on her import duties and apparently modest distortions in the
exchange rate point to a reasonably open economy. More comparisons are needed to
corroborate this interpretation, however.
Figure .: Colombia in Latin America: Economic Openness, – (Imports as
Percentage of GDP — Constant Prices)
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Mexico from Moreno-Brid, J. C. and Ros , J. (). See more details in Table A...
A comparative exercise throughout the ‘classical’ ISI period, say from the late s
to the late s, rather than the snapshot of the late s offered above, informs best
the attitudes of different nations regarding their relation to the world economy. Given
data limitations and the scope of this study, attempts to cover each and every mechanism
used as barrier to importing are not made. Instead, an aggregate indicator, real imports
to GDP, is used. An important advantage of this indicator is that it captures, indirectly,
the effects of all the aforementioned tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade by presenting
the outcomes or results of using such mechanisms. Utilising this indicator as a proxy for
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economic openness, the Colombian experience should be considered as distinct from that
of other large countries more committed to ISI, namely, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
Figure . invites three observations. First, in absolute terms, with imports representing
nearly  of GDP, Colombia was the most open economy for the period as a whole.
With imports/GDP proportions of ., . and . respectively, Mexico, Argentina
and Brazil were considerably less ‘open’. Secondly, for the period as a whole, the imports
to GDP coefficient shows basically a trendless pattern, or at best, a very marginal upward
tendency — if one is to compare the – levels with the mid-s ones, of  and
, respectively. 
e stories for Mexico and Brazil are starkly different, since they show a
clear downward trend from around  and  in the post war years to around  and
 by –, respectively. Argentina, in turn, though less clearly, also sees its pre-war
levels of  slashed to  by the end of the period. 
at is to say, whilst Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico ‘closed’ their economies by some  Colombia did so by only ,
despite remaining in absolute terms the most open to foreign goods and services. Lastly,
Colombia displays the most volatility of the series, suggesting it could have been most
prone to having to curtail imports to alleviate balance of payments problems. In short,
Colombia did not close its economy to the same extent as other ISI-followers. Even more,
it is likely that apparent economic closure, when it occurred in the case of Colombia, was
more due to necessity than political choice or ideology, as will be shown below.

e post-war era is well known for being characterised by a ‘dollar shortage’ for many
countries: Colombia was no exception. 
ere was no ‘Marshall Plan’ for Latin America.
International finance flowed mainly to Europe, and Latin American governments and
firms had to wait until the s boom for substantial access to world capital markets.
Multilateral banking institutions, especially the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), and from the late s the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), provided loans to Latin American governments — mainly for targeted infrastructure
projects, however. In this context, Colombia’s external indebtedness (the majority of which
Data for a larger sample and the representativeness of other cases render the use of these three countries the most
appropriate comparison. Complete series for Chile and Uruguay since the late s were not found, for instance. Peru,
a good case for comparison given similarities in geography, size, population and stage of economic development pursued
export-led growth, at least until the late s. Venezuela’s unique position, as an oil-rent economy also makes the
comparison problematic.
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Figure .: Colombia: Evolution of Foreign Trade, – (Current US Millions)
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was public debt), measured as a percentage of GDP, declined markedly from around  in
the late s to about  in the mid-s and remained below  up until , when
it picked up again, but remained far below pre-war levels. With only limited recourse to
financing abroad, Colombia could only import what her export capacity allowed. As seen
from Figure ., exports and imports expanded unprecedentedly from  to ; an
expansion underwritten by the phenomenal increase of coffee prices in world markets —
which peaked on  — and gradual growth in the export quantum. When the price of
coffee dropped later that year, so did trade levels, which by  meant exports had fallen
by around  and imports by . Import levels were a mirror of export performance,
particularly in a country in which like nowhere else, a single commodity made for more
See Avella, M. ‘El Acceso de Colombia al Financiamiento Externo en el Siglo XX’ in Robinson , J. and Urrutia, M.
(Eds) Economía Colombiana del Siglo XX () p. , Figure ..
See Figure A.. and Table A...
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than  of total exports. Over-reliance on coffee made the evolution of the price of the
bean in foreign markets central to the economy. If coffee prices collapsed, with a small time
lag, so did imports and with it customs revenue declined. Internal demand also suffered
from a fall in coffee incomes and naturally, foreign exchange ran short. 
e reverse effects
occurred with hikes in prices. A major issue of this structural dependence on coffee was
potential macroeconomic volatility and reactive and remedial policy responses.
Examining the relationship between commodities and economic growth between 
and , Blattman et al. found that Colombia exhibited the highest volatility of terms of
trade among a sample of  countries and that the commodity with the maximum price
volatility was coffee. 
ough the period addressed in this chapter falls outside the one
just featured, it is reasonable to sustain that a marked departure from that pattern was
unlikely for the – period for two reasons. First, between  and , which
borders the start of this thesis, coffee remained a volatile commodity, ranking third behind
only tobacco and wool, and in Colombia the share of coffee exports in the total grew
further still, rendering the country more exposed. Secondly, the structure of world supply
did not alter significantly with Brazil’s production and management of stocks having a
major impact on international prices. Colombia remained a price-taker; at least until the
establishment of the International Coffee Organisation in  and the emergence of
coffee agreements, which were designed to reduce volatility. Colombia’s terms of trade
experienced two clear trends in the period: an upward trend between  and  and
a descent one from then on up to . Year-to-year there were abrupt fluctuations,
such as the hikes of , ,  and  when prices increased by more than
; often followed by plunges of similar proportions, as registered in , –
and . Policy could only react to such fluctuations, which given the economy’s strong
commitment to coffee exports, amounted to economic shocks. In short, volatility in coffee
Colombia’s dependence on coffee in its export matrix compared only to the levels exhibited by Venezuela’s oil. See
Figure A.. for the export matrix.
For an excellent review of the transmission mechanisms of coffee cycles on the economy; see Ocampo, J. A. ‘Ciclo
Cafetero y Comportamiento Macroeconómico en Colombia, –’ in Coyuntura Económica () Vol. , No. ,
and No. .
Other commodities include: tobacco, wool, cotton, rubber, iron, wheat and sugar. See Blattman, C., Hwang, J. and
Williamson, J. ‘Winners and Losers in the Commodity Lottery: 
e Impact of Terms of Trade Growth and Volatility in
the Periphery, –’ in Journal of Development Economics () No. .
Blattman, C. and Hwang, J. ‘Winners...’ p. .
See Table A...
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prices made the economy ever more vulnerable in the context of a ‘dollar-shortage’ era
with limited access to foreign borrowing.
Figure .: Colombia: Foreign trade, – (Trade balances as percentage of
GDP)
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is fundamental trait of foreign trade and its direct effects on the domestic economy
made policy-makers aware of the situation in the balance of payments and inspired a wide
range of mechanisms to address it. Yet the above-mentioned increases in both the price and
the volume of coffee exports from  to  did not make for a comfortable position
in the trade balance. Data collected by the CB, which until  made a distinction
on the balance of foreign trade with and without crude oil (which was foreign and so
required large sums of hard currency), reveals a weak position. As seen in Figure ., trade
deficits, as proportion of GDP, surpassed two percentage points in –, –,
– and ; displaying negative signs for another  years. 
is quasi-chronic
difficulty in the balance of payments drove the imposition of restrictions to imports, not

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the intrinsic desire of policy-makers to protect and promote national industry, as alleged
by most conventional interpretations.

e general manager of the Banco de la República noted in his Annual Report to the
Board of Directors in : “...with a view to counter the large decline in international
reserves, the monetary authorities have given special attention to external trade... resorting
to severe measures on imports, limiting them to the essentials...” Measures were taken to
harmonise import necessities with possible foreign exchange inflows, he added. Restating
the obvious amidst the crisis of –, another manager wrote: “the dive in coffee
quotes affected our import capacity that so much depends upon the relation of trade
prices.” Conversely, in the peak year of the coffee boom () a favourable environment
was captured: “truly notable has been the improvement in the value of exports and the
consequent rise of our imports. As a result the measures that regulate foreign commerce
passed from the rigid import controls of  to the liberty decreed on February , by
which the list of articles of prohibited importation was suppressed, a vestige of old norms
enacted to defend balance of payments.” Accordingly, years of modest surpluses, such as
, also called for caution: “after periods of adverse trade balances... this positive figure
is the result of healthy commerce, like the one an increase in exports and a prudent policy
of imports, taken the country to reach relative largesse in trade balance.”

e foreign press noted and commented these movements. Evidence of a rather liberal
stance to foreign products in good times is provided by the New York Times: “last summer
[] with coffee prices high and dollars flooding in, virtually all restrictions on imports
were removed...” “An analysis of last year’s economy must look back to May , when
Government opened the door to all sorts of imports.” Coffee prices collapsed soon after,
as reported by the same daily on October : “
e Council of Ministers met today
to approve an executive decree restricting imports to save dollar reserves in the light of
Banco de la República. (BRep) ‘Informe del Gerente a la Junta Directiva’[IAGJD] –, p. .
BRep. IAGJD, –, p. .
BRep. IAGJD, –, p. .
BRep. IAGJD, –, p. .
BRep. IAGJD, –, p. .
New York Times,  February, .
New York Times,  January, .
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dropping coffee prices.” 
e newspaper also noted the transitory nature of the measures:
“Foreign exchange control officials said the ban was a result of a temporary shortage
of dollar exchange... they said that as dollars became available again the ban would be
eased...” So were government’s intentions to end restrictions whenever possible, quoting
the Treasury Minister on December that year: “...the Colombian Exchange Office had
been directed to proceed at once approving all pending applications for dollar exchange
licenses... [and] to continue granting new applications for such licenses without any delay
whatsoever...” Official will notwithstanding, adverse conditions prevailing in coffee
markets and conditionalities on foreign loans advanced to Colombia to pay off a backlog
of unpaid accumulated bills on exported goods from the US, made further curbs on
imports necessary. 
e measures, as reported by the New York Times, included limiting
imports from the US to a specific monthly amount, reclassifying imports into more or
less expensive dollar brackets, placing surcharges on some items,  declaring prohibition
on hundreds of imports and increasing the deposits on import licenses.
To reiterate, qualitative evidence coming from the official views of the directorship
of the CB (endowed with substantial autonomy from government up until ) and
from the coverage of the US press, do not indicate that Colombia’s commercial policy
was inherently protectionist, nor that the prime aim was to promote the development
of national industries at the expense of imports. On the contrary, and in line with the
quantitative evidence presented above, the chronic position of the external accounts —
defined largely by the fate of coffee in world markets — dictated the general economic
context and external constraints that governments had to deal with. In this environment,
policy-makers made pragmatic choices about how to deal with crises and about what
mechanisms to deploy to address them. In other words, the political choices relating to
‘protectionism’ in this period seemed to be about the ways of handling crises that made
import curtailments essential, rather than a preference for autarky per se. 
e intentions
New York Times,  October, .
New York Times,  October, .
New York Times,  December, .
New York Times,  June, .
New York Times,  March, .
New York Times,  November, .
New York Times,  April, .
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of the state in these years tipped more towards liberalising trade, but its praxis became
more how best to curb imports.
Colombian authorities, then, repressed imports using a variety of means amongst which
four prevailed: tariffs, prior deposits, the import exchange-rate, and import licensing.
A respected scholar, Diaz-Alejandro, studied the issue and noted the reasons why the
authorities did not rely on just one mechanism, putting the instability of the world coffee
market and the consequent burden of the adjustments at the centre of the explanation.
For instance, relying on a flexible exchange rate without a licensing mechanism would have
meant sharp sudden drops in coffee prices leading to devaluation and hikes to appreciation.
Further, “the shifting of resources in and out of the import-competing and export sectors
would have unfavourable effects on welfare... and asymmetrical reactions to devaluation
and appreciation would also impart an inflationary basis to the economy.” 
erefore,
the apparent ‘activism’ of the authorities to restrict imports was the result of a pressing
need to spread the adjustment of volatile and uncertain export markets, not eagerness
to protect domestic producers from external competition by all means imaginable. A
series of studies on foreign trade and economic development by the National Bureau
of Economic Research, comparing ten developing countries from the late s to the
early s confirms Colombia’s singular economic-policy instability, as reflected in the
number of exchange control regimes it underwent. In a twenty-year period running
from  to  Colombia exhibits  regimes. In similar time frames, Turkey and
the Philippines displayed seven each, India six, and Chile, Ghana and South
Korea five.
More tellingly, serious attempts made at liberalising trade materialised late in  and
early , for example, the prohibited import list was eliminated. However, these
Diaz-Alejandro, C. ‘Foreign Trade...’ p. .
Diaz-Alejandro, C. ‘Foreign Trade...’ p. .
For the classification of exchange regimes and the features that define them, see for instance; Bhagwati, J. and
Srinivasan, T. N. ‘India: Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development’ ().
Krueger, A. ‘Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Turkey’ ().
Baldwin, R. ‘Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: 
e Philippines’ ().
Bhagwati, J. And Srinivasan, T. N. ‘India...’ ().
Behrman, J. ‘Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Chile’ ().
Clark, L. ‘Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Ghana’ ().
Frank, C. ‘Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea’ ().
Díaz-Alejandro, C. ‘Foreign Trade...’ p. .
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were short-lived, as the collapse in coffee prices that ensued forced the reversal of the
measures later on that year. Similarly, the full liberalisation of the trade regime pursued
by León Valencia at the end of his administration in – and which was at first
continued under the presidency of Lleras Restrepo, came to a crashing end in November
, as foreign exchange reserves declined in the context of a very unfavourable position
in the trade account and the reluctance of the new government to devaluate the currency.
Efforts at trade liberalisation in the s and s constitute sound evidence for the
proposition that the role and intentions of the state in Colombia’s late-industrialisation,
was substantially different from the standard accounts, which emphasise governments
committed to a state-led ISI, and which place protectionism as a preferred political choice.
Instead, the newly emerging picture is one of governments resorting to ‘protectionist’
measures as a way to counter external shocks.
According to Martínez there were three key tariff reforms during the period: those
of ,  and . Not one of the reforms seems to have been carried out for
the sole purpose of sheltering targeted industrial sectors in the wider framework of an
ISI strategy. 
e first reform roughly doubled effective rates of protection, making for
a mixed system of ad valorem and specific duties and revising exchange restrictions, but
the motivation behind it was far from being unambiguously a pro-protectionist stance
of manufacturing from government: there were competing considerations, as noted by
Banco de la República’s general manager. He highlighted the precarious support that
the tariff offered to domestic industry, given that since  price increases had eroded
the protectionist power of tariffs, and a notable reduction in the ordinary revenues of
the state by means of customs, which had declined from  in  to  in 
(as share of total government income); an outdated nomenclature that lacked precision
and remained incomplete, and finally; the convenience of raising tariffs with a view to
improving bargaining positions in trade agreements, especially relevant since the Annecy
Agreement had ended the previous commercial accord between Colombia and the US.
Of these alternative causes, the deleterious consequences of inflation on tariffs had been
noticed by Hernán Jaramillo Ocampo, the Minister of Finance implementing the reform,
Martínez, A. ‘La Estructura Arancelaria y las Estrategias de Industrialización en Colombia, –’ ().
BRep. ‘IAGJD’ (–) pp. –.
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who argued: “[its] negative effect is easier to appreciate if we consider that custom duties
representing . of the value of imports in  had declined to . by ; a loss in
protectionist power of more than .”
Similarly, Bejarano calculated that owing to inflation the effective average level of
protection that the  tariff reform had bestowed industry with, had been trimmed from
 in that year to  in . On the issue of customs and public revenue, Antonio
García, a prominent economist, declared: “[the tariff system] is not a system for the
promotion of development but a mechanism of providing the state with fiscal powers and
undeserved profits to a group of entrepreneurs.” Reinforcing this link, a foreign mission
to Colombia in the early s, noted at a more general level, that: “When revenues fall,
drastic revisions in the tariff schedules are often enacted to restore the yield, but usually
after a considerable time lag.” Interestingly, Ocampo too observes the recurrence of
time lags, between the reform of the tariff system of  and the  foreign exchange
crisis (see above), which “was only decreed two years later in ”. Referring to the
tariff reform of , Martínez stresses that, though President Lleras Camargo sought to
apportion for tariffs a stronger role in protectionist goals, the policy ultimately aimed at
the control and rationing of foreign exchange and only in subsidiary manner at industrial
sheltering. In short, the tariff reforms that Colombia implemented during the s
and s were hardly the product of a distinct and resolute state-led strategy of ISI. On
the contrary, on the main, they seem to be a reaction to various pressing circumstances,
such as tax collection, foreign exchange scarcity and related balance of payments crises.
Beyond tariffs, other tools that were utilised to deal with adverse internal and external
conditions, whilst directly affecting the trade regime, often ended up having little to do
with protecting manufacturing interests. For example, Wogart sustains, that: “... the
frequent changes in relaxing and introducing [import] controls seem to indicate that
the primary nature of policy actions lay more in adjusting demand for foreign goods
Jaramillo Ocampo, H. ‘De la Unidad Nacional a la Hegemonía Conservadora, –’ () p. .
Cited in GRECO. ‘El Crecimiento...’ p. , fn. 
Cited in Sáenz-Rovner, E. ‘Colombia Años : Industriales Política y Diplomacia’ () pp. –.
Organization of American States. Fiscal Survey of Colombia: A Report Prepared under the Direction of the Joint Tax
Program OAS/IDB, , p. .
Ocampo, J.A. ‘Ciclo...’ p. .
Martinez, A. ‘La Estructura...’ pp. –, .
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to the limited and fluctuating capacity to import, which was determined by Colombia’s
export performance and the inflow of foreign private and (especially) public capital.”
Likewise, prior deposit for imports, which are often described as another weapon in the
arsenal of pro-ISI measures aimed at repressing imports, initiated in  at the modest
rate of  of the declared import value, became after  a de facto tool of monetary
policy. Diaz-Alejandro shows that expressed as a proportion of total domestic credit,
sums advanced as prior deposits rose from . in  to  in .
Summarising and related to the point on tariff reforms, it is reasonable to argue that
the use of a wide range of policy instruments to curb and/or liberalise foreign trade in
mid-twentieth century Colombia owed little to the will or strategic economic preferences
of policy-making elites, and more to the shifts in fiscal, external and internal economic
circumstances of a relatively poor developing country. In this context, policies designed to
manage foreign trade cannot possibly be interpreted as serving the goal of industrialisation
via the substitution of imports under the aegis of the state. At best, these policies constituted
a varied and often contradictory set of broader motivations. 
e Fiscal Mission to Colombia
puts it like this: “Control over foreign trade is exercised by means of import and export
prohibitions, quotas, advance licensing requirements and various other foreign exchange
and administrative regulations. 
ese are motivated by the following explicit goals: to
provide revenues, to protect and develop domestic industry, to conserve foreign exchange
and to promote domestic price stability [italics added].”
Another significant issue derived from this last point is that several motivations implied
various policy mechanisms, and clashes among institutional actors, all of which would
have further constrained efforts to implement a full-scale ISI strategy. An insight worth
quoting at length, presented by the Fiscal Mission, which reported: “Conflict between
these various goals necessary results... Many agencies other than the Customs Division
have responsibilities for administering various aspects of tariff policy. 
ese include the
Wogart, J. ‘Industrialization...’ p. .
Alviar, O. ‘Instrumentos de Dirección Monetaria en Colombia’ () p. . For a complete discussion of the
mechanism and its evolution see the same work pp. –. Alviar treats prior deposits for imports as a standard tool of
monetary and credit polices at the disposal of the authorities.
Diaz-Alejandro, C. ‘Foreign...’ p. .
Organization of American States. Fiscal Survey of Colombia: A Report Prepared under the Direction of the Joint Tax
Program OAS/IDB, , p. .
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Figure .: Latin America: Agricultural Protectionism, – (Total Value of Im-
ports — Percentages)
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Council on Tariff Policy, the Import Control Agency, the consulates abroad and the Office
of Exchange Registry. In addition, in the broader framework of foreign trade policy,
there are the Ministries of Agriculture and Development, and 
e Council on Economic
Policy and Planning. 
e Colombian Ports Authority administers the taxes on navigation
and shipping... 
e administration of foreign trade policy, including customs, appears
exceedingly complex. 
ere are multiple duties on single items in the tariff list, and the
import and export regulations include import licensing, import prohibitions, quotas,
exemptions and exchange regulations. 
ere are many agencies not counting legislative
committees, which make and administer tariffs and trade policies.” Such administrative
decentralisation and fragmentation must have hindered the state’s capacity to execute and
achieve any intended policy goals.
Organization of American States. Fiscal Survey of Colombia: A Report Prepared under the Direction of the Joint Tax
Program OAS/IDB, , pp. –.

e Fiscal Mission also observed that economic effects of tariffs were not the intended ones in terms of regressiveness,
interpersonal equity, contraband and overall levels.
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Finally, a vital yet completely overlooked issue in the political economy of protectionism,
which the traditional literature exclusively associates with manufacturing, is the use of
tariffs to protect agricultural producers. Tariff-based sheltering of agriculture in Colombia
was distinct: first because agricultural protection rates were conspicuously high and because
these made the country in comparative terms a much smaller importer of agricultural
products than the rest of the region. As seen in Figure ., Colombia’s incidence of custom
duties and charges of equivalent effects on unprocessed foodstuffs was the highest among the
 economies surveyed, with  imposed on the value of imports. A distant second place
for another ‘ISI nation’ was Argentina, which levied duties at ., whilst Brazil, Mexico
and Uruguay imposed substantially lower rates — ., . and . respectively.

e CEPAL study, calculating these data concluded: “Only one of the countries under
discussion — Colombia — levies on its imports of unprocessed foodstuffs duties and
charges that are high in comparison with those levied on nearly all other groups of products,
as part of a protectionist policy and as an incentive to domestic production.” Such policy
practices of import-substituting agriculture for mid-twentieth century Colombia, which is
mostly unheard of in the literature, should have had negative effects on manufacturing, for
high food prices limited the demand for industrial goods. 
is in stark contrast with other
nations that favoured cheap food policies in order to broaden the market for manufactures.
Government publications, memoirs of key policy-makers and national development
plans, hinted that, if the Colombian state was to intervene in the economy to promote
economic growth, it would do so in a balanced or integrated manner. 
at is, it would
be for the benefit of the major economic sectors, in a rather distinct political economy. It
was in this spirit that the National Plan of  of President Santos was launched to tackle
the problems of agriculture and livestock-farming as well as manufacturing. Further,
the enactment of policies geared specifically at promoting import substitution agriculture
was well reflected in presidential speeches. For example, in his message to Congress in
, Santos stated: “...lacking, as we do, high purchasing power in external markets... it
is imperative that we allocate ever lower shares of our foreign exchange to buy articles for
United Nations. ‘Multilateral...’ p. .

is point is discussed in Ch. .
Ministerio de Economía Nacional. Informe, , Vol. , pp. –.
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direct consumption, such as agricultural and manufacturing ones [that would be produced
in the country. It is with this criterion in mind that government actions... established
decreasing shares for the importation of certain agricultural products.” In similar tone,
Mariano Ospina’s Finance Minister explained to the press the scope of a set of economic
measures enacted on : “... the only appropriate treatment, stimulate the sources of
production, developing vigorously industry and agriculture.” He justified the more
protectionist regime created by the tariff reform of  with the following statement:
“We are protectionists to integrate and harmonise the apparently antagonistic interests of
the two great sources of wealth on which the country splits: agriculture and industry.”
Few in the existing literature have noticed this peculiarity of Colombia’s political economy.
Sáenz-Rovner is one of the exceptions, who writes: “he [President Ospina] conditioned
protection to industrialists in so far as it did not affect the interest of agriculturalists and
providing manufacturers were willing to utilise national raw materials in the making of
their products.” 
e same author added: “Jaramillo Ocampo on his part ... reluctantly
accepted the increase of tariffs for industrial products in , a campaign in which ANDI
had engaged for years.”
In light of the quantitative and qualitative evidence displayed above, and the country’s
particular political economy, it is only reasonable to see the pro-industry features of the
 tariff reform as a mere concession to the sector. It was not, however, one of many
policies directed at promoting ISI. Neither the Conservative government of Ospina nor the
Liberal administrations that preceded him or those that followed, supported industrialists
in any systematic fashion. One concession to industry under the presidency of Ospina
does not amount to, nor is it representative of, a long-lasting, serious commitment on the
part of the Colombian state to ISI. Concession does not equal commitment. State support
in other supposedly pro-manufacturing policy fields was equally timid, for example in
such areas as, foreign exchange, direct pro-development policies and credit.
Presidencia de la República. Declaraciones Presidenciales: Mensaje del Presidente de la República de Colombia al
Congreso Nacional en sus Sesiones de , , Vol. , p. .
Jaramillo Ocampo, H. ‘De La Unidad...’ p. .
Jaramillo Ocampo, H. ‘De La Unidad...’ p. .
Sáenz-Rovner, E. ‘Industriales...’ p. .
Sáenz-Rovner, E. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
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Exchange Rate and Inflation
Besides trade protectionism, the conventional literature singles out the pursuit of low
exchange-rate levels as another fundamental in the state-led ISI strategy of the post war
era. It is argued that the governments of ISI nations committed strongly to a policy of
overvaluing their currencies to support domestic industrial development by means of
cheaper imports of manufacturing inputs and capital goods. Franko, for example, lists
exchange rate overvaluation as a standard element in the ‘ISI toolbox’. In the Colombian
case, representative of this literature is García, who sustains that: “Since the s Colombia
has tried to promote the industrial sector through tariffs, severe import restrictions or
import prohibitions of certain goods, and an overvalued national currency. 
is policy
continued until the late s when exports were promoted and the overvaluation of the
currency was reduced.” To accept this view in the Colombian experience, however, is
misleading from a historical perspective. Four questions need be dealt with satisfactorily if
interpretations like these are to be accepted. First, to what extent was currency appreciation
a ‘policy choice’, that is, to what extent did government intervention effectively cause
the peso to become stronger, or to what extent was currency appreciation due to factors
beyond government control? Secondly, is there evidence to prove that appreciation was
the intended policy of the governing elites? Is there evidence to the contrary? 
irdly, in
comparative perspective with other ‘ISI nations’, by how much was Colombia’s currency
overvalued? Lastly, is it necessary to contextualise the policies adopted?

e starting point for answering these questions is to trace and examine the trajectory
of exchange rates and exchange systems. With the abandonment of the gold standard, and
the massive devaluation that accompanied it in the early s, Colombia adopted a fixed
exchange system until . For the following two decades mixed multiple fixed rates
and fluctuating rates for trade transactions and a fluctuating rate for financial transactions
See Fishlow, A. ‘Some Reflections on Comparative Latin American Economic Performance and Policy’ () p. ,
; and Cardoso, E. and Helwege, A. ‘Latin America’s...’ p. .
Franko, P. ‘
e Puzzle...’ p. .
García, J. ‘
e Effects of Exchange Rates and Commercial Policy on Agricultural Incentives in Colombia, –’
() p. ; and García, J. and Montes, G. ‘Trade, Exchange Rate and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Colombia’ ()
passim.
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Figure .: Nominal Exchange Rates: Colombia, – (Pesos)
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applied. During this period maxi-devaluations were not uncommon. Generally, there
were four rates of exchange: a basic rate for most imports and some exports, a freely
fluctuating rate for capital transactions and non-traditional exports, and two rates for
coffee and oil. After  these rates were combined with a crawling peg system with
regular mini-devaluations, returning to the principle of a unique rate. Other ‘ISI nations’,
such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile followed similar arrangements. A notable exception,
however, was Mexico, which sustained a single fixed rate regime throughout the period. In
general, a trend moving away from multiple fixed rates to single fluctuating ones began to
take place after the late s and early s. According to 
orp, “... the exchange
rate was never overvalued to the degree it was elsewhere, and Colombia moved before
Classification used in Schott, F. ‘
e Evolution of Latin American Exchange Rate Policies since World War II’ ()
p. .
Ocampo, J. A. ‘
e Transition...’ pp. –.
See Schott, F. ‘
e Evolution...’ passim; and Konig, W. ‘Multiple Exchange Rate Policies in Latin America’ Journal of
Interamerican Studies () Vol. , pp. –.
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other countries in the direction of more reasonable and coherent foreign trade policies.”
Yet an early move did not exempt it from the fact of currency appreciation.
Figure .: Colombia Real Exchange Rates: Official & Free (Index of Rates — Free
=)
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Most evidently, and as captured by the spread between the free and the official exchange
rates, the overvaluation of the peso is indisputable. 
e difference between the basic
selling rate and the black and/or fluctuating free rate widened decisively with the adoption
of the multiple-fixed rates system in , and reached particularly worrisome levels of
 and above in the years , – and . After the implementation of the
crawling peg system in , the spread tended to diminish but did not stabilise entirely
as the last observation of the series shows in Figure .. Further, the evolution of the real
official exchange rate itself seems to confirm the case for overvaluation. From  to
 this rate appreciated by about  (see Figure .) and despite the correction of the
maxi-devaluation of , the peso regained strength and set another tendency towards

orp, R. ‘A Reappraisal...’ p. .
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appreciation for the – period — with the exception of the year . By 
the real official exchange level was virtually the same as that prevailing in . 
is, in
addition to the persistence of the above-mentioned spread and the use of differential rates,
appears to support the argument that the state implemented a deliberate and conscious
policy of currency overvaluation that created serious distortions in the external sector,
which in turn harmed exports and the agrarian sector, all in its efforts to pursue ISI.
Feasible, appealing and reasonable as they seem, these interpretations are short-sighted
and historically misconstrued, as will be shown below.
By how much was the Colombian peso overvalued during the ‘classic’ period of ISI? 
e
average of the spread between the official and the free exchange rates for the period 
to  was . 
is seems high, but when appropriate comparisons are made, and the
peculiar circumstances of Colombia are considered, this degree of overvaluation in fact
is rather modest. For example, Argentina’s average for the same period stood well above
Colombia’s, at , and that of Chile more than doubled at .. Brazil, on the other
hand, which from  to  applied an auction rate system that practically eliminated
the spreads, saw a not so dissimilar mean of  (see Figure A..). 
ese three countries,
like Colombia, suffered repetitively from balance of payments problems, driving them to
modify their exchange regimes and to carry out frequent devaluations. Unlike Colombia,
however, all others experienced serious inflationary pressures. Further comparisons are
complicated but illuminating. Venezuela, enjoying the foreign exchange abundance that
oil exports provided, successfully maintained a system of multiple fixed rates with only
one major devaluation. Mexico, benefiting handsomely from tourism receipts, did not
experience serious balance of payments problems and managed to maintain a single fixed
rate system without resorting to major devaluations. Relishing almost complete freedom
of monetary transfers and convertibility into gold-backed US dollars, the Mexican system
knew no black markets for foreign exchange. Yet the Mexican peso is considered to have
been overvalued. Villa-Issa sustains that by  overvaluation stood at  and that the
Konig, W. ‘Multiple...’ p. .
Mexico carried out a large devaluation of her currency once between  and . It is also important to note that
Mexico and Venezuela were the only countries discussed here that up to  had inflation rates at world level.
See Pick’s Currency Yearbook (, ).
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average for the – period was . 
e Mexican case then, seems to be one in
which, in the absence of chronic balance of payments problems, the path of sticking to
the single fixed exchange rate system, and the overvaluation this entailed was the result of
policy by choice. 
is was not something Colombian governments could replicate nor did
they attempt to.

e special character of Colombia’s position with regards exchange rate evolution is
consistent with the findings offered by other authors. Astorga, for instance, finds that
for the – period an appreciating trend in real exchange rates is the dominating
trend in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, whilst rates remained flat for Colombia, Mexico and
Venezuela. Jorgensen and Paldam discern no long-run trend for any of the eight largest
economies, except for Brazil and Venezuela — where it is upward sloping — between 
and . 
ese authors also find Colombia’s average size of fluctuations around the
real long-run exchange rate to be the largest, even if it did not suffer the widest swings, a
distinction earned by Chile. Astorga’s findings reaffirm this. Using a multilateral index
for import prices, he identifies Colombia and Brazil as those countries with the highest
exchange rate volatility — defined as the coefficient of variation — whereas Venezuela and
Argentina exhibit the lowest. A feasible explanation of the unpredictability and volatility
of the exchange rate for Colombia was the reluctance of its economic policy-making
authorities to seek an equilibrium rate. Instead, as Díaz-Alejandro puts it: “world coffee
prices... provided a major rationalization for import and exchange control.” Summing
up, among the middle- and large-sized nations of Latin America, Colombia’s currency
overvaluation ranked low. Moreover, unlike such countries as Mexico and Venezuela, the
volatile international prices of Colombia’s main export combined with moderate levels of
inflation and recurrent balance of payments crises suggest that the use of fixed multiple
Villa-Issa, M. ‘Performance of Mexican Agriculture: 
e Effects of Economic and Agricultural Policies’ (). Other
calculations by Reynolds show that by  the margin of overvaluation of the Mexican peso was ., and that it had
climbed to . by . See Reynolds, C. ‘Why Mexico’s ‘Stabilizing Development was Actually Destabilizing’ in
World Development () No. /, pp. –.
Astorga, P. ‘Real Exchange Rates in Latin America: What does the th Century Reveal?’ () Universidad Carlos
III: Working Papers in Economic History, WP-, p. .
Jorgensen, S. and Paldam, M. ‘
e Real Exchange Rates of Eight Latin American Countries –: An
Interpretation’ in Geld und Währung/Monetary Affairs () No. , pp. – p. .
Jorgensen, S. and Paldam, M. ‘
e Real...’ p. .
Astorga, P. ‘Real Exchange...’ pp. –.
Diaz-Alejandro, C. ‘Foreign Trade...’ p. .
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exchange rates and controls, and the overvaluation that the system entailed, was more the
outgrowth of circumstance than the result of pre-conceived policy efforts.
A closer examination of the literature for the Colombian case is necessary to settle the
matter of policy or contingency. Nelson, Schultz and Slighton published a comprehensive
study of the Colombian development process in which particular attention was given to
foreign exchange policy. 
ey stated: “In the short-run, the excess demand for foreign
exchange has been controlled by the more or less coordinated implementation of a variety of
policy instruments... shift of commodities to the prohibited or prior license list, a slowdown
in the rate of approval of import licenses, an increase in import deposit requirements,
adjustment of the differential between the effective rates on imports and exports, direct
controls on capital exports, restrictions on credit creation by the banking system, and in
periods of great stress, an increase in the nominal exchange rate or rates (devaluation). It is
not clear, however, whether there has been a conscious long-run exchange rate policy.”
Further, they argued that exchange rate policy was part an extension of the measures
adopted to deal with immediate exchange crises and part a reflection of the autarkic
strategy of Raúl Prebisch and CEPAL. Eduardo Wiesner, formerly at the CB in Bogota,
agreed on the first part: “
e synthesis is that the short-run has not permitted us to act
in the long-run. Our short-run policies combined are the ones that have determined
the long-run.” As for the autarkic intent of policy, Wiesner disagrees profoundly. He
sustains, that “... the Exchange Certificates [] constituted a first step towards a free
market... and that it reveals a preoccupation for achieving an exchange target less full of
controls and restrictions. It could almost be said, that this has been the aspiration of the
exchange and monetary authorities for decades. But it has never been possible to attain it
[italics added].”
A plausible way out of the choice-versus-contingency conundrum has been indicated
by Esguerra and Villar. 
ese authors, as stated above in this chapter, argued that the
Nelson, R. , Shultz, P. and Slighton, R. ‘Structural Change in a Developing Economy: Colombia’s Problems and
Prospects’ () p. .
Nelson, R. et al. ‘Structural...’ p. .
Wiesner, E. ‘Devaluación y Mecanismo de Ajuste en Colombia’ in Wienser, E. (Ed) Política Externa de Colombia
() p. .
Wiesner, E. ‘Devaluación...’ p. .
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protectionist policies of Colombia were the result, and not the cause, of a modest and poorly
diversified export sector. By treating the exchange rate variable in particular, and trade
policy in general, as endogenous, they explain best why periods in which protectionism
was relaxed coincided with real currency appreciation. In the long-run, they continue:
“...the evolution of the real exchange rate can hardly be explained by monetary or foreign
exchange policy decisions.” 
is interpretation is consistent with the view of Ocampo,
who examining the role of economic policy in the structural transformation between 
and , concludes: “In both cases, [that is, during coffee-price booms and in times of
foreign exchange shortages] economic policy has followed signals in the foreign exchange
market.” In short, economic policy making regarding foreign exchange has followed
rather than directed the market.
Further examination of the devaluation carried out in  supports the view that the
intent of exchange-rate policy was not to increase the value of the peso. 
e  devaluation
of the nominal exchange rate carried out in March of  is particularly telling because
of the context in which it was decreed. Unlike the devaluation of , which was marked
by an acute crisis in foreign reserves, or the maxi-devaluation of , surrounded by the
continuing collapse of international coffee prices and the rapid expansion of the monetary
base, or that of , preceded by the largest fiscal deficit under the fixed exchange rate
system, the  devaluation lacked a context of immediate crisis. As recalled by
Lauchlin Currie, leading economist of one economic mission advising government at the
time: “
ere was no exchange crisis and no pressure for devaluation at the time, but I was
fairly confident that once the issue was raised in the [Economic Development] committee,
a ‘crisis’ would be created and an action of some sort would result.” Sheahan supports
this account providing more detail. He writes: “At the time there was no crisis at all. Prices
were stable, balance of payments was not under pressure and devaluation was undertaken
calmly as a discretionary device to stimulate growth. In the words of one of the architects
of that operation: “I was sitting on the beach one day thinking how calm the economy
Esguerra, P. and Villar, L. ‘El Comercio...’ pp. –.
Esguerra, P. and Villar, L. ‘El Comercio...’ p. .
Ocampo, J. A. ‘
e Transition...’ pp. –.
See for foreign exchange crises; Sánchez, F., Fernández, A. and Armenta, A. ‘Crisis Cambiarias en Colombia Bajo
Tipo de Cambio Fijo: –’ ().
Currie, L. ‘
e Role of Economic Advisers in Developing Countries’ () p. .
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Table .: Colombia in Latin America: Exchange-Rate Systems
Categories   
Single fixed rate Mexico Mexico Mexico
Fixed multiple rates Venezuela Venezuela Venezuela
Brazil
Bolivia
Colombia
Uruguay
Fixed multiple rates for trade
transactions and fluctuating
rates for financial transactions
Argentina Chile Uruguay Bolivia
Paraguay
Uruguay
Fixed multiple rates and fluc-
tuating rates for trade transac-
tions, and fluctuating rates for
financial transactions
Paraguay Peru Paraguay Argentina
Chile Colombia
Argentina Brazil
Fluctuating multiple rates for
trade transactions and fluctu-
ating rates for financial trans-
actions
Colombia
Single fluctuating rate for
trade transactions and fluctu-
ating rates for financial trans-
actions
Peru Peru Chile
(Argentina )
(Uruguay )
Single fluctuating rate Bolivia Paraguay
Source: Taken from Schott () adjusted by the author as suggested by Schott and based on Konig ().
was, and it occurred to me that if we ever wanted to devalue, now would be the time to do
it”.
Making this point with even greater force, Arango assures, that there is no evidence of
coffee producers having pressured for the devaluation — for the real exchange rate had
recovered in the third quarter of  and costs had stabilised. In other words, the
devaluation of  was implemented not as a response to either an external or an internal
fundamental crisis or imbalance, nor was it the outcome of political pressure exerted by
powerful exporting interests, nor did it come as an attached conditionality of the IMF. 
e
Sheahan, J. ‘Import, Investment and Growth — Colombia’ in Papanek, G. (Ed) Development Policy: 
eory and
Practice () p. .
Arango, M. ‘El Café en Colombia: Producción, Circulación y Política, –’ () p. .
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episode described can be said to be representative of the intent of Colombian policy-makers
towards liberal trade regimes -positive economic and financial circumstances allowing.
Another persuasive argument to show that the decision of adopting a certain type of
foreign exchange regime often lay beyond the alleged will and policy domain of protectionist
pro-ISI governments is illustrated through a classification of the region’s exchange systems
and a look at the consequences of shifts in exchange systems on other areas of trade. Once
again, it will be seen that Colombia represents a distinct case. Table . shows that as
the post war era unfolded, Latin American nations with the exception of Mexico and
Venezuela moved unequivocally away from fixed, and consequently complex fixed rate
systems towards more flexible and simplified regimes, that is a ‘south-eastwards’ move in
the table. 
e significance of this trend lies in the reasons behind it and the consequences
shifts in systems entailed. First, exchange reforms leading to the elimination of multiple
rates were part and parcel of stabilisation programmes negotiated with the IMF in the
cases of Chile and Bolivia in , Paraguay in , Argentina in  and Uruguay
in  (the last two not shown in the table). 
is was a time when the Fund started to
reconsider its position on the advisability of sustaining fixed exchange systems in developing
countries. Colombia’s reform of  does not seem to have been enacted at the request
of any multilateral institution. Secondly, and more importantly, as countries abandoned
the multiple exchange rate system, external pressures forced them to implement measures
to substitute for these shortly after. To sustain liberal, unified exchange-rate regimes an
arsenal of restrictions was put in place, including import surcharges, export taxes, steep
increases in import deposit advances and retentions. When pressures proved unbearable,
as in Uruguay and Chile, policy reversals became the ultimate solution. Evidently, attempts
at exchange-rate reform were often incompatible with the underlying external position of
Latin American economies. 
e use of multiple rates was to a large extent conditioned, in
In this line of argument, a quote by Diaz-Alejandro is relevant: “
e export-led or coffee-fuelled prosperity, aided by
the quietest and least expected post-war devaluation in March , was accompanied by a relaxation of exchange and
import controls inherited from the war and the Great Depression. Consequently, in the first half of , in spite of an
import exchange rate which in purchasing-power-parity terms was still substantially cheaper than the rates of the s,
the prohibited import list was eliminated and the most liberal import regime witnessed since  was instituted.” See
Diaz-Alejandro, C. ‘Foreign Trade...’ p. .
For a detailed discussion of each category and their associated problems; see Schott, F. ‘
e Evolution...’
Konig, W. ‘Multiple Exchange...’ p. .
Konig, W. ‘Multiple Exchange...’ pp. –.
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the words of a contemporary academic: “by the adverse external impacts that continue to
operate and that are expressed by a fundamental imbalance of the foreign sector and by
general exchange and monetary weakness...”
Nevertheless, the reform of  sought to eliminate exchange controls in a gradual
fashion. As explained by Romero, in the most thorough study of the history of Colombia’s
exchange rate, the road to free convertibility began with the CB’s closed auctions, external
debt payments and capital repatriation, leaving all other transactions to the market of
exchange certificates. Subsequently, as import restrictions were relaxed, an increasing
number of transactions migrated to the free market. In the last stage, a unified exchange rate
was attained in the market for certificates. 
e clout of coffee interests, however, ensured
the stalling of the reform, and by , a retreat to the old ways had been effectively
accomplished. Coffee growers preferred a devalued and a unified exchange rate, and
above all a stable one. Most interestingly, according to Romero, the inequities of the
multiple, fixed exchange-rate system notwithstanding, the system “was vital in avoiding
higher levels of real overvaluation”. 
is audacious claim is supported further when
a comparison with Peru is made. Between  and , that is when Peru was on
a semi-floating system pursuing an export-led strategy, and Colombia was mostly on a
fixed multiple-rates regime, the peso depreciated in real terms by about , whilst the
Peruvian sol appreciated roughly by the same proportion. 
us, amongst the Latin
American nations that faced serious balance of payments crises, Colombia adopted the
most liberal exchange-rate system that external circumstances permitted, and even tried to
go further in the way of flexible rates. In short, if there was a persistent overvaluation of
the currency, as for most of the period of study, this was not the result of state policy. If
anything, policy-makers tried to implement exchange regimes that reflected market forces,
so long as external pressures allowed. So, what non-policy forces shaped the exchange-rate
system?
Konig, W. ‘Multiple Exchange...’ p. .
Romero, C. ‘El Tipo de Cambio en Colombia, –’ () pp. –.
Romero, C. ‘El Tipo...’ pp. –.
Romero, C. ‘El Tipo...’ p. .
See 
orp, R. ‘Economic Management...’ p. .
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e existing literature on the exchange rate is extensive and a review of it is not necessary
here. 
e standard variables affecting the certificates-exchange rate, which is the closest
resembling a market-based rate, are public expenditure, terms of trade, productivity levels,
trade openness and external financing. As indicated by Astorga, in mainstream economic
theory, lasting improvements in the terms of trade, productivity gains and net inflows
of capital are expected to cause a currency to appreciate, whereas large fiscal deficits,
deterioration of the terms of trade and higher levels of economic openness tend to generate
the contrary effect. 
e empirical findings in the Colombian case largely corroborate
economic intuition. 
e most powerful influence on the exchange rate has been the terms
of trade. Ocampo’s econometric findings reveal that a trend over time and the terms of
trade explain half the variance of the exchange rate between  and ; even more
interestingly, he detects a cyclical pattern of the exchange rate opposite to that of the
terms of trade, “regardless of variable regimes”. For example, the steep increase in the
terms of trade registered from the early s to , owing to a sustained boom in the
international prices of coffee, was accompanied by a decline in the real exchange rate —
an overvaluation of the currency. In line with this pattern, as coffee prices fell from 
onwards, the exchange rate depreciated acutely. 
e puzzling fact in these events is that,
contrary to economic theory, the appreciation of the peso occurred at a period in which
policy-makers, on the whole, relaxed exchange controls and liberalised imports (see
Figure .). And subsequent depreciations ensued, as severe quantitative import restrictions
were imposed and exchange controls revived after . 
e apparent contradiction with
the tenets of the theory has been satisfactorily dealt with, as mentioned above, by Esguerra
and Villar, arguing the endogeneity of Colombia’s trade policy in regards to the availability
of foreign exchange.
Regarding the productivity variable, Esguerra and Villar, find that Colombia’s relative
labour productivity vis-à-vis the US is not a statistically significant determinant of the
exchange rate. A lasting force towards depreciation because of slacking productivity seems
For a study focusing on developing countries; see Taylor, A. ‘A Century of Purchasing-Power Parity’ in Review of
Economics and Statistics () Vol. , No. , pp. –; for Colombia; see Cárdenas, M. ‘La Tasa de Cambio en
Colombia’ in Cuadernos de Fedesarrollo () No. .
Astorga, P. ‘Real Exchange...’ pp. –.
Ocampo, J. A. ‘
e Transition...’ p. .
Esguerra. P. and Villar, L. ‘El Comercio...’ pp. –.
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not to be the case for most of the century. On the contrary, from circa  and until
the mid-s, Colombian productivity increased in relation to that of the US, probably
causing some currency appreciation. 
is could be explained by the twin processes of
industrialisation and agricultural modernisation the country underwent at that point.
From then onward productivity levels tended to even, hence productivity forced neither
depreciation nor appreciation. As far as public expenditure concerns, the findings
are mixed. Romero sustains it is a significant factor, especially between the mid-s
and , partly as result of the surge in military spending, whilst Esguerra and Villar’s
findings indicate no significance. Siding with the former, who breaks up the study into
sub-periods, increasing functioning costs as percentage of GDP may have contributed
further to the peso appreciation of these years. Given the low and relatively stable levels
of access to foreign financing in the period covered in this study, capital flows are not
considered to affect exchange rates.
Summarising, the prime determinant of the Colombian exchange rate was the terms of
trade variable; a sustained increase in real coffee prices after , which peaked in ,
created a strong pressure for the peso to overvalue. 
is arguably amounted to a negative
external shock. which domestic policy could have done little to offset. 
e fall in the terms
of trade that followed forced a correction through the maxi-devaluation of . Further,
Colombia’s industrialisation (state-led or not) and agricultural modernisation, sustained
relative productivity levels vis-à-vis the US, which suggests at least this was not a constant
toward real depreciation. Evidence on the impact of government spending is inconclusive.
A final point to note, related to the impact of coffee prices, has been noted by Edwards,
who claims, that real appreciation resulting from these have been accommodated, partially
by money creation and inflation, and partially by adjustments in the nominal rate.
In other words, the policy space for deciding the real exchange rate seems to have been
minimal. Ergo, in the medium-run, that is, during Colombia’s accelerated industrialisation,
a conscious policy of peso overvaluation must have been impracticable.
Esguerra, P. and Villar, L. ‘El Comercio...’ p. .
Romero finds productivity levels to be statistically significant in determining the real exchange rate; however, the
proxy used is too raw (GDP p/c) not as reliable as the one utilised by Esguerra and Villar.
Romero, C. ‘El Tipo...’ p. , ; and Esguerra, P. and Villar, L. ‘El Comercio...’ p. .
Edwards, S. ‘Commodity Export Prices and the Real Exchange Rate in Developing Countries: Coffee in Colombia’
() p. .
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A final challenge to interpretations that claim that Colombia deliberately and persis-
tently overvalued their peso to promote ISI pertains to the historical context in which it
would have occurred. At the international level two aspects are worth highlighting. First,
immediately after WWII, the world trade and monetary systems that emerged discour-
aged the flexible exchange-rate regimes that the literature praises so much — in rather
ahistorical fashion. Frenkel and Rapetti, rightly point out: “
e main characteristics
of the international conditions that Latin America faced during the post-war period re-
mained virtually unchanged up until the late s. 
e international monetary system
followed the Bretton-Woods rules, which established that countries had to maintain fixed
exchange rates against the US dollar... Given the virtual absence of private sources of
international finance, the only substantial source of external finance for the region came
from the IMF. In order to get financial assistance, countries had to negotiate their exchange
rate policy with the institution.” Secondly, contrary to more recent policy stances,
during the s and s such multilateral financial institutions, as the World Bank
were not against industrialisation projects in developing countries. In fact, Webb’s study
suggests the exact opposite, noting that the Bank on occasions found itself lending to
ISI-related projects. Moreover, he argues, a “pro-ISI bias was created by changes in the
Bank’s project selection and procurement procedures”. 
e above international context
notwithstanding, national concerns tipped the balance in favour of the exchange systems
and policies observed.
Frenkel and Rapetti, again, provide a framework to think about this. In their view, “the
choice of exchange rate regimes in Latin America has been influenced by the historically
specific degrees of freedom (or urgency) with which countries addressed concerns about:
a) price stability, b) domestic financial stability, c) external and internal imbalances, and d)
economic growth and development. ” In the Colombian case, according to Wiesner, the
Frenkel, R. and Rapetti, M. ‘A Concise History of Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin America’ () p. .
Webb, R. ‘
e Influence of International Financial Institutions on ISI’ in Cárdenas, E. et al. (Eds) An Economic... pp.
–.
Webb, R. ‘
e Influence...’ p. . 
e changes refer, first; to a sort of institutionalisation of protection of local
capital goods when the Bank opted for a preference rule for domestic suppliers of Bank projects, and, secondly; to
modifications in the projects’ appraisal methods, that included economic rates of return (instead of solely financial ones)
and the use of shadow exchange rates and wages, which justified ISI projects.
Frenkel, R. and Rapetti, M. ‘A Concise...’ pp. –.
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Table .: Colombia in Latin America: Average Rates of Inflation, –
Annual Change in CPI (Percentages)
Period Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
– . . . . . .
– . . .  . .
– . . . . . .
Average . . . .  .
Source: Hofman ().
commitment to price stability was strong and clear. He argues that the exchange-rate
authorities worried about inflation, and attempted to achieve the goal of a unified exchange
rate in equilibrium without suddenly increasing the income of the coffee sector, which
was considered to generate inflation. Meisel agrees with this view up to a certain point,
claiming, that an independent and autonomous CB, whose principal mandate consisted
of ensuring price stability, clearly committed to this goal until . 
e commitment
weakened as the mandate combined price stability with economic development. 
e data,
as shown in Table ., question this judgement, however. 
e decade preceding the 
reform of the CB saw higher, not lower, rates of inflation than the period following it, and
moderate price increases continued for a few years after the nationalisation and loss of
autonomy of the CB in .
A contemporary academic, Schott, examined in  the reasons why Latin American
governments remained reluctant to adopt flexible, unified exchange regimes. He wrote:
“...in several of the largest countries — Argentina, Brazil and Colombia — it continues to
be deemed unacceptable to expose ‘basic’ import items such as food staples and fuels to
the immediate price increase and future fluctuations that their integration into a unified
fluctuating-rate system would entail.” As seen above, Colombia was a much more of an
open economy than other Latin American countries, and also faced higher instability in
the external sector due to the exceedingly volatile prices of coffee in world markets. 
us,
See also Ch.  this dissertation.
Wiesner, E. ‘Devaluación...’ pp. –.
Mesiel, A. ‘Autonomía de la Banca Central e Inflación: La Experiencia Colombiana, –’ () p. .
Schott, F. ‘
e Evolution...’ p. .
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in principle it seemed reasonable for the monetary and exchange authorities to concern
themselves with inflation as seriously as they did. Recently, Romero’s econometric exercises
confirm the fears of economic policy-makers regarding the exchange-rate-inflation link. Her
estimates show that the transmission effect of the exchange rate on prices existed as eventual
depreciations caused increases in the prices of imports, which translated into cost inflation
for producers and ultimately higher prices for the final consumer. Tellingly, Romero also
finds, contrary to the tenets of the conventional literature, that the exchange-rate regime
did not unambiguously favour the kind of imports that would have delivered a spurt to
industrialisation via imports substitution, declaring: “It is curious that the higher elasticities
of long-run exchange-rate transmissions are concentrated in the capital as well as in the
intermediate good sectors, which allows one to argue that depreciations of the exchange
rate generated price increases in the imports of intermediate goods and of raw materials
that were key for certain industrialising sectors between  and .” Romero,
therefore concludes that the fixed exchange-rate system influenced the industrialisation
process in a negative manner.
As seen from Table ., Colombia, unlike Argentina, Brazil and Chile managed to
sustain moderate rates of inflation during the period — exhibiting single-digit numbers
for the s and s. Given the external economic conditions, this was a considerable
achievement. 
e . average rate of inflation for the – period is sensible when
compared to the  attained by Mexico, at the time said to have been riding a golden
era of ‘stabilising development’. Venezuela’s performance is remarkable: levels of inflation
were similar to those that advanced market economies experienced. Yet the Venezuelan
record might not look as solid when it is remembered that in seven out of these  years
the country suffered deflationary pressures.
Conclusions

is chapter has sought to crack the current consensus on Colombia’s industrialisation
experience. To do this, initially a mapping of the different streams of the literature
Romero, C. ‘El Tipo...’ pp. –.
Romero, C. ‘El Tipo...’ p. .
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was offered and the common flaw amongst them highlighted: the assumptions that
governments since the s/s deliberately pursued economic policies geared towards
ISI. An examination of commercial policy showed that the country’s industrial-protectionist
profile of the mid-twentieth century is alleged more than real. First, average tariff rates
were higher before the s than during the intervening period. Secondly, the country’s
trading profile is distinct from those of similar Latin American economies. A snapshot of
the incidence of tariffs and an appraisal based on a proxy for trade-openness (over time),
made clear that Colombia had a much more open economy than those of Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico. 
irdly, the tariff reforms enacted in ,  and  were far
from being unambiguously protective of manufacturing in intent. Historical, qualitative
evidence emerging from official agencies, the international press and foreign economic
missions confirm the above characterisation of Colombia’s efforts and policies on the trade
arena.

e ultimate forces driving trade and tariff policy were certainly not the autarkic aspira-
tions of those heading the government, as many authors implied. Likelier culprits, as the
evidence displayed above indicates, were pressures in the balance of payments resulting
from over-reliance on a single export, and the need to raise revenue for the fiscal coffers -
which had deep historical roots going back to the nineteenth century. On occasions, more
discrete reasons, like the betterment of strategic positioning over future trade agreements
might have also been taken into consideration. 
e argument that manufacturing tariffs
and other protectionist measures were deployed by governments at the behest of industrial-
ists can only be considered within the range of factors just mentioned. Single concessions
did not amount to state commitment in this area in any form.

e other substantial part of the chapter concentrated on the exchange rate. A most
effective way to approach this issue was to look for clear answers to the following questions:
Was the Colombian peso overvalued? If it was, by how much, both in absolute and in
comparative terms? To what extent was the trajectory of the exchange rate dictated by
policy? What was the role of non-policy forces? Lastly, does taking into consideration the
contexts in which exchange-rate policy was carried out add value towards its understanding?
Answers: First, as captured by the spread between the official and the free exchange rates,
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the peso was overvalued by  between  and . Comparatively speaking, this
degree of appreciation was well below that experienced by the monetary units of countries
like Argentina and Chile. Secondly, the appreciation of the peso, though historical fact, was
not the result of deliberate policy. Several factors explained this. Paramount amongst them
was the evolution of the terms of trade, over which national authorities had practically
no control. 
irdly, given the quasi-chronic problems in the external sector, especially in
balance of payments, the exchange-rate systems adopted tended to follow, not substitute,
the forces of the market. Fourthly, there is significant evidence, for example the devaluation
episode of , to argue that at times when the authorities thought a more liberal and
flexible exchange regime could be afforded, such a path was pursued. Fifthly, the intent of
exchange rate policy seemed not have been skewed towards protectionism, but towards
the attainment of relative stability in the external sector, even if the price to be paid was
moderate but tolerable levels of overvaluation. Sixthly, the adoption of a fixed exchange-
rate system in the s, and its maintenance at least until the late s, can be partly
attributed to Colombia’s willingness to participate in the world monetary system and to
observe the rules of Bretton-Woods. Lastly, domestic concerns reflected the view that the
exchange rate drove inflation, a concern that played a dominant role in exchange-rate
policy. Ex-post, this view seems valid. In light of the revision and empirical findings
made, the dictum of Diaz-Alejandro on exchange rates is now more relevant than ever:
“
e adjective ‘overvalued’ is one to be used with care at all times, but particularly so in
Colombia.”
A wider consideration arising from this chapter belongs to the general/thematic literature
on commercial policy. If Capie’s review of these works is accurate, and as he sustains “...
most analyses of protection in recent decades have been carried out within a public-choice
framework... examining the costs and benefits to different groups... [in which] gainers
generate a demand for protection, and the government is the source of supply... [and]
lobbying alone cannot explain all the protectionism that exists”; then, a ‘thick’ historical
Diaz-Alejandro, C. ‘Foreign Trade...’ p. .
Capie, F. ‘Commercial Policy: Tariffs’ in Mokyr, J. (Ed) 
e Oxford Encyclopaedia of Economic History() Vol. , p.
.
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approach exploring and emphasising the various intentions of government - like the one
presented here - constitutes an interesting, alternative research avenue.
Having examined developments in the fields of trade and the exchange rate that point
at the problems of labelling the Colombian experience of industrialisation as ISI or as a
state-led process, another important area of action, equally associated with ISI, is assessed
in the following chapter: direct promotion of industry.

4 The Institute of Industrial Development: Its
History as Direct Industrial Promoter
Colombia’s Institute of Industrial Development (Instituto de Fomento Industrial — hence-
forth IFI), is regarded as having been a decisive player in the country’s industrialisation
strategy. Since its foundation, IFI was the only state agency in charge of assisting man-
ufacturing firms, thus it can be said to epitomise the commitment of the state to the
industrialising project. An examination of IFI’s role is important because it sheds light on
the broader issue of the role of the state in late development. More precisely, by analysing
and assessing the trajectory and contribution of the institute during its life as direct in-
dustrial promoter, new interpretations can be drawn regarding the effective commitment,
nature and capacity of the Colombian state to advance industrialisation. 
e existing liter-
ature on IFI and its contribution to late-industrialisation is unsatisfactory for three reasons.
First, previous works have failed to distinguish between IFI as a direct industrial promoter
(–) and IFI as a development bank (–). Moreover, the vast majority of
the literature has focused on IFI as lender, neglecting its entrepreneurial and risk-taking ac-
tivities. Secondly, a serious shortfall is the lack of substantive primary-evidence supporting
the conventional interpretations about IFI. A corollary of previous problems is a resultant
historiographical vacuum in terms of an assessment of IFI as direct industrial promoter;
and concomitantly, of the effective commitment of the Colombian state to the industrial
endeavour. 
is chapter addresses these problems. Based on solid empirical evidence it is
argued, contrary to the existing literature, that the contribution of IFI towards Colombia’s
industrialisation was not important, at least when the institute acted as a direct provider of
equity capital to industrial firms (–). Board memoranda, balance sheets and annual
reports offer a picture of the institute from ‘within’ that reveals a chronically precarious
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financial situation and also allow for the construction of basic time series to assess and issue
new judgements on its impact throughout the period of study. A hypothesis to account for
the rather discreet performance/contribution of the institute along the following lines is
advanced: IFI’s funding model was inappropriate and made the institute overwhelmingly
dependent on the government. 
is dependency translated into lack of autonomy when
taking large investment decisions; which in turn led to poor investments worsening further
its already fragile financial position and diminishing its potential contribution to the
project of industrialisation.

e chapter is organised in eight sections. Section one reviews the literature on IFI
and challenges some of the traditional views. Section two introduces the reader to IFI:
its mission and the instruments for the promotion of industrial firms, and explores the
finances of IFI from ‘within’, supplying primary evidence on its frail financial position. A
preliminary assessment of the contribution of the institute to industrialisation is the subject
of section three. Sections four and five attempt to explain the pattern of investments of the
institute considering as key factors: the funding sources of IFI and the level of autonomy
in investment decision-making, respectively. Section six illustrates with a case study the
points made in sections four and five. Section seven supports through previously unknown
historical evidence claims of government intervention on IFI’s decision-making processes.
Last section concludes.
Historiography on IFI

e historiography on the financing of Colombia’s substitutive industrialisation process
is thin. Even thinner, however, is that on the country’s most emblematic agency for its
industrial development: IFI. 
e existing literature can be divided into two categories:
first; those broad works on Colombia’s twentieth century economic history in which
discussions about IFI are included and, second; a small number of articles in books, and
papers primarily concerned with IFI. 
e historiography may be characterised as being
Bejarano, J. A. ‘Historia Económica y Desarrollo: La Historiografía Económica sobre los Siglos XIX y XX en Colombia’
() pp. –, –.

e only book dedicated to IFI by authors other than IFI is Lopera, M. T., López, R. and Peláez, S. ‘Política de
Fomento, Industrialización e Internacionalización del Capital: Un Estudio Crítico del IFI’ ().
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comprised of two groups. On one side are IFI’s staff, collaborators, the institute’s official
historians, and independent researchers offering, in general terms, a very sanguine history
of the institute, stressing its achievements, often neglecting its failures, and failing to assess
its performance rigorously. On the other side are a handful of IFI’s critics arguing for
a more balanced assessment of its overall proceedings, prominently among them those
advancing functionalist-Marxist perspectives contending that IFI was an instrument of the
ruling bourgeoisie.
Assessments from the general literature on the role of IFI in Colombia’s industrialisation
start with Berry. He points at the significant function IFI played in the technical and
financial support given toward the development of specific basic industries, such as cement,
steel and chemicals. Avella et al. have gone further, highlighting IFI’s direct investments
as one of the three pillars by which the strategy of industrial modernisation via import
substitution took off after  — the two other pillars were, according to them, increasing
protectionism and the channelling of growing amounts of credit to industry. 
ey
emphasise the diversity of enterprises IFI fostered in intermediate and late industries as
much as its ability to associate with both foreign and domestic partners. Avella et al. also
underscore the rapid growth of its assets up until  and the then ensuing “spectacular
expansion during the National Front years”, presumably as signals indicating the financial
and economic strength of the entity.
From a political angle, Revéiz has taken the evolution of IFI from  to  to illus-
trate how changes in the country’s development strategy caused concomitant alterations in
state institutions. Under his view, “the institute’s early years were characterised by large
scale direct investments in industries where the country had no antecedents (chemical,
metallurgy, non-metallic minerals), and its actions directed toward the production of
For IFI and IFI’s staff and collaborators literature; see Lleras, C. ‘El IFI ante el Desarrollo Colombiano’ in IFI. El IFI y
el Desarrollo Industrial, – (); IFI. ‘IFI:  Años de Desarrollo Industrial’ () and Durana, G. ‘Realizaciones
y Perspectivas del Instituto de Fomento Industrial’ in Colombia en Cifras ().
Lopera, M. T. et al. ‘Política...’ Ch. .
Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ pp. –.
Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ pp. –.
Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ pp. –.
Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ p. .
Reveiz, E. ‘Evolución de las Formas de Intervención del Estado en la Economía en América Latina: El Caso Colombiano’
in Bejarano, J. A. (Ed) Lecturas sobre Economía Colombiana ().
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intermediate goods; so as to subsidise the sectors consuming IFI products”. 
is interpre-
tation fits neatly the economic model of import substitution, state-led or state-sponsored
industrialisation, indicative planning and deep state intervention. From  on the nature
of the promotional activities of IFI shifted from direct investments via capital contributions
to financial intermediation in long-term capital markets; suggesting a move away from
subsidies, closer to real prices and more efficient allocation of resources. 
is change
would mark the beginning of a new paradigm typified by financial liberalisation, reduced
state intervention and market-driven development. Within his politics-based approach
toward IFI’s evolution, Revéiz also conceives of IFI as a propeller of industrialisation thanks
to the scale and diversity of the enterprises it promotes. A similar political approach has
been taken by Wright, who argues that: “the closest the Liberals came to establishing an
embryo for more extensive state intervention was the founding of IFI in ”. For him,
IFI is one of the few, if not the only, exception by which the state intervenes through a
publicly-formed organisation to pull industrial progress amidst a wider political context
that is hostile to state meddling in economic issues. Mora, for his part, has related the
strengthening of Colombia’s state capitalism of WWII with the foundation of IFI under
the leadership of President Santos and Finance Minister Lleras. Mora also stresses the
post-war era as one which sees the beginnings of the Colombian state as entrepreneur,
and points out the involvement of IFI in the production of chemical and steel plants as
illustrations.

is chapter challenges these interpretations. 
ough at first glance they offer different
angles on IFI, a closer look reveals a fundamental and flawed denominator. Avella et al. and
Berry privilege the functions and apparently great impact of IFI on the economy; Revéiz
and Wright emphasise IFI politically as standard-bearer of an interventionist and possibly
developmentalist state; so does Mora identifying IFI’s actions as traits of state capitalism.
However, there is a basic underlying assumption to all, namely, that IFI became a key
Revéiz, E. ‘Evolución...’ p. . 
e argument is shared by Isaza; see, Isaza. J. F. ‘La Empresa Mixta y el IFI’ in IFI.
IFI:  Años de Desarrollo Industrial () p. .
Revéiz, E. ‘Evolución...’ p. .
Wright, P. ‘
e Role of the State and the Politics of Capital Accumulation in Colombia’ in Development and Change
() Vol. , p. .
Wright, P. ‘
e Role...’ p. .
Mora, A. ‘Historia...’ p. .
Mora, A. ‘Historia...’ p. .
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agent in a Colombian state-led ISI strategy. 
e former observe this in the contributions of
IFI toward such strategy; the latter presume that the ISI strategy was, effectively, state-led;
thus IFI came to represent it. 
is study will argue that for both strands of the literature
their initial premise — that there was a state-led ISI strategy — does not hold, as it came
to be seen through IFI and its contribution to it.

e technological perspective of IFI’s impact on industrialisation is the subject of Poveda’s
study. 
is author is concerned with the contributions IFI made in terms of technological
innovations and the introduction of new industrial processes. Poveda states: “up to these
days [] the management and actions of IFI had been one of the factors that considered
on its own have contributed the most toward the implantation of new technological
innovations in the country”. He singles out the integrated steel plant with 
omas
converter of Paz del Río steel works, the electrolysis of salt for chlorine production, and the
extraction of tannins from mangrove trees amongst others. It is worth noting that this
way to assess the performance of the institute in the industrialisation effort is not unique.
Lopera et al. adopted these technology-based criteria when determining whether or not
IFI had fulfilled its foundational duties. In this chapter no effort is made to address
the validity of the assessments and conclusions based on technological criteria. To do
so requires an examination of the learning effects and technological spillovers that IFI
encouraged, which falls beyond the scope of this study.

e literature on IFI by IFI is, not surprisingly, more partisan. Forero, for instance,
is keen on retrieving from history IFI’s early prolific times at breeding enterprise. She
draws attention to the number of firms that IFI promoted through foundation and/or
restructuring in the immediate years following the economic disruptions of WWII. 
e
emphasis she places on the great productivity of IFI at firm creation, which “entering into
its fourth year had helped founding  companies”, contrasts strikingly with the longer
and highly unfertile period that followed it, and of which Forero says nothing. Others
Poveda, G. ‘Políticas Económicas, Desarrollo Industrial y Tecnología en Colombia, –’ ().
Poveda, G. ‘Políticas...’ p. .
Poveda, G. ‘Políticas...’ p. .
Lopera, M. T. ‘Política...’ pp. –.
Forero, C. ‘El IFI. La Fuerza de un País’ in IFI. IFI: Desarrollo Empresarial Para Todos ().
Forero, C. ‘El IFI...’ p. .
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like Prieto attach to IFI unique attributions. According to this author: “the presence of
IFI in the national development was of special importance because it identified domestic
production opportunities, supported them either financially or with its own capital, and
oft assumed the risks entirely on its own at a time, when practically the spirit of association
did not exist”. 
is is certainly not the case. By , the comptroller’s office reported
over a thousand public limited corporations. Furthermore, the one occasion in which IFI
alone faced the entirety of the risks and financing of an industrial venture was in 
when it supplied all of the capital for the Colombian Yeast Co., however, this intervention
did not start from scratch, since this company was the outgrowth of an already existing
venture.
Similarly, Isaza contends that: “in the near-total absence of an urban bourgeoisie with
investment capacity in basic industries, such as tires, steel, and iron; it was only natural
for IFI to concentrate its actions in these sectors”. Again, the statement is plagued with
problems. For instance, steel and iron producers existed long before IFI’s foundation; the
most important plants located in Tabio, Samaca, and Pacho. As for the derisive size and
role of the Colombian bourgeoisie Isaza insists on, he ignores not only the acknowledged
impetus of entrepreneurial Antioqueños in commerce, manufactures and mining in the
early-twentieth century and before, but also the appearance of groups of industrialists in
urban centres like the capital city, and also in smaller ones, such as Barranquilla, Cali and
Bucaramanga.

us, the key question concerning the current historiography is whether or not the
authors cited above have given an accurate vision of both the magnitude and the significance
of the actions of IFI in Colombia’s industrialisation process. In other words, has IFI’s
role been misconstrued? Did IFI become the supreme agency for industrial progress the
literature claims it was? 
is chapter will argue that at least from the time IFI was founded
up to the year it turned into a development bank () IFI did not play such decisive
Prieto, L. ‘Proyección del IFI y Desarrollo en Colombia’ in IFI. IFI: Desarrollo Empresarial Para Todos () pp.
–.
Prieto, L. ‘Proyección...’ p. .
Isaza, J. F. ‘La Empresa Mixta y el IFI’ in IFI. IFI... pp. –.
See for example; Wiesner, E. ‘Paz del Río’ ().
Brew, R. ‘El Desarrollo Económico de Antioquia desde la Independencia hasta ’ ().
See Sáenz-Rovner, E. ‘La Ofensiva Empresarial’ () Ch. .
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role. 
is view will be supported by compelling evidence. 
e working hypothesis is
divided into two parts. First, the magnitude of the financial resources IFI handled during
its first  years of existence did not allow it to play the critical role that the conventional
historiography states it did. A perspective on IFI’s funds is offered through the eyes of
IFI’s directives, which, contrary to what is often implied, suggests fund starvation. Second,
an analysis of its resources by origin permits this author to advance the complementary
assertion: given the origins of IFI’s resources the institute failed to govern its investment
decisions by purely technical, financial, and economic principles. Instead, decision-making
was dominated by governmental, conjunctural and political concerns that prevented IFI to
operate autonomously. 
is was particularly so, in the cases of large industrial investments,
as will be seen later.
IFI: Mission, Modus Operandi and Finances
As indicated by its organic law IFI was created in September  to fulfil a major task: to
promote the foundation and enlargement of enterprises that exploit basic industries and
the primary-transformation of domestic raw materials that the initiative and capital of the
private sector have not been able to develop satisfactorily. As established by law, these
industries were:
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , p. .
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , p. .
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Steel Tannin Extract
Metallurgy Pita and Ramie
Coal Oily Nuts
Ceramics Tagua wood
Soda Coffee Vellum
Sulphuric Acid and Chemical Products Maize
Fertilisers Canned Fruits and Vegetables
Salt for Cattle Fishing
Animal Feed Wool
Insecticides and Fungicides Hides
Cellulose Milk Pasteurisation
In addition to these  industries, government had a right to include any other industry,
basic or of primary-transformation, whenever it saw fit. Another article allowed for
its participation in secondary-transformation industries, if it was deemed necessary to
create the consumption required to guarantee the economic viability of basic and first-
transformation businesses. In other words, IFI could promote any of the  sectors listed
above at will, but could also provide assistance to firms outside these if governments so
wanted it. In this way its mandate had been made broader and flexible, so as to enable it to
switch on to any industrial sector promising rapid growth, but at the same time made the
institute prone to politically-driven needs. It is unclear, either from the indicative listed
sectors or from the actual investments, whether the institute had been expressly created
to promote industry through import-substitution, as some have suggested. For certain,
there was no such claim in IFI’s foundational charter and a brief review of its intended and
actual investments does not support that view either. 
e exploitation of coal (Valle &
Cauca Plant) and tagua wood, like the processing of coffee vellum projects, were all geared
toward exporting purposes. 
at is not to say, however, that there were no intentions to
substitute imports. 
is was indeed the case for steel products with steelworks Paz del Río,
cellulose through Propal, and soda ash by means of the Zipaquirá Soda Plant, amongst
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , p. .
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , p. .
Garay, J. L. ‘Colombia: Estructura Industrial e Industrialización () cited in Rettberg, A. ‘
e Political Preferences
of Diversified Business Groups: Lessons from Colombia’ in Business and Politics () Vol. , Issue , p. .
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others. It is also the case that IFI was involved in ventures where there were hardly any
grounds for it to do so, such as its incursion in tourism with Hotel San Diego in Bogota,
and its shares in the river transport company, Shipyard Union. 
at investments like these
were clearly out of line with its mission and foundational objectives was so evident that
the directors recognised it behind closed doors.
It is worth noting three distinctive features of IFI, which reveal the nature and limits of
state interventionism. 
e first is the condition of complementarity that the institute was
to hold in the industrialising project. As stated earlier, IFI will only promote industries that
“the initiative and capital of the private sector have not been able to develop satisfactorily.”
What constituted the ‘satisfactory development’ of an industrial sector was never established,
but with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to sustain that the purpose of this private
initiative clause in the mandate of IFI aimed at keeping the institute’s role — and that of the
state- in check; in addition to avoiding public crowding out effects and official competition.
To maintain the state as junior partner a second condition was included: the temporary
nature of IFI’s ownership in the firms it promoted. According to the organic law that
governed the institute, IFI was in the obligation of selling the shares in the enterprises it
fostered at the earliest possible opportunity. 
ere are three interesting points to make of
this requirement. First, by forcing IFI to sell its stakes the size and influence of the state
in would-be state-owned enterprises was severed. Secondly, the requirement to transfer
to the private sector successfully-promoted enterprises amounted to the privatisation of
public gains. Whether IFI might have benefited more from keeping and running these
successfully-promoted ventures than from selling them remains to be established; however,
the issue is important and the fact that the state had forsaken such an opportunity is
telling of its position vis-à-vis private enterprise. 
e third point refers to the fact that
IFI was the only official agency charged with the task of industrial development. As the
Institute’s ‘father’, Carlos Lleras, noted, before the creation of IFI and until the arrival of
development banks in , Colombia lacked a specialised entity that dealt with medium-
IFI. Acts of the Board of Directors (AoBD), Microfilm No. ,  October , Act No. , unmarked page,
AIFI.
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , p. .
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , p. .
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and long-term industrial financing. 
us, IFI faced a monumental assignment in terms
of both the diversity of the expertise and technical knowledge it would have to count
on to promote those industries, but above all, in terms of the financial muscle it would
have to develop to realise them. Summarising, IFI had a broad and at times ambiguous
mandate subject to sudden governmental modifications, which in practice promoted both
import substitution and export diversification, and whose scope from the start became
circumscribed to the deeds and behaviour of private initiative.
IFI could assist in the foundation of new companies or in the restructuring of existing
ones through various mechanisms; capital contributions, that is, through the subscription
of shares in publicly limited corporations. It also acted as lender advancing short-term
loans to firms that found access to finance from banks closed; although its credit activities
remained small. Underwriting was permitted but not much practiced. As for the
financing of IFI itself, several mechanisms were attempted. 
e start-up capital came
mainly from government and the Central Mortgage Bank (BCH), a mixed mortgage
agency. 
ereafter, irregular capital contributions from governments accounted for most
of IFI’s resources. Furthermore, IFI was authorised to obtain credit both at home and
abroad; from the former it borrowed if not heavily at least regularly, whilst from the latter
no attempts were made until the early s. IFI also resorted to the capital markets
during its initial years, particularly when looking for funds for the steelworks project;
however, even these early placements met sceptical private investors and this financing
option was discarded subsequently. Unlike other similar industrial-development agencies
in the region, IFI does not seem to have aimed at the twin objective of promoting industry
and fostering the development of capital markets through the introduction and widespread
use of financial instruments: which might also help to explain its lack of concern with
capital markets.
What does the literature say on the magnitude and origins of IFI’s financial resources
when operating as direct investor? Given the above-reviewed statements, surprisingly
Lleras, C. ‘El IFI...’ p. .
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos,  p. ; and IFI. Balance e Informe, , p. .
IFI. Balance e Informes, , p. –. Of an initial capital of  million government subscribed  million and BCH
the rest.
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Figure .: IFI: Evolution of Assets — Real vs. Nominal (Millions of Pesos)
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little. 
e pattern found is one limited to the enumeration of the industrial sectors
and/or the companies in which it partook. No systematic efforts have been made either
to calculate the share of IFI in each sector or company or to estimate the total of its
investments, guarantees and credits as percentages of aggregate indicators. For Avella
et al. it suffices to say, that IFI’s investments were diversified, that it partnered up with
domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, that despite having started activities right after its
foundation in  it had accumulated assets worth . million pesos by , and that
it underwent spectacular growth during the National Front (–). Similarly, Mora
offers no data to support his argument that the arrival of IFI strengthened Colombia’s
state capitalism; instead he describes some of the industries promoted: steel, tyres, and
chemical products. Revéiz’s emphasis on the unprecedented scale of large investments in
Partial exceptions discussed; Lopera, M. T. et al. ‘Política...’ (); and Contraloría General de la República. ‘Aporte
del IFI al Proceso de Desarrollo Industrial’ in Informe Financiero () Issue November. –.
Avella et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ p. .
Mora, A. ‘Historia’ p. .
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non-metallic minerals and chemicals, for instance, is not illustrated with a comparison of
investments in these areas prior to . 
e deepest he delves into IFI’s resource-analysis
is through a breakdown of its investments by sectors, as allocated to a number of firms.

ough this constitutes an improvement it is ambiguous, since obviously the allocation of
investments was not symmetrical. In short, the literature that has so much celebrated IFI’s
investments and has heightened the role and status of this institution in the Colombian
substitutive-industrialisation process has failed to endorse its arguments with empirical
evidence.
What was the real state of IFI’s finances? A glance at the annual and bi-annual balance
sheets and reports offer first-hand, reliable sources to explore the matter. According to the
evolution of nominal assets in Figure ., not only do IFI’s assets show a clear increasing
trend from  to  (exception years /, , and ), but exhibit three
periods of remarkable growth: /, /, and /. 
e spurt in total assets
during the first period is accounted for by a doubling of industrial shares and investments
in various negotiable securities; and to an increase of ,, in its social capital. 
e
leap during – is mostly explained by the doubling of its capital from ,,
to ,,. 
e last soar, again, is mainly the result of substantial increases in paid
capital. Despite marked differences in year-to-year increases the average for the entire
period – is a respectable .. Assets multiplied nearly twenty-fold throughout
the whole period. At first sight, the review of IFI’s assets evolution hints that its financial
position was sound. By the same token, it suggests that the general literature on IFI, and
the study by Avella et al. in particular, were right in pointing at this indicator to shore
up the critical function of IFI in the industrialisation of the country. Once the nominal
series is deflated, however, the picture is bleaker. 
e yearly average growth of assets drops
significantly when measured in real terms. 
e trend in real terms reflects much more
accurately the actual state of IFI’s finances coinciding with the contemporary views of its
staff, as will be shown below.
Revéiz, E. ‘Evolución...’ pp. –.
IFI. Balance e Informe, , .
IFI. Informe del Gerente, –.
IFI. Consolidated Balance on  December , Microfilm No. , AIFI; and IFI. Consolidated Balance on 
December , Microfilm No. , unmarked page, AIFI.
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A comparative exercise between the arguments the recent literature has advanced on the
magnitude of IFI’s financial strength and the great scope of its actions, on the one hand;
and the statements and actual position of IFI’s finances as declared by its own directives,
on the other, offers strikingly different views. A survey through the institute’s minutes
of the board of directors and the prose of the annual reports provide the best first-hand
historical evidence against the former view.
Early signs of financial problems at IFI were recorded in the minutes of the meeting
celebrated in early March . 
e general manager, Gabriel Durana, explained: “the
lack of immediate liquidity of the bulk of assets will produce a shortage of funds for
ordinary expenses that is already being felt”. A few months later, there was a similar
pronouncement: “available funds for the most urgent expenses of the institute have been
petering out and it has become necessary to think of selling securities of the portfolio.”

e point here is that the selling of stock was more the result of financial necessity rather
than business sense. By  the institute acknowledged failure at paying out dividends
to its shareholders. “At the present time it is not possible to guarantee the BCH the 
annual payment over its capital contribution to IFI... given the institute is not yielding
any profits.” Liquidity problems in the mid-s partly had their origins in the nature
of the investments IFI undertook, particularly the long maturation of projects, such as the
development of metallurgy in Tolima, the Industrial Consortium of Santander, and the
contributions of capital and credit advances made to the pasteurisation of milk plant in
Bogota. Slow returns to capital investments forced IFI to sell its most valuable securities
at times when the quotations were not best; preventing optimal realisations. 
e joint
effects of these situations in addition to the large number of liquidations of companies it
promoted in its early years thwarted efforts at meeting obligations with its shareholders, as
noted above.
Not only did IFI fail to pay out its shareholders, it also failed to meet its credit-based
obligations. A petition to cancel the debt requested by IFI in  was registered in the
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  March , p. , AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  January , p. , AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No.  of the Advisory Committee to the Board,  June , unmarked
page, AIFI.
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board’s minutes: “as a consequence of a contract celebrated in  between IFI and
the Nation, which authorised the institute to issue ,, in Bonds for Industrial
Development at  [annual] and  year gradual amortisation, IFI has a liability that will
reach ,,... In order to clean up the balance sheets IFI asks for the sum owed to
the Nation to be written off.” It has not been possible to establish whether or not the
debt was written off; but as of June th  the requirement neared ,,. 
e
important issue here is that for nearly twenty years, IFI failed to service this obligation
and this should have tarnished its reputation undermining any later efforts to capturing
resources in capital markets.
In  the future economic viability of IFI was being pondered for the first time. Juan
de Dios Ceballos, general manager, stated: “liquid assets in easily negotiable bonds and
stocks hardly suffice to cover the institute’s commitments of the second semester... it is
considered that if IFI is not granted immediate and significant support it will be forced to
reduce its activities a great deal; and it would not be worth keeping it to attend duties of
purely administrative nature.” Four months later, Ceballos manifested that no reply had
been received from government to his request for ,,; and that given the urgency
imposed by pressing expenses, he was authorised to sell securities of Icollantas — IFI’s
most valuable stock. By January  drastic measures were put forward. 
e manager
expressed his view “that if the government did not increase the capital of the institute, IFI
would have to continue selling its most tradeable stocks to meets its obligations, and in
that case it would be better to liquidate the institute.”
Dire financial conditions did not improve in ; on the contrary, that year led the
general manager to conclude the annual report with these words: “a cold-headed analysis of
the economic situation of the institute yields three main conclusions: - Paid up capital is
insufficient to accomplish the vast industrial-promotion task assigned. - 
e total amount
of IFI’s resources are at present committed to enterprises of which IFI cannot rid itself of.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  February , p. , AIFI.
IFI. Consolidated Balance on  June , Microfilm No. , AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  July , p. , AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No.  of the Advisory Committee to the Board,  November , p. .
AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  January , p. , AIFI.
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Hence, with its own resources the institute cannot undertake any new ventures. - For an
organisation such as IFI to fully perform one of its principal functions, that of industrial
research, it needs to count on a fixed annual allotment from the national government.
Otherwise, the large costs involved in this activity gradually deplete the available capital.”
In the following three years IFI received enough capital contributions to continue its
operations, but around  its own existence as an entity seemed to come to an end.
A customary request for urgent funds by the deputy manager to the government met a
disquieting reply, as the manager manifested: “it was not possible to obtain resources from
government because the Finance Minister considers it is not the case to fix IFI’s situation
in view of the establishment of the National Corporation Production.” Two months
later, a discussion among the directors of the institute revealed IFI had no resources with
which to pay its own staff: “the serious economic position of the institute and the necessity
of funds to pay the personnel and meet its obligations, forces to decide if under the current
circumstances IFI is sumptuary, useful or necessary; in the first case it must be shut down,
in the second case, must be sustained; in the last, must be financed by government”.
Fortunately for IFI, the project concerning the National Corporation vanished and a
new source of income was designed to alleviate the institute’s chronic economic troubles.

e mechanism consisted of granting it the right to authorise exports, other than coffee and
bananas, and charge for this service a fee equivalent to  of the value of the exported item.
Forecasts by IFI on the revenues this would generate in  rounded to ,,.

ough the percentage to be charged turned out to be lower, the export fee generated
income alleviating some of the most urgent financial troubles. It did not solve, however, its
long-standing economic requirements. In the following years, directors and annual reports
continued to register the lack of adequate funds for IFI to achieve its goals.

e empirical evidence gathered from the board of directors’ minutes and the annual
reports of IFI demonstrate that the financial position of the institute during most of its life
IFI. Informe del Gerente, , pp. –.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  April , unmarked page, AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No., ,  July , pp. –, AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  February , p. , AIFI.
IFI. Informe del Gerente, ; IFI. Informe, ; and AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  July , p.
, AIFI; and AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  June , p. , AIFI.
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as direct investor in industrial ventures was precarious. Contrary to the pictures offered by
most of the literature, IFI did not enjoy a comfortable financial situation. So dire were
its finances that the institute failed to meet obligations both with its shareholders and its
creditors. Furthermore, dire financial straits led both IFI’s own staff and state officials
to consider the liquidation of the institute at various opportunities, as shown above, in
, , , and the early s. Finally, efforts to clean up the finances of the
institute in the late s and early s via an export fee for non-traditional exports
and the allocation of a yearly item from the national budget alleviated but did not solve
IFI’s problems. To sum up, from its foundation in  up to its transformation into a
development bank in , the financial position of IFI was fragile. Constant liquidity
problems, claims about insufficient capital to operate, frequent doubts on its economic
viability, and failure to honour its contracts are clear-cut illustrations of this. Given all of
this, it is reasonable to argue that the financial position of IFI has been misconstrued by
the conventional literature.
So far, the quantitative evidence put forward in the first section to illustrate the economic
health of IFI consisted of a review of IFI’s growth of total assets over time. 
e qualitative
evidence offered against its financial soundness was based on statements and discussions
recorded in the minutes of the board of directors and fragments of the annual reports. It is
time to scrutinise IFI’s performance more closely.
Towards a Preliminary Assessment of IFI
How does the record of IFI at industrial promotion look like? As can be seen from Figure
. the institute’s promotional history can be broken into two distinctive periods. A
first phase starting from its foundation up to  was characterised by hyper-activism
in the creation and nurturing of industrial firms. In these years a total of  ventures
were promoted out of which  companies were founded and  existing ones received
injections of equity capital. Within this period the first five years right after IFI’s creation
proved the more dynamic. From  to , the record is more lacklustre. On four
occasions (/,  and ) firms were neither founded nor funded and only
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 ventures obtained support of which  were newly constituted firms and three were
already existing. 
roughout the whole period, IFI promoted a total of  companies or
an average of . firms per year. Naturally, to assess better the role of the institute in
harnessing industrial development via its actions on these firms a distinction needs to be
made between ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ ventures.
Figure .: IFI: Developmental Activities, –
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e first step is to examine the rate of ‘failure’ among IFI-firms. 
at is, the incidence
of liquidations among industrial companies promoted by the institute. As Figure .
helps to illustrate, out of  firms sponsored  ended up in liquidation. In other words,
 of IFI-firms were not competitive in the market or were simply non-profitable for
other reasons. Especially during the first decade of operations the institute’s record of ‘firm
survival’ was relatively low, as  out of  of its investments went bust. For the second
period the ratio improved somewhat and only five out of  followed the liquidation path.
A high number of these ‘failed’ firms () exited the market within five years of them
Includes support to the Institute for Water and Electrical Energy Exploitation.

T I  I D
being created or financially supported by IFI; thus, leaving little chances for a long-lasting
contribution towards Colombia’s industrialisation. Five remaining firms lived longer than
six years, but none did for more than  years and it was often the case that liquidation
processes were protracted due to bitter disputes among shareholders. Uncompromising
positions between IFI, other shareholders and external creditors frequently led to court
procedures that extended the life of some firms formally, even though these had ceased
operating long before their legal demises.
Figure .: IFI’s Performance at Enterprise Promotion, –
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Lleras, C. () and Lopera, M. T. et al. ().
It is in the ‘successful’ cases — and measured by IFI’s own mandate-standards — that the
contribution of IFI is best examined. As said earlier, according to the institute’s foundational
charter, IFI’s mission was to transfer to the private sector the firms it supported once these
had matured and proved to be financially sound. As shown in Figure ., the number of
firms that IFI promoted and later transferred was five between  and  and  for
Illustrations of these are the Agrarian & Sugar Company of Urabá and the Mining & Metallurgic Industry of
Colombia.
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–, adding up to a total of . However, not all of these were successful transfers
in the sense that its ownership passed from public to private hands, nor did this occur
on a permanent basis. In  IFI’s shares in Hotel San Diego of Bogota were bought
up by another official agency, the army’s retirement fund. Similarly, Paipa Chemicals,
involved in the production of sodium sulphates, was acquired by the state of Boyacá in
. Another firm recorded as being successfully transferred in  is the National
Company of Fertilisers, only to be recapitalised a year later with a massive injection of
equity capital provided by IFI and further public funds, to be finally liquidated in .
Summarising, only about a fourth of all of IFI’s ventures followed the original IFI-charter’s
trajectory of firm promotion, maturation and transfer to the private sector it set out.
Independent of the performances of industrial firms promoted by IFI, the role played
by the institute can be gauged by looking at the financial resources it put into them, as
measured by the share of equity capital it provided as part of the total of paid up capital
of each firm. Table . offers interesting insights into this matter. First, early on IFI
contravened the regulation that prevented it from taking up more than  of the shares
of any promoted firm by subscribing more than half of total shares of Colombian Milk
Industries and assuming full ownership of the yeast business, albeit this proved an exception.
Secondly, IFI’s most important investments in the s flowed to the rubber tyre and steel
industries, as represented in the large portions of equity capital provided to Colombian
Tyre Industries and Steelworks Paz del Rio, which made the institute owner of around 
of these two corporations. For the s the largest outlay of the institute constituted its
stake in the Cauca & Valle Coal Plant (not on the table), and other large investments were
made in the non-metallic and printing and paper sectors. During the early s metal
products became important for IFI through heavy involvement in Metalworks Colombia,
though it did not make it a majority shareholder. 
roughout the period chemicals and
agricultural industries were also well cared for. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, as
seen from the large sample gathered on the table, on average, IFI’s shares in the firms it
promoted represented around a fifth or . of their paid up capital.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  July , p. , AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  November , p. , AIFI.
Lleras, C. ‘El IFI...’ p. .
IFI. Informe y Balance, , pp. –.

T I  I D
Table .: IFI’s Participation in Industrial Companies, – (
ousands of nom-
inal Pesos)
Year Industrial Venture Initial Paid Up
Capital
IFI’s Contribu-
tion
IFI’ Share ()
 Mangrove Industries   .
 Colombian Milk Industry   .
 Uraba Agrarian & Sugar Co.   .
 ‘Sulfacido’ Chemical Products   .
 Colombian Tannins Co.   .
 ‘El Papagayo’ Foodstuffs   .
 Medellin Siderurgy ,  .
 Colombian Yeast Co.   .
 National Vegetable Fats Co.   .
 Wool Spinning of Colombia   .
 ‘La Industria’ Woods   .
 Chlorine National Co.   .
 Colombian Tyre Industry , , .
 Colombian Glass Co   .
 Colombian Fibres Co.   .
 Colombian Central Metal-
lurgy
  .
 Industrial Shipyards Union ,  .
 Mining & Metals Industry   .
 Alcaloids Co.   .
 Colombian Zinc Co.   .
 Santander Industrial Consor-
tium
  .
 Colombian Manure Industry   .
 Caldas Industrial Co.   .
 Paipa Chemicals   .
 Colombian Fishing Industry ,  .
 Paz del Rio Steelworks , , .
 Villavicencio Meat Plant   .
 Wood Suppliers   .
 Colombian Coal Co.   .
 Colombian Asbestos ,  .
 Colombian Fertilisers ,  .
 ‘Granites & Marble’   .
 Valle & Cauca Coal Plant ,
 ‘Forjas’ Metalworks , , .
 National Cables Co. , , .
 ‘Sucroquímica’ , , .
 ‘Pulpapel’ , , .
Total , , .
Sources: IFI. Informe; IFI. Informe del Gerente; IFI. Balance e Informe (all various years) and IFI. Reseña (). Valle
& Cauca Plant not included in total calculations. Percentages do not always match because of rounding.
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e fact that IFI was more often than not the junior partner in the associations with
private capital helps challenging the commonly held view that assumes that IFI-firms
producing intermediate and/or raw material goods ought to sell their output for prices
that carried an implicit and important subsidised element in it. 
e fact that IFI was on
average a minor shareholder suggests the presence of two unlikely assumptions in such a
view. First, that IFI was capable of imposing its will upon the management and ownership
structures of the firms it supported, as to define their pricing policies. Secondly, that
IFI itself was uninterested in making its firms profitable enough to attract private buyers.
Even though it is certain that IFI itself needed not be lucrative, this did not necessarily
apply to its industrial ventures. Moreover, even if IFI had been the major shareholder it is
very difficult to believe that its associates, be it other official entities, foreign investors or
domestic entrepreneurs, would have supported such non-sense attitude from a business
point of view. Only more research into this issue can seriously confirm or reject the view
in question; however, the fact that IFI’s shares in the firms it promoted was far from
majoritarian makes it scarcely plausible.
Probably the most direct way to assess the impact and contribution of IFI towards
Colombia’s industrialisation is to estimate the share of the institute’s investments within
the larger picture of total industrial investments. If the institute was becoming a tool of
growing importance, as some authors claim, a tendency upwards of that share should
be expected, as IFI invested more financial resources in industrial ventures. However, as
Figure . shows, this was not the case. IFI’s investments, proxied by the subscriptions of
capital in the firms it promoted, represented up to  of all the stocks issued in the Bogota
Exchange in –, a period of hyper-activism of the institute and of one large outlay
in the rubber tyre industry. From then on its proportion in the total surpasses that in the
foundational years in only two years ( and ). 
ese are years in which the data
captured — with a lag — IFI’s biggest individual projects, namely, Paz del Río steelworks
and the Valle & Cauca coal-washing plant. 
e average for the years displayed in Figure
. is a modest . of all stocks issued. 
is relatively small contribution needs to be
placed in context. First, as noted earlier, IFI was not capable of promoting new or existing
Isaza, J. F. ‘La Empresa...’ p. ; and Revéiz, E. ‘Evolución...’ p. .

T I  I D
Figure .: IFI’s Contribution to Industrialisation, – (Share in All Stocks Is-
sued)
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1941  1942  1943  1944  1945  1946  1948  1950  1951  1952  1958  1963 
% 
IFI's Share 
Sources & Note: For data and methodology on total stocks see Table A... For IFI’s share data from Table . (above).
Data for  included in . See also Table A...
companies in all years. Secondly, IFI’s share was small within a financial system in which
the role of capital markets was a minoritarian one, as will be discussed in the next chapter,
for Colombia’s financial system was overwhelmingly credit-based. Lastly, the proxy used
above, that is, IFI’s share in all stock issued magnifies the institute’s contribution, for this
only captures a fraction of the actual industrial investments.
Summarising, a preliminary assessment of IFI’s achievements and contributions to
Colombia’s industrialisation process was made through a brief overview of the total number
of IFI’s ‘successfully’ promoted enterprises, its participation in a large sample of the firms
it assisted, and the calculation of the institute’s share in the larger picture of the country’s
total industrial share investments. 
e purpose of the first evaluation was to appraise
the effectiveness of IFI at industrial promotion by looking at the number of firms it
transferred to the private sector. Not only is this ‘yardstick’ the one IFI tacitly set itself in
its foundational charter, but it is also one that evaluates the work done by IFI, as private

T I  I D
business were most likely to purchase firms with black ink balance sheets and solid growth
prospects. In this respect, simply put, IFI transferred a total of  firms. 
e second
exercise sought to gauge the ‘depth’ of IFI’s involvement in the ventures it promoted, as
measured by the funds it invested in them. 
e outcome is a rather surprising average share
of . Given that IFI was the only public agency charged with industrial promotion
this percentage can be seen as low and an interesting interpretative implication can be
drawn from it. Namely, that IFI’s role, as a potential incubator of industrial state-owned
enterprises was modest. Nor is it the case that the firms it fostered were, on average, of
majoritarian public ownership. On the contrary, IFI seemed to have been the junior
partner in the private-public associations. 
e third check aimed at measuring the scope
of IFI’s contribution to industrial development through the investment variable. On this
front too, its contribution seemed small. On average, IFI’s investments represented less
than  of the industrial total, and this is only for the years in which it made any. 
ese
preliminary ways of assessing IFI should suffice to challenge the predominant views of
the literature, which attached to it an all-powerful role. It also suggests there is a need to
distinguish the history of the institute before , i.e. when the institute turned into a
development bank. At the same time, however, this is not a sufficiently thorough survey
to make hard statements about IFI’s performances and some qualifications are in place.

e first is that some IFI firms that were not transferred to the private sector did remain
in the market providing key basic and intermediate inputs for other industries, such as
steelworks Paz del Rio. Individual enterprise histories need to be written to define their
precise contributions. Secondly, in a few instances, firms originally promoted by IFI and
liquidated under its management later made ‘comebacks’ under private/foreign ownership,
such as Colombian Metalworks. 
e next sections look to explain the causes underlying
IFI’s modest contribution to industrialisation.
Pattern of Investment: Funding
IFI’s chief task was to promote industry and this was essentially done via investments in
the form of capital contributions in public limited companies. Hence the need to look
at IFI’s stocks. As Figure . shows, the evolution of IFI’s industrial stocks is far from
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being a duplicate of its total assets. Moderate growth after  is followed by minor slips
in  for both items. But from then on they performed rather differently. Total assets
underwent a steady increase from  until , and then stabilised for the next four
years. 
e value of total assets multiplied three-fold during this time. Stocks grow steeply
in , but then stagnated for ten years. A wedge of more than ,, between
them started to close as stocks began to recover in the early s. A new gap widened
thereafter. 
e point to make here is that industrial stocks have their own dynamic. Whilst
total assets exhibit an overall rising tendency, industrial stocks show a stepped-like pattern.
Obvious questions arise: what explains the difference? What determines stocks’ behaviour?
Regarding the first question, it has already been mentioned that unpaid capital inflated
total asset numbers. Moreover, plants in installation phases along with large expenses in
studies, which not necessarily always turned into realisable stocks and/or remained only
paper firms, also added to total assets. To explain the evolution of IFI’s industrial stocks
on its own merit one must explore the institute’s funding sources.
Obviously, the institute’s investment capabilities depended on its funding sources. Figure
. shows that there was a tight correlation between paid up capital, which was the institute’s
most important supply of financial resources, and IFI’s investments, as represented by its
industrial stocks. Both lines grew from  to  and then stagnated until . 
at
year, industrial stocks skyrocketed and then stabilised at around ,, for nearly ten
years until . Had it not been for the  leap in industrial assets a close co-evolution
between the two entries would have stretched until . 
e sudden jump in stocks is
explained by the constitution of Paz del Río Siderurgy in , of which IFI subscribed
,,, and for which the institute had resorted to a different funding source than
capital contributions from government. Another steep rise in stocks occurred in  when
more than ,, flowed to the coal company Carbones del Valle & Cauca, in which
the institute had been investing for years with resources largely obtained from increases in
paid capital. A similar behaviour for the two items follows until , when stocks start to
lag behind the explosion of funds of the mid-s. Still, substantial increases in stocks
took place as IFI invested heavily in cement, fertilisers and metal works. 
ese numbers
then beg the questions: What was the driving-force behind this stepped-like pattern of
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investment? Who supplied the paid up capital of the institute? Who discounted its bonds
and held its debts? How important were foreign loans? Did it generate sufficient internal
resources as to re-invest them? Table . helps to clarify these queries.
Of the institute’s initial paid up capital of ,,,  was subscribed by government
and the rest by the BCH. Other official entities, private commercial banks, both foreign
and domestic, and the general public were invited to partake in this and in all other capital
increases IFI authorised throughout the years. To attract potential investors, seats on
IFI’s board of directors were offered. Private bankers were entitled to elect up to two
representatives on the board, whilst the general public and other state agencies could
appoint another, depending on who subscribed the shares. However, these and other
fiscal incentives worked to no avail; throughout IFI’s life it was the national government
Figure .: IFI: Investment Pattern and Financing, – (millions of pesos)
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Figure .: IFI Resources by Origins, Selected Years – (percentages)
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who remained the major shareholder. 
ere is no clear-cut evidence to explain this
generalised apathy, but it is reasonable to sustain that poor returns, low expectations, the
long-maturation nature of its businesses, and customary reluctance to invest in public
securities kept investors at bay. As illustrated in Figure ., the contributions of capital
made by successive governments from  until  constituted the majority share of
the institute’s resources. From an obvious peak of  at the time of foundation to a low
of  two years later, capital contributions maintained an average for these selected years
of over  of all financial means.
An early initiative to raise funds was through the issuance of securities, ‘IFI Industrial
Promotion Bonds’. In  the directors conceived the idea and issued ,, worth
in -year bonds earning  interest, with the national government as guarantor and the
CB as fideicommissioner. 
e latter also discounted the bonds. Indirectly, it was the
IFI. Balance e Informe, , p. ; IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , pp. –.
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government who via the CB funded IFI under the bonds modality. 
ere is no doubt that
these funds constituted an important share of total resources in the early s (Figure
.), helping IFI with the main projects of the time: tyres, shipyards and the pasteurisation
of milk project, amongst others. As indicated by its balance sheets, IFI made use of this
method of financing only on this occasion. 
ere is neither apparent reason nor evidence,
as to why IFI relinquished such a convenient form of financing, although an only limited
potential for successful placements might have acted as deterrent.
Bonds were also employed to build up funds for IFI’s largest project: steelworks Paz del
Rio. In  the government of Alberto Lleras authorised IFI to issue up to ,, in
bonds at , amortisable in  years. IFI only realised two issuances worth ,,,
each in  and . 
ese placements were different from the previous one, however.

e money raised was earmarked, which meant it could only be destined to the financing
of the initial expenses of Paz del Rio. In other words, though important as they were in
terms of the amount these resources represented for IFI (a third of total resources for 
and ), the exclusiveness of its use prevented IFI to dispose of them for other purposes.
It is worth noting that it was the national government who, once more, emerged as bond
holder.

e absence of foreign credit as a supplier of finance in IFI’s accounts is rather puzzling.
Even after acknowledging the scarce possibilities of finding credit in good terms in in-
ternational markets in the context of the war and post-war years, IFI appeared to have
done little to obtain any. Unlike IFI, industrial development corporations and banks of
the region, such as the above-mentioned NAFINSA and BNDE, and the Corporación de
Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) from Chile, got hold of generous amounts of credit
from US and multilateral organisations in the s and s; and especially for the first
two, these funds became a substantial share of their investable funds. Not only did IFI
Ministerio de Hacienda. Memorias de Hacienda, , Vol. , p. .
Wiesner, E. ‘Paz...’ pp. –.
Superintendencia Bancaria. Informe, , p. LV.
Wiesner, E. ‘Paz...’ p. .
For Chile; see, Mamalakis, M. ‘An Analysis of the Financial Investments of the Chilean Development Corporation:
–’ in Journal of Development Studies () Vol. , No. , pp. –. For Mexico; see, Blair, C. ‘Nacional
Financiera. Entrepreneurship in a Mixed Economy’ in Vernon, R. Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Mexico ()
pp. –.
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fail to use credit from abroad as a source of funds, but it also failed to apply for it until the
early s, despite legal authorisation that would have allowed it. 
e institute’s own
performance and its ways of doing business, as suggested by a member of the directorship,
might have influenced this attitude. As Hugo Ferreira declared in a meeting of the board in
: “possible financing by international organisations is scared away with balance sheets
where businesses such as the collieries of Timba and San Francisco where the institute
has been making losses without obtaining any benefits continue; or with ventures like
that of Cementos Boyacá, where the directorship is only persuaded through official or
regional intervention”. 
ere is good reason to believe, that the first-hand statements of
an ‘insider’ of the highest rank accurately explain IFI’s dearth of foreign borrowing.
Domestic credit became the sole source of funds that neither originated in the state
(at least not exclusively) nor obeyed the sponsoring of specifically targeted projects of
ephemeral duration. Credit from private and public commercial banks, the BCH, the CB,
the Agrarian Bank and from other entities of the financial sector turned into a growingly
important and regular source of resources. Taking the years  and  as outliers, the
proportion of total resources that the domestic money markets supplied to IFI oscillated
around . Promissory notes, such as that pictured in Figure ., occasionally entered
the list of financiers and in no small amounts. 
e holders of these papers were likely to be
the same entities that acted as creditors. Now, the fact that the banking system provided
an important share of IFI’s resources does not conflict with the view that the institute was
still under-funded. Banking-originated funds were important, but within the low levels of
overall financing of the institute.
Internally generated resources constitute the last item in the list, as measured by IFI’s
profits. Any analysis or mere consideration of IFI’s profitability faces an insurmountable
problem: its promotional nature. 
e institute’s take on profits seems to be resolved against
it from the available evidence. Pedro Vicente Ortiz, general manageri, wrote in June :
“...precisely, the characteristic of the institute is that it is not a lucrative organisation,
but instead, and as its statutory function dictates: “its objective is to promote the foundation

e first request for funds from abroad registered in the Acts dated  May , when IFI started negotiations over
a loan for US ,, with the IDB.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  February , p. , AIFI.
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and enlargement of enterprises exploiting basic and primary-transformation of national
raw materials industries...” [bold in the original]. 
is is the standard and frequently
cited viewpoint, not only of the institute, but also from the banking superintendence: “...
an institution destined to promote industrial ventures... should not take into consideration
making large profits, but the encouragement of those sectors of industry not being exploited
by private initiative.” 
e criteria also applied to IFI’s credit activities: “... regarding
loans, IFI cannot impose strict banking criteria of rigidity in collections and so forth;
loans are facilitated to assist companies in getting out of difficulties and not to obtain
profits from the credit itself.” Despite the unequivocal tendency toward a not-for-profit
IFI from its foundational charter, directorship, and its regulator, for the purpose of this
section IFI’s profits had the potential capability of generating own internal profits and
be turned into a source of funding. In turn, this could have enhanced its autonomy at
decision-making.
As can be seen from Figure ., in the first thirteen years of operations IFI yielded very
modest profits ranging from . to . percentage points, and was in the red in only three
years. A huge loss in  nearing  of its paid up capital was the product of writing
off the Industria Colombiana de Pesca, a fishery, IFI had heavily committed to with more
than ,, in shares. 
e following years are marked by moderate losses and two
profitable years. 
e years – turned critical as the consecutive cumulative losses
surpassed . 
is time the poor performance was due to the joint effects of massive
writing down of some of the institute’s industrial shares and heavy losses inflicted by the
coal-mining operations of Valle & Cauca plant. 
e recovery of the ensuing years did not
prevent IFI from averaging a return to capital representing a loss of . throughout its
 years of life as a direct industrial investor. In other words, as analysed from its income
statements from  to , IFI was incapable of generating a sustained flow of profits
that could have been reinvested in its own projects and might have empowered it with
financial autonomy.
IFI. Informe del Gerente, , p. .
Superintendencia Bancaria. Informe, , p. XXX.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No.  of the Advisory Committee to the Board,  April , p. , AIFI.
Value for  is unknown in magnitude, but is negative, as captured from the balance sheet of the annual report of
 from Superintendencia Bancaria.
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Figure .: IFI’s Performance: Returns to Capital, – (percentages)
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e outcome of the analysis of the structure of the origins of IFI’s resources points at an
overwhelming dependence of the institute upon government. An average for the above
selected years of the resources, which originated in government — capital contributions,
IFI Industrial Development Bonds, and Paz del Rio debentures — shows that  of IFI’s
funds came from state sources and only the remaining  could be said to pertain to the
institute’s funds, as represented by its own obligations with other financial and banking
entities, promissory notes, and eventually, minor profits in good years. 
is last item
was negligible in practice, however. In short, IFI became over-dependent on government
capital contributions for the running of many of its running projects and for the provision
of fresh funding for embarking on new ventures. Such conditions, as will be seen in
the following section, hindered the institute’s ability to take its investment decisions in
autonomous fashion.
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Pattern of Investment: Autonomy

is section will argue that dependence on government funds undermined the capacity
of IFI to take investment decisions in an autonomous fashion. But how exactly were
successive governments influencing IFI’s decision-making process? 
e answer has a
clear-cut relationship with the precarious financial situation of the institute described
above. 
e relation was simple and direct: by making capital contributions to IFI, and by
subscribing debentures from IFI, government opened up the opportunity to ‘attach strings’
to its disbursements. Attaching strings meant that the government channelled resources
to IFI on condition that, for instance, the funds in question were spent exclusively on
projects which the government preferred. By this means IFI’s independent decision-making
processes were hampered. A funds-starving entity in the mid-s and s saw the
direction of its activities being defined by governments, as the latter ruled over the financial
possibilities of IFI’s investment plans. 
is is most visible in the selection and promotion of
IFI’s macro-projects. In other words, the overwhelming dependence of IFI on government
funds combined with its chronic state of financial weakness rendered its decision-making
process vulnerable to governmental will.
Framed as a question: would it be realistic to expect total independence for IFI? No.
To expect absolute independence would be naïve, yet to attain some level of relative
independence, as to enable the agency to carry out is investment decisions on technical and
economic grounds, and free of official patronage and pressure from private interests prone
to rent-seeking, was highly desirable. 
e fiscal empowerment of developmentalist agencies
along with corresponding bureaucratic autonomy are often listed among the prerequisites
for successful industrialisation of latecomers. For example, Johnson emphasizes these
in his account of the thriving industrial catch-up of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
Yet, Colombia is not South Korea or Taiwan, let alone Japan. Closer, geographically,
and most crucially, historically, are Brazil and Mexico. 
ese two countries designed IFI-
like developmentalist agencies. 
ough neither Mexico’s NAFINSA nor Brazil’s BNDE
Johnson, C. ‘Political Institutions and Economic Performance: 
e Government-Business Relationship in Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan’ in Deyo, F. (Ed) 
e Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (). See also for
South Korea; Amsden, A. ‘Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation’ ().
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concerned themselves exclusively with industry, both promoted the sector in similar ways
to IFI, and to a larger extent, in relative financial terms. 
e point for bringing these
cases here, is that, unlike IFI, NAFINSA and BNDE seemed to have attained such relative
autonomy; and this impacted favourably on their performance and thus on their respective
contributions to industrialisation. Empirical studies on both these agencies suggest this was
the case. For instance, Blair makes reference to this point neatly: “Within limits, Nacional
Financiera is a body of competent técnicos making microeconomic decisions on the basis
of criteria familiar to any lending institution in the private sector: market potential, debt-
service capacity, managerial talent, past performance [italics in the original].” 
e case of
Brazil’s BNDE has been so distinctive as to attract serious academic attention. Geddes,
Sikkink, and Willis have all looked at BNDE’s ‘bureaucratic independence’, ‘insulation’
and ‘institutional capacity’ in different attempts to explain the bank’s relative effectiveness
and contribution to state-sponsored developmentalism. In short, Latin American states
similar to Colombia, that had designed IFI-like agencies to assist and promote industrial
development have gone further in attaining this goal, partly by granting these agencies the
autonomy required to do so. IFI, in various instances, lacked such autonomy. 
is was
more evident in the cases of large projects.
For numbers on this see; Amsden, A. ‘
e Rise...’ Ch. .
Blair, C. ‘Nacional...’ p. .
Geddes, B. ‘Building State Autonomy in Brazil, –’ in Comparative Politics Vol. , No. .
Sikkink, K. ‘Brazil and Argentina: Un Enfoque Neoinstitucionalista’ in Desarrollo Económico () Vol. , No. .
Willis, E. ‘Explaining Bureaucratic Independence in Brazil: 
e Experience of the National Economic Development
Bank’ in Journal of Latin American Studies () Vol. , No. .
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Table .: Presidential Decrees, –
Date Decree Firms/Industry Value
(Million
Pesos)
Purpose
 May   Uraba Agrarian &
Sugar Co.
Manufacturing Plan
 June   Industrial Shipyards
Union
Acquisition
  Steelworks Paz del Rio  Financing
 December   Coal  Studies
 February   Coal  Plant installation
 June   Colombian Fertilisers  Capital contribution
 October   Coal  Plant installation
 September   Boyaca Cements  Capital contribution
 September   Pulp & Paper . Studies & Plant
 September   Coal  Plant completion
 December   Coal  Studies
 May   Coal  Capital contribution
 June   Boyaca Cements . Debt-equity swap
Sources: IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, .
A list of IFI’s largest ventures has been compiled based on the following criteria: Share of
resources of each venture in the total amount of IFI’s assets at the time of the constitution
of the company or its reorganisation; secondly, amount of credit advanced, in addition
to shares subscribed; third, time and effort dedicated to each project, as registered in the
minutes of the board of directors, according to frequency and length of it being discussed.

e more resources and time devoted to a large venture, the more likely it will make it
into the top of the list. A plausible ranking looks like this: Paz del Río steelworks (),
Cauca & Valle plant (), Colombian Rubber Tyres (), Forjas metalworks (),
Boyacá Cements () and Colombian Milk Industry ().

e standard procedure by which governments meddled in IFI’s projects consisted of
executive decrees. Presidential decrees, based on faculties given by the constitutional charter
and extraordinary legal provisions, roughly followed this order. First, they described the
considerations that prompted government to act; secondly, they indicated the concrete
Article No.  of the National Constitutional Charter of  and Law  of .
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industry or company to which assistance should flow to; thirdly, they attached an exclusivity
string; and finally, they provided a sum to be allocated to that industry or firm through IFI.
As will be seen, also by decree, IFI acquired or managed companies, usually beyond its
initial remit. 
e following is an illustrative sample of the decrees, by no means exhaustive,
by which consecutive governments set the pace and path IFI was to tag along (Table .).
Few words need be said about this list. First, as can easily be inferred from the numbers,
when made effective, the amounts contained in the capital contributions and debentures of
these various decrees were so large, that they defined the stepped-like patterns of investment
of the institute, as represented in its industrial shares. Time-lags between inflows of money
and the funds being displayed in the total of IFI’s shares are due to the timing involved in
the study, preparation, and execution of the projects in question. Secondly, the frequency
with which presidential decrees mediated to carry out IFI’s ventures is high: , ,
, , , , , , , and  are all years where intervention
occurred. From  onward, decrees are most likely to have played a similar role. 
irdly,
governmental meddling was not confined to a specific venture or industry. As seen from
the list, intervention occurred in sectors, as diverse as cement, steel, fertilisers, sugar mills,
paper, shipyards, and coal; this last item, receiving most attention, however. Lastly, with
the exceptions of the sugar mill and the pulp and paper cases, all of the decrees listed
supplied finance to the biggest of IFI’s ventures. From all this, it is reasonable to conclude,
that as far as IFI’s largest projects is concerned, the institute enjoyed little autonomy to
decide over their implementation because the agenda was set by government. 
is was
particularly so due to IFI’s financial vulnerability, as has been discussed and shown above.
Two more comments need to be made. First, critics of the view that IFI lacked institu-
tional autonomy might argue that the direction of the causality could have flown the other
way around. 
at is, governments did not set the path for IFI to follow. Instead, the supply
of state funding was the result of effective IFI advocacy to ‘bringing government on board’
when embarking upon large ventures. 
e institute’s successful fund-raising, thus, was
nothing but the outcome of full governmental support. Such reverse causation is plausible.
However, three caveats arise from this perspective. One, evidence pointed at in an earlier
section, highlights IFI’s constant liquidity problems, claims about capital insufficiency
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to operate, iterative doubts about its economic viability, and repeated failure to honour
contracts, suggesting that what IFI lacked throughout these years was precisely government
financial and political support. Secondly, even if such evidence is neglected, and the view
of government support sustained, it makes more sense to claim that government acted not
so much as full-time sponsor of IFI, but rather as the ultimate veto player. 
e denial,
retention, and delaying of funding embodied ways to veto plans of IFI which governments
did not share. And three, there is reason to believe that governments preferred to hold the
last word in regards to the financial viability of the institute’s large projects. Counterfactual
questions help clarifying this. How autonomous IFI would have become, had it been
endowed with a permanent annually-based allowance of funds from the national budget?
Or with a legal monopoly over foreign borrowing, as NAFINSA? Or with regular resource
injections from earmarked taxes, as BNDE? Would governments have lost their veto power
and sway over the institute had IFI received a constant and ample flow of funds? IFI was
only granted an entry from the national budget late in , when plans to turn it into
a development bank had already been put forward. So, why did this take so long? 
e
answer, as suggested from the above evidence, is that it was not in the governments’ interest
to do so. Politicians, as will be shown below, preferred to count on a kind of IFI malleable
to their interests, subject to their financial largesse.
As argued above, overwhelming fund-dependence of IFI on government implied the
latter was capable of forcing or influencing projects. 
is was especially so with large
investments. To illustrate how this took place, an analysis of one of the institute’s most
important ventures was carried out: the Valle & Cauca Coal Plant. It is an interesting case
because there is empirical evidence around this project to illustrate and support claims
about governmental pressure on IFI to promote the venture, and discharges from the
institute about its responsibilities. Although illustrative of how political pressure was
applied, the study of Valle & Cauca is not meant to be representative of all of IFI’s ventures
nor is it selected with a view to indicate a trend. It is solely on the basis of its magnitude,
in terms of financial resources and time and effort of IFI, that its study is justified.
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Case Study: Valle & Cauca Coal Plant

at coal turned into one of IFI’s major concerns is beyond doubt. In , IFI possessed
shares in Valle & Cauca worth ,,, which represented more than half of the
Institute’s total investments in industrial stocks in all companies, on top of at least another
million being spent on coal studies. 
e means of financing differed from IFI’s previous
large projects, since this time most of the funds had been allocated by the government via
capital contributions, and not through IFI Industrial Bonds (as for Icollantas) nor by means
of debentures (as for Paz del Rio). 
e concentration of resources was not only financial,
however. To accomplish the coal project, IFI implemented organisational changes creating
a Coal unit to deal with all aspects related to this industry within IFI and engaging in
collaboration with other agencies. IFI’s auditors recorded the effort: “at present, the
institute is fully devoted to the establishment of the washing plant of Carbones del Valle
[bold in the original]”; a statement corroborated by the frequency and length with which
issues around coal are registered in the directors meetings. In other words, if Paz del Rio
steelworks had been IFI’s emblematic venture during the s, during the s the turn
had come to Valle & Cauca coal plant.
It is not obvious, however, why IFI got involved in a coal plant in the first place. Coal
exploitation, classification, transporting, and storage, when primarily aimed at export
markets amounted to a ‘basic industry’ under the Manufacturing Plan of . As the
Plan was indicative to IFI, its directorship was compelled to promote industries within the
range of industries covered by it, the institute found no obstacles in this sense. Moreover,
IFI had antecedents in the coal business. In  it acquired a right to exploit the mines of
San Jorge near Zipaquirá, with a view to integrate them in a soda plant, which demanded
significant coal inputs. 
e sums involved were slight and the main project was not coal-
based; instead, coal was incorporated as a component in the supply-chain of a larger plant.

us, IFI only began to take coal seriously in the s.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Consolidated Balance on  December , AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No.  of the Advisory Committee to the Board ,  May , p. , AIFI.
IFI. Informe del Gerente, , p. .
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , p. .
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During this decade the country’s public opinion and its political leadership began
to look for alternatives to coffee exports. Contemporary official publications and press
commentators offered insights into the increasing expectations and speculation that started
to surround the production and export potential of coal around the s. With this in
mind, rather than with the purpose of assessing the accuracy of the content and forecasts
back then, some illustrative evidence emerges. A message from the chamber of commerce
of Cali to President Gómez, himself an advocate of coal, celebrated the enormous coal
potential of the region and the facilities that the coal from Valle offered for its economic
exploitation. 
ere was no shortage of exaggeration in the missive: “Cali rests on a huge
carboniferous deposit, well-known for its size and quality, as one of the richest on earth.

is gigantic basin, of perturbing opulence, assures indefinite exports of this black gold. It is
one of the most important reserves, if not the most important of all, for the world’s future.
A millenary enclosed treasure.” Another coal-advocate referred to the layers present
in Valle del Cauca, as ‘the Colombian Ruhr’, pointing at the equivalency to Western
Germany’s massive deposits. Similar tones described access facilities to coal seams and
their economic capabilities. A vast potential of coal for exporting became a generalised
phenomenon among opinion makers, government, and coal entrepreneurs.
Amidst the euphoria international markets were said to spring up everywhere. Cali’s
chamber of commerce listed Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil
and several Central American nations as firm clients. Others added Japan. IFI did
seem to escape the frenzy at first. One of its directors requested: “more information on the
studies that have verified the possible markets for Valle & Cauca; so far information is based
on general statistics, but there is no first-hand research... a situation might arise in which
the plant is working and the production for exporting lacks markets.” Later however,
IFI joined the optimistic trend including Germany, Italy, Mexico, Costa Rica, and many
others as possible exporting destinations. 
e enumeration of buying nations was often
Cámara de Comercio de Cali. Mensaje de la Cámara de Comercio de Cali al Excelentísimo Sr. Dr. Laureano Gómez,
Presidente de la República, , pp. –.
De la Espriella, R. ‘Posibilidades del Carbón Colombiano’ in Economía Colombiana () Vol. , No. , p. .
De la Espriella, R. ‘Posibilidades...’ p. .
Departamento de Investigaciones Económicas de Industria Colombiana. ‘El Carbón: Clave del Futuro Económico de
Colombia’ in Industria Colombiana () No. , p. .
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  August , pp. –, AIFI.
IFI. Informe del Gerente, , p. .
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accompanied by concrete numbers in exporting incomes, coke and other coal-derived
products in actual tons, and potential and actual reserves in billions. In short, a wave of
expectations based on coal cropped up with a view to make the national economy less
dependent on coffee, and to exploit a vast natural resource hitherto forgotten.
To be fair, expectations about bright prospects for coal in the post-war period were
not unjustified. First, Europe’s and Japan’s reconstruction efforts were deemed to require
a strong demand for energy, which by the s essentially meant coal. According to
Yergin’s estimates, by  coal provided  of total energy use in Western Europe,
and more than half of that in Japan. Secondly, energy-supply in Europe faced serious
problems: not enough coal capacity and low productivity. In , Europe suffered
its first post-war energy crisis, as the result of the combined effects of roaring demand,
a terrible shortage of coal, and a very cold winter. 
irdly, prospects of finding cheap
coal-substitutes for industrial boilers and power plants along with hopes of converting the
West’s economies to oil faltered at first, as oil prices stayed relatively high and ensuring
supply from international supplies proved risky as the Suez crisis of  unfolded. In
short, public and private optimism with regards to potential Colombian coal exports in
the post-war years were well warranted. Export potential, however, was not sufficient to
turn coal into a real and lasting alternative to coffee, as will be shown later.
It was within this international context of a global energy crisis and a national opin-
ion climate willing to exploit the opportunities that emerged from it, that IFI received
substantial funding from government for the coal venture. 
e first presidential decree in
the series promoting coal dated December . 
e measure provided funds to IFI and
other entities to conduct studies on coal reserves and prospect the mines whose economic
viability seemed promising. It authorised the Agrarian Bank to advance subsidised credit for
purchase of machinery and equipment for coal exploitation, and made an explicit emphasis
on the production of coal for exporting purposes. 
e inflows, however, had strings
attached. 
e resources could only be directed towards the exploitation and exportation
of coal projects; concretely, to the Valle & Cauca plant. Executive decrees throughout
Yergin, D. ‘
e Prize: 
e Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power’ () pp. –.
Yergin, D. ‘
e Prize...’ pp. –.
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , pp. –.
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the s transferred funds to IFI on condition that these were exclusively destined to
the study, installation, construction, and conclusion of the coal washing plant and related
matters. 
ere is no evidence of fund diversion within IFI once funding for this purpose
was received. On the contrary, IFI’s minutes of directors meetings often indicate clear-cut
observance of the letter and spirit of those dispositions. By supplying IFI with earmarked
funds only (or mostly), governments were effectively fixing the agenda of the institute. In
this case it occurred with the development of the Valle & Cauca washing plant.
And yet, what was the Valle & Cauca venture about? As gathered from above, at its
core was an effort to exploit a domestic natural resource in order to industrialise it and to
export it. However, given the mineral characteristics of most of the coal deposits found
in Valle and Cauca, for it to be exported the coal needed to be washed, classified and
blended. It was out of this requirement that IFI entered the project. Its main task was to
construct the washing plant that made coal exportable. As the project grew more complex
it encompassed three main parts: washing plant construction, mines’ mechanisation, and
port railways facilities. IFI executed the first in its entirety, acted as comptroller in the
second, and left the third to the national railways company. A strong interest in IFI arose
regarding the mechanisation of the mines for the plant to be economically viable it needed
to operate at a certain minimum of its capacity, and to guarantee sufficient inputs, coal
production had to increase.
IFI ignored its own early warnings on the technical and economic feasibility of the
coal project. A  report by foreign expert and consultant Mehwirter noted: “Reserves:

e quantities of reserves are sufficient, but the quality of these need be determined. As
coke is one of the key points in the project the large investment of capital required is
being based on a sample without confirmation and there is no available information as to
whether or not other layers are susceptible of being coked. 
is is the scheme’s fundamental
For full decree contents see Decree No.  of  pp. –; Decree No.  of  pp. –; Decree No.
 of  pp. –; Decree No.  of  pp. –; Decree No.  of  pp. –; Decree No.  of
 pp. – in IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, . In some of these decrees earmarked funds to other ventures were
included, as was the case for Cementos Boyacá, and Industria Colombiana de Fertilizantes and coal studies for the El
Cerrejón deposits in Magdalena.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  August , p. , AIFI; and IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. ,
 June , pp. –, AIFI.
High sulphur and ash contents made coal difficult to sell in world markets.
IFI. Informe del Gerente, , p. .
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weakness. More coking trials are imperative. Production: Due to high financing costs it
will not be profitable to operate the plant with production levels below , tons per
month... Markets: It is not expected for the domestic market to grow strongly. 
e only
additional market is to export. 
e quantities in which can be sold are unknown. 
e
varieties of which can be sold are unknown. 
e sizes of which can be sold are unknown.
Effectively, nothing is known about the possibilities or requirements of the market. Have
the producers of coal understood that for two years they will have neither profits nor
markets; but only expenses. I DOUBT IT [Capitals in the original].” In other words,
given the fact that the whole edifice of the coal project was based on its production being
exported, the Mehwirter report suggested, at least, structural negligence and demanded
immediate action for the sake of the viability of the plant.
Despite the serious recommendations noted above, Mauricio Archila, general manager
of IFI stated, on the very same day the report was published: “the project of the washing
plant and the exploitation of coal for exporting had been exhaustively studied by IFI and
other entities... [and] the institute is prepared to verify the purchase of the equipment
for the plant.” 
e investment on the coal venture went ahead and it is not possible
to demonstrate with historical evidence that this decision was, or was not, justified. An
unsupported assertion is that total disregard of the expert advice hints that the criteria
governing this particular project appeared to be other than technical, financial or economic.

e Valle & Cauca business turned into failure early on. After more than a year of delays
and significantly over budget the washing plant began making losses in . A glance
at its performance explains why. As seen from Figure ., the plant never got close to
processing the minimum of , thousand tonnes per month deemed necessary for it
to achieve economic viability. Production reached its peak in  when , tonnes
went through, but the average during its short life-time was , tonnes. In this -year
period it utilised only between  and  of its installed capacity. 
us, the plant
drowned in losses from its onset and affected negatively IFI’s own financial accounts. By
the first semester of , the institute recorded the largest accounting loss of its history.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  September , p. , AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  September , p. , AIFI.
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Figure .: Coal Plant: Capacities & Actual Processing, – (thousands of tons)
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e balance of its income statement showed a total loss of ,,. Around 
of it was due to industrial stocks devaluation, i.e. the collapse of Valle & Cauca’s market
value. 
is should have brought IFI to the brink of extinction. 
e loss represented
 of the institute’s total capital and its organic law dictated automatic liquidation if
loses reached . Losses on the ground were also important. For  the annual
report exhibited losses of ,, for Valle & Cauca, and ,, in the related
development of the Timba and San Francisco collieries, which supplied feedstock to the
washing plant. Faced with this situation, a report by the auditor encouraged IFI to
look for the termination of the contract between the collieries and the institute, ruling
out any realistic prospects of recovering ,, worth in investments; and hinting
at the beginning of the end of the project, as this meant reducing further coal-processing
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Consolidated Balance and Income Statement on  June , AIFI.
IFI. Estatutos Orgánicos, , p. .
IFI. Informe, , pp. –.
IFI. Informe, , pp. –.
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levels. A couple of years later, IFI shut down the washing plant dismissing some 
workers, and leaving several coal producers, which required their anthracite coal to be
processed, in an uncertain situation.
With the benefit of hindsight, IFI and others have examined more closely what went
wrong. “
e strong desire to supply the domestic coal market, and to open up a new
exportation item, has not been accomplished due to the lack of complete studies about the
characteristics of the deposits, the markets, and the economic conditions of its production,
transportation, and distribution”, wrote the general manager in . A Belgian mission
in the early s arrived to Cali to look for the roots of the washing plant failure and a
study commissioned by Valle’s Regional Corporation prepared a report to establish the
causes of the crisis of the coal industry there, the main factors behind the closure of the
plant, and prospects toward its re-opening.

e investigations concluded: first, that markets for production were local, since it
was not possible to compete either in the national markets or in the international ones.
Secondly, that most of the extractive processes were conducted in a rudimentary manner,
wasting valuable reserves and making the extraction non-economic. 
irdly, that supply
did not meet demand. Fourthly, that the operation of the washing plant was un-economic.

is was due to the joint effect of producers’ unwillingness to process their coal and
consumers’ resistance to buy washed coal, alleging high humidity levels. Processed coal was
 higher in price than crude coal, hence it was not competitive. Fifth, the investigations
found that the coal of the region was not exportable because of both its uncompetitive
price and its failure to meet international standards of quality. And finally, that the washing
plant should definitively terminate its operations.
As had been indicated by the Mehwirter report, lack of accurate knowledge of the
deposits proved a crucial deficiency. At least so, argued articles and studies by foreign
experts, such as Edward Roesler, who stated, that: “among the most fundamental aspects of
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  March , pp. –, AIFI.
Corporación Autónoma Regional Del Cauca (CARC). Investigación sobre la Industria del Carbón en el Valle del
Cauca’ () p. .
IFI. Informe, , p. .
CARC. Investigación sobre la Industria del Carbón en el Valle del Cauca, , p. .
CARC. Investigación sobre la Industria del Carbón en el Valle del Cauca, , pp. –.
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coal exploitation figures knowing seam thickness.” Mid-twentieth century assessments
proved to be right, as more contemporary studies, such as that of De la Pedraja, suggest. He
sustains that although there were plenty of coal reserves, as forecast by everyone, seams were
thin and irregular, widely scattered and often vertical. Summarising, the impossibility of
realising economically productive extraction in the Valle & Cauca coal mines originated in
the nature of the coal seams themselves. 
is vital aspect was left out on any considerations
about the levels of output necessary for the washing plant to operate economically. 
is
disregard determined to a large extent the ultimate fate of the plant. Is it possible that this
neglect for the technical aspects in the conception of the project was the consequence of
political intervention in IFI’s investment decisions? 
e next section aims to answering
this question on the basis of empirical evidence.
Government Intervention on IFI’s Decision-Making: Historical
Evidence
Can it be shown that it was government meddling in the Valle & Cauca project what led
to its demise? 
e quest for hard evidence on political pressure and/or political criteria
governing the viability of economic ventures is an elusive one. 
e following is probably
the most clear-cut available historical evidence insofar as governmental intervention in the
institute’s selection and management of its investment projects is concerned. As mentioned
in the introduction of this chapter, several of the directors’ remarks that originate in the
minutes of the board — then confidential — hinted that due to government meddling its
financial performance had been damaged. In this respect, Álvaro Hernán Mejia, general
manager, wrote: “
e financial problem of IFI has been aggravated in previous years due to
the fact that to its care were trusted enterprises initiated by other official sectors, — which
for lack of technical planning or fault in their financial system — came to constitute a
heavy burden and with few chances of this situation being rectified.” 
is is a reference
Roesler, E. ‘La Economía Minera de la Industria del Carbón en la Región Caleña’ in Industria Colombiana () No.
. pp. –; and Banco de la Republica. ‘La Producción de Carbón en Colombia’ in Revista del Banco de la Republica
() Vol. XXXI, No. , pp. –.
De la Pedraja, R. ‘Electricidad, Carbón y Política en Colombia’ () pp. –.
IFI. Informe del Gerente, , p. .
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to the collieries of Timba and San Francisco, that were initially assisted by the Agrarian
Bank, and whose businesses were transferred to IFI, in view of the construction of the
washing plant. More specific complaints were voiced by Jorge Miller in IFI’s meeting of
directors in February , who then stated: “it must be included in the memorandum the
issue concerning the companies that the institute has been forced to continuing promoting,
such as Cauca & Valle plant...” 
e quote is more telling because Miller himself, was
one of two presidential appointees in the board. 
e point to make here is that, as follows
from these two pieces of evidence, IFI had both to enter into the project and to stay in it,
due to government decisions.
In similar fashion, Ángel Echeverri, representative of the BCH in the board of directors,
raised questions about the overall purpose of IFI’s intervention in those ventures and
about their role in the broader development strategy. He declared: “government must
be notified that the capital contributions of IFI in these enterprises cannot exhibit any
satisfactory outcomes, for these do not belong to any general plan that aims at a clear-cut
objective.” A similar opinion was expressed by the other government representative in
the board, General Alfonso Ahumada, who declared: “the problems in the coal industry
and Cementos Boyacá were not possible to foresee, as these were ventures that originally
lay outside the institute’s action range.” Strictly speaking, and as noted earlier, contrary
to Echeverri’s and Ahumada’s comments, coal was an initial part of the developmental
plans of IFI, as stated by its foundational charter, whilst cement probably classified as basic
industry. Nevertheless, their discharges seemed to suggest that governmental rulings that
decreed that IFI had to promote these industries were not consistent with IFI’s plans at
the time of their administration, and that were not considered thoroughly as immediate
prospects.
A third director, Ernesto Vasco, added a dose of regional politics was present in the
coal plant case, as he stated: “IFI’s actions regarding these companies [referring to Valle &
Cauca and Timba and San Francisco collieries] have been surrounded by very complicated
situations: in the case of Carbones del Valle, an offer [to purchase the company] by Dade
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  February , pp. –, AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  February , pp. –, AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. , n.d., pp. –, AIFI.
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Petroleum Company was presented to IFI; but Vallecaucanos manifested that neither the
plant could be sold to Dade nor the mines transferred, because this represented a threat
against the national sovereignty; thus they offered to financing the industry; however, at the
time of reckoning no contributions were made...” Effectively, what Vasco denounced
was a palpable exercise in nationalistic politics, by which IFI was compelled to forsake a
good opportunity to recover some of the inflicted losses in that company through its sale.
Instead was tied to it and forced to delay its exit from the market. In the collieries case,
Vasco expressed his uneasiness about the fact that the transferral of this business from the
Agrarian Bank to IFI meant, that the obligations to attend their liabilities had also been
transferred with them, troubling further IFI’s own finances.

e displayed evidence points, at the very least, to governmental co-responsibility in the
failure of Cauca & Valle project. First, IFI seemed not to have enjoyed freedom to select
and fund the entirety of the venture, as the Timba and San Francisco administrations
were apportioned to IFI, with all the technical and financial inconveniences they entailed.
Second, IFI was prevented from realising a seemingly advantageous sale of the company
when the opportunity arose, because of nationalistic waiving. 
us, IFI was forced to
delaying the company’s market exit. 
ird, it is not clear that governmental support of
the coal venture fitted in any cohesive and imminent manner within the wider goals of
economic planning and development of the institute at the time. In sum, government
set the target, brought IFI into the project and prevented the institute from exiting it.
In other words, as far as Valle & Cauca is concerned, the institute was unable to apply
technical and economic criteria in the assessments of the viability of the investment. Instead,
the government did it on IFI’s behalf and the consequences of such interfering proved
disastrous.
Conclusions

e main sections of this chapter have offered a revisionist view on the role of IFI in the
industrialisation of Colombia. 
e challenge to the conventional literature originates in
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  February , pp. –, AIFI.
IFI. AoBD, Microfilm No. , Act No. ,  February , pp. –, AIFI.
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two shortfalls of the historiography. 
e first consists of the treatment commonly given to
IFI as an organisation that promoted industrial development through the same mechanisms
and with same intensity throughout its life. Hitherto, the vast majority of the literature
had failed to appraise IFI in its role as direct industrial promoter; that is, as entrepreneur
and provider of venture capital. 
e period – is a distinctive one for IFI and its
contribution to industrialisation needs be assessed separately from that when acting as a
development bank — post . In this sense, an initial contribution of this study to the
historiography is that of delineating a new periodisation in the history of the institute.

e second problem with the current literature relates to the frequently portrayed
picture of IFI as a key player and contributor to industrial development. A preliminary
assessment of the actual contribution of the institute suggests that such a view has been
misconstrued, at least for the period –. In absolute terms, the number of firms
successfully promoted and transferred to the private sector hardly surpassed a dozen, the
share of IFI in the total of industrial investment averaged a modest . (as captured by
its proportion in the total of stocks issued in the Bogota stock exchange), and the evidence
on the participation of IFI in publicly limited manufacturing companies indicates that the
institute was more often than not the junior partner in these private-public joint ventures.
Implications from this latter point suggest that, contrary to what authors such as Revéiz
propose, IFI must have faced difficulties in influencing the pricing policies of the firms it
promoted. In short, the very modest financial contributions of IFI to its industrial firms,
which constituted IFI’s chief mechanism to promote industry in this period, substantiate
the claim proposed in this study, namely that IFI was not an increasingly important tool
for industrialisation.

e underlying reason why IFI’s role was not the one the literature claims, is that the
strong financial muscle that it was assumed that IFI possessed was not so strong in reality.
On the contrary, and as demonstrated with primary evidence from the directorship — or
in other words, from ‘within’ — the institute suffered from chronic and severe financial
problems. 
is financial fragility, combined with an overwhelming funding dependence
upon government and its own inability to generate a regular stream of resources out of
its investment projects undermined the capacity of IFI to perform a significant task in
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industrial development. Moreover, under these conditions IFI lost the ability to take its
investment decisions in an independent fashion. Successive public capital contributions
to the institute with strings attached meant that politics came into play when deciding
upon the selection of large projects, as illustrated with Cauca & Valle coal plant. 
e
largest of IFI’s projects often ended in company liquidations that caused massive losses for
the institute, affecting further its own performance and the capacity to contribute more
decisively to Colombia’s industrialisation.
A logical corollary of the revisionist role played by IFI necessarily has implications on
broader explanations about Colombia’s economic development. More explicitly, a down-
grade on the role played by IFI weakens interpretations that assume that industrialisation
took place under the guidance, leadership, or a sponsoring role of the state. State-led and
ISI-based interpretations that work on the assumption that IFI had been an important
pro-industrialising agent must be reconsidered on two grounds. First, on the obvious point
that the contribution was, and could have never been, as decisive as implied until now. Sec-
ondly, that the state actually committed itself whole-heartedly to the industrialising project
via the political and financial support of developmentalist agencies, such as IFI. 
ere is a
new and compelling need to question the effective commitment and the preferences of the
governments towards industrialisation. Precisely, these variables can be examined through
an analysis of the developments in the credit-policy field to which attentions turns next.

5 Industrial Credit, the State, and the Financial
System
It is important to set the historical record straight. Colombia’s industrialists are said to
have enjoyed an ample and cheap supply of financing during the state-led and/or ISI era
circa –. Several assumptions underlie this view. First, that the Colombian state was
deeply committed to industrialisation at any cost. Second, that the state was capable of
channelling ever increasing financial resources to manufacturing at the expense of other
economic sectors. 
ird, that the state was willing to do so. Fourth, that industrialists
had the political clout and influence to force the financial system to lend to them at
subsidised prices. 
ese postulates are often supported with evidence leading one to believe
that financing was not a real problem for manufacturers. 
is chapter challenges the
assumptions and evidence supporting this interpretation. It sustains that such view is
misconstrued and the empirical evidence used to support it is only partial. 
e arguments
goes as follows: the relative share of institutionalised credit flowing to manufacturing
was significantly lower than assumed by proponents of the above view, when the sectoral
allocation considers the financial system as a whole. In fact, it is argued that industrialists
came to represent the losers in a financial system whose structure was bank-based and in
which key players — CB and the biggest publicly-owned bank — represented competing
interests, those of agriculturalists in general and coffee growers and cattle farmers in
particular. 
e state, contrary to what the literature claims, utilised its political power to
advocate chiefly for the financial interests of primary producers and only in a marginal
sense catered to those of manufacturers, at least until .
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e chapter divides in five sections. 
e first section reviews the current literature on
the issue of industrial credit in Colombia. 
e second provides historical evidence by
industrialists indicating that both short- and long-term credit availability were sources of
concern for the sector — and deemed insufficient. 
is is validated by the display of further
primary evidence from the CB, government sources and foreign experts coinciding with
the assessments of industry. 
e next section characterises the Colombian financial system
as a credit-based one, dominated by private commercial banks with an increasing role for
public financial institutions. It also reviews and analyses the legislation shaping the flows of
credit. 
e fourth part offers new calculations of the sectoral shares of credit by commercial
banks, the CB, and public institutions, such as the Agrarian Bank, demonstrating that
state support in financing matters was largely directed at agrarian, not industrial interests.

e last section concludes.
Credit to Industry: the Colombia Literature
Most of the literature dealing primarily or marginally with industrial credit has framed the
issue on the basic assumption that the Colombian experience fits neatly in the context of
import-substituting or state-led industrialisation. Berry and 
oumi outline the country’s
post-war economic policy as one following a “fairly standard import-substitution” strategy
until the mid-s. Avella et al. characterise the deliberate development strategy that
emerged after  — that of ISI — as exhibiting three distinctive elements: the chan-
nelling of major resources to industry, direct state investments in the sector, and rising
protectionism. Misas, in a similar vein, narrows the bases of ISI in Colombia to two
factors: high protectionism and promotional credit. Other authors, such as Rettberg and
Hallberg expressly emphasise the role of subsidised industrial credit that originated in
state institutions since the s — also subscribing to the ISI account. So does the work
Berry, A. and 
oumi, F. ‘Post-War and Post-National Front Economic Development of Colombia’ in Herman, D,
(Ed) Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela () pp. –.
Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ pp. –.
Misas, G. ‘La Ruptura...’ pp. –.
Rettberg, A. ‘
e Political...’ p. .
Hallberg, K. ‘Colombia. Industrial Competition and Performance’ () pp. –.

ese studies concern mainly with the formation of economic groups and the development of (non)competitive
industrial practices.
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by Muñoz and Bolívar who see the state as a new player in the financial markets acting with
the aim of favouring the development of the productive sectors following CEPAL-inspired
ideas at a time “when the problems of industrial financing were seen through structuralist
lenses” and offered solutions accordingly. From a conceptually slightly different angle,
Ocampo and Tovar stress governmental policies of the post-war period to redirect credit to
strategic sectors, such as manufacturing, in a state-led or accelerated strategy of industri-
alisation. 
ey illustrate their point by examining the evolution of industrial financing
from the s to the early s. 
e emerging pattern, according to their study, is that
of external financing or loans replacing new equity as the main source of funding, thanks
largely to state policies of development credit. 
e underlying thread of this branch of
the literature is the pro-active role they all assign to the state in supporting industrial
development in the framework of an ISI or state-led strategy. 
e use of these concepts to
understand the industrial trajectory of Colombia in the mid-twentieth century seems to
put a straitjacket to these analyses forcing the authors to extend to the area of industrial
credit insights and/or conclusions reached in other policy areas, i.e. trade policy. 
is
section argues that the utility of ISI premises in accounting for industrial credit policies is
deceptive. State actions to support industry in the trade-policy field, if only partially, as
discussed in Chapter , did not replicate in the financial arena. Below, it will be shown that
the empirical evidence regarding state policies and industrial credit makes the application
of these frameworks inappropriate to explain the Colombian experience, at least in this
specific policy field.
Another stream of authors that address the issue of industrial financing more directly
also draw similar conclusions; namely, that industry received plentiful and increasing
amounts of ordinary and subsidised resources from the financial system as industrialisation
progressed during the post-war years. One of the most authoritative studies on the issue
is that of Castro and Junguito. 
ey argue that financial resources were not a constraint
on industrial growth, neither in the s nor especially the s and s, thanks
Muñoz, C. and Bolívar, A. ‘Una Visión Historiográfica del Sistema Financiero Colombiano, –’ () pp.
, –.
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to official policies that had started to direct credit towards industry. 
e favourable
evolution of institutionalised credit is reflected in the increasing share of loans allocated
by the commercial banks to industry relative to other sectors; and through an upward
trend identified in new loans to the sector measured against industrial GDP, which seems
to confirm the new direction of financial resources. Ultimately, Castro and Junguito
sustain that the rising levels of corporate indebtedness of the early s and the recurrence
of industrial firms to the curb and foreign markets for credit was the outcome of public
policies that subsidised interest rates and led to credit rationing.
Fajardo and Rodríguez explore in more detail the ways by which state policies were
designed to supply the industrialists’ rising demands for credit, as Colombia embarked
upon the “industrialising strategy at any cost”. 
ey emphasise the new role of the
CB as a key decision-maker regarding credit policy and the rediscounting mechanism
as the preferred monetary instrument for preferential credit allocation. Others, like
Salazar, highlight the adoption of forced investments upon commercial banks and the
possibilities of manipulating their reserve requirements, as measures aimed at redirecting
credit to priority sectors — of which industry was one. 
e common denominator
in these interpretations is one that argues the existence and intensification of financial
repression. State intervention in the financial system through the rediscounting mechanism,
the manipulation of reserve requirements and the enactment of obligatory investments
encouraged interest rates rigidities that distorted the markets for money and capital. Lower
than market-determined interest rates led to excesses in the demand forcing the banks to
ration credit. Ultimately, this prevented the financial system to operate at full capacity and
the system remained shallow. 
e most important implication of that view to this study is
that industry did not really seem to suffer from credit scarcity because industry was one of
the sectors prioritised by government measures. Consequently, this was reflected in the
portfolios of the commercial banks. From the empirical viewpoint these authors frequently
Castro, Y. and Junguito, R. ‘La Financiación de la Industria Manufacturera Colombiana’ () pp. –, .
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Salazar, N. ‘Historia Monetaria y Financiera de Colombia, –’ () pp. –.

I C,  S,   F S
show how changes in the structure of credit length terms from a predominantly short-term
basis to a more medium-and long-term lending pattern indicate that industry was receiving
ever larger shares of financial resources relative to other sectors. Also, reviews of the
decrees, laws, and CB resolutions illustrating official policies along with industry’s growing
share of loans in the portfolios of private commercial banks suggest their interpretations
match the evidence; hence their conclusions are definitive. 
is is not the case, however.

is branch of the literature fails to grasp the issue of industrial credit on two accounts: first,
by emphasising the portfolio of the private banks they leave out of the picture increasingly
important players in the financial system: public lending institutions. Not only were official
institutions expanding in size, but they were also specialising in meeting the financial
needs of certain sectors, i.e. coffee growers, cattle farmers, agriculturalists, and housing
— as will be discussed below. 
e obvious implication of this is that focusing on the
private commercial banks introduces a bias toward industry and its share of credit. 
e
way to rectify this is by examining the distribution of credits by sectors across of the entire
financial system. Secondly, it is often assumed that the decrees and laws that favoured
the allocation of credit to the so-called ‘productive’ sectors was symmetrical and did not
discriminate between industry and agriculture. 
is, again, is not so clear. More often
than not, as will be shown below, industry was a relative loser from such legislative acts.
A third stream of authors, converging somewhat with the previous literatures, centres
on the rent-seeking capabilities of industrialists to benefit from credit allocation. 
is
gradually started to take place, according to Kalmanovitz and Avella, after the reform of the
CB in , which centralised financial decision-making and strengthened promotional
credit policies. 
ey argue that both industrialists and agrarians managed to advance their
corporative interests in capturing the rents originating in the seignorage of the CB. An
active and direct policy of promotion to industry and agriculture materialised through
differential rediscounting rates, the creation of bancos del gremio - producer-association
banks — during the s, and the operation of rediscounting funds administered by
the CB since the mid-s. An identical claim emerges from the study by Armenta
See for example Salazar, N. ‘ Historia Monetaria...’ p. .
Avella, M. and Kalmanovitz, S. ‘Barreras del Desarrollo Financiero: Instituciones Monetarias Colombianas en la
Década de ’ () Borradores de Economía, No. , pp. –.
Avella, M. and Kalmanovitz, S. ‘Barreras...’ pp. –.
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et al. 
ey assert from an analysis of the CB’s minutes of the board that: “it is visible
how much terrain developmental credit has gained on the industrial and agricultural
sectors, especially during the s, with such an intensity that in occasions control of
the monetary expansion is sacrificed at the expense of this type of credit”. Following the
same line of thought are Revéiz and Pérez, who advance a hypothesis which argues that it
was the capacity of industrial leaders to successfully influence the state in general aspects
of economic policy and in particular in the growing control over credit between  and
, which permitted them to flourish. It is critical to note here that the stress in these
accounts is placed upon the ability of industry as a sector or industrialists as key agents to
capture the state (or part of it) to extract rents that facilitated their survival or development.

e initiative rests with the economic group demanding credit and not so much with the
preferences of the state. 
us, although the direction of the impulse for industrial credit
from this branch of the literature is the reverse from that of the previous two, the outcome
is the same: an ample supply of subsidised and ordinary credit flowing to the industrial
sector. 
is study partially agrees with the statements of Avella and Kalmanovitz and
Armenta et al. to the extent that agricultural interests successfully captured rents from the
financial system thanks to their powerful influence on different governments well before
. However, it rejects the part of the thesis in which industrialists too seemed to have
participated in this process. 
e nature of the aggregated indicators they used as evidence
to prove their point, such as changes in total internal credit as percentage of GDP, makes
it very difficult to establish the relative share allocated or captured by each sector, and
especially so for industry since it lacks the kind of sector-specific banco gremial from which
other economic groups benefitted.
A few important clarifications need to be made. First, the vast majority of the above-
reviewed literature does not deal directly with the issue of industrial credit. 
e subject
often simply falls within broader works tracing the evolution of the financial system, the
trajectory of industrial development, the forms of state intervention in the economy, and
particularly, the contradictions between price stability and economic growth as well as
Armenta, A., Fernandez, A. and Sánchez, F. ‘Historia Monetaria de Colombia en el Siglo XX’ in Robinson, J. and
Urrutia, M. (Eds) Economía... p. .
Revéiz, E. and Pérez, M. ‘Algunas Hipótesis sobre las Formas de Regulación de la Economía y la Estabilidad Política
Colombiana entre  y ’ in Desarrollo y Sociedad () No. , pp. .
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long-term monetary-history reviews. Secondly, several of these studies focus on a period
that does not fully match the one examined here. Whilst this author draws special attention
to the period from  to  most of the cited works concentrate on the s and
even more so on the s. Frequently, their focus on the earlier decades is a rapid flypast
setting the stage for the full development of their arguments about a later historical time.

is acknowledgement has an important implication: that this thesis does not necessarily
disagree with the broad arguments and theses of the above-cited literature. In a sense,
the disagreements and challenges posed by this chapter refer to general assumptions and
statements about industrial credit. Historiographically, the problem is one of a near-void
of literature on the topic of industrial financing rather than one of a hotly contested debate
with a myriad of interpretations in which another competing explanation is offered. 
us,
the purpose of this chapter insofar as the literature on Colombian industrial financing is
concerned is threefold. First, to set the record straight that credit to industry was neither
substantial nor largely subsidised when the financial system as a whole is considered.
Secondly, that the timing of significant state support to industry from the financial point
of view is misplaced when located in the s or s. 
is only starts to materialise in
the following decade. 
irdly, to note that extending notions and assumptions based on
ISI and state-led industrialisation frameworks to the Colombian experience may obscure
rather than better our understanding of industrialisation and the role of the state in it.

e prevailing literature has unapologetically failed on two important fronts. One is that
of providing primary evidence on the situation of industrialists regarding credit shortages
(or lack of it). Financial repression, rent-seeking and ISI-centred accounts all neglect
the actual evidence of industrialists and other contemporary sources, placing financing
difficulties as regular, serious and unsolved problems affecting the performance of the
sector. 
e other relates to the absence in these studies of aggregate data on sectoral credit
from the financial system as a whole. Castro and Junguito, like Fajardo and Rodríguez,
and Salazar, refer strictly to the evolution of industrial credit and its generally growing

e notable exceptions, that is, works primarily concerned with industrial financing, are the studies by Junguito,
R. and Castro, Y. ‘La Financiación...’; Junguito, R. ‘Financiación de la Industria Manufacturera en los Años Ochenta:
Aspectos Crediticios y Tributarios’ in Caballero, C. (Ed) El Sector Financiero en los Años Ochenta (); and González,
M. ‘El Crédito...’
For more on this see Bejarano, J. A. ‘Historia...’ pp. –.
Berry was first to raise this issue; Berry, A. ‘A Descriptive...’ p. .
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share in the total of loans advanced by the private commercial banks to support the view
that financial resources available to the sector are on the rise as the mid-twentieth century
unfolds. From a different angle, Ocampo and Tovar, like Sándoval, Kalmanovitz and Avella,
and Echavarría focus on the behaviour of publicly limited manufacturing corporations
and the shift in their financing sources occurring between the mid-s and the s:
the displacement of equity issues for institutionalised banking loans. 
e limitations in
each of these approaches are evident. 
ey are concerned only with private commercial
banks and leave out of the picture increasingly important lending institutions in terms of
their sheer size and sectoral preferences. 
e most important amongst these institutions
being the Agrarian, Industrial & Mining Bank — henceforth Agrarian Bank — but also
relevant, though smaller, the Central Mortgage Bank — BCH. Any complete examination
of the allocation of resources of the Colombian financial system must take into account
the operations of these two agencies. A third, if less evident component, are the loans
facilitated by the CB to the public without the intermediation of any other financial
institution. In other words, direct operations of the CB with private economic agents
and organisations, such as the National Federation of Coffee Growers (FNC) and the
provincial Cattle Funds, which also involve significant amounts of resources, and perhaps
more critically, were subject to preferential terms and conditions, need be included in a
more comprehensive exercise.

ose addressing the issue of funding sources have different problems. 
eir accounts
relate exclusively to publicly limited manufacturing corporations, which depending on the
year, may account for up to two thirds of the sector’s total output, but still leave out the
majority of firms whose legal form is different. Although the literature has routinely made
recourse to data that does not discriminate between the categories of ‘credit’ or ‘external
sources’ (beyond paid up capital), they assume that the largest share of this financing was
shouldered by banks. 
is, as will be shown below, was not the case. Moreover, the share of
output accounted for by industrial publicly limited corporations shows an ever-increasing
trend as we near the mid-s. However when the focus is on the s they explain far
less limiting their relative weight in the aggregate exercise. Lastly, these approaches fail to
Sándoval, D. ‘Política Económica y Financiación Industrial’ in Deslinde () Vol. , No. .
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put the changes in the relative shares of funding sources in the wider context of financing
needs of industry as a whole. It is unknown if the shares are changing in a context of
shrinking or of growing lending activities. 
ese shortcomings of the prevailing literature
justify a study of industrial credit and its share in the financial system as a whole on the
following grounds. First, amidst a supposed strategy of ISI, the economic effort of the
nation in general and of the state in particular in regards to such a process is best tested and
illustrated when the trends in lending practices from both private commercial banks and
state financial institutions are examined. Secondly, because both private and official lending
entities competed for resources (rediscount) in the CB, it is reasonable to include the latter
in the analysis. An economic group or agency’s gains are the other’s losses, whether private
or public. Finally, because the credit activities of both sets of institutions can ultimately
affect the growth and stability of domestic prices, or merely the government’s perception
of it. 
e state’s measures reacting to inflationary pressures or threats of it can trigger
actions and policies that affect all financial intermediaries independently of ownership and
purpose. In other words, tight monetary policies deployed to fight off inflation may affect
financial institutions indiscriminately and independently of which type of entities are
responsible for being too aggressive in their credit expansion. Now is the turn to examine
the actual situation of industrial credit in the mid-twentieth century.
Credit to Industry: The Voice of the Sector and Beyond
As said earlier, ANDI (National Association of Industrialists) had formed the largest
and most important association of the sector. Its membership, a mixture of individuals,
associations and firms stood at  by  and reached  in . At first, representing
large textile, beer, cement, tobacco, food and beverage producers from the Antioquia
region, it gradually became more encompassing and geographically diverse to include
entrepreneurship from Bogota, Cali and Barranquilla. By some accounts ANDI is said
to have represented between  and  of industrial output, others put estimations
Schneider, R. ‘Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America’ () p. .
Schneider, R. ‘Business Politics...’ pp. –.
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significantly lower. Regardless of the exact figures it is well accepted that ANDI was
the chief organisation of the country’s industrial interests  (especially of large-sized
manufacturers), and therefore the concerns regarding their demands for industrial financing
can be taken to be representative of the sector.
Difficulties in industrial financing from the s until the mid-s referred mainly
to: first, long-term capital investment and short-term working capital needs; secondly, con-
tractionary monetary policies; lastly, the operation of a financial system whose inadequate
institutional structure made it harder to meet industry’s demands. For the early s
there is no lasting ANDI-equivalent organisation to resort to in order to display evidence
about industrial financing problems and to assess their demands. Other sources need be
used. A government publication, Anales de Economía y Estadística, stressed in its 
editorial the first of these problems by pointing at “the insufficiency of private resources to
cope with the requirements of both industry and agriculture and the central function of
appropriate credit flows to these sectors, so as to meet national necessities...” A study
by the IBRD, carried out in  by Lauchlin Currie, also highlighted capital scarcity
as a barrier to industrial development. Currie stated: “It is very likely that difficulties in
mobilising capital funds has more than retarded initiatives in new [industrial] sectors”.

ese timely perceptions of government officials and outsiders at the time coincide with
the wider views of the secondary literature. Chu sustains that: “the real value of commercial
bank loans to the private sector remained depressed throughout the period –, and
loans to industry seemed to conform to this general pattern. Moreover, the marginal share
of industrial loans was relatively stable”. Urdinola explains that the closure of private
mortgage banks in the s in addition to the non-operative scheme of credit directed to
industry by the BCH “had brought industry to the point of asphyxiation owing to the
Osterling, J. P. ‘Democracy in Colombia: Clientelistic Politics and Guerrilla Warfare’ () p. .
See for instance; Urrutia, M. ‘Gremios, Política Económica y Democracia’ ().

e interests of small manufacturers were hardly represented by ANDI. In  they created the Colombian Association
of Small Industrialists (ACOPI).
DANE. Anales de Economía y Estadística, , No. , p. .
Currie, L. ‘Bases...’ p.. Perry also notes the emphasis in various parts of the report about capital scarcity and the
need for external assistance and the need to raise public and private savings; see Perry, G. ‘Introducción al Estudio de los
Planes de Desarrollo en Colombia’ in Gómez, H. and Wiesner, E. (Eds) Lecturas sobre Desarrollo Económico Colombiano
().
Chu, D. ‘
e Great Depression and Industrialization in Colombia’ in Berry, A. (Ed) Essays on... p. .
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lack of working capital”. For the s the evidence came directly form industrialists
themselves.
Long-term capital funding however was not the only type of financial difficulty faced by
industry in the late s and following years. ANDI’s Assembly in  reported a list
of the factors affecting the sector and among them short-term credit seemed to top their
concerns. 
eir weekly bulletin stated: “purchase of equipment and raw materials, delays in
the absorption of new products, and above all and with worrying justification, the scarcity
of working capital, is one of the most salient deficiencies in our economic organisation.”
A few months later the association stressed the combination of both working and fixed
capital requirements of industry and the insufficient supply of resources from the banks
for these purposes, resulting in a concomitantly tight financial position of the productive
enterprises it represented. Similar statements regarding industry’s financial shortages
and demands from the sector and the association directed at government and the CB to
act upon them are regularly found in the minutes of CB, the minutes of ANDI’s annual
assemblies, and its internal weekly, all reporting on the credit shortages that industrialists
from different regions, such as Santander, and industrial cities like Bogota, Medellin,
Cali and Manizales suffered throughout the s and early s. 
e severity and
unremitting shortage of industrial credit of the s led ANDI’s president to address a
letter to the president of the Republic, Alberto Lleras — and his cabinet ministers — which,
if well dramatised the situation also signalled the significance of the issue for contemporary
manufacturers.
Short-term financing was identified as a barrier to domestic investment in industry and
was closely linked to the underutilisation of plant capacity. A  study by the Centre
for Economic Development from the University of the Andes found that in a sample
of incorporated companies, restrictions of credit, in relation to their increasing working
Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ p. .
ANDI, Boletín,  August , No. , p. .
ANDI, Boletín,  April , No. , pp. –.
BRep. Minutes of the Board of Directors, (MoBD) Act No ,  October , p. , Archivo del Banco de la
República (ABRep).
See for instance BRep. MoBD,  September , Act No. , p. , ABRep; and BRep. MoBD,  June
, Act No. , pp. –, ABRep; also, ANDI, Boletín,  July , No. , pp. –; and ANDI, Boletín,
 August , No. , pp. –; ANDI, Boletín,  June , No. , pp. –.
ANDI, Boletín,  November , No. , pp. –.
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capital needs, were a problem for . of manufacturing firms. 
at study also found
that lack of medium- and long-term credit was a problem for . of firms. A larger
study carried out two years later revealed that  firms declared financing difficulties
amongst the causes that explained plant underutilisation. Of these, some  companies
mentioned working-capital credit as the only cause.
Industrialists were quick to identify the barriers preventing them to obtain the neces-
sary financial resources they needed. 
ese obstacles can be classified into two: govern-
ment’s search for macro-economic stability and the persistence of an inadequate financial-
institutional framework. On the first issue, stability meant controlling the growth level of
general prices. 
is often implied reining in the expansion of credit of the banks. A neat
illustration of this situation is found in the above-cited letter of the ANDI to president
Lleras: “Firms in financial distress are finding it ever more difficult to obtain funding due
the harsh restrictions imposed on the lending capacities of banks in order to compensate for
the growth in the means of payment generated by Banco de la República...” ANDI was
not altogether indifferent to the stability of prices: “Industry recognises the government’s
efforts to ensure monetary stability and observes favourably the healthy expansion of credit
... nevertheless, regarding manufacturing credit, it consider[ed] necessary a more generous
flows in accordance with the growth of production and the financial requirements of
development projects...” It also suggested to shift the burden of the squeeze more evenly,
i.e. away from private commercial banks and into more specialised and possibly state-run
development institutions. In this respect, at the  Annual Assembly, ANDI issued the
following statement: “considering the critical circumstances that have led to the current
regime of restrictive credit...[ANDI] declares it essential to adopt measures aimed at a more
uniformly distribution of the anti-inflationary controls, without these focusing uniquely
and exclusively on the banking system.” Indeed, the CB was fully aware of the economic
sectors that felt more the contraction of credit: “due to the curtailment of the means of
Wiesner, E. ‘Barreras Artificiales a la Inversión Doméstica en la Industria Nacional’ in BRep. Revista del Banco de la
República, , No. , p. .
Cited in 
oumi, F. ‘La Utilización del Capital Fijo en la Industria Manufacturera Colombiana’ in Planeación y
Desarrollo () Vol. , pp. –. In this  survey a total of  firms participated, representing two thirds of
total industrial value added.
ANDI, Boletín,  November , No. , , pp. –.
ANDI, Boletín,  June , No. , pp. –.
ANDI, Boletín,  June , No. , p. .
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payment, loans to finance manufacturers and merchants have reduced, at times when
they must pay income taxes, advance sums for a priori import deposits, and sustain the
movement of business in general.” Despite the fact that industrialists’ concern about
credit being restricted due to monetary stability was not a permanent issue, it seemed to
be one occasionally aggravating an already difficult situation.
On the second issue, awareness of the institutional shortfalls of the financial system in
its ability to supply industry with the financial resources deemed essential for its growth
and development came at early dates and are well documented. 
e fundamental concern
lay in the lack of long-term credit for capital investments. Currie’s analysis of the s
noticed the small contribution of commercial banks in this field and recommended the
creation of an entity entrusted with supplying industrial credit. He was not alone. 
e
CB’s board received requests from ANDI in  and  asking it to take actions to
alleviate the problems of the sector regarding long-term borrowing. Specifically, ANDI
appealed to the CB to act as guarantor of industrial companies taking on loans with the
IBRD, and also asked for its support toward the creation of a financial corporation
designed to fund investments geared to improve production capabilities. Petitions did
not stop there. ANDI pleaded to promote the development of a larger capital market
to facilitate the placement of industrial bonds and shares, to intensify credit to small
industrialists through the Agrarian Bank, and to expand the issuing capacity of BCH’s
industrial debentures. 
e poor service that the Agrarian Bank provided to industrialists
was perceived early on by government. A draft of the  General Plan of Eduardo Santos
stated: “Despite the full title of this entity, namely, Agrarian, Industrial & Mining Bank,
and notwithstanding the creation of industrial bonds... credit for industrialists is poorly
developed compared to that for agriculturalists.”
BRep. MoBD, Act No. ,  February , pp. –, ABRep.
Cited in Perry, G. ‘Introducción...’ pp. , .
BRep. MoBD, Act No. ,  May of , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD, Act No. ,  July of , pp. –, ABRep.
ANDI, Boletín,  October , No. , p. .
ANDI, Boletín,  April , No. , pp. –.
Presidencia de la República. Plan General: Medidas de Fomento de la Economía Nacional en Desarrollo de las
Facultades Extraordinarias,  June , p. , [Unpublished draft] Archivo General de la Nación (AGN). On the
inadequacy of industrial bonds by the BCH; see Ministerio de Hacienda. Exposición del Ministro de Hacienda, , p.
; who labelled the possibilities of financing via this mechanism as “paltry”.
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e manufacturers’ association continued to demand the founding and operation of
development banks throughout the s, to increase the paid capital of IFI, and to
arrange the setting up of mutual investment funds.
ANDI was not alone in recognising the problem of long-term financing. An early yet
comprehensive assessment of this issue was provided by Antonio Ordoñez Ceballos, fiscal
auditor, who in  sustained that the industrial loans from the Agrarian Bank were
“practically stagnant”, that medium-sized firms, whose legal form was other than limited-
liability, had been “abandoned from state tutelage” and that the industrial bonds issued by
the BCH were “paralysed”. His successor echoed these views, declaring that the medium-
and long-term credit for industry was practically non-existent and that this was especially
problematic for small- and medium-sized firms. Similarly, a prominent Liberal politician
and banker, Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, noted in  that the current arrangements
for industrial financing of -day loans were not suitable for investment purposes and
advocated for the reform of the banking system. A consultative body, the Committee for
Economic Development, put numbers to the investment deficit of the sector, claiming in
its  Final Report that the unsatisfied, long-term capital investments of industrial firms
stood between  and  million pesos per year and that recent government measures to
alleviate this situation had been ineffective. 
e development economist, then consultant
for the government, Albert Hirschman, put it bluntly in : “
e most serious gap in
the Colombian financial structure remains the lack of a sufficiently ample capital market
See for instance, in addition to previous references, ANDI, Boletín,  July , No. , pp. –; and ANDI,
Boletín,  July , No. , pp. –.
ANDI, Boletín,  May , No. , p. .
ANDI, Boletín,  August , No. , p. .
Revisoría Fiscal de Instituciones Oficiales de Crédito. El Banco Emisor, El Crédito, La Moneda y Algunas Considera-
ciones Generales sobre la Reforma Bancaria en Colombia, , pp. –.
Revisoría Fiscal de Instituciones Oficiales de Crédito.‘El Crédito del Estado en la Economía Colombiana, , p. .
Recent studies on the origins of ACOPI found that in the early s the “lack of credit was the principal problem of
small industry”. In fact, they argue that one of the main motives for the organisation of the association was to work for
the development of credit at a national scale for the sector — and this aim is indeed listed in ACOPI’s foundational
statements. See Pallares, Z. ‘ACOPI: El Gremio de la PYME. Cincuenta Años de Historia, –’ in Dávila, C. (Ed)
Empresas y Empresarios de la Historia de Colombia () pp. –; and Dávila, C. and Pallares, Z. ‘Empresariado
Medio, Proteccionismo y Política Pública: La Asociación Colombiana de Pequeña y Mediana Industria (–)’ in
Cerruti, M. (Ed) Empresas y Grupos Empresariales en América Latina, Espana y Portugal () pp. –.
Espinosa Valderrama, A. ‘La Reforma Bancaria en el Congreso’ in El Mes Económico y Financiero () No. , p.
.
Cited in Manero, A. Informe Presentado al Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento sobre el Mercado
Colombiano de Capitales, , p. . 
e sum amounted roughly to  of the industrial investments actually made
in the sector.
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to provide funds for industrial expansion.” But the problem seemed to have been a
protracted one. As late as , a survey conducted by the National Planning Department
showed that  of firms flagged the availability of domestic credit as a major problem in
carrying out expansion plans. Alas, for industrialists, according to Póveda, the solution for
the development of the sector came largely from non-institutionalised sources of financing,
the curb market, and as expected, at high costs. Various solutions to the problem of
long-term financing for investment were thought of at the time, however.

e Committee for Economic Development suggested that to support industrial ex-
pansion, the creation of a credit institution with access to foreign funds was required.

e organisation succeeding this committee, the National Planning Council, led the
way for slightly more concrete actions, proposing in  the “foundation of a financial
institution, the Development Corporation or Bank, with a mission to supply financial
assistance in the medium- and long-term to the most attractive of private initiatives in
industry and agriculture.” 
e most detailed of schemes, however, originated in a study
commissioned jointly by the Colombian government and the IBRD to a New York-based
investment bank, Glore, Forgan & Co. Alfonso Manero, partner and author of the report
concluded in his recommendations: “A Financial Society should be established to fund new
or existing industrial firms with long-term financing... whose capital may be subscribed by
commercial banks, insurance companies, private savings institutions and wherever possible
with securities from private individuals and industrial companies. If necessary, government
could supply  million pesos from the treasury... to manage total initial resources ranging
from  to  million...” 
is proposal, however, failed to materialise.
But one idea that became law was that of Finance Minister Luis Morales. Morales, who
had founded the Banco Popular in , left the management of that bank to join Rojas
Hirschman, A. ‘Colombia: Highlights of a Developing Country’ () pp. –.
Cited in Billsborrow, R. ‘
e Determinants of Fixed Investments by Manufacturing Firms in a Developing Country’
in International Economic Review () Vol. , No. , p. , fn. .
Póveda, G. Informe sobre Inversiones y Financiamiento de la Industria, , p. . 
e Final Report of the
Committee for Economic Development also stressed the high costs of capital; see Comité de Desarrollo Económico.
Informe Final, , p. .
Comité de Desarrollo Económico. Informe Final, , p. .
Consejo Nacional de Planificación. Informe Annual, , p. .
Manero, A. Informe Presentado al Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento sobre el Mercado Colombiano
de Capitales, , pp. –.

I C,  S,   F S
Pinilla’s cabinet in , and in his new position he drafted the project that later became
Decrees  of  and  of , by which the National Production Corporation
was created and its statutes conceived. 
e entity’s authorised capital were a stunning
 million pesos, to be subscribed by government and private sector for the development
of basic industries, preferably, steel, metallurgy, textiles, sugar, oil and derivatives, electrical
equipment, coal, drugs, and pulp and paper amongst others. Notwithstanding legal
status, it did not materialise either. According to his creator, “the Corporation was killed
off by political circumstance, neither the National Front nor Álvarez Restrepo [succeeding
minister] showed interest in it.”

e purpose of this section has been threefold. First, to present primary-based historical
evidence to demonstrate, from the standpoint of industry, that industrial credit constituted
a permanent source of preoccupation for the sector, since the resources made available to
it were deemed insufficient to satisfy industrial demand. Secondly, to note the importance
of the implications of these credit constraints. Shortages of credit to finance working
capital affected negatively, according to manufacturers themselves, levels of industrial
capacity utilisation. Difficulties in obtaining long-term capital could have hindered the
development of new industrial sectors and the expansion of industrial capacity. Lastly,
raising the question of the perception of industrialists on the institutional suitability of the
financial system serves as a sound introduction to the next section.
The Institutional Financial Framework
Whether financial systems should be market- or bank-based has been the subject of great
debate in finance literature. 
e critical disagreements are over the respective effects that
one system or the other had on economic growth. Advocates of bank-based systems stress
information advantages, superior capital mobilisation for exploitation of scale economies
and more effective debt repayments; whilst supporters of market-based systems highlight
risk management facilities and the betterment of corporate governance amongst other
Author’s interview with Luis Morales, Bogota, August  and September ,  (recorded).
Legislación Económica, , Vol. X, No. , pp. .
Author’s interview with Luis Morales, Bogota, August  and September , .
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merits. Levine settled the matter demonstrating that the most robust links to economic
growth came from overall financial development, irrespective of its organisation or struc-
ture. 
ough this may suffice for a certain part of the literature it opens up another
debate in political economy and development policy.

is is because financial system structures are critical determinants of the abilities
states possess (or lack) to effect selective industrial policy. Zysman distinguishes three
models of finance: first, capital market-based, in which bonds and stocks dominate
long-term industrial funding, with central banks committed to controlling monetary
aggregates and where prices are determined freely by competitive markets and financial
resources are allocated accordingly. Secondly, credit-based models, in which few financial
institutions dominate the system without being themselves dependent on the state, with
market power translating directly into influence on clients, and where prices are also
heavily influenced by these institutions. Lastly, government-administered credit-based
ones, in which governments fix prices in several markets, leading to demand-supply
disequilibria where financial resources are consequently allocated through administrative
discretion. Each model entails distinctive political implications. In the first model,
governments, banks and firms are in distinct spheres and meet as autonomous bargaining
partners, concomitantly, the capacity of the state to direct financial flows is limited. In
the second model, though governments lack the apparatus to dictate the direction of
flows, they can build up alliances with the dominant financial institutions and negotiate
the terms/recipients of lending, while in the third the distinctions between public and
private spheres blurred: “the state’s entanglement with industry becomes part and parcel
of the financial system.” 
e key point, therefore, is that the structure of a financial
system defines different ranges of state capacities, it endows or deprives the state of the
capacity to intervene in credit markets, and in doing so it also builds or denies states
political capacity. 
ough Zysman’s study deals with advanced economies his insights
can effectively be applied to late-developers. In fact, Woo has done precisely that, and
For a useful literature review of the bank- vs. market-based systems; see Levine, R. ‘Bank-Based or Market-Based
Financial Systems: Which is Better?’ in Journal of Financial Intermediation () Vol. , No. .
Levine, R. ‘Bank-Based...’
Zysman, J. ‘Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change’ () Ch.
.
Zysman, J. ‘Governments...’ p. .
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has pushed the argument further. She argues that: “... financial structure can be used to
test state efficacy because it is the overarching mechanism guiding the flow of savings and
investment, delimiting the options of industrial policy... it is this that makes all states
potentially ‘developmental’, whether they exist in Europe, Latin America or East Asia.”

e need, then, to characterise and place the Colombian financial system in the above
framework is apparent.
Figure .: Financial System Structure: Credit-Based, – (-year averages)
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Sources & Methodology: See Table A...
As seen from Figure ., throughout the period the financial system was credit-based.
From  to  only Bogota had a stock exchange, then Medellin, an industrial centre,
opened another. Relative to banking, credit exchange transactions peaked during WWII
thanks to a combined hike in government bonds, which quadrupled between  and
 and the more sustained increase in stock issuances of private companies. 
e
decade-long decline that ensued is partly explained, according to Manero, by inflationary
Woo, J. ‘Race...’ p. .
See Table A...
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pressures that put investors off fixed-income securities, and more probably, by the return
of economic normality and the preferences for real estate investments in expanding cities
and in land and farms in the countryside. Rapid growth in the financial assets of private
banks also played a role. Relative stagnation during the s and s is said to have
been the result of ‘double-taxation’ introduced by the government of Rojas, by which
profits as well as shareholders’ dividends were subjected to taxation. Government policies
aimed at directing credit to targeted sectors, have been another oft-cited factor to account
for the underdevelopment of the country’s capital markets. Finally, it is worth noting that
within these modest markets, concentration amongst a handful of companies was high.
For instance, in , Bavaria and Coltejer accounted for two thirds of all the volume of
stocks traded; and out of  bond emissions carried out  corresponded to government
securities and only two were industry issuances — the other two obligations emitted by
the Country Club of Bogota.

e credit-based financial system was not static, however. Two aspects are central in
accounting for the transformations of the financial structure and how these influenced
industrial credit availability: the rise and decline of different types of financial institutions
and a long sequence of legal dispositions affecting the terms, conditions, and balance sheets
of both public and private commercial lending entities. 
ese institutional changes in the
financial system dating from the s determined, to a significant extent, the patterns of
industrial credit. On the first aspect, as illustrated in Figure ., the most important shift
at the organisational level during the s and s was the collapse of private mortgage
banks, whose share of assets in the total of the financial system reduced by a factor of three
from  in  to  in the mid-s. 
is was the result of the Great Depression,
which on the one hand had cut the sources of foreign credit — on which mortgage banks
relied heavily; and on the other, worsened the capacities of payment of mortgage debtors,
which in turn translated into ever growing levels of bad debts in these banks’ portfolios.
Manero, A. Informe Presentado al Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento sobre el Mercado Colombiano
de Capitales, , p. .
Sáenz-Rovner, E. ‘Colombia ...’ pp. –.
Urdinola, ‘El Credito...’ p. .
Manero, A. Informe Presentado al Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento sobre el Mercado Colombiano
de Capitales, , p. .
See also Muñoz, C, and Bolívar, A, ‘Una Visión...’ p. .
See Muñoz, C, and Bolívar, A, ‘Una Visión...’ pp. – and Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ pp. –.
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Figure .: Credit-Based Financial System by Types of Banks (percentage of total as-
sets)
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To compensate for the losses made by these institutions, Olaya Herrera’s government
reacted with legislation creating new official agencies: the Agrarian Bank in , and
the BCH, a year later. Both became important agents in the financial structure, the first
one turning into the single largest provider of finance to agriculturalists, saw its share
of assets rise from zero in  to more than  by the late s. Meanwhile, BCH
became one of the largest players in the mortgage sector; supplying resources mainly to
construction and agriculture, the joint assets of mortgage banks fluctuated moderately
from  onwards around  of the total of the financial sector. In stark contrast to
what occurred with the mortgage sector, private commercial banks suffered moderately
during the crisis and recovered swiftly during the s to become the dominant agents in
the financial business representing over  of all assets.
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is wave of institutional rearrangements left industry a net loser. Private commercial
banks whose mortgage sections had been supplying medium and long-term capital to
manufacturers stopped this line of business because of legislation that made this a privilege
of mortgage banks. 
e Agrarian Bank’s rise served well the short-term needs of coffee
growers, cattle farmers and other agriculturalists. Mortgage banks, as said above, satisfied
the requirements of construction and agriculture, specialising on gradual amortizations.
Requests from commerce, mainly of short-term nature, were well catered-for by the private
banks. Industrialists’ short-term loans were supplied by commercial banks but no lending
institution catered for their medium- and long-term needs. In the words of Urdinola:
“industry was orphan”. For industrialists this situation did not change for the better in
the s.
A second round of institutional innovations in the early and mid-s marked decisively
the growing pattern of sector-orientated credit initiated in the previous decade. 
e lead
was, again, taken by the state through the creation of the so-called bancos gremiales: sector-
targeted institutions with promotional purposes. 
is trend towards ‘developmental’
banking started in  with the foundation of the Popular Bank, aimed at advancing
the twin-goals of credit democratisation and support of small urban artisans. 
ree
years later, another intermediary arrived with the creation of the Coffee Bank, designed
to finance the production, transportation, and exporting of coffee and other agricultural
products. In  the turn was for the Livestock Bank to serve the needs of that sector.

e promotional nature of these institutions meant they frequently enjoyed various types of
privileged treatment, be it access to CB’s funding without being a shareholder, preferential
rediscounting facilities, relaxation of reserve requirements, and/or lower interest rates.
Despite vocal opposition from private bankers against ‘unfair’ public competition the
new banks had come to stay. As Figure . shows, in relative terms, public banks’ assets
Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ p. 
See Muñoz, C. y Bolívar, A. ‘Una Visión...’ pp. –.
Franco, J. ‘Evolución de las Instituciones Financieras en Colombia’ () p. .
Franco, J. ‘Evolución...’ p. .
Muñoz, C. and Bolívar, A. ‘Una Visión...’ p. .
To see how private Bankers perceived the arrival of these new Banks and voiced their concerns; see, Michelsen, E.
and Merchán , R. ‘Contra la Competencia Oficial se pronuncia la Asociación Bancaria’ in Bancaria No.  () and
Venegas, J. ‘El  por ciento de la Cartera Bancaria para Crédito de Fomento’ in Bancaria No.  ().

I C,  S,   F S
grew in sustained manner and by the end of the s accounted for about a fifth of the
total assets of the financial system. Whether the rise of these banks reflected the power
of coffee growers, agriculturalists and cattle farmers and their ability to capture rents or
whether it was a more state-led initiative is unclear. Official documents, such as the
Memorias de Hacienda, suggest that at least there was a confluence of interests and offer
insights into the process dynamics. On the one hand, Finance Minister, Carlos Villaveces,
announced in  that government intended to continue the strengthening of credit
institutions facilitating resources for the expansion of both agriculture and cattle farming.
On the other, he acknowledged “that on several occasions distinguished cattle ranchers
and cattle-raising assemblies had requested from the government the establishment of
a bank that met their needs and that government pay due attention to these recurring
demands which had stipulated the formation of the Livestock Bank”. Luis Morales, who
succeeded Villaveces in the ministry, recalls the creation of the Livestock Bank emerging
from a conversation sustained with President Rojas in the context of the II International
Fair of Bogota, in which the former proposed the idea to Rojas, knowing all too well
about the General’s “certain inclinations for cattle-ranching”. 
e president is said to
have thought of it as “excellent” and prompted Morales to consult the president of that
association to materialise it. At first, the Livestock Bank’s management was entrusted to
the Popular Bank, but in  was re-fashioned as an autonomous incorporated company.

e foundation of two public banks in addition to the growth of the Popular Bank and
the relative stagnation of the Agrarian Bank, all during the Rojas’ administration suggest
the consideration of a hypothesis: whether the financial rearrangements carried out under
Rojas were conceived of to build new constituencies or clienteles — independent of those
already associated with the state prior to his government. Testing this claim is beyond the
scope of this thesis, but considering the facts discussed above it seems plausible.

e salient fact is that neither the first wave nor the second round of financial-institutional
rearrangements that took place circa s-s favoured manufacturing with the creation
For an interpretation emphasising the former; see Kalmanovitz, S. and Avella, M. ‘Barreras...’ pp. –.
Ministerio de Hacienda. Memorias de Hacienda, , pp. –.
Ministerio de Hacienda. Memorias de Hacienda, , pp. –.
Author’s interview with Luis Morales, Bogota, August  and September , .
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of a sector-targeted institution; public, mixed or private. Broadly speaking, during the
late s coffee growers and other agriculturalists were served by the Agrarian Bank and
the Coffee Bank; cattle farmers by the former and the Livestock Bank; construction by
BCH; and artisans and consumers by the Popular Bank. Commerce was the natural main
client of private commercial banks, but all sectors, except for construction, also competed
for the resources of the remainder of the private-banks’ portfolios. To sum up, official
attention was being directed at the rural sector but not manufacturing. Industry was the
only economic sector lacking a bank of its own and industrialists had to compete with
all other sectors for a residual share of the credit that commercial banks could supply.

is situation seemed to change in the next decade with the creation of the corporaciones
financieras or development banks, however.
Legal regulations authorising the formation of a new kind of financial intermediaries,
the development banks long-awaited by the industry, came in . 
ese were designed
to promote through medium- and long-term credit facilities the creation and expansion of
manufacturing industries, preferably, but not exclusively. However, a proper statutory
framework defining their modus operandi was only streamlined in . Further, great
difficulties in raising funds via deposits from the public and unsuccessful placements of
bonds in the capital markets made them largely inoperative until the CB started to provide
them with growing resources in the early s, as it opened lines of credit for them and
began buying their bonds. Only when development banks enjoyed the full support
of the CB was their importance as both direct investor and creditor of industry realised
fully. Sustained growth in their assets from the mid-s turned them into an important
type of institution in the financial system, but it is necessary to note that the timing of
this take-off of development banks meant manufacturing was the last economic sector to
find a specialised type of financial intermediary that supplied it with resources it needed,
especially for medium- and long-term investment purposes.
IFI was a direct state promoter of industries whose main goal was to provide equity capital in association with private
initiatives, but it was not a lending organisation.
Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ pp. –.
Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ ; and Muñoz, C. and Bolívar, A. ‘Una Visión...’ pp.–.
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e second aspect in the transformation of the financial structure was that relating to
the laws, decrees, and resolutions from the legislature, the executive, and the CB that
incentivised, and/or imposed measures on, the financial agents to allocate a portion of their
resources to economic sectors prioritised by government. It has become a commonplace
in the literature to depict the s as the prelude that lay the basis for the repressed
financial system that emerged in the s and consolidated in the next decade. 
at is,
a banking system in which government affected financial intermediaries’ balance sheets
directly through legislation that obliged them to invest in, and lend to, economic sectors
deemed to be a priority. Or one in which the government influenced them indirectly
via access to rediscount, attractive rediscounting conditions, and/or the manipulation
of banks’ reserve requirements. 
e literature has rightly described the period as one of
‘centralised’, ‘directed’, or ‘selective’ promotional credit, but has failed in identifying
industry as one of the main sectors supposedly benefiting from it. For instance, Fajardo
and Rodríguez, argue that: “obviously, banking and credit policies were part of the strategy
of import substitution industrialisation ... as this required a consequential financial effort,
and one in which the Central Bank was essential...” For their part, Kalmanovitz and
Avella, state: “the reform of  signalled the turn towards a more active monetary policy,
one of direct promotion of industry and agriculture...” Lastly, Urdinola claims that
“the truth behind the surge in the new monetary theory [promotional credit] was that
productive sectors, mainly industry, wanted cheap medium- and long-term credit...” But
did the legislative and executive decrees of the s and early s actually prioritise
credit to industry? Did industrialists really become recipients of subsidised credit? A closer
look at the most important decrees, often cited to support the above claims reveals this
was simply not the case; at least not until .
Pro-ISI or developmentalist policies in the financial field are often said to have started
with legislation that in  authorised private commercial banks to lend for developmental
purposes for periods of over one year, thus eliminating the ‘self-liquidating principle’ —
Kalmanovitz, S. and Avella, M. ‘Barreras...’ pp. –.
Muñoz, C. and Bolivar, A. ‘Una Visión...’ pp. –; and Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ p. .
Salazar, N. ‘Historia Monetaria... ‘ p. .
Faiardo, J. and Rodríguez, N. ‘Tres...’ p. .
Kalmanovitz, S. and Avella, M. ‘Barreras...’ p. .
Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ p. .
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a practice that tied the terms of deposits to those of loans to guarantee the liquidity of
the system — which had regulated the way banks had organised their lending terms since
. Decree  of  also served to mark the beginning of an era of legislation
that “classified as productive certain economic activities and made credit available to these
sectors rediscountable at preferential interest rates”. For industry, however, the decree
was not as beneficial as has been suggested.
First, and as seen in Table A.., Decree  of  did not single out manufacturing
as recipient. Agribusinesses were listed along with irrigation works, deep wells and other
similar works for water provision, electrical pants, distribution networks, extractive indus-
tries and urban construction. Other transformative industries only came to be added 
months later. Secondly, industrialists regarded the measure as being largely unsuccessful.
ANDI’s IX Assembly issued the following statement in April : “Government’s sanction
concerning medium-and long-term credit at the hands of commercial banks has been
insufficient, not only because of its theoretical quantities, but also because some banks did
not make the measure effective...” 
e reason why bankers did so was simple, as the
Finance Minister explained the scope of decrees  and  of  to the board of
directors of the CB: “the measure[s] are purely discretionary, thus do not oblige saving
sections or banks to make those investments nor to concede the developmental loans
referred to in the decree... To repeat, banks did not make the measure fully effective
because they did not have to. 
irdly, the regulation of the decree that came in  (see
Table A.., Decree ) rendered the potentially favourable effects it had on industrialists
ineffective. On the one hand, its bylaws included cattle farmers in the list of economic
sectors benefiting from the decree — a sector that was also granted direct access to CB
funds in the same year — consequently reducing the relative share of the promotional
Avella, M. and Caballero, C. ‘La Economía Política de la Reforma Financiera’ in Bejarano, J. A. (Ed) Lecturas sobre
Economía Colombiana () p. ; and Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ p. . 
at is not to say that banks were not
rolling over short-term credit, however.
Hernández, A. ‘Política de Redescuento, –’ in Gómez Otálora, H., Ortega, F. and Sanclemente, P. (Eds)
Lecturas sobre Moneda y Banca () p. .
See Table A.. Decree  of .
ANDI, Boletín,  April , No. , pp. –. Further, ANDI requested government to authorise the Agrarian
Bank to intensify its loans to small industrialists and for the BCH to issue more reasonable amounts of industrial bonds,
so as to meet the demand from manufacturers.
BRep. MoBD,  November , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
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loans of all other groups, industry included; and on the other, the provision that allowed
for transformation industries to obtain credit to pay off immediate liabilities was abolished.
If there ever was a piece of legislation that forced banks to lend specifically and exclusively
to industry it was the Decree  of  (Table A..). 
e decree authorised the
fiduciary sections of commercial banks to issue industrial bonds with maturation of up to
 years and most crucially obliged the banks to buy and hold the bonds in proportion of
 of their deposits at sight or at term. 
e literature rightly portrays this measure as the
first law by which banks were obliged to allocate a certain percentage of their deposits to
an economic activity previously determined by government. In a way, this signalled,
in addition to initiatives put in place to incentivise banks to lend to certain sectors, the
arrival of measures that forced financial intermediaries to lend to government-targeted
activities. However, the literature has exaggerated the impact of this decree upon industrial
financing for three reasons. First, the measure was short-lived. Passed in June  and
derogated by August  it had a lifetime of about two years only. 
is rather important
fact has not been noticed by the same authors that flag it as a landmark in the history of
industrial credit nor for those stressing it as the emergence of forced-investment practices
in the financial system. Secondly, the quantities involved were relatively small compared
to measures that followed for other targeted sectors. Unlike the measure of  that
forced banks to allocate  of either their term or at sight deposits to industry, Decree
 of  obliged banks to dedicate  of both at sight and term liabilities to cattle
farming and agriculture. Law  of  increased this requirement by another percentage
point making it three times as large as that made for industry and including both and not
only one type of the banks’ deposits. 
irdly, a difference between the resources made
available to industry and those to agriculture was that only the latter were rediscountable
in the CB and at preferential interest rates, so as to encourage banks to lend more freely
to these activities. Summarising, up to  — and contrary to what the conventional
literature sustains, legislation tailored to meet the credit demands of industry has been
scarce and short-lived. Moreover, and as will be shown below, only a small portion of it
Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ p. ; Fajardo, C. and Rodríguez, N. ‘Tres...’ p. ; Bolívar, A. Muñoz, C. ‘Una Visión...’
pp. –; Salazar, N. ‘Historia Monetaria...’ p. . Note that in  Law  had obliged private banks to hold 
of their additional reserve requirements in bonds of the Agrarian Bank.
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was subsidised, especially when compared to other activities, such as cattle farming and
other agricultural sectors.
In addition to the employment of incentives through the mechanism of rediscount and
legally-grounded obligations upon banks to advance credit to certain economic agents,
rulings in the early s, usually made by the board of directors of the CB, were designed
to determine the sectoral allocation of new deposits entering the banking system. 
is was
the case of Resolutions No.  and No.  of , by which caps to the increases in the
banks’ assets were accompanied with mandatory instructions as to how these new resources
should be allocated. As with other schemes, industry did not emerge a distinct winner
from this: for purchases of pledge bonds  (mostly agricultural), to satisfy demands
from Decrees /, / and Law / went  (all agrarian), and the remaining
 for ordinary operations. In other words, the bulk of new deposits was channelled to
financing agriculture and facilitating ‘popular credit’. Subsequent modifications of the
ways banks had to allocate incoming deposits, such as those dictated by Resolutions No. 
and  of , did not single out or earmark new resources for industry in any kind or
form until .
In this context of neglect of industrial credit, however, two measures could have had
mild but positive effects on manufacturers; first, the above-mentioned ‘popular credit’,
and; secondly, the creation of the Private Investments Fund (FIP). Following Law 
of  and Decree  of , the Popular Bank and the commercial banks were
authorised to advance subsidised long-term credit to co-operative societies, mutual-aid
funds, industrialists, artisans, workers and employees with modest liquid assets — hence
‘popular credit’. Similarly, the FIP was a fund ascribed to the CB that channeled credit
through the banking system. At first endowed with external resources, later also resorting
to primary emissions, the FIP was designed to foster sectors that could strengthen the
nation’s balance of payments account, and since this could be attained either through the
exporting of new products or via the substitution of imports, industrial firms benefited from
it. 
ese arrangements represent two instances in which industrialists were indirectly
favoured via preferential lending conditions, but in none of these arrangements had they
For a brief review of the different funds ascribed to the CB in the s and s; see, Gaviria-Cadavid, F. ‘Moneda,
Banca y Teoría Monetaria’ () pp. –.
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been explicitly targeted; this was rather an indirect result or side-effect of broader policies.
Industrialists benefited amongst various other economic groups or activities. Moreover,
the Fund for Agrarian Financing (FAF) created in , rapidly came to dwarf in resources
the FIP. To examine the actual patterns of credit allocation from private banks and from
public institutions the evident next step is to assess the impact of the credit legislation just
revised.
The Sectoral Allocation of Credit

is section presents different data containing sectoral allocations of credit gathered from
primary sources, such as the CB’s annual reports and its monthly review; reports from the
private association of commercial banks, ASOBANCARIA, reports from the Agrarian Bank
and the BCH and data published monthly by the banking regulatory agency. It argues
that in order to measure and assess the commitment of the state toward the industrialising
project, efforts at examining the share of credit — both ordinary and subsidised — that
flowed to industry, the activities of all lending institutions in the financial system need to be
accounted for. As will be shown, the Colombian state, contrary to what the conventional
literature sustains, did not prioritise industrial credit — at least not until . Priority,
instead, was given to coffee growers and cattle farmers. 
e first calculations exhibit the
sectoral allocation of credit of commercial banks. 
e next integrates the resources
advanced by the state-owned Agrarian Bank and BCH. 
en all other financial institutions
are included. Lastly, the credit advanced directly by the CB to the private sector, by-passing
the financial intermediaries completes the wider picture. Efforts at estimating the subsidies
entailed in CB’s operations and evidence on the actual impact of credit flows and legislation
on the balance sheets of manufacturing firms is also provided.
Figure . exhibits a few important trends. First, commerce, which had been the leading
sector in terms of shares of total credit allocation, declines markedly from more than half of
the total new loans received in  to less than  by ; losing its status to industry.
For manufacturing the pattern is not so clear-cut at first. Its early s level of 
By the mid-s FAF nearly quadrupled FIP in total credits made; Gaviria-Cadavid, F. ‘Moneda...’ p. .
Nearly identical to the estimates used by Castro and Junguito for industry, but for all sectors.
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Figure .: Credit Allocation by Commercial Banks, – (New Loans — Per-
centages)
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slumps to . in  and only surpasses its  peak of more than  in 
when it nears . 
en it drops and is overtaken by agrarian loans in /. From
then on, however, industry’s share grows gradually and widens the gap with agriculture
decisively. Recalling the legislative acts of the previous section it is reasonable to argue
that the initial impact of Decree  (on developmental -year loans) and its ensuing
additions was noticeable. A drop of more than  is recorded in commerce and a hike of
 occurs in industry in the following year (); however, industry’s share then declines
to its pre-decree level.

e agrarian sector benefits in a more lasting fashion, with an increase of more than 
spread over  years and stabilises since at around  of total allocated loans. 
is rise
is largely driven by new loans advanced to livestock, though coffee also adds to it. It is
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Figure .: Credit Allocation: Commercial Banks, Agrarian Bank and BCH, –
 (New Loans — Percentages)
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difficult to discern from this figure any significant and lasting effects from the  and
 legislation favouring agriculture and livestock, other than for maintaining its share
relatively constant. As for the short-lived  pro-industry decree, it is plausible that it
accounted for a few percentage points in the early escalation of –; yet despite the
derogation of the law, industry’s share kept on rising. 
e key points to take from here
are: that as late as  it was not clear at all that private commercial banks were directing
ever-growing financial resources to industry. Secondly, it is only from  onward that
the share of industrial credit rises steadily. However, as noted in the previous section, this
was not necessarily the result of legislation prioritising the channelling of financing to the
sector. Lastly, given there was no equivalent of banco gremial for industrialists — along

I C,  S,   F S
the lines of the Coffee Bank and the Livestock Bank for coffee growers and cattle farmers;
commercial banks turned out to be the main providers of financing for industry. 
e
critical question then arises: where did the state financial effort amidst a supposed ISI or
state-led industrialisation strategy go to?
Figure .: Credit Allocation by the Entire Banking System, – (Outstanding
Loans — Percentages)
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Sources: BRep. IAGJA, various years and BRep. Revista, various issues. See further details in Table A...
As said earlier, the financial system was by and large privately owned but since the s
a state-owned agency, the Agrarian Bank (full title: Agrarian, Mining & Industrial Bank),
was becoming ever more important. Despite claims in its very title and mandate to serve
the three sectors, this bank, for all practical purposes, lent primarily to crop growers and
cattle farmers. In this respect, the official institution represented more accurately the
economic interests and strategy of the state. 
e integration of the credit allocated by the
Agrarian Bank and the BCH, which was the only entity authorised to issue industrial bonds
until the early s, to each economic activity alters the financial picture — when only
the commercial banks are taken into account. Figure . shows that the declining trend
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in commerce still holds, but it is now the agrarian sector which comes second opening a
gap with industry of more than  in the mid-s and equalising the credit advanced
to the services sector in . 
e increase of agrarian credit from  to  — and
consequent wedge created with industry — is explained chiefly by the joint-effects of a
larger incidence of Agrarian Bank’s new loans relative to commercial banks, and the drop
in industrial loans facilitated by the these banks, noted in Figure .. As for industry, its
share averages roughly  until ; then it catches up steadily and nearly closes the gap
with agriculture and livestock, as it reaches  of new loans in . Summarising, when
the credit originated in state-owned financial institutions, such as the Agrarian Bank, is
taken into account in the sectoral allocation of loans of the financial system, industrialists’
share reduces substantially and it becomes clear that it was not only far behind commerce
but it also lagged behind agribusiness. It is also worth noting that there seems to be a
direct inverse correlation between the industrial and agrarian credit shares, visualised in
two marked ‘wedges’: the first one starting in  and finishing in ; the second one
opening up in / and closing down again in ; suggesting that the losses of one
sector represented the gains of the other. Returning to the question posed above, the bulk
of the state’s financial effort seemed to have been directed toward agriculture and livestock
and not to industry.

e sectoral allocation of credit changes even more when the entire banking system,
i.e. commercial banks, bancos gremiales, the Agrarian Bank, mortgage banks, the CB
and the bancos prendarios (pledging banks) are included. 
is paints an even bleaker
picture of resources flowing to industry. From , the year from which data for all
agents are available, the largest receivers were agrarian interests with an average of 
of all loans advanced by the financial system between  and  (see Figure .).
Commerce followed with nearly ; even livestock, when considered as a sector on its
own outdid industry taken . of the total. Industrialists obtained on average 
of all outstanding loans facilitated by financial intermediaries, the smallest share of credit
any sector received — safe for construction. Two important implications arise from these
numbers on the sectoral allocation of credit; one empirical, the other interpretative. 
e
See Table A...
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first is that empirical evidence demonstrates that industry did not become a privileged
receiver of credit in terms of having been allocated larger shares of it than other sectors. 
e
erratic pattern or no pattern at all of industrial credit relative to other sectors confirms this.

e second point is that interpretations that stress the role of the state in promoting and
financing industrialisation via credit/financial policies, that is those of ISI and/or state-led
industrialisation frameworks do not fit the empirical evidence. On the contrary, the state
on the credit front promoted agriculture first and foremost and industry only marginally.

is is illustrated further when an examination of the direct operations of discounts and
loans from the CB is made.
Figure .: Loans and Discounts by the Central Bank, – (-Year Averages of
Year-End Balances — Percentages)
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Further to the loans facilitated by public and private financial intermediaries, Banco
de la República was authorised to carry direct transactions with the public, in addition
to those it carried out with its main clients, affiliated banks and government. 
e extent
of resources in question was not insignificant and once again, the share of these flowing
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to industry was rather modest. Relatively speaking, industry was a loser in the credit
allocated directly by the CB to private agents. 
at this type of directly-administered
credits mattered was evident from the importance that CB directors assigned to it as a
potential source of monetary expansion and instability. In October of , as a response
to claims that inflationary pressures originated in the CB’s credit facilities to the coffee
sector (via the FNC) and in the discounting operations it carried out with pledge bonds,
the board of directors commissioned a study to look into the determinants of the country’s
economic instability and asked to examine carefully the role played by these elements in
it. In various years, for instance, , , , , , ,  and ,
the amounts received by so-called particulares - non-bank private agents — ranged between
half and two thirds or more of the resources advanced to CB’s most important clients, its
affiliated banks. And in , private agents received even more credit from the CB
than its affiliated banks. In the early s private agents received on average  of the
loans and discounts advanced by Banco de la República. During the second part of
WWII and in the immediate post-war years, credit to private agents was severely tightened,
but relaxed again in the early s to attain high levels in the late s and s when
the international prices of coffee faltered and the CB provided sustained and generous
financing support. Between  and  the proportion of relative credit advanced to
private agents returned to its prewar levels. In other words, around a third of CB’s lending
facilities were directed to private non-financial agents. Given the visible importance of
these resources it is crucial to examine which economic sectors benefit from these direct
lines of credit.
Since the s coffee growers, mostly represented by the association of coffee producers,
had gained access to the funds of the CB for the purposes of financing the harvest, sustaining
the internal price of the bean, and exporting. As seen in Figure ., coffee rapidly came
to dominate the credit to private agents, as the sector absorbed roughly  of all loans
and discounts during the s. Although its share declined from then on, it remained
For the claims see; BRep MoBD,  February , Act No. , pp. - , ABRep; and for the commission
see BRep. MoBD,  October , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
Data on the allocation of credit by the CB is displayed in Tables A.. and A...
Credit to the national government not included. See Table A...
Complete data are not available for – for coffee or any other group; however, qualitative evidence based on the
editorials and comments made by the general manager of the CB in his yearly reports serve to confirm the view that
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well above  until the early s. Credit advanced to the FNC by the CB in the
– period averaged a very substantial  of all resources lent to private agents.
Operations with pledge bonds came in second place with an average of , also for the
whole period. 
ese corresponded to the discounting of bonds issued by warehouses
upon merchandise or commodities used as collateral. Until  it is clear that the large
majority of products that qualified for discounting in the CB were agricultural, including
among others: rice, sesame, wheat, cotton, timber, and soybean. 
e preference of the
CB in discounting pledge bonds for agricultural funding is illustrated, for instance, in
its rejection to discount malted barley, which considered it to be a raw material for beer
brewing — an industrial activity. 
is highlights further that the aim of the pledge-
bond discounting was conceived, instead, to foster agricultural production. 
is bias
towards agricultural financing in regards to pledge bonds was reversed somewhat after
, however. Industrialists’ requests to the CB for it to authorize the discounting of
bonds guaranteed with domestic and foreign raw materials and inputs for further industrial
processing started to be accepted in the late s. 
us, by the late s and early
s wool, raw and yarn cotton, rayon fiber  leaf tobacco,  soy flour, Paz
del Rio-steel-products, and canned goods, amongst others, were incorporated in a
growing list of commodities, raw materials, and a few finished goods that through pledge
bonds financed not only agriculturalists but also industrialists. 
is move seemed to
have alleviated industrialist’s financial needs in certain situations, as the Finance Minister
reported on a trip made to Medellin in July : “enthusiastic and optimistic feelings
prevailed in the business climate among industrialists thanks to the efficacious assistance
provided through the financial mechanism of pledge bonds, which has aided enterprises in
coffee was by far the sector receiving the majority of financial resources originated directly in the CB. See BRep. IAGJD,
–.
Pledge bonds are titles of credit issued (along with warehouse receipts) by general-deposit warehouses that are
immediately negotiable. 
ey serve as collateral with commercial banks for short-term credit. 
e CB rediscounted
these credits from at least . 
is financing mechanism is common in rural economies where capital is scarce.
BRep. MoBD,  February , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  October , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  October , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  November , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  February , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  October , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
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dealing successfully with thence dire circumstances...” Despite the broader acceptance
of non-agricultural items in the financing scheme with pledge bonds two hard facts about
credit allocation remained still.
First, that it was coffee above all, and other crops in second place, that benefited from
this method of funding. Secondly, industrialists did not enjoy either a special or a separate
line of direct credit with the CB in the way coffee growers or cattle farmers did. 
is last
group, cattle farmers, formed the other economic sector — apart from coffee — receiving
direct credit from Banco de la República. Evidence from the minutes of the board of the
CB shows that from the late s, sustained efforts from these business groups to gain
access gradually paid off. 
e CB opened lines of credit via Cattle Funds to the provinces
of Atlantico, Bolivar, Caqueta, Cordoba, Magdalena and Valle amongst
others. Although their share in the resources allocated by the CB never came close to that
of coffee producers or the financing through pledge bonds, the average of funds granted to
cattle farmers peaked at  in – and amounted to nearly  of the total from the
year that the first Cattle Fund started operating these resources. To sum up, industrialists
did not come to represent a privileged economic sector in the directly-allocated credit
originating in the CB. Preferential treatment was instead enjoyed by coffee growers first
and foremost, followed distantly by cattle ranchers. Other agriculturalists and industrialists
only came to benefit indirectly through the rediscounting of pledge bonds guaranteed
with agricultural produce, raw materials and industrial inputs that Banco de la República
accepted from commercial banks. In short, industry did not particularly benefit from the
credit facilitated directly by the CB. Since the resources that the CB facilitated — through
the direct operations it authorised with private agents or via the rediscounting of funds
to financial intermediaries to the final borrowers — were made at preferential rates, it
is integral to this examination to attempt the identification the economic activities that
benefited from it and an estimation of the size of the subsidies involved.
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  February , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  August , Act No. , , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  May , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  March , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
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Figure .: Allocation of Subsidised Credit: Re/Discounts by CB (millions of 
Pesos)
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e balance sheets of the CB provide enough synthesised data to compile a full series
of subsidised credit at its source. An entry in the assets-side contains the values of the
loans and discounts that Banco de la República advanced to both affiliate and non-affiliate
financial institutions. 
e sums amount to subsidies because they were intended to be, and
effectively were officially labeled, de fomento, ‘developmental’ resources, implying that the
CB carried out these operations at lower interest rates than those for normal, commercial
transactions. 
e exact differentials are difficult to capture. 
ese often they varied in
one, two or up to three percentage points, but since they started from very low bases,
were significant. 
ough the classification of the loans is not consistent throughout, some
inferences can be made from the available evidence. 
e CB started to subsidise credit
in  following decrees issued by Ospina’s administration in order to compensate the
victims of the violence that deepened across the country after the assassination of Gaitán
in April  (Figure .). 
e funds were intended for the rural victims. Agriculturalists
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and cattle farmers from Boyacá and the Eastern plains seemed to have received large parts
of these credit lines, which though subsidised, overwhelmingly became unrecoverable
loans. 
e first hike in cheap credit came in  when the effects of Decree 
of , or so-called ‘developmental’ credit, were first registered. As discussed above,
this measure and related dispositions ( of ,  of ,  of ,  of
) did not target manufacturing single-handedly at all. Unfortunately a break-down
by economic activities of the loans contained in these measures is not possible from the
CB’s data. 
e changes in the classification used by the CB from , however, permit
informed guesses.
Given the absence of major pieces of legislation on developmental credit between 
and  the classification offered for  and  is most valuable. In it, the CB
distinguishes between agrarian, industrial and other developmental loans. 
e shares are
far from proportional, in line with the arguments and findings advanced so far, for cheap
credit to agriculture and livestock amounted to  of a total of  million pesos or ,
whilst the share allocated to industry pales at a residual of  million or  in .

e shares the following year are  vs. , respectively. Because the classification
changed in these years but the sources (that is the legislation that largely determined this
allocation) did not, or at best only marginally, it is plausible to argue that at least as far back
as  the relative distribution of cheap financing between these two sectors was similar
to that shown in the early s. It is also clear from the layer chart that the bulk of the
subsidies flowed to agrarian activities in the mid-s, when new legislation was passed.
It is worth noting that despite the overwhelming disproportion of subsidised credit flowing
to agrarian ventures, compared to industrialists, the above data underreports the total of
cheap credit advanced. 
is is because the CB’s balance-sheets only covered ‘legislated
developmental’ credit, that is, the credit determined by the decrees/laws reviewed earlier,
but it did not single-out, nor quantify, the funds facilitated to the Agrarian Bank, which
were substantial and made at lower rates than resources supplied to private commercial
References to the exact percentages are made in Chapter . See BRep. MoBD,  June , Act No. , pp.
–, ABRep.

is author approached archivists at Banco de Bogotá and Banco de Colombia to examine the distribution of the
loans by economic activities from Decree ; both organisations refused access on confidentiality grounds.
See Table A.. for the series underlying the percentages cited. 
e increase that takes place between  and  is
difficult to explain, though at least part of it could be compensating for the real decline suffered in  vis-à-vis .
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banks. Rounding and simplifying, rediscountable resources for commercial banks had
to be lent by these to the final users at subsidised rates, data captured in Figure .. But
cheap credit advanced by the Agrarian Bank, which also (re)discounted heavily in the CB
was not registered, or more precisely only a small fraction. In short, agribusinesses and not
industrialists enjoyed extensive privileges when it came to financing in terms of access to
subsidised credit.
Figure .: Liabilities by Types of Creditors: National Limited-Liability Manufactur-
ing Companies (Percentages)
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However small the volumes of cheap institutionalised credit to industry were, potential
doubts over the evolution of the total volume of resources (subsidised and ordinary) can be
dissipated further by shifting the focus away from the suppliers of funds and into the actual
recipients. Reliable, aggregated evidence emerging from manufacturing firms gathered by
the regulator of limited-liability companies provide enough evidence to construct a series
showing the composition of liabilities. If empirical reality is in line with the conventional
views of the literature, this demand-side approach should reveal an increasing role for
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banking obligations and facilities in proportion to total creditor’s liabilities. 
is should
be potentially and especially so after  (following Decree ) and  (decree ).
If on the contrary, as argued in this dissertation, no distinctive increase or upward trend is
found, there will be even stronger grounds to sustain that manufacturing was not favoured
by banking — irrespective of legislation on credit, the returns or profitability of the sector,
or the risk profile associated with it. A few notes on the dataset are necessary before
commenting the findings. Data were only obtainable in aggregated fashion from 
onwards. Although this leaves a substantial part of the period studied here unexamined, it
is encouraging that at least there is one full observation available pre-, for this allows
a benchmark, however isolated, to assess the effects of the legislation of the s. 
e
series runs until  because it is up to this year that most individual entries within the
liabilities side of the balance sheets are consistent and/or can be identified, integrated and
grouped by origins without serious distortions. Finally, the break-up of the liabilities by
types of creditors offered here is new. 
is author does not know of any study that has
attempted the disaggregation for these years. 
e literature has divided the sources of
corporate financing into two broad categories (reserves and retained profits on the internal
side, and loans and increases of share capital in the external part) but no detailing of the
‘loans’ entry had been done. 
is in not problematic in itself, but the issue arising from
it is that often such loans are considered to amount to credit originating in banks —
and in legislation forcing banks to direct it to government-prioritised activities, such as
industry. 
is, as will be clear by now, has been misconstrued, as argued throughout
this chapter, and will be further challenged with the piece of empirical evidence displayed
above — that breaks down of the category in question.
From the bar chart it can be discerned that the key component (see Figure .), bank
loans, underwent rather minor alterations, increasing a marginal  percentage points
between  and –, only to decline thereafter to an average of . It is plausible
to argue that the rise was the result of Decree  of , but if this was the case the
A comparative exercise over time between the composition of creditor’s liabilities of industry and agrarian firms is
desirable but from this dataset is not sensible. Whilst a large and an increasing number of manufacturing firms over the
period of concern had the legal form examined here, this is certainly not the case for the vast majority of agricultural and
livestock businesses.
See for instance; Ocampo, J. A. and Tovar, C. ‘Colombia...’ p. ; and Sándoval, D. ‘Política...’ p. .
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effects were certainly short-lived. 
e proportions are in relative terms and it does not
add much to provide the absolute figures, for the data are based on different samples of
incorporated companies that vary at times largely in the numbers of firms covered.

e banks, however, provided a helpful service to the sector in the – lustrum via
overdrafts and red numbers in the credit-balances of current accounts, which escalated a
significant  compared to . 
is feature, however, did not last long either, as the
relative proportions of this liability decreased to their previous level in the – period.

e process that really stands out from the figure is the more enduring substitutive effect
that took place between other types of liabilities, namely, trade credit and the ‘various’ entry.

e first category is captured in the chart as ‘suppliers’ and it comprised both domestic
and international ones; the second is a more complex one, whose elements are difficult to
identify, but that contained, amongst other things, promissory notes, bills, and ‘various
creditors’ and ‘various others’, which hint at this largely being in effect, the curb market.

e encompassing ‘various’ passed from accounting for half of all liabilities of national
manufacturing corporations in  to explain  of liabilities from  onward. 
e
compensating force, as noted, was the credit offered by suppliers, which nearly tripled from
 to an average of  over the same time. 
ough at a minor scale, another interesting
observation is the decline in financing/funding originated with ‘shareholders’, comprised
by loans and dividends overdue, which also halved between  and – from 
to . 
is in turn seems to have been offset by the combined rise of ‘specified-guarantee
obligations’ (mortgage- and pledge-based credit) and non-mortgage, long-term obligations.
In short, demand-side empirical evidence surfacing from the creditors’ liabilities of national
manufacturing corporations indicates, again, that the role by banking credit in financing
the growth of industry was limited or unchanging. 
is stands in stark contrast to claims
by the existing literature of an excessive surge in cheap and ample credit to the sector
originating in incentives and legislation directed by the state to promote and support
industrialisation.
See Table A...
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Conclusions

is chapter started pointing at the various shortcomings of the extant literature on
industrial financing in mid-twentieth century Colombia. Conventional wisdom has
approached the issue using a theoretical framework that has run its course: ISI. Under
these lenses manufacturers are believed to have been the beneficiaries of credit policies that
forced the banking system to direct ample and subsidised resources to the sector. Industry
is considered to be one of the ‘productive’ sectors for which successive governments
prioritised the allocation of financial resources as part of an alleged wider economic
strategy aimed at industrialising the nation via substitution of imports. 
is chapter
challenges such interpretations. And it does it on empirical grounds. First; primary
historical evidence shows that industrialists considered short-term credit scarcity a grave
problem, for example, leading to underutilization of plant-capacity. Similarly, inadequate
longer-term financing, it was claimed, hindered expansion plans. Primary evidence from
other agents/institutions, namely, foreign missions/experts, such as those of the IBRD,
complements and confirms the allegations of manufacturers. So does further qualitative
material originating in public/governmental agencies, such as the fiscal auditor and the
CB. 
e compilation of this variety of sources aims at a triangulation of evidence that
substantiates and gives strong support to the claims of the industrial sector, which on their
own, should be taken skeptically.
Secondly, an examination of the financial system and of the decrees, laws and resolutions
issued on the allocation of its resources demonstrates that so-called ‘legislated-credit’ did
not single out industrialists as privileged targets of any one government’s financial policies.
Moreover, it is shown that industry was left institutionally ‘orphaned’ when it came to
matching the needs of specific economic activities with a financial institution especially
designed for each, as it occurred with for instance with the Coffee, and Livestock banks
founded in the s. Attempts to create similar organisations to serve industry were
not seriously considered. 
irdly, first-hand evidence on the allocation of new and
outstanding loans covering the entire banking system, i.e. private commercial banks, the
Agrarian Bank and other bancos gremiales, as well as the mixed BCH and the Banco de
Or were very poorly endowed. 
e best example of this is IFI; see chapter  of this dissertation.
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la República, shows that the relative share of credit allocated to industry was far from
being extraordinary. Not only were other sectors receiving larger proportions, such as
agribusinesses, but there was no clear-cut upward trend found, as should be expected, if
the ISI or state-led industrialisation interpretations were to hold. Further, fragmentary but
valuable evidence on the proportions of subsidised lending also indicate that industry was
a relative loser.
Establishing the relative sectoral shares of credit allocated by the entire banking system
is a significant and long overdue contribution that provides material for new, revisionist
interpretations. 
e one advanced here is that the Colombian state, via credit policies
at least, delivered only limited support to industry during the alleged era of state-led
ISI. Instead, it has been shown, agrarian ventures, and particularly coffee growers and
cattle ranchers, received preferential financing incentivised by and/or ordered directly from
government heights. Having demonstrated that the allocation of credit by the banking
system failed to make industry a privileged recipient, the critical pending question is
why. Why did credit legislation and more generally its allocation benefit other economic
activities? Why were governments disinclined to assist manufacturing with ample and
cheap credit? 
e most relevant insights to these questions come from an examination of
the wider political economy that underpinned the financial system and that determined
the flows of ordinary and subsidised financing. 
is is the subject of the next chapter.

6 The Political Economy of Banking-Credit
Allocation
“No one really believes that this country is governed by senators and representatives elected by popular
vote. 
e real power, the economic power, resides in other visible institutions, in the Monetary Junta,
the Banco de la República, the Agrarian Bank...”
Alfonso López Michelsen, 
“
e coffee industry... could scream at the four winds:
I am the fiscal equilibrium; because on coffee exports depend the custom revenues, which constitute the
bases of our budgets;
I am the external credit of both nation and provinces; because over coffee levies external public and
private debts are served, and because if coffee exports stopped the Banco de la República would go bust
in less than three months...
In one word, I represent Colombia’s material civilisation, and from me it depends.”
Mariano Ospina Pérez, 

is chapter offers a political-economy explanation of why credit was not directed to
manufacturing enterprises either in large volumes or at subsidised prices during the alleged
era of state-led ISI. 
e main hypothesis holds that a growing incompatibility emerged
between the financial requirements intrinsic to the advanced stages of industrialisation
and the clientelistic demands of the Colombian polity. 
is claim is examined through a
theoretical framework that treats the preferential allocation of credit as the outcome of a
political equilibrium. On the demand-side lies the political power of credit demandeurs,
which depends on the relative size of industry in the economy, its organisational strength
and financial needs. 
e power of other groups competing for resources, especially of
Haggard, S. and Lee, C. ‘
e Political...’ pp.–. 
is section borrows freely from their ideas, and from Haggard,
S. ‘Pathways...’ pp. –.
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agriculture, and of those bearing the costs of cheap credits, is likely to counter the strength
of industrialists’ appetite for finance. On the supply-side, the intentions/interests and
the power of ruling politicians, as well as the structure of government institutions, are
critical. 
e latter concerns the degree of insulation of the policy-making processes of
key public institutions, such as the CB. 
e former allows for agency: politicians mostly
concerned with macroeconomic stability, i.e. taming inflation, are less likely to interfere
in the financial system, whereas leaders whose top priority is growth are more likely to
intervene and support preferential credit schemes. As the elements of the theoretical
framework are substantiated with a combination of primary evidence and arguments from
the existing literatures, indications as to what to expect in the allocation of preferential
credit among economic sectors shall become apparent.

e chapter is structured in eight parts. 
e first section presents historical evidence on
the interests and preferences of politicians in government regarding the broad economic
strategy, to show that across political parties and throughout the period there was little
appetite for a full-fledged pro-industrialisation programme. It argues that the label ‘bal-
anced growth across sectors’ describes best the macro policies of the time, which exhibited
remarkable continuity. 
e second section considers the political aspects of industrial
policy and examines the necessary conditions for states to design and implement successful
industrial transformations. 
e role of the CB is considered next, where new evidence, for
instance arising from its rediscounting lines and interest rates, demonstrates that industry
was not privileged. Part four of the chapter surveys the political clout and economic
relevance of industry vis-à-vis coffee and other agrarian interests to gauge their respective
power and ‘predict’ the direction elected politicians would give to credit flows under the
aegis of the state. 
e narrative proceeds claiming that the largest publicly-owned bank,
the Agrarian Bank, served clientelistic purposes, based on the patterns of credit allocation
and the nature of the loans it advanced in the countryside. Section six considers whether
or not the demand and supply of credit met the needs of different economic activities,
according to fixed-capital requirements. New calculations of marginal capital-output
ratios, cross-checked with loans-to-output data establish which sectors were prioritised.
A plausible counterfactual exploring the likelihood of a pro-ISI political coalition and

T P E  B-C A
assessing the chances of a successful industrialisation strategy consolidating in the political
agenda of the time is the subject of part seven. 
e last section concludes.
Interests and Preferences of Elected Politicians

e starting point on the supply-side of the political equilibrium of preferential credit
is the identification of the interests and preferences of governments. A representative
and indicative set of documents to review are the so-called Government Plans (planes de
gobierno) often unveiled at the start of the presidential terms. Planes de gobierno offer a
glimpse into the macro interests of ruling politicians. Indeed, Bruton suggests, that “the
most formal policy instrument [for ISI] was the national plan, and many countries spent
substantial resources in drawing up a comprehensive plan... Plan documents reflected the
initial conditions and government objectives... In particular, plans concentrated heavily on
manufacturing...” 
e building of institutions and the drafting of plans around the goal of
accelerated industrialisation in several latecomers is also noted by Amsden. She highlights,
amongst others, the arch-developmentalist drive of Park Chung Hee in Korea around
, the early-s 
ird Development Plan of Taiwan (promoting heavy industry),
and the Pioneer Industry Ordinance of Malaysia in . In India, state commitment
for a ‘push’ to industrialisation came earlier. According to Chibber, between  and
 Nehru and the Indian National Congress made “the path to development virtually
synonymous with industrialisation”. 
at developmentalism was strongly placed on the
political agenda since, is confirmed through the passing by the Indian Parliament of the
Industrial Policy Resolution aimed at diversifying into basic sectors. In Latin America,
similar trends are observed in Brazil, where modernising ideology influenced governments
from the late s, portraying industrial development as the “hallmark of modernity”. A
decisive spurt took concrete form a decade later with the Targets Plan, implemented under
the presidency of Kubitschek (–) — a ‘push’ that was long-lasting. Lastly, in Mexico,
Bruton, H. ‘Import Substitution’ in Chenery, H and Srinivasan, T. N. (Eds) Handbook of Development Economics
() p. .
Amsden, A. ‘
e Rise...’ pp. –.
Chibber, V. ‘Locked...’ p. .
Leff, N. “Economic...’ p. .
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as early as  President Miguel Aleman, in office until , “made industrialisation his
only economic goal [italics in the original]”. 
is review prompts the question: what were
Colombia’s economic plans?
Reacting to the disruptions that WWII was causing for the Colombian economy, in June
, Liberal President Eduardo Santos launched his General Plan designed to promote
national development and to give the economy a more rational orientation. 
e Plan, the
first of its kind, considered that: “development demands an equilibrium or equivalence
between agrarian and mining exploitations on the one hand, and industrial evolution,
on the other”. Perhaps because of this it consisted of three individual sub-plans: one
for agriculture, another for livestock, and a third for manufacturing. Unlike in Mexico
under Aleman or Brazil under Kubitschek, Colombia’s plans never equated economic
development or modernity with industrialisation, hence, its strategies did not concentrate
the energy of policy-makers or the financial resources of the economy on it at any point.
Santos’ economic plan set a trend best characterised, nominally at least, as ‘balanced growth
across sectors’. In practice, however, more often than not the most favoured sectors were
livestock and agricultural interests, particularly coffee producers.
In the absence of similar plans by the government of Santos’s successor and party-fellow,
López Pumarejo, annual reports by the Ministry of the National Economy provide a
sense of government actions and intentions. 
e  report of this ministry suggested
that: “...the country should orientate its financial efforts to increase the production of
meat, wheat, potatoes, fish, maize, lard, fruits, vegetables and other basic items, as well
as that of transforming industries.” 
e following year the ministry produced a detailed
five-year plan for the development of agriculture, but no equivalent for manufacturing.
In explaining the industrial dynamism of these years, Abel and Palacios, state: “Industrial
growth and initiative were not the direct effect of planned policy but the unintended
Amsden, A. ‘Escape . . . ’ p. . For further references on ISI in Latin America, see 
orp, R. ‘A Reappraisal...’ and
chapter  of this thesis.
Presidencia de la República. Plan General: Medidas de Fomento de la Economía Nacional en Desarrollo de las
Facultades Extraordinarias,  June , p. , [Unpublished draft], AGN.
Presidencia de la República. Plan General: Medidas de Fomento de la Economía Nacional en Desarrollo de las
Facultades Extraordinarias,  June , p. , AGN.
Ministerio de la Economía Nacional. Informe, , p. .
Ministerio de la Economía Nacional. Plan Quinquenal de Fomento Agrícola, .
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Table .: Presidential Succesion, -
Period in
Office
President Political Party Observation
- Enrique Olaya Herrera Liberal
– Alfonso López Pumarejo Liberal
– Eduardo Santos Montejo Liberal
– Alfonso López Pumarejo Liberal Resigns (political pressure
and personal reasons)
– Alberto Lleras Camargo Liberal
– Mariano Ospina Pérez Conservative Political violence spirals
– Laureano Gómez Castro Conservative Resigns (illness)
– Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez Conservative
– Gustavo Rojas Pinilla Military coup d’etat Supported by Conserva-
tive/Liberal factions
– Military Junta Transitional government
– Alberto Lleras Camargo Liberal National Front, coalition
rule
– Guillermo León Valencia Conservative National Front, coalition
rule
– Carlos Lleras Restrepo Liberal National Front, coalition
rule
– Misael Pastrana Borrero Conservative National Front, coalition
rule
Sources: Bushnell, D. () and Hartlyn, J. and Dugas, J. ().
and fortuitous consequences of measures designed to strengthen the balance of payments,
restore public finance and revive domestic foods production... [E]rroneous conclusions
about the pro-industrialist aims of economic policy should not be derived from the
industrialization of the s and s.” Liberal politicians, thus, were not strong
advocates of industrialism.
Ospina Pérez’s presidency implied party change at the top of the executive branch
but not a transformation in the general framework of economic policies. In his Politics
of the National Union, Ospina stressed as one of the bases of his administration the
stimulation and promotion of agriculture via scientific systems of land cultivation, provision
of fertilisers, water irrigation and cheap credit, as well as the protection of industry. 
e
variety of protectionism promoted by this government, however, was that of ‘integral
Abel, C. and Palacios, M. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
Ospina Pérez, M. La Política de Unión Nacional, , Vol. , pp. –.
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protection’, that is, one that stimulated both agriculture and industry. As 
orp explains
it: “Purchasing local materials was, needless to say, unpopular with industry — but a
solution was worked out: in  import quotas begun to be allocated conditional on
purchases of local raw materials, and other measures of support to agriculture [italics in
the original].” 
e multifaceted and strong links of presidents, such as Ospina’s, with
agrarian interests could explain the rural bias of policy. Before the presidency, Ospina was
senator for Antioquia, a position from which he boosted the creation of the Agricultural
Mortgage Bank and the foundation of the Agrarian Bank, and formed the legal bases of
the general-deposit warehouses that also served crop growers. Further, he was appointed
general manager of the FNC from  to , earning him the ‘hombre del gremio’
(coffee-growers’ man) label henceforth. Abel notes Ospina’s early recognition amongst
national political circles as “the champion of rural interests”. Notwithstanding the above,
the fact that other presidents and political leaders of the period, lacking Ospina’s wide
range and depth of countryside links, also opted for balanced-growth policies serves to
recognise the great political significance of this sector and the politicians’ awareness of this
fact. Elite consensus over the broad economic strategy remained constant even amongst
the most politically radical of presidents: Laureano Gómez.
During his administration the Ministry of Finance’s Memoir of  envisaged the
economic orientation of government, indicating that “to reduce Colombia’s economic de-
pendency on the price of coffee in the US an intense promotion of the national production,
both agrarian and industrial, was required”. Allegations about industrial favouritism,
which had emerged early during his administration, were emphatically denied by minister
Álvarez Restrepo: “It is not as it has been said, that under the current government manu-
facturing enjoys privilege or exceptional conditions or discriminatory advantage. No: the
government’s position is one of fair equilibrium toward all productive forces. Manufactur-
ing, commerce, agrarian; all economic activities must be served.” 
e same message was
reiterated the following year by a different finance minister. 
e lukewarm commitment

orp, R. ‘A Reappraisal...’ p. ; and Jaramillo Ocampo, H. ‘De la Unidad...’ p. .
Perry, O. ‘Quién es Quién en Colombia’ () pp. –.
Abel, C. ‘Política...’ p. .
Ministerio de Hacienda. Memoria de Hacienda, , p. .
Ministerio de Hacienda, Exposición del Ministro de Hacienda, , p. .
Ministerio de Fomento. Una Política de Fomento, , p. .
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of this government, as much as that of its predecessors, toward industrialisation was best
summarised in the concluding remarks of an independent consultative body modelled on
the British Royal Commission, the Committee for Economic Development, whose final
report admonished: “More important that any one concrete suggestion is the adoption of
a defined attitude... government and people shall not fear industrial development.” 
e
committee’s observation constitutes further evidence of the irresolute stance of governments
to industrialise the Colombian economy.
Under the military rule of Gustavo Rojas, regime change opened up opportunities for
change. As a non-professional politician and as ‘outsider’ to the electorate, the General
could have shifted the economic strategy by favouring industrial development with clear
policies, as the Committee had recently recommended. Rojas chose not to, however. His
broad economic strategy consisted of ten fundamental points, summarised as: promoting
private enterprise, welcoming foreign investment, stimulating the oil sector, maintaining
monetary stability, continuing the strengthening of financial institutions for agriculture and
livestock, housing planning, balancing the exchange rate and external accounts, keeping tar-
iff protection for manufacturing and ensuring equilibrium in the budget. 
is can hardly
be interpreted as state-led industrialisation. Rather, the economic course during military
rule explicitly followed the path taken by the previous democratic government: “continuity
with the economic management of Urdaneta’s administration [the vice-president who
replaced Gómez after falling ill], with a view towards the orderly development of the econ-
omy” read the Finance Minister’s memoir. Similarly, trade protectionism closely echoed
the ‘integral’ approach of the Ospina years: “Government will continue the protectionist
policies of national work and production. Agriculturalists and industrialists can be assured
that the products of their lands and factories will be defended...” In practice, however,
and as will be shown below, the agrarian sectors received a level of support unmatched by
manufacturing.
Alacevich, M. ‘
e Political Economy of the World Bank: 
e Early Years’ () pp. –.
Comité de Desarrollo Económico. Informe Final, , p. .
Ministerio de Hacienda. Memoria, , pp. –.
Ministerio de Hacienda. Memoria, , p. .
Ministerio de Hacienda. Memoria, , p. .
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e nature of the coalition rule following the dictatorship, in the context of a conciliatory
political environment, secured changes in economic strategy which were only marginal —
at least until . 
e Economic Platform of the National Front, presented to the public
in August , pursued the following objectives: First; to conduct strict stabilisation
policies in the monetary, fiscal and exchange fields, secondly; to attempt an equitable
distribution of national income; thirdly, to promote a policy of economic development
and rehabilitation that would increase agrarian and industrial production and would
permit an intense substitution of imports; and fourthly, to unite the public and private
sectors towards austerity in spending and priority in investment. 
e import-substituting
process highlighted in point three refers to both agriculture and manufacturing; the sub-
sectors singled out included vegetable oils, cocoa, wheat and wool; and metal-mechanics,
metallurgy, chemical and pulp paper, respectively. Further, the  Memoir of the
Ministry of Finance explained that the government’s plan for the stimulation of production
covered all sectors. One document that decidedly favoured the industrial sector as
part of wider economic development strategy, providing studies and projections for its
long-term planning, was the Plan General de Desarrollo Económico y Social. 
e plan had
been elaborated by the Planning Department with the aid of CEPAL and was adopted
by President Lleras as the official manifesto of his government’s economic policy. Since
Lleras’s term was nearing its end when the plan became public, its execution came to depend
on the willingness of his successor, León Valencia, who decided to brush it aside. A review
of the National Front’s major policy steps in economic development supports further the
primary evidence presented here. Berry, for instance, singles out the institutionalisation of
planning, the adoption of floating exchange rates, the Andean trade scheme and monetary
reform; but above all agrarian reforms and agricultural development. His interpretations
Ministerio de Fomento. Memoria, , Annex, p. xxiii.
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Memoradum de Trabajo sobre Información Básica para la Plataforma Económica,
, p. , AGN.
Ministerio de Hacienda. Memoria, , Annex, p. .
Perry, G. ‘Introducción...’ p. .
Kalmanovitz, S. and López, E. ‘La Agricultura Colombiana en el Siglo XX’ () p. . According to these authors,
the disregard of León Valencia for the plan was coherent with his short-sightedness on economic affairs.
Berry, A. ‘
e National Front and Colombia’s Economic Development’ in Berry, A., Hellman, R. and Solaún, M.
(Eds) Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia () pp. –.
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are in line with others, such as Hartlyn, who contends that economic policy-making during
this period was ‘moderate’ and ‘eclectic’ with several elements of continuity.
In sum, unlike several neighbouring countries, Colombia did not prioritise manufactur-
ing over this period. Irrespective of the political hue of the administration — Conservative
or Liberal, democratic or military — there was broad policy continuity. For reasons that
will become clear later, industrialism did not take hold in Colombia’s political-ruling elites.

erefore, economic development plans lacked serious commitment to industrialisation.

e kind of institution-building that underpinned industrialisation in other latecomers was
mostly absent. 
e corollary of this is that the process of industrialisation in mid-twentieth
century Colombia, like its prior development, was not led by a state pursuing a conscious
strategy of ISI. Instead it was the result of an endogenous process. In the Colombian case
at least, Haber’s dictum that Latin American states were autonomous entities capable of
framing development strategies like ISI is social science fiction, resonates justly. 
at
industrialisation then was largely a private/market-led process and that ruling politicians
did not conceive it as a path for economic development needs to be explained. 
e nature
and organisational structure of domestic politics is a useful pointer.
The Political Nature of Economic Policy
Industrial policy, as any economic policy that aims at promoting or favouring one economic
sector or group over another, is ultimately redistributive in nature. Whether through
tariffs, subsidised loans, preferential exchange rates or fiscal exemptions, a ‘push’ for
See Hartlyn, J. ‘
e Politics...’ pp. –. Concrete support for manufacturing took place with the transformation
of IFI from direct industrial promoter into a public development bank in . From then on IFI’s financial muscle
developed strongly and several manufacturing firms received generous support; see Lopera, M. T. and Peláez, S. ‘Política...’
Simultaneously, however, this financial support — typically associated with ISI deepening — contrasted with the wider
movement of the framework of economic policy-making towards export-led growth, as evidenced by the reforms
accomplished in ; on this see for instance, Ocampo, J. ‘
e Transition...’ and Hartlyn, J. ‘
e Politics...’ pp.
–. 
e last administration of the coalition government (–), came closest to implementing a strategy in
which one preferred economic activity, namely construction/housing (not manufacturing) acted as a ‘leading’ sector.
Buendia agrees with this view: “none of the ten development plans the country had seen has made of the industrial
sector, the leading sector.” See Buendia, H. G. ‘Los Grupos Industriales y el Desarrollo Colombiano: Conjeturas e
Interpretaciones’ in Coyuntura Económica () No. , p. .
Haber, S. ‘
e Political...’ p. . Similarly, Griffin remarks: “...one cannot say that economic planning has failed in
Colombia; it has never been tried.” See, Griffin, K. ‘Coffee and the Economic Development of Colombia’ in Bulletin of
the Oxford University Institute of Economics & Statistics () Vol. , No. , p. .
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industrialisation is bound to lead to winners and losers in the short- and long-run. Given
that such policies originate in the public realm, it is naïve to assume that politicians neglect
the redistributive impact, and thus the electoral costs of the policies they design and
implement. 
e policy instruments and the organisational power of the state are also
essential to the achievement of the proposed policies. 
e combination of these two factors
is the critical determinant of policy-making success or failure.

e literature on policy formulation and the roles of politics and the state in eco-
nomic development is vast. 
is section concentrates on examining the variables that
constrain/enable policy elites in their attempts to industrialise their societies as well as
on the factors shaping the broad economic goals themselves. First, insights as to why
policy elites oppose economic development are examined. 
en a review of arguments
emphasising various broad characteristics of the states implementing development strate-
gies is offered. A more nuanced view of the political determinants of state preferences
and the influence of key economic groups on policy-making clarifies why policy elites
choose certain policies over others. Explanations as to why certain policies are pursued are
complemented with why distinct mechanisms to achieve them are preferred. Finally, the
particular case of Colombia’s non-attempts at state-led ISI are framed and accounted for.
In a theoretical paper Acemoglu and Robinson suggest that political elites in economically
backward countries block technological and institutional development, because they dread
to lose political power, they are unwilling to initiate change. 
e ‘political loser hypothesis’
emphasises that if the losers are economic (i.e. not political) agents they cannot prevent
technological and institutional progress. 
us there is a need to examine the role of political
institutions and power in economic development. In their owns words: “... the problem
of understanding why industrialization was rapid in some countries, whereas in others it did
not get off the ground, is closely related to understanding why in some countries the state
encouraged industrialization, whereas in others it did not.” 
e mathematical model by
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. ‘Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective’ in American Political Science Review
() Vol. , No. , p. . See also, Robinson, J. ‘
eories of “Bad Policy”’ in Policy Reform () Vol. , No. ,
pp. –.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. ‘Political Losers as Barriers to Economic Development’ () Unpublished
manuscript, p. .
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. ‘Economic...’ p. .
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which elites running backward states fail to promote industrialisation is new, but the insight
is not. In  Griffin et al. proposed that economic development was not an objective of
Latin American governments because growth undermined the monopoly over power that
the dominant economic group enjoyed. Griffin and collaborators substantiated their
claims with empirical evidence on the structure, incidence and levels of taxation as well as
data on the patterns of expenditure and the size of governments.
Debates over the rapid industrialisation of latecomers concomitantly have noted the
importance of the commitment of public powers around a pro-manufacturing strategy. In
examining successful cases, Zhu emphasises the “cohesiveness and consistent commitment
to industrialisation [italics added]” of Northeast Asian states. 
e pioneering work of
Johnson on the role of the state in the Japanese economic ‘miracle’ illustrates this point:
“[A] state’s first priority will define its essence... For more than fifty years the Japanese
state has given its first priority to economic development.” By ‘economic development’
Johnson means industrialisation. As does Koo discussing Japan’s neighbours: “In South
Korea Park Chung-Hee was very different from Syngman Rhee in his strong commitment
to economic growth. Whereas Rhee had been preoccupied with political concerns, Park
gave highest priority to economic development. In Taiwan, too, Chiang Kai-shek concen-
trated on economic development from the s on.” Similarly, Kohli indicates that
states that define their goals narrowly and clearly, like South Korea did under Chung-
Hee — rapid industrialisation — are important factors in explaining the effectiveness of
state interventions. 
e experiences of East Asia hint that a strong and clear political
commitment to manufacturing is a necessary condition for economic development in
Griffin, K. ‘Monopoly Power, Material Progress and Economic Surplus’ in Griffin, K. (Ed) Financing Development in
Latin America () pp. –.
Zhu, T. ‘
reat Perception and Developmental States in Northeast Asia’ () Australian National University:
Department of International Relations Working Paper, No. , p. .
Johnson, C. ‘
e Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept’ in Woo-Cumings, M. (Ed) 
e Developmental State
() p. .
Woo-Cumings, M. ‘Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development’ in Woo-
Cumings, M. (Ed) 
e Developmental State () p. .
Koo, H. ‘
e Interplay of State, Social Class and World System in East Asian Development: 
e Cases of South
Korea and Taiwan’ in Deyo, F. (Ed) 
e Political... pp. –. Robinson also notes the compromise of South
Korean governments as they “overtly committed themselves to industrialization”; see Robinson, J. ‘Industrial Policy and
Development: A Political Economy Perspective’ () p. .
Kohli, A. ‘State...’ p. . Wade has also noted the relevance of political commitment to industrialisation in his
account of Taiwan’s successful industrialisation; see Wade, R. ‘Governing...’ pp. , –.
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late industrialising economies. 
e insights from the formal models on obstacles to it are
telling, yet both Acemoglu and Robinson and Griffin et al., perhaps by necessity, reduce the
composition of the forces blocking economic upgrading to a unitary, homogenous group
or class. From a historical point of view, however, this does not suffice. A more nuanced
account is required to explain why political elites fail to push for decisive industrialisation.

e political environment in which presidents operate, and the characteristics of the state
they run are relevant variables deserving closer examination.
Since Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol ‘brought the state back in’ to the comparative
and historical analyses of social change, widening the ways in which states are examined
both as organisations through which collectivities pursue distinct goals as well as the
result of configurations influencing political groups and classes in society, the number of
studies adopting state-centred approaches examining industrialisation-themes has risen
sharply. Evans for instance, draws a distinction between successful and unsuccessful
late-industrialisers according to the types of states attempting the transformation. Devel-
opmental states, like the Japanese, relying on a highly trained, meritocratic and competent
bureaucracy with effective capacity to intervene, autonomous from vested interests, yet em-
bedded with private, industrial capital provided the basis for the type of state involvement
that led to rapid industrialisation. So-called ‘embedded autonomy’, that “apparently
contradictory combination of corporate coherence and connectedness” is, according to
Evans, the basic state structure that can sustain successful industrialisation. Predatory states
impede it, as they provide little in the way of public goods and lacking autonomy from
private interests have their public decisions “up for sale”. In addition to autonomous
states with competent bureaucracies other authors stress that states attempting industrial
upgrading must display qualities such as strength, internal cohesiveness and capitalist
ethos.
Skocpol, T. ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analyses in Current Research’ in Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D.
and Skocpol, T. (Eds) Bringing... p. .
Evans, P. ‘Predatory...’ pp. –.
Evans, P. ‘Predatory...’ p. .
Chang, H-J. ‘
e Political Economy of Industrial Policy’ () p. .
Kohli, A. ‘State...’ p. –.
Haggard, S. ‘Pathways...’ p. .
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e underlying logic behind the characterisation of a state that successfully fosters
industrialisation is that strength, autonomy and cohesion are required for it to be able
to discipline the firms receiving assistance. 
e beneficiaries of industrial policies must
be disciplined and compelled to meet targets and performances. Key is state capacity.
Only states with effective capacity can impose discipline on firms and can design and
implement the mechanisms by which government failure is minimised. Elements affecting
such capacity are the political power of landed elites, the industrial bourgeoisie and the
working class. For example, Kay suggests that Latin America’s deficiencies at ‘statecraft’
are linked to its “more polarised and entrenched class structure.” In accounting for the
failure of Indian developmentalist forays Chibber focuses on the weak capacities of the
Indian state vis-à-vis organised business, especially when planners demanded the latter
to conform to policy priorities. Indian public officials proved incapable of disciplining
the capitalist class because they lacked the institutions that could have empowered them
to do so. Under that logic, the same author attributes the success of Korea’s industrial
‘push’, amongst others, to the patterns of authority set within the state. Under Chung
Hee’s presidency, Chibber argues, one state agency became the apex body for economic
policy and planning, centralising decisions and disciplining both private firms and other
state agencies. To others, this effectively amounted to a super-ministry. 
is kind of
institutionalisation of authority and power provided the Korean state with the capacity to
design and implement effective industrial policy that its Indian equivalent lacked.
An underestimated aspect in the politics of late-industrialisation is the countryside.
Perhaps because industrialisation is associated with factories, workers and consumers in
urban centres it is often assumed that rural groups are politically negligible. Moreover,
agriculture under the ISI framework is more often than not the ‘victim’ of overvalued
exchange rates, price controls and the general anti-export bias that this model generates.
See for instance, Amsden, A. ‘
e Rise...’ pp. –.
Jenkins, R. ‘
e Political Economy of Industrialization: A Comparison of Latin American and East Asian Newly
Industrializing Countries’ in Development and Change () Vol. .
Kay, C. ‘Why East Asia Overtook Latin America: Agrarian Reform, Industrialisation and Development’ in 
ird
World Quarterly () Vol. , No. , p. .
Chibber, V. ‘Locked...’ pp. –.
Chibber, V. “Bureaucratic Rationality and the Developmental State’ in American Journal of Sociology () Vol. ,
No. , pp. –.
Chang, H-J. ‘
e Political...’ p. .
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e transfers made from agriculture to industry represent the ‘plundering of agriculture’,
that Valdés and Schiff argue, could only have negative effects on economic growth. 
e
transfers of surpluses, however, were pivotal to the industrial upgrading of Korea and
Taiwan. Further, Kay argues that what is remarkable is that East Asian states managed
to squeeze agriculture ensuring its sustained growth — partly because of inflows to the
sector that Valdés and Schiff fail to consider. Davis offers an original interpretation of
the relation between the rural sector, the state and successful late-industrialisation that
informs the Latin American cases in general, and the Colombian one in particular.
Davis’s intention is ‘bringing the rural perspective back in’ to studies of industrial policy.
She sustains that the rural middle-class endows the state with the will and capacity to
discipline capital and labour. Specifically, if small agricultural producers wield political
influence within the state, the disciplinary regime that emerges takes shape in the form
of both macro- and micro-economic constraints and regulations. At the micro level,
performance standards and control mechanisms a la Amsden, complemented with gov-
ernment control over banks and the flows of finance stand out as effective devices. At the
macro level, policies intending to set realistic food prices and favourable exchange rates
for agriculture with a view to bolstering aggregate demand are key. In short, the rural
influence is considered to have tipped the balance against inflationary ISI regimes in late
late-industrialisers like South Korea and Taiwan, but not so in early late-industrialisers such
as Argentina and Brazil. Within this framework, Colombian late-late-industrialisation,
with salient political forces rooted in agriculture, is a puzzling case.
Why did a ‘late-latecomer’ to industrialisation with a distinctively powerful rural con-
stituency connected to the external economy fail to construct a disciplinary regime that
spurred rapid and successful industrialisation? 
e immediate response, as discussed above,
Valdés, A. and Schiff, M. ‘
e Plundering of Agriculture in Developing Countries’ ().
Amsden, A. ‘
e State and Taiwan’s Economic Development’ in Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (Eds)
Bringing... ; Kay, C. ‘Why East Asia...’ p. ; Jenkins, R. ‘
e Political...’ pp. –.
Kay, C. ‘Why East Asia...’ pp. –.
Davis, D. ‘Discipline...’ pp. –. 
ough Davis also includes urban middle classes in her analyses it is the rural
middle class that is critical.
Davis, D. ‘Discipline...’ p. .
Davis’s differentiation between ‘early and late late-industrialisers’ is not so much chronological as it seeks to underscore
the extent to which industrial manufacturing and production are under way, as opposed to the weight of agriculture, at
the moment of industrial take-off, and the likelihood that the balance between these would engender a rural middle-class
embedded state; see pp. –.
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is that Colombian ruling elites did not exhibit preferences or interests to effect a ‘push’ for
industrialisation. 
is argument is insufficient, for in turn what begs explanation is why
politicians were not inclined to pursue strong pro-industrial policies. 
e thesis advanced
here is that the political regime, broadly speaking, whether authoritarian or democratic,
and the particular redistributive mechanisms by which politicians hold onto power are
decisive in shaping the micro- and macro-economic policies that set the path for state-
or market-led industrialisation. Concretely, in the (mostly) democratic and electorally
competitive environment of Colombia, politicians seeking and retaining power relied
extensively on clientelistic practices. In a country where the majority of the population
still lived in the countryside, the agrarian clientele represented a crucial constituency. 
is
had distinctive implications for the variety of disciplinary regime that formed. At the
macroeconomic level, as set out by Davis, policies by and large did not harm agrarian
interests and were in no way systematically geared towards promoting industrial develop-
ment. At the microeconomic level, however, rural-clientelistic imperatives prevented the
building of institutions and mechanisms designed to financially assist manufacturing firms
— consequently, the need for disciplinary devices was muted. Unlike other early- and
late-industrialisers, Colombia’s public sources of credit between  and  were over-
whelmingly channelled to agrarian ventures. Loans to agriculturalists, especially to coffee
growers and to livestock farmers, flowed in large quantities and at subsidised prices. To
reiterate, preferential financing was not advanced to industry because political clientelism
forced the channelling of resources towards the countryside.

ough several criticisms can be made to labelling the political system and experience of Colombia as democratic,
this author considers the well-documented arguments by Posada-Carbó on this issue adequate. Briefly summarised, he
sustains that Colombia, in line with liberal democratic traditions, has effectively fragmented and limited public power.

e system of checks and balances, if far from perfect, has by and large functioned: congress, the courts, civil society and
local forces have been instrumental on this. Further, despite fraud, manipulation and violence, Colombia’s electoral
history is not to be discarded: early incorporation of popular sectors, prevalence of elections to form government and
their relatively high competitiveness, as well as respect for the terms set in office, stand out as extraordinary attainments
in the region. Finally, most citizens have considered elected governments legitimate; see Posada-Carbó, E. ‘La Nación...’
Chs.  and .

orp has argued that “there was substantial institutional building, based more in the rural sector than in industry.

e institutional development covered technology, irrigation and credit... From the s, policies embraced the rural
sector.” See 
orp, R. ‘Progress...’ p. . In line with this argument, Grindle selected Brazil, Colombia and Mexico as
case studies that substantiate the major role of the state in seeking to stimulate a more productive and modern agricultural
sector in Latin America; see Grindle, M. ‘State and Countryside: Development Policy and Agrarian Politics in Latin
America’ () p. . Grindle’s data show that Colombia’s government expenditure on agriculture as percentage of total
government spending between  and  was well above other regional economies pursuing ISI, such as Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Venezuela; see Grindle, M. ‘State...’ p. .
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Robinson argues that notwithstanding their political dominance, political elites ought
to provide something to their citizens to hold on to power; basically, elites have two ways
of doing this: clientelism or populism — two forms of redistribution that though socially
inefficient are politically attractive. Clientelism implies micro-level distortions best
represented in the selective allocation of favours or rents (subsidised credit, for example).
Populist policies lead to macroeconomic imbalances, say in exchange rates and the level
of prices, through wage hikes and price controls. Critically, Robinson also sustains that
for historical reasons, Colombian politicians used clientelism as the mechanism for
redistribution and that they have made it more efficient than populism. Further, theories
of clientelism in democratic polities predict that a group like the coffee producers would
be a target of redistributive policies. Similarly, Rius and van de Walle argue that political
clientelism represents the primary source of opposition to economic-policy reform: here a
policy-reform path is understood to be a shift to a strong and comprehensive pro-industrial
policy regime. Specifically on the issue of financing, Rius and van de Walle state: “Given
clientelistic concerns... the government continues to regulate interest rates and credit to the
agricultural sector, even though the government credit agency runs a big deficit, repayments
rates are low and the poorest peasants do not have access to the credit system.” Is such
characterisation of the credit system close to the historical experience of Colombia? Is
there empirical evidence to substantiate the view that governments and politicians were
aware of the importance of the agrarian constituencies?
Antonio García Cadena, a prominent economist of the time and later adviser to the
Minister of the Economy, prophesised in : “For all the sex-appeal expressions of
Robinson, J. ‘Un Típico...’ pp. –.
A survey of the literature on clientelism lies beyond the scope of this study. For Colombia’s long history of clientelistic
practices and the causes behind them; see for instance Martz, J. ‘
e Politics...’; Archer, R. ‘
e Transition...’; and Carey,
J. M. and Shugart, M. S. ‘Incentives...’ pp. –.
Robinson, J. ‘Un Típico...’ p. .
A review of the literature by Robinson suggests that this group meets at least five or six of eight features that make for
likely recipients, namely: relatively numerous, capable of solving collective action problems, vote in high numbers. Coffee
growers did not form a political party and for various reasons it would be difficult to say that the average coffee-producer
was unideological when it came to politics or that it belonged to the same social network that politicians did (other three
conditions making for clientelistic candidates). However, and this is relevant, the representatives of the sector, who were
more often than not part of the political elite themselves, were also highly pragmatic when it came to political settlements
(a proxy for “swinging” voters) and were rather important in the electoral map. See Robinson, J. ‘
e Political Economy
of Redistributive Policies’ () pp. –.
Rius, A. and van de Walle, N. ‘Political Institutions and Economic Policy Reform’ () p. .
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industrial civilization offer urban- and ruling-classes’ imagination; for many years, this
nation will remain dependent on its land produce for its living.” President López seemed
to agree: “
e future of Colombia is linked to its countryside; agrarian issues of all kinds
have foremost importance.” 
e relevance of the countryside, however, was more targeted
or localised: activities/regions connecting Colombia to the world economy conferred it
its pre-eminence. When in  legislators considered bestowing the executive with
extraordinary powers to face the economic crisis unleashed by WWII, they approved this
delegation of powers with a view “to defend and promote the national industries, especially
the coffee sector.” Referring to the string of decrees that followed, a presidential discourse
read: “Government did not hesitate to defend the coffee industry, the most important of
the country and the one most worthy of support, for it provides sustenance to an infinity
of small-owners...” Concretely, reflecting on the support President López provided the
Agrarian Bank during his administration, which concerns this study the most, he wrote: “It
was a reason of great satisfaction and pride to have strengthened an institution exclusively
dedicated to serve country people; to show that it was possible to achieve for them much of
what I considered to be my mission when leading the fate of the Republic.” 
e evidence
displayed above suggests that at least during the late s and early s, that is, at the
start of the period under examination, politicians and Liberal administrations considered
specific groups within the agrarian sector politically important and aimed at catering for
their needs.
Unsurprisingly, Conservatives were also aware of the relevance of coffee for the economy.
Finance Minister Álvarez Restrepo recounted in : “[T]he supreme index of our
economy is the price of coffee. If it goes up, the prices of the goods people buy go up. It if
goes down, all prices — housing, merchandise and cattle — rapidly adjust accordingly.”
On the issue of financing, President Gómez too was an advocate of extensive facilities
to agriculturalists. His Agriculture Minister stated: “
e president is convinced that the
García Cadena, A. Unas Ideas Elementales sobre Problemas Colombianos, , p. .
Presidencia de la República. Declaraciones Presidenciales: Mensaje del Presidente de la República al Congreso Nacional
en sus Sesiones de , , p. .
Senado de la República de Colombia. Anales del Senado, Proyecto de Ley,  December , p. .
El Tiempo,  July .
Presidencia de la República. Declaraciones Presidenciales: Mensaje del Presidente de la República al Congreso
Nacional, , Vol. , pp. –.
Ministerio de Hacienda, Exposición del Ministro de Hacienda, , pp. –.
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foundation of a prosperous and productive agriculture is abundant credit.” 
at the
interests of the rural sector were well looked-after in this administration is also evident from
the minister’s memoir, who added: “
e Finance Minister, Álvarez Restrepo, has been the
minister of agriculturalists, not only on credit matters, where he excelled, but also on other
aspects such as the creation of the Provincial Cattle Funds, freedom to export, etc...” But
it is on the specific aspect of the sectoral allocation of loans where the defence of agrarian
interests by Angel Escobar, Agriculture Minister, is more forceful. Considering that the
share of loans allocated to agrarian ventures by the banking system was disproportionately
low and deeming that the distribution of credit was simply wrong, the minister proclaimed:
“...for a social class representing more than  of the economy, which is  of the
social fabric ... the overwhelming majority of the credit that corresponds, once the values
are twisted, is only .” Escobar proposed to rectify this unfair situation without
delay. Qualitative evidence stemming from cabinet offices like this one, in addition to the
previous impressionistic remarks by presidents and their close collaborators, suggest that
Colombian ruling elites regarded rural populations and voters as important constituencies.
In line with the arguments rehearsed above, state support for the rural economies was
critical in attaining and retaining political power.
As mentioned above, the mechanism through which this support (or redistribution)
took place was clientelism. 
us, rural clientelism provided a central feature of the
political context in which Colombia’s industrialisation occurred. According to Kahn and
Blankenburg, whether a country implements weak or strong industrial policies depends
considerably on the country’s internal distribution of power. 
e presence or absence
of compatibilities between political settlements and rent-management systems define the
success or failure of industrial strategies. What the distinctively clientelistic practices of the
Colombian polity point at, is that the numerous and widely-dispersed constituency that
the countryside represented necessarily diffused and fragmented political power. Politicians
and state officials faced a formidable challenge in making their case for a strong pro-industry
regime amidst a large, well-organised and vocal agricultural group, such as that of the
Ministerio de Agricultura. Memoria, , p. .
Ministerio de Agricultura. Memoria, , p. .
Ministerio de Agricultura. Memoria, , p. .
Kahn, M. and Blankenburg, S. ‘
e Political...’ pp. –.
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coffee growers. Supporting this view and focusing on Colombia, Di John argues that,
in a consolidated state with fragmented and clientelistic political institutions (including
political parties), a development strategy aimed at advanced ISI was unlikely; consequently,
the country opted for relatively decentralised, small-scale production structure. In other
words, the extended practice of clientelism linking politicians and rural producers/suppliers
fragmented power in a way that made the commitment for a ‘push’ for industrialisation
non-viable. For this reason, Colombian politicians did not essay it — at least not hard
enough. Industrialism did not imbue elites owing to the agrarian roots of their political
bases.
Summarising, development strategies emphasising industrial ‘push’ cannot be taken
as given. Political economies mediate the potential commitments of ruling elites to lead
their economies down the road of advanced industrialisation, provided that internal
distributions of political power allow for these intentions to turn into authoritative actions.
States attempting industrial upgrading can be expected to display a set of characteristics,
such as cohesiveness, strength and autonomy, to develop the kind of institutionalised
capacity required to discipline the firms/sectors benefiting from generous support. Rural
middle-classes wielding considerable political power are critical in bestowing the state with
disciplinary capabilities at both the macro- and the micro-economic level: the discipline
necessary for industrialisation to become efficient and for the overall strategy to succeed.
Notwithstanding the presence of a politically influential rural-middle class in Colombian
politics, epitomised by the exporting coffee-growers, that shaped a disciplined macro
environment, at the micro-level, the state failed to support manufacturing with ample
and subsidised financing. Clientelistic-political imperatives directed public credit towards
agricultural and livestock farming interests. In this context Colombian political elites
could not afford to prioritise industrial upgrading via cheap financing. An incompatibility
between internal political powers and the resolute commitment required for deepening
industrialisation prevented the emergence of a state-led ISI strategy.
Di John, J. ‘From Windfall to Curse: Oil and Industrialization in Venezuela:  to the Present’ () pp. –.
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The Central Bank

e way institutions essential to the orientation of financial flows and monetary stability,
such as the CB, are structured is vital in explaining why (and how) different economic
sectors/groups manage or fail to obtain preferential treatment in the form of subsidised
and/or ample credit from the financial system. 
e ability of rent-seeking groups to extract
rents partly depends on the preferences of ruling politicians over the trade-off between price
stability and rapid economic growth. In places where previous macroeconomic instability
has represented a damaging political liability, governments are less likely to intervene in
financial markets; in countries where the top political priority is rapid growth compounded
with the need to pay-off particular sectors, financial policy might be used extensively for
political ends. 
e extent to which any of these stylised scenarios occurs also hinges on
the level of insulation of the CB and allied ‘control ministries’, and whether or not these
are well institutionalised and autonomous from government. Maxfield emphasises three
determinants of policy patterns in finance, namely: a) the timing and actors involved in the
formation of the CB, b) the relationship between the CB and other state agencies, and c)
the extent of conglomeration between industrial and financial capital. Fearing inflation,
cheap credit, controls on international capital flows and heavy regulation, bankers are
likely to impose their policy preferences — tight monetary policy and liberal financial
regimes — if the CB is private and independent and works in alliance with a hegemonic
Ministry of Finance. In short, institutions such as the CB and the Ministry of Finance
and the relationships between them and government are pivotal in the shaping of financial
policy: if founded on solid autonomous bases, CBs are likelier to remain so.
Calomiris and Haber argue that banking arrangements are subject to opportunistic
behaviour by rulers, however. Hence, agreements over financial property rights are fragile.
Haggard, S and Lee, C. ‘
e Political Dimension...’ p. .
Haggard, S. and Maxfield, S. ‘Political...’ p. .
Maxfield, S. ‘Bankers’...’ p. .
Maxfield, S. ‘Bankers...’ pp. –.
On the first of the determinants, the fiscal auditor of public financial institutions remarked in his report of :
“Our Banco de la República was born strongly influenced by the stark reaction against the political interference of
governments, which in lieu of resolving fiscal emergencies ruin the sound structure of money — and with it the public’s
confidence. 
erefore, private capital was entrusted with inordinate representation...” in Revisoría Fiscal de Instituciones
Oficiales de Crédito, La Institución Bancaria Colombiana, , p. .
Calomiris, C. and Haber, S. ‘Why Banking is All About Politics and Always Has Been’ (Forthcoming) Ch. .
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e inherent conflicts governments face both as regulators of, and as borrowers from,
banks — given their position as contract enforcers against debtors and their dependence
on these very debtors for political support — underscores this opportunism. Insightfully,
these authors treat the property-rights system structuring banking not as the result of an
anonymous ‘market’ for institutions, but rather as “the product of political deals hammered
out by coalitions of market participants, which are intended to improve the welfare of the
members of those coalitions, not the society at large.” Further, they state: “
e allocation
of political power determines... the distribution of the burden of taxation, the allocation of
public spending, the regulation of entry, the licensing of banks, the supervision of publicly
traded companies and the flow of credit and its terms. 
ese bargains are exceptionally
complex but at root they are about the creation and distribution of economic rents and
the maintenance of political power.” It follows from the above that banking policy
will differ significantly in authoritarian polities from democratic ones, but also within
democracies. 
us, one can expect to find considerable variation, defined, for instance, by
whether redistribution is effected through clientelistic or populist politics. As discussed
above, politicians in Colombia opted for the former, and this is reflected in the structures
characterising the country’s CB and the banking system.
One study of Colombia’s CB distinguishes three main periods in its history. From its
foundation in  until , the Banco de la República is said to have been a private
and autonomous entity whose chief objective was to maintain price stability, showing a
clear commitment to this goal. A second period from  to  sees the maintenance
of its private status and independence but adds to its mandate the task of ensuring the
“accelerated development of the economy”. As a result, the CB allegedly abandoned the
commitment to price stability of the previous era. In the third period, –, the
Monetary Junta, a state entity, possessed no independence from government and had as its
main function the management of the monetary, financial and foreign exchange variables
of the economy — with a distinctive lack of commitment to price stability. Following
Calomiris, C. and Haber, S. ‘Why ...’ p. .
Calomiris, C. and Haber, S. ‘Why ...’ p. .

e distinction between them is discussed at length by Calomiris, C. and Haber, S. ‘Why ...’ pp. –.
Meisel, A. ‘Autonomía...’ p. .

e legal disposition ordering the new mandate of the CB did not state, as Meisel claims, “the accelerated development
of the economy” but “the ordered development of the economy”; Alviar, O. ‘Instrumentos...’ p. .
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Maxfield, the early foundation of the Colombian CB, the second oldest institution of
its kind in Latin America, and the private and independent status granted in its origins,
arguably made for firm foundations of the Bank’s ability to commit to price stability. 
e
very mild industrialism of political elites throughout the mid-twentieth century probably
eased the CB’s commitment in that respect too.

e independence of the CB seems not to have been as fragile as the framework of
Calomiris and Haber indicate. According to Cárdenas and Partow: “the degree of indepen-
dence of Colombia’s CB has been strongly path dependent, mainly because institutional
change has arisen from within the bank, rather than imposed by outside pressures.”
Certainly, the juridical arrangements contained in the organic law governing the CB ex-
plained this to no small extent, particularly the clause referring to the composition of its
directorship. A legal concept by the Bank itself recorded in the minutes of the board in
 assured the directors: “the contractual stipulation on the composition of the board of
directors is one of private law, and one that cannot be modified by Congress through any
imperative law...” On this issue, the fiscal auditor pointed out: “
e Bank’s system of
elevating to contract the composition of the board represents a barrier to parliamentary
incursions... any planned reforms to the organic law of the Bank will be purposeless
without changing the board.” 
e independent and private nature of the CB at this
time was in no doubt, as he added: “First, we encounter the problem of the formation
of the board, where the interests of the private institutions and of private agents form
the majority... With the Bank’s current composition it will be impossible to direct any
monetary policy for the general interest.” 
us, the – period can certainly be
classified as one in which the autonomy of the CB rested on strong legal foundations,
and presumably, as Meisel suggests, one in which its commitment to price stability was
relentless.
Cárdenas, M. and Partow, Z. ‘Does Independence Matter: Case Studies from Colombia’ () Inter-American
Development Bank: Documento de Trabajo, No , p. .
BRep. MoBD,  October ,[Act No. not retrieved] p. , ABRep.
Revisoria Fiscal de Instituciones Oficiales de Crédito, El Banco Emisor, El Crédito, La Moneda: Y Algunas Considera-
ciones Generales Sobre La Reforma Bancaria en Colombia, , pp. –.
Revisoria Fiscal de Instituciones Oficiales de Crédito, El Banco Emisor, El Crédito, La Moneda: Y Algunas Considera-
ciones Generales Sobre La Reforma Bancaria en Colombia, , pp. –.
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Meisel’s case for the CB’s lack of commitment to price stability following the reform of
 is, however, debatable on two grounds. First, the actual increases in the level of prices
between symmetric periods of time (say, – and –) reveal that inflation
rates were actually higher in the dozen years preceding the reform than in the same number
of years following it. From Meisel’s own data, the average annual rise in prices for the
– period is ., whereas that for – is .. Secondly, as noted by Oscar
Alviar, then advisor and high ranking official at the CB, the directors adopted a pragmatic
approach to monetary management that synthesised the monetarist and the structuralist
theories of inflation with a view to attain the satisfactory development of the economy.

is implied that moderately high levels of inflation were tolerable for the Bank, given the
relatively high rates of economic growth the economy exhibited. Alviar sustained: “...if
Colombian GDP grows at between - per year the growth of its means of payment
ought to be between  and , deeming as acceptable concomitant price increases
around .” What this quote intends to consider is the possibility that in the context
of the time the levels of inflation seen, say between  and , of around  a year,
though high were tolerable for some of the members of the CB charged with monetary
stability. For Alviar’s standards, it seems, the average rate of inflation appeared not to have
gone unmet by wide margins, given the respectable rates of economic growth displayed.
Having briefly reviewed the nature and main features of the CB, the examination of its
actions informs the politics affecting it.
Most studies examining the measures implemented by the CB since the late s,
but especially after , tend to summarise its causes and effects in the framework of
an overarching policy-regime: financial repression. In a financially repressed system,
measures such as ceilings on interest rates, high reserve requirements and forced investments
discourage the efficient allocation of capital by the financial system. 
e artificially, non-
market determined prices of money and capital generate excess demand that forces the

is same calculation for the periods – and – confirms the post- era saw lower inflation: .
and . respectively. Naturally, this does not say anything about the causes behind inflationary pressures in any period,
but given that Meisel uses inflation rates to support his claims it is only valid to use the same data to counter him.
Alviar, O. ‘Instrumentos...’ p. .
Alviar, O. ‘Instrumentos...’ p. .
See for instance Avella, M. and Kalmanovitz, S. ‘Barreras...’; Salazar, N. ‘Historia...’ ; Muñoz, C. and Bolivar, A. ‘Una
Visión...’ and Sánchez, F., Fernández, A. and Armenta, A. ‘Historia...’

e seminal work is that by Shaw, E. ‘Financial Deepening in Economic Development’ ().
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Figure .: Representation in the Central Bank
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rationing of credit. In addition, to enable government to channel financial resources
to itself (at cheaper rates than under a free-market situation), the rationing takes place
amongst economic agents/sectors: firms and households, manufacturing, agriculture and
services. Under the financial repression logic, then, the politically favoured sectors are those
who not only gain access to financing but also obtain credit at cheaper rates and under
better conditions than other sectors. 
e question is who represented these privileged
sectors and what mechanisms were utilised to prioritise them.
In the context of a private and autonomous CB, it is reasonable to expect economic
groups with institutionalised representation on the Bank’s board of directors would have
been first to benefit from generous terms and conditions for credit — given their position
as ‘insiders’. As illustrated in Figure ., the composition of the board was as follows:
government had three representatives throughout the period, one of whom was the Finance
Minister, and after  a fourth member was appointed representing the public and semi-
public financial institutions — such as the Agrarian Bank. Private bankers permanently
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appointed three members whilst another ex officio member originated from the coffee
producers, the general manager of the FNC. Merchant interests were also represented
throughout but it must be noted that from  to  the ‘commercial’ seat was shared
with the Colombian Association of Agriculturalists (SAC), which from  to , in
turn, co-elected its representative along with that of the cattle ranchers. 
is last group
also shared with SAC a seat from  to . During – one position was held by
particulares, namely, the representative of the general-deposit warehouse businesses. Several
of these companies were in turn owned and run by the FNC. 
e apparent absence of
manufacturing representatives in this picture is misleading, however. 
e ANDI got to
co-designate one member after . However, this was in conjunction with another two
corporate interests, the National Federation of Merchants and the Association of Chambers
of Commerce. Effectively, industrialists were not only the last to gain formal representation
on the board of the CB, but they were given the least chance to place their preferred
representative on it. 
is pattern of power distribution within the CB was reflected in
both the access and the conditions under which the institution facilitated financing, as
will be seen in the next section.
Direct credit from the CB in the form of discounts or rediscounts was until the early
s kept as the prerogative of affiliated institutions (private commercial banks) and
the government. After , coffee, represented by the FNC, started to receive direct
financing through the discount of bonds of general-deposit warehouses guaranteed by
the Federation. Additionally, in  the National Coffee Fund was created and funded,
amongst other means, with  million pesos issued by the CB. 
ough coffee growers
obtained early access to CB’s funding they were not the only group to do so. Pledge bonds
benefiting other agricultural producers, such as those of rice, sesame, wheat, cotton, timber
and soybean were also being rediscounted. It is clear that the purpose of this particular
financing mechanism was to promote agricultural production, at least until the late s.
A discussion inside the board of the CB on February  revealed this intention, as the
directors considered rejecting the request from a manufacturing firm to discount bonds on
its raw materials: “...Malterías of Colombia Inc. has requested the possibility of considering
BRep. ‘El Banco de la República: Antecedentes, Evolución y Estructura’ () pp. –.
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that the Bank carry through the discount of pledge bonds guaranteed with malted barley...
the board does not accept it for it believes that malted barley is a raw material for the
elaboration of beer and the aim of the authorised operations is to promote the production
of agriculture.” By the late s and early s, nonetheless, several raw materials and
finished products, such as wool, raw and yarn cotton, rayon fiber, leaf tobacco,
soy flour, Paz del Río-steel-products and canned goods had made it to the list of
pledge-bond items the CB was willing to discount; accordingly, this should have eased
financing conditions to manufacturers in these sectors.
Apart from access to CB’s funds through the discounting of pledge bonds initiated by
the FNC, direct lines of credit were granted to certain associations. 
rough legislative
decree in  the CB established direct financing for livestock farmers through the
Provincial Cattle Funds. 
e first to obtain direct loans was the livestock association of
Antioquia; quickly followed by the equivalents of Atlantico, Bolivar, Caqueta,
Cordoba, Magdalena and Valle amongst others. A new kind of financial institution,
the development bank, was also given the privilege of accessing CB’s funds in  and
co-operatives obtained similar treatment in . 
e benefits of direct access to the CB
via credit lines or through pledge bonds were not small since by-passing the financial system,
i.e. private commercial banks, meant that the costs of loans were reduced significantly, as
the intermediation margin of banks was avoided. Further, the rate of interest at which
these loans were made could be the same or even lower than the rediscount rate applied by
the CB to its affiliated financial institutions. 
is is examined next.
BRep. MoBD,  February, , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  October , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  October , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  November , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  February , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  October , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  February , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  August , Act No. , , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  May , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  March , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
Alviar, O. ‘Instrumentos...’ pp.–.
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Figure .: CB’s Rediscount Rates
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As captured by the different rates of interest used for rediscount by the CB (see Figure
.), it is clear that a privileged client was the publicly-owned Agrarian Bank. Since its
foundation in , this bank enjoyed the lowest interest rate amongst those with access
to the CB. Borrowing rates of  were the norm throughout the s; an extra point
was added in , remaining at  until . Incomplete data show that the rate had
returned to  by the early s. 
e preferential status of the Agrarian Bank in the CB
was well recognised at the time, but it also became a source of criticism. A parliamentarian
scrutinising operations circa  noted that rediscounts in the CB from that institution
more than tripled its paid capital, and consequently violated the established norms. 
e
politician angrily concluded: “thus, we have got: the Agrarian Bank perfectly outlawed...
the Banco de la República has broken the law.” Charges against the CB may be true,
in so far as institutions such as the Agrarian Bank were given resources beyond the legal
Senado de la República, Anales del Senado,  November , pp. –.
Senado de la República, Anales del Senado,  November , pp. –.
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limits — according to criteria based on the reserve and capital profile of the borrower.

is practice was likely to be the outcome of strong government pressures on the CB. For
example, in one meeting held with President-elect Ospina Pérez in , the board of
the CB reported that having proposed to the president the idea of stabilising credit lines
to contain the expansion of the means of payment no agreement was reached; however,
the minutes of the CB recorded: “
e president manifested that what is of most pressing
urgency is to increase the capital of the Agrarian Bank to serve the peasantry...” 
e
CB also mentioned requests by the banking regulator to apply differential interest rates
favouring agrarian operations. It must be to these types of actions shaping the relations
between these entities that the fiscal auditor referred to in his report of , stating: “It is
true that public banks have special treatment at the Central Bank, to this situation we have
arrived not as the result of policy, but due to isolated interventions aimed at obtaining a
reduction in the rates of rediscount.”
Not only the Agrarian Bank saw favourable borrowing terms from the CB. Coffee
growers, via the FNC, accounted for the lion’s share of agrarian pledges, obtaining lower
interest rates than the commercial banks (used as the reference rate, given they were
the CB’s main clients). Scant observations for the rates at which the CB lent to the
Provincial Cattle Funds suggest they were not favoured relative to other groups or types
of operations — two percentage points above private banks’ rates. 
is, however, must
take into consideration that simply by obtaining credit directly from the CB, their rates
were lower than those for borrowers going through the commercial banking system.

e ‘development’-labelled item in Figure ., commencing in , represents loans
advanced by private banks rediscounted in the CB under a special credit line for economic
development. 
e number of measures covering this type of funds was extensive. 
e
terms varied and so did the recipients. From  to  these loans were granted at a
percentage point below those for affiliated banks. 
en at the latter rates. After  all
BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  April , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
Revisoría Fiscal de Instituciones Oficiales de Crédito, El Banco Emisor, El Crédito, La Moneda: Y Algunas Considera-
ciones Generales Sobre La Reforma Bancaria en Colombia, , p. .

e reference rate remained fixed for over twenty years thanks to the abandonment of the authorities of the interest rate
as instrument of monetary control. 
is because of the evident failure at monetary control during the Great Depression;
see Alviar, O. ‘Instrumentos...’ p. , and Kalmanovitz, S. and Avella, M. ‘Barreras...’ p. .
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‘developmental’ loans were advanced at two percentage points below the rates stipulated
in each contractual obligation. 
e sectors benefiting from these operations varied from
cattle-ranching stockbreeders and farmers engaged in late-yield cropping to urban housing
for the middle classes. 
e ambition of any producer-association since , according
to Urdinola, was reduced to getting access to that special credit line providing subsidised,
long-term financing. In sum, the identifiable winners in the credit granted directly from
the CB were agrarian borrowers via the Agrarian Bank, Provincial Cattle Funds, and coffee
growers and other agriculturalists (to a lesser extent) through the discount of pledge bonds.
Another set of favoured recipients were those accessing ‘developmental’ loans through the
private commercial banks. In no distinctive way, were manufacturing firms singled out as
preferred borrowers.
Power of Credit Demandeurs and Suppliers
As a late-latecomer to industrialisation, Colombia experienced its industrial ‘take-off’
during the s and s. As discussed in Chapter , during this period the country
saw the so-called ‘easy’ part of ISI being completed. Roughly from the mid-s on, the
challenge turned to carrying through industrial ‘sequencing’, that is, to move vertically
in the production of light manufactured goods to producing intermediate and capital
goods (machinery and equipment), the advanced or ‘big push’ sectors. As explained by
Di John, the differences between the two phases are enormous in terms of the economic
and financial requirements that attempting the transition demands. Di John sustains,
that whereas in the ‘early ISI’ phase technology is simpler, scale economies, investment
requirements (at firm level and in physical infrastructure) and learning costs are low; in
the advanced stage, technology grows complex and learning costs climb higher, as well as
investment requirements do. In short, given the nature of the economic demands that
industrial upgrading imposes, in the absence of deep/thick and efficient capital markets, a
Urdinola, A. ‘El Crédito...’ p. . For a break-down of developmental and subsidised credit, see this dissertation Ch.
.
Di John, J. ‘Oil...’ p. .
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Table .: Role of Economic Activities, – (as a Percentage of GDP)
Period Coffee Non-Coffee
Agriculture
Livestock Industry
– . . . .
–  . . .
– . . . .
– . . . .
– . . . 
– . . . .
Source: See Tables A.. and A...
large part of the financial effort supplying investable resources is likely to originate in the
banking system.

ough easy access to credit as well as subsidised loans have been distinct features of many
a late-industrialiser, given the features of advanced industrialisation and the fact that
resources are limited and capital in countries like Colombia scarce, a need for condensing
funds is practically inevitable. Amsden, in this respect points out: “intermediate assets
may be allocated by government to either a relatively large number of firms (diffusion)
or to a relatively small number of ‘national leaders’ (concentration).” Although she
refers to allocation patterns within the industrial sector itself, this insight is applied here
to the more general allocation of loans by the banking system across economic sectors.

e trade-off Colombian policy-makers faced in the s regarding the allocation of
loanable funds was whether to concentrate financial resources amongst the few for advanced
industrialisation or to maximise the diffusion of credit recipients amongst the many in
agriculture, particularly the coffee-sector, and livestock farming. How this dilemma resolved
is demonstrated below through quantitative evidence on the sectoral distribution of loans
that takes into consideration the physical requirements of each economic sector. First,
however, is necessary to assess the economic and political power of the sectors competing
for resources.
See for instance; Woo, J. ‘Race...’ ; Armijo, L. ‘Brazilian Politics and Patterns of Financial Regulation’ in Haggard, S.,
Lee, C. and Maxfield, S. (Eds) 
e Politics... ; and Willis, E. ‘
e State as Banker: 
e Expansion of the Public Sector in
Brazil’ ().
Amsden, A. ‘
e Rise...’ p. .
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Evaluating the importance of individual economic sectors, their financial needs, or-
ganisational strengths and their respective bases of social support shall serve as a guide
to predict the direction politicians will give to financial resources. A rough proxy for the
economic weight of each activity comes from its respective share in total output. Table .
confirms that the economy was undergoing structural change by the mid-century, as the
contribution of manufacturing to GDP increased; whereas the share of non-coffee agricul-
ture halved during the same period. Whilst, respectively, these are clear-cut upward and
downward trends, livestock-farming’s share remained steady throughout at around ,
as did coffee’s at between  and , until the s, when external prices faltered and
the sector entered into crisis. Following these data, intuitively one could expect that as the
agrarian sector shrinks and the industrial expands, financial resources would tend to flow
increasingly to the latter. Relative shares of sectoral GDP data, however, are simply too
broad as proxy for assessing the economic significance of different activities. 
e unique
characteristics of certain sectors must be taken into consideration, particularly, of agrarian
activities, which represented manufacturers’ main competitors for scarce resources.
For example, although coffee did not reach even half of industry’s contribution to GDP,
it accounted for a stunning  of the country’s exports. 
is meant it generated the
overwhelming majority of the foreign exchange with which imports of all kinds were made.
No other single product dominated the export matrix in the twentieth century to the
same or remotely similar extent, as coffee. At their peak, gold, oil and coal, and other
primary commodities individually explained less than a fifth of all exports. Manufactured
exports accounted for less than  for the period under study. Coffee’s importance, beyond
exporting, deserves closer inspection.
First, coffee cultivation was geographically widespread — more so when compared to
Brazil’s. Seven departments (Quindio, Risaralda, Caldas, Tolima, Antioquia, Valle and
Cundinamarca) located in the slopes of the central valleys constituted the principal coffee

e share of industry in the post-war lustrum can be considered atypical, and explained by a compensatory boom in
repressed consumption and investment.
See A.. for the export matrix.
Koffman argues that no other coffee-exporting country was so dependent upon this single crop; see Koffman, B. ‘
e
National Federation of Coffee growers of Colombia’ () p. .
For comparisons of production structures between the two countries; see Bates, R. ‘Open-Economy...’ p. .
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zone — representing about a fourth of the country’s area and  of its population,
and yet some  of coffee production came from other departments in the east, such as
the Santanderes and even the Caribbean (Magdalena). Secondly, coffee was the most
important commercial crop. At its peak in , it accounted for  of agricultural
production (value), at a trough in  — when world prices collapsed — it still explained
a substantial . In employment terms, it generated “more than  of the gainfully
employed agricultural workers” or  of country’s labour force, in addition to many
other direct and indirect jobs in commercial and transport-related activities. Lastly, and
most importantly, coffee cultivation was atomised amongst a majority of small-producers.
According to Koffman, in  there were , farm units under coffee plantings, of
which some  had a size smaller than  hectares. 
is minifundista structure was
vital, not as much for production itself as for domestic politics.

e atomisation of coffee growers into tens of thousands mattered politically. Most ob-
viously, their sheer numbers made them an important electoral constituency. In fact, Bates
argues that more than the portion of the electorate it represented, which was significant,
the coffee sector enjoyed unrivalled power thanks to its strategic location in the country’s
structure of political competition. He sustains that: “By being willing to pivot between
the two parties, or to broker a coalition between their moderate factions, the coffee sector
could make — or unmake — national governments.” Moreover, at the institutional
level, and somewhat irrespective of their political location, coffee-growers’ large numbers
Griffin K. ‘Coffee...’ p.. According to Kalmanoff, the number of farm families engaged in coffee production
(,) comprise close to  million people or slightly more than  of the total population; see Kalmanoff, G. ‘
e
Coffee Economy of Colombia’ () p. .
Koffman, B. ‘
e National...’ pp. –. According to 
orp and Durand, “Even in non-coffee departments, the role
of coffee in the business of the ports and financial institutions was crucial.” See, 
orp, R. and Durand, F. ‘A Historical
View of Business-State Relations: Colombia, Peru and Venezuela Compared’ in Maxfield, S. and Schneider, B. (Eds)
Business and the State in Developing Countries () p. .
Koffman, M. ‘
e National...’ p. .
Griffin, K. ‘Coffee...’ p. . Data are for the late s.
Koffman, B. ‘
e National...’ p. . Data are for .
Koffman, B. ‘
e National...’ p. .
An arduous debate emerged in the s and s surrounding the structure of coffee production. Revisionists,
such as Arango, Palacios, and Le Grand challenged effectively interpretations about the myth of the overwhelmingly
democratic nature of coffee growers as a group, demonstrating that its composition was much more heterogeneous;
particularly, that large hacendados accounted for substantial shares of total production. See Arango, M. ‘El Café...’;
Palacios, M. ‘Coffee in...’ and Le Grand, C. ‘Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia,–’ ().
Bates, R. ‘Open ...’ p. .
Bates, R. ‘Open ...’ p. .
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infused with political legitimacy the organisation representing them to an extent that no
other interest group could aspire to. And indeed, the FNC was remarkably influential.
According to one source, it counted , members, total personnel of , and
financial resources that dwarfed those of similar associations. 
e power of the FNC
and its ability to shape policy is well-known and needs not be rehearsed here. Suffice
to note that FNC’s political power and organisational capacity was unmatched by any
other interest group; that it made significant efforts to remain above the two main political
parties, or rather, close to both Liberals and Conservatives, that it had extensive links to
elected politicians in Congress and that it enjoyed direct access to the presidency. Some
analysts, such as Kalmanovitz and López, have gone as far as suggesting that the FNC
constituted itself as “a state within the state”. It is reasonable to make this argument
because: “... politicians of every political persuasion defend[ed] coffee-grower interests.
‘Official’ Liberals, members of the MRL [dissident faction from the Liberal party], ospinista
Conservatives, laureanista Conservatives and anapistas... [Anapo was the party led by
General Rojas Pinilla].” In short, the economic and political significance of the coffee
sector was indisputable and growing — and the sources of its ascendancy multiple. 
e
situation for the rest of the agrarian sector, however, was different.
Politically, until the s, non-coffee agriculture and livestock-farming interests were
represented by the encompassing Agrarian Society of Colombia (SAC). Because of its
confederative nature, membership is hard to discern, but Bejarano sees as credible reports
from the SAC counting over  agrarian juntas with more than , affiliates.
What is clearer from the budget accounts, however, is that its financial muscle was very
For a similar view see; Kalmanovitz, S. and López, E. ‘La Agricultura...’ pp. –.
Data are for ; from Koffman, B. ‘
e National...’ pp.  and . Personnel numbers do not include businesses
and organisations were the FNC’s stakes/interests were dominant, such as the Coffee Bank, National Merchant Navy
and Almacafé general-deposit warehouses.
For analyses on this; see, Palacios, M. ‘El Café...’ Chs.  and ; Schneider, B. ‘Business Politics...’ Ch. ; Arango, M.
‘El café...’; 
orp, R. and Durand, F. ‘A Historical...’; and 
orp, R. ‘Has the Coffee Federation Become Redundant?
Collective Action and the Market in Colombian Development’ ().
Koffman’s research revealed that in the s at least a third of the members of Congress represented, “what are,
broadly-speaking, coffee-growing departments”, which entitles them to serious consideration; see Koffman, ‘
e
National...’ p. . At least seven presidents during the twentieth century either came from the coffee sector or had
close personal/professional associations with it.
Kalmanovitz, S. and López, E. ‘La Agricultura...’ p. .
Koffman, B. ‘
e National...’ p. .
Bejarano, J. A. ‘Economía y Poder: La SAC y el Desarrollo Agropecuario Colombiano, –’ () p. .
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limited. 
e golden age of SAC’s influence and prestige peaked in the early-twentieth
century, though several of the privileges gained then remained in place for longer. For
example, laws from  and  awarding SAC at regional and national level the role
of official consultative body of government, earned them representation in a wide range
of institutions, such as the CB, the Institute of Territorial Credit, the Agrarian Bank, the
Institute of Social Security and the National Railways. Institutionalised representation
in state agencies and bodies was coupled with cabinet appointments. For instance, between
 and , prominent members of the SAC became, quasi-customarily, ministers of
agriculture. Notwithstanding the above, the fact is that by  the SAC was in frank
political decline due to a combination of factors, of which the prominence of the FNC, the
explosion of non-agrarian associations, and disputes amongst different sections of agrarian
producers within SAC stood out. 
e political decline of non-coffee-agricultural interests
was not countered by a sudden boom in new exporting products that could have raised its
profile. And as shown earlier, the weight of this sector in the economy was shrinking — if
only gradually. 
e key to the sector’s leverage, when it came to demanding preferential
credit, ought to lie elsewhere.
Despite the growing importance of manufacturing output in the economy, Colombian
society remained largely agrarian. From a total population of . million in , over
 million depended on agriculture. Excluding coffee farms, the number of agrarian
smallholdings neared ,. Further, the occupational structure in  showed
that . of the employed population laboured in the primary sector, whilst only .
worked in the secondary. 
ough this relation was changing, by , the former still
Koffman, B. ‘
e National...’ p. .
Bejarano, J. A. ‘Economía...’ pp. , –.
Bejarano, J. A. ‘Economía...’ pp. – and Annex II. On the special relation between countryside and politics,
Hartlyn states: “In a complex pas de deux, more common in the agricultural sector than elsewhere, political figures
have sometimes been appointed as managers of producer associations and previously non-political managers of these
associations have occasionally been selected as cabinet ministers or for other high government posts.” See Hartlyn, J.
‘
e Politics...’ pp. –.
Population numbers from Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ p. ; agricultural-dependents data from Koffman,
B. ‘
e National...’ p. .
By smallholding is meant units whose size was less than . hectares. Data from Tinnermeier, R. ‘Small Farmer Credit
Activities of the Colombian Agricultural Bank’ () in AID Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit () Vol. , No.
, p. .
Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ p. .
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employed roughly three times as much labour as the latter (. vs. .). 
at the
majority of the economically active population was engaged in agrarian activities, could be
expected to be a force demanding financing for this sector; but more critical, perhaps, was
the fact that “most of the food produced in Colombia [was] provided by a large number of
small farmers using labour-intensive techniques who between them own only a fraction of
the agricultural land.” According to Griffin, in  . of the cultivated surface took
the form of minifundia, whilst only . constituted latifundia. In short, that a large
number of agrarian minifundistas supplied Colombia and its growing cities with foodstuffs
meant that electorally, this group had to be reckoned with — even if their organisational
capacity as an interest/producer-association group was not as great. 
e existence of both
a large number of small coffee growers, politically influential and well-organised, and
of another even larger body of small agricultural-producers, that nourished the nation,
raises the possibility to consider that financial resources were more likely to be distributed
sparsely amongst the largest possible quantity of recipients, than concentrated amongst a
few.

e political clout of industrialists is the next concern. In  Robert Dix listed ANDI
- along with the FNC and FENALCO - as one of the most powerful interest groups.
In a study evaluating which associations were most influential in congress (for the early
s), Kline ranked ANDI first, though he also recognised that the presidency had greater
relevance when it came to political decisions than the national congress. Similarly,
research by Rivera-Ortíz calibrating interest-group influence on planning, as perceived by
the planners themselves at DNP, indicated that ANDI’s degree of influence was “great”
() and “considerable” (); whereas that of the FNC was “great” and “considerable”
in equal but lower magnitudes (). 
e most influential group, however, was not
ANDI but ASOBANCARIA. Two comments need be made regarding these findings.
First, when questioned about the perception of influence on economic policy in general,
Avella, M. et al. ‘La Consolidación...’ p. .
Griffin, K. ‘Coffee...’ p. .
Griffin, K. ‘Coffee...’ p. .
Dix, R. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
Kline, H. ‘Interest...’ Table .
Rivera-Ortíz, I. ‘
e Politics of Development Planning in Colombia’ () Table .
Rivera-Ortíz, I. ‘
e Politics...’ p. .
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the responses rankings change and the lead corresponds to the FNC, closely followed by
ANDI. Secondly, Rivera-Ortíz notes that interest associations “prefer to channel influences
and complaints through institutions dealing directly with specific economic policies rather
than through the national planning agency. Finally, in a series of interviews conducted
by Hartlyn in the mid/late-s with elite politicians, businessmen and others, he asked
about views on the power capabilities of major groups and organisations to act or to
negotiate during the National Front. Respondents indicated that for the FNC power
capabilities increased  and decreased , whereas for ANDI and FENALCO, they
increased  and , and decreased  and , respectively. It is unwise to draw
conclusive interpretations from these studies, yet evidence and expertise from these scholars
allows a tenable remark: that in ANDI industrialists had a powerful representative of their
interests in the national political arenas, but that these spaces were shared with other
important organisations that aggregated interests from other economic sectors. 
is seems
so to be particularly the case for the late s and s.
However, this may not have been so in the s and even during the s. In fact,
the organisational strength of industrialists was rather weak at the beginning of the period
examined here. To start with, in the early s there was no association representing the
interest of manufacturers, and during the s rivalries between the entrepreneurs of
Medellin and Bogota led to the creation of parallel organisations: the Colombian National
Industry and the National Federation of Industrialists, respectively. Both had fizzled
by the end of the decade. 
e fleeting nature of these entities prompted the state to
organise an association. On  June  Eduardo Santos issued Decree , by which
the National Association of Manufacturers was created to act as consultative body of the
government, studying the problems that affect the sector and formulating the necessary
recommendations. Blocked by the Supreme Court, a lasting association of industrialists
had to wait until , when the privately-organised ANDI was founded. Sáenz-Rovner,
a scholar that analysed ANDI’s trajectory in its early years, sustains that given the rapid
industrial expansion of the pre-WWII years, industrialists had to be eventually reckoned
Rivera-Ortíz, I. ‘
e Politics...’ pp. -.
Hartlyn, J. ‘
e Politics...’ Appendix Table A.
Schneider, B. ‘Business...’ p. , fn. .
Articles ,  and  of Decree  of .
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with, however, he continues: “... the economic power of the manufacturing sector was not
automatically matched by proportional political influence on the executive and legislative
bodies.” 
us, it is reasonable to infer that ANDI’s political power grew gradually as it
grew in size and developed institutional capacity. 
e question, however, is how influential
did it become regarding credit and financing issues, which as discussed in the previous
chapter, constituted a serious and constant concern for manufacturers.
ANDI did not seem to have had much clout in this respect. First, as noted in Chapter ,
throughout the period the sector lacked an Industrial Bank over which to exert influence
to extract financing concessions, as there were in other countries (BIA in Argentina for
example) or for other sectors in the country (Coffee Bank for instance). Secondly, as shown
above, the institutionalised representation of industry in the Banco de la República came
late when compared against competing groups and its sway therein was rather modest.
Finally, IFI, which had statutory faculties to act as a lending institution, opted to supply
equity capital instead, as seen in Chapter  - and in rather precarious circumstances. In
short, ANDI did not seem to have much of a political scenario on which to act other than
directing its requests to government, as to persuade it to force or incentivise private banks
to increase their loans to the sector. 
e legislation on this was reviewed on Chapter  -
and it suggested that industrialists emerge as relative losers from the so-called ‘legislated
credit’. 
e reactions of banks towards government meddling will be treated later on.

e social bases of industrialists’ power were not skewed in their favour either. As noted
earlier, as late as  employment in the primary sector tripled that of manufacturing.
Urrutia briefly puts it in his study on interest groups and economic policy: “No one
Colombian minister has dared to state, that what’s good for Colmotores [car manufacturer]
is good for the country.” 
e unfulfilled analogy with the US Defence Minister’s words,
Charles Wilson: “What’s good for General Motors is good for the country”, points at the
differences in the electorates between the two countries. A sense of the size and nature
of the ‘industrial’ constituency of the Colombia of the s was offered by Finance
Minister, Hernán Jaramillo, who justifying the  tariff reform to the press, declared:
“As minister I do not fear to say that I am defending the industries from Antioquia, since
Sáenz-Rovner, E. ‘Industriales...’ p. 
Urrutia, M. ‘Gremios...’ p. .
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by protecting them I am also trying to guard , workers; to shelter all raw-material
exploitation and all the agrarian labour that comes from industrial processing...” Clearly,
it was not enough to stand for industry alone. According to Dix, in , more than 
member-companies of ANDI employed around , workers; the issue is that labour
did not necessarily align itself politically with industrial capital. In other words, these were
not elements of a unified constituency.
Discrete concessions to individual industrial ventures by the CB, however, suggest that
there was some effective influence - and at the highest of levels. 
e opening of direct credit-
lines to some of the largest and most prominent manufacturing firms, such as Bavaria,
Malterias de Colombia S.A. and Leonidas Lara e Hijos, as well as the granting of loans
to Tubos Moore, and the discounting of bonds (over tobacco leaves) to the Compañia
Colombiana de Tabaco, all measures recorded in the minutes of the board of directors
of the Banco de la República, constitute evidence of this sway. When requests entailed
generalised benefits the response from the CB tended to be negative, as was the case with
ANDI’s demand to extend to  of the deposits at sight and term of banks the resources
destined to finance -year investments. In short, despite industrialists apparently general
political might when it came to credit its range seemed rather circumscribed.
In the pursuit for ample and cheap credit by industrialists, agriculturalists and livestock
farmers alike, and the financial system, especially private banks, firmly and effectively
fought off and checked their demands. 
is was possible thanks to the combination
of a largely autonomous CB, where private bankers provided the leadership, expertise
and spokemanship required to design and reform policies; and the effective capacity of
the association of bankers, ASOBANCARIA, to defend their interests and advocate for
measures they saw fit. It is striking that given the strategic importance of finance on the
economy and the influence that bankers have had on the national polity, the literature
Cited in Sáenz-Rovner, E. ‘Industriales...’ p. .
BRep. MoBD,  November , Act No. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  November , Act No. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  November , Act No. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  September , Act No. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  October , Act No. , ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  October , Act No. .
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has failed to examine their lobbying and weight on policy systematically. A thorough
examination of the power and influence of banks is beyond the central scope this study,
however, to gain insights into it and to gauge their extent, a brief review of steps taken by
them to enact, modify and implement some of the most vital pieces of legislation affecting
their operations will be offered. 
ese include the above-mentioned substantial reform of
 and measures on mandatory lending, as well as on the mechanisms available to the
CB to implement monetary policy.

e CB reform of , which is often said distracted the CB from its essential role
of controlling the increase of prices by adding to its mandate the mission of promoting
economic development, and is associated with the inappropriate meddling of government,
was in fact part of a wider trend of what this author calls ‘controlled reforms from within’.
Reacting to a draft bill proposed in  by senator Jorge E. Gaitán, minutes of the board
of directors of the CB revealed that with a view to avoid a reform involving changes to the
legislation, the board appointed a commission to study and prepare an alternative bill, that
in the words of the Finance Minister, “could be presented at the right time as an initiative
from government and not from the Banco de la República”. After several amendments,
the board approved on st February  the draft bill led by Carlos Villaveces from the
Monetary Committee, made up by an internal mixture of banking, government and private
representatives. A year later, when the  Decree-law of  that reformed the CB
was issued, the Finance Minister in a habitual meeting with the CB’s directors indicated
that the decree in question had been structured on the basis of the draft bill studied by the
board, with a few modifications.

e forced allocation of loans to activities specified by government was another issue
that bankers heavily criticised at the time, and that the current literature has echoed
in the framework of financial-repression and excessive government interventionism in
No one comprehensive study on banking- or finance politics is known to this author, as there are for other sectors.
See for instance the studies referred to above by Koffman and Palacios on coffee or the seminal study by Sáenz-Rovner
on industrialists; Sáenz-Rovner, E. ‘La Ofensiva...’; for commerce; see, Rodríguez, O. ‘Interés Gremial y Regulación
Estatal: La Formación de la Federación Nacional de Comerciantes, –’ ().
Minister’s words recorded in BRep. MoBD,  July , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep. For details on the
commission; see BRep. MoBD,  June , Act No. , pp. – and June , , Act No. , p. .
BRep. MoBD,  February , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
BRep. MoBD,  April , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
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financial markets. Qualitative empirical evidence originating within the banks and their
association suggests that, again, regarding some of the most contentious measures on this
aspect, private banks either took the lead or reacted with forceful determination. 
e
critical executive decree of  February , by which the principle of self-liquidation that
had dominated the banking system since  was relaxed, allowing commercial banks
to engage in medium- and long-term lending, found its origins in a project presented
(and written) by representatives of the national banks and CB’s board member. In the
document, the specific investment projects/activities, interest rates, maturity of loans and
quantity limits that banks could allocate to this modality of credit were remarkably similar
to those issued by the government in the official law a fortnight later.
Concerning another measure that obliged commercial banks to allocate a part of their
resources to specific economic activities, ASOBANCARIA claimed in its bi-monthly
bulletin of early : “Owing to the great preoccupation that banks have to channel
developmental financing wherever required, ASOBANCARIA spontaneously presented
government a decree draft on agrarian credit that the authorities considered important...
the outcome of this was the adoption of Decree  of , which, with the exception of
its obligatory character that in our judgement is not required, ordered banks to direct 
of their deposit at sight and at term to agrarian loans...” In truth, ASOBANCARIA did
produce a draft of Decree , however, it did not do so casually, as suggested. Rather, it
was a reaction to an earlier decree passed during Rojas’s administration. After his fall, the
banks saw the opportunity to draft and to present to the Agriculture Minister, who was
also acting Finance Minister, a substitutive decree — and seized it. 
ough the banks
did not manage to reverse the compulsory nature of the measure, they were most effective
in making the implementation as cumbersome as possible and in shifting a large part of
the monitoring and administrative costs of the potential credits to the Agrarian Bank —
BRep., MoBD,  January , Act No. , p. , ABRep.
ASOBANCARIA. Boletín Informativo, , No. –, pp. –.
ASOBANCARIA. Boletín Informativo, , No. –, p..
On this issue, a letter from the president of the SAC, Luis José Carvajalino, dated  May , addressed to
ASOBANCARIA’s directors, stated: “Everything suggests that practical difficulties have made the obligations imposed
on banks to channel  of their deposits to agrarian developmental credit ineffective... bankers argued that requests for
such loans have simply not being made... the loan applicant finds the procedure so complex and long that forfeits the
operation...”; see ASOBANCARIA. Boletín Informativo, , No. –, p. 
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in addition to getting the latter to also act as guarantor of last resort. Finally, the very
effectiveness of the measure was questioned at the time by other financial institutions. 
e
general manager of the publicly owned Livestock Bank, in a memorandum addressed to
Ruben Piedrahita, member of the interim military junta of , expressed in reference to
the decree in question: “
e latest measures on agricultural and livestock credit run the
risk of being ineffectual, even if implemented, for they fall short of the required resources
... the volume of the operations Commercial Banks must do in line with Decree 
is inferior to that currently recorded in the statistics of the Banco de la República.”

ough the claims need validating, they might help to explain why the bankers seemed
not to be very concerned with the measure. 
e set percentage might amount to a floor
from which the banks’ normal operations were either only marginally different or that was
merely occasionally unmet.

e actions of the banking community to pre-empt or to rectify legislation that could
harm their interests were frequent, wide-ranging, and above all effective. ASOBANCARIA’s
bulletin recorded some of these. 
e mechanisms included lobbying in Congress, meetings
with the president of the Republic and/or with cabinet officials, and certainly, resolutions
originating in the CB, where they, as indicated earlier, were institutionally represented
and therefore very strong. On issues concerning the composition of the board of the
CB, commercial-banks’ stakes in general-deposit warehouse businesses, the adoption
of flexible reserve requirements, rediscounting rates, and on what was considered the
disloyal competition of public financial institutions, bankers defended their positions
fiercely. Intelligently, and strategically, banks were constantly keen to present themselves
as the targets of a long string of non-technical and arbitrary measures by politicians, that
typically threatened the stability and liquidity of the financial system. Such attitude was
adopted simultaneously, if not coherently, with the primary role bankers took on themselves
For the list of requirements; see, ASOBANCARIA. Boletín Informativo, , No. –, pp. –.
Reyes Gutiérrez, J. Memorandum, p., Banco Ganadero, Bancos, Junta Militar de Gobierno, Presidencia de la
República, AGN.
ASOBANCARIA. Boletín Informativo, , No. , pp. –; ASOBANCARIA. Boletín Informativo, , No.
, p.  and ASOBANCARIA. Boletín Informativo, , No. , pp. –.
ASOBANCARIA. Boletín Informativo, , No. , pp. –.
Espinosa Valderrama, A. ‘La Reforma Bancaria en el Congreso’ in El Mes Económico y Financiero” () No. , p.

See Chapter .
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in carrying and controlling reforms to both the CB and the banking system. 
e double
positioning as detractors and agents of change constituted a remarkable constant throughout
the period. Finally, given that private banks were largely successful in containing demands
from politicians to offer cheap and ample credit and that no outright expropriations or
nationalisations ever took place, the energies of the latter had to be channelled to squeezing
the entities over which officials had extensive powers, such as the Agrarian Bank.
Public Banking for Clientelistic Politics

e Agrarian Bank became the public institution through which successive governments
favoured agrarian producers with subsidised credit. 
e bank’s patterns of credit provide
evidence to substantiate the claims and interpretation advanced here on the clientelistic
nature of credit allocation by this institution, as will be shown next. 
e number, size,
terms and distribution of loans suggest this bank was used to maximise the number of
recipients of resources. 
e widest possible diffusion of credit amongst the overwhelmingly
agrarian clientele of the bank shall not be all that surprising, given that, as noted above, mid-
twentieth century Colombia remained an agrarian nation; and electorally, the countryside
was a critical constituency.

is study considers the pattern of credit allocation by the Agrarian Bank clientelistic
not only because its loans were made at below market-determined rates but because the
allocation of its loans could have served political purposes. Specifically, this means small-
sized, widely spread, subsidised credit for rural areas. 
e Agrarian Bank’s cheap financing
could have acted as a major electoral lever. 
roughout the period, the bank lent the
majority of its resources for short-term operations that were well below the interest rates
charged by private commercial banks for often similar economic activities. When adjusted
for inflation, the real active rates of the Agrarian Bank were consistently negative, whilst
those of private banks were for the most part positive. Figure . shows this. Undoubtedly,
because of this, and unlike most commercial banks, the Agrarian Bank reported regular
losses. Certain lines of credit, such as rehabilitation financing, proved to be great loss-
A study by Fainboin showed that, for instance, during the early s bad loans of the Agrarian Bank were between
three and four times the levels of those of commercial banks; see Fainboin, I. ‘El Rieso y la Política de Crédito de
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Figure .: Active Interest Rates & Inflation: Private vs. Public Banking (percent-
ages)
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Sources & Methodology: Data for Commercial banks from Salazar, N. () Annex . 
e series is a global rate of all
credits. Rates for Agrarian Bank from Revisoría Fiscal de Instituciones Oficiales de Crédito Publico (); Caja de
Crédito Agrario, Industrial y Minero (); and Tinnermeier, R. ().
making ventures, as the general manager recounted in : “From the loans advanced
for the ‘th of April’ victims, . are lost... From those corresponding to rehabilitation
made in , some . will not be recovered.” 
at despite credit modalities
like these, the Agrarian Bank managed to survive and expand, was largely thanks to the
preferential treatment it received from the CB in terms of the volume of funds it obtained
— well beyond the agreed paid up capital and reserve levels that governed all other financial
institutions — and, as seen above, relatively low rediscounting rates. Statements from
the CB’s directors noting the problems that such over-dependency generated and urging
Fomento Agropecuario’ () p. . But losses had long been in the making before that. A debate in Congress in
 revealed that the bank probably had between  and  million pesos worth of loans written off, which accounted for
more than  of its new loans; see, Senado de la República, Anales del Senado, November , , p. .
BRep. MoBD,  June , Act No. , pp. –, ABRep.
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the finding of alternative sources of financing for that institution — that did not cause
primary emissions — were regular features in their annual reports.
Figure .: Credit Patterns in Banking: Private vs. Public (number of new loans)
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Sources: Data for commercial banks for – from Contraloría General de la República. Anuario General de
Estadística, various years; and for – from BRep. IAGJD, –, p. . Series for Agrarian Bank from BRep.
Revista, various issues.

e striking dispersion of the bank’s credit concerning both geographical coverage and
the sheer number of recipients substantiate the interpretation offered here. 
e growth
of the Agrarian Bank’s financial assets, noted in the previous chapter, was matched by its
physical expansion. 
e number of branches and agencies increased from  in  to
 in , which meant that this bank on its own had more branches than all private
commercial banks combined. 
e enlargement process was significantly helped by the
BRep. IAGJD, –, p. ; BRep. IAGJD, –, pp. , ; BRep. IAGJD, –, p. ; BRep.
IAGJD, - , p. ; BRep. IAGJD, –, p. ; BRep. IAGJD, , Vol. , p. ; BRep. IAGJD,
, p. . On the preferential treatment by the CB to this institution; see also, Revisoría Fiscal de Instituciones
Oficiales de Crédito, El Banco Emisor, El Crédito, La Moneda: Y Algunas Consideraciones Generales Sobre La Reforma
Bancaria en Colombia, , p. .
Tinnermeier, R. ‘Small...’ p. .
According to one study, the number of agencies and branches from private banks was  on  December ; see,
Holguín Franco, J. ‘Evolución...’ p. .
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bank’s merger with the Colombian Savings Bank in the mid-s, another publicly-owned
institution with over  branches, but its underlying driver continued to be the creation
of credit offices across the country and the countryside in particular — amounting to the
establishment of a clientelistic network that covered the national electoral and territorial
map. In fact, a report by the fiscal auditor claimed that the bank’s operations were benefiting
. of the nation’s municipalities. 
is impressive coverage in financing by the state
is striking and possibly unheard of in any other public service.
Figure .: Credit Patterns in Banking: Private vs. Public (Average Loan Size — Pe-
sos)
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Sources & Methodology: See Figure . for sources. 
e proximate average real size for loans was calculated from
data on total value of new loans from BRep. IAGJD, various years; and BRep. Revista, various issues. Missing data
complemented with Revisoría Fiscal de Instituciones Oficiales de Crédito Público (). 
e deflator used is a CPI
with  as base year from GRECO ().
Revisoría Fiscal de Instituciones Oficiales de Crédito y Fomento, El Crédito del Estado en la Economía Colombiana,
, p. .

e report by the National Planning Council in , noted that the expansion in both offices and financial operations
could “become dangerous for monetary stability” and that the rapid growth in branches and agencies had been “carried
out lacking proper studies of economic factors.”; see Informe Anual del Consejo Nacional de Planificación, , pp.
– in Desarrollo y Sociedad () No. .
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e outgrowth of this overstretching of the Agrarian Bank was maximising the number
of loan recipients, whilst fragmenting the size of the credit. Figure . shows the contrasting
trends between the Agrarian Bank and commercial banks regarding the number of loans
made. Whilst the Agrarian Bank tripled the number of loans made between  and ,
all the new loans advanced by private banks combined halved between the mid-s and
. 
e , new loans made by the Agrarian Bank in  were serving somewhere
between . and . of all farmers. 
e downward trend seen in commercial
banks could be at least partially explained by the new practice of dedicating a growing
share of their loanable resources in medium- and long-term credit operations, which
presumably involved larger quantities. 
is is consistent with the changes in legislation
of the early s, which allowed for longer-time horizons in lending. 
e opposing
movement on the Agrarian Bank, despite significant increases in its funding, presumably
was the combination of ceilings imposed on the size of loans, which artificially fractioned
the volumes of credit, and the wider electoral support that arose from diffusing loans
in as many recipients as possible. Figure ., showing the striking differences between
the proximate average loan size of private banks and the Agrarian Bank, provides further
support for the claims made. 
e evidence of the stagnating size of real loans from the
Agrarian Bank vis-à-vis the growing proportions of those from commercial banks, permits
to plausibly argue that whilst the latter reflected market-determined loan-sizes, the former
had been politically conceived of. And, indeed, the regulator was keen on highlighting that
one of the critical problems of the financing supplied by the Agrarian Banks constituted
the “truly insignificant quantities involved.”
Supply Meets Demand
Table . shows that relative to output, livestock farming received the highest allocation of
credit from the banking system, on average , which was significantly higher than the
Berry, A. ‘Agriculture in Colombia’ (n.d.) pp. –.
Revisoría Fiscal de Instituciones Oficiales de Crédito y Fomento, El Crédito del Estado en la Economía Colombiana,
, p. . In  the Senate debated the creation of a bank for livestock-farming because it considered that the
loans to the sector made by the Agrarian Bank were too small to be useful; see Senado de la República. Anales del Senado,
 July , pp. –.
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Table .: New Loans to Output by Economic Activities, – (ratios)
Year Coffee Non-
Coffee
Agricul-
ture
Livestock Industry Services All Activi-
ties
– . . . . . .
– . . . . . .
– . . . . . .
– . . . . . .
– . . . . . .
– . . . . . .
Sources and Methodology: See Tables A.. and A..–.. Data includes allocations by private commercial banks,
Agrarian Bank and Mortgage Bank. For commercial banks data from BRep. IAGJD, - ; and BRep. Revista,
various issues. For Agrarian Bank, DANE. Anuario General de Estadística, various years. For Mortgage Bank, BCH.
Informe y Balance, various years and BRep. IAGJD, various years.
economy’s total average, standing at . Industrial activities and the services sector, led
by commerce, also obtained higher than all-activities’ allocations, though by rather slight
margins;  and , respectively. 
e generous treatment given to cattle-ranching
and industry emerging from these figures reflects to a large extent the preferences that
private commercial banks had in lending to the latter and that both private and public
institutions displayed for the former. It is important to note that there is no clear-cut
trend for manufacturing. In the context of the alleged state-led ISI that a vast part of the
literature argues took place in Colombia at this time, it is unexpected to find that the ratio
is trendless; and even more so, if as indicated above, the advanced stage of industrialisation
in which the country found itself required larger volumes of resources. Regarding other
activities, a marked downward tendency is observed in the numbers for commerce, and
for livestock after –; whilst an upward trend is identifiable for other-than-coffee
agriculture throughout the period and for coffee after –.

e ratio of credit to output for coffee is surprisingly low, given the above-mentioned
preferences of politicians and the privileges enjoyed; however, this proportion is misleading.

e new-loans data do not capture the considerable amounts of credit facilitated by the CB
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Table .: Comaprisons of Credit to ICORS, –
Coffee Livestock Non-
Coffee
Agricul-
ture
Industry Services All Activi-
ties
ICORs [A] . . . . . .
Sector to Overall
ICORs [B]
. . . . . .
Loans to Output [C] . . . . . .
Sectoral to Overall
Loans to Output [D]
. . . . . .
D/B . . . . .
Source: Authors own calculations and sources from Table A... For the loan to output ratios data are from new loans
from private commercial banks, the Agrarian Bank and the Mortgage Bank.
to the FNC through the discount of bonds guaranteed with coffee. If such credit were
integrated, the ratio for coffee would increase in not insignificant manner. Differentials
between the credit/output ratio for all activities and that for individual sectors shows
the largest proportional allocation of credit for livestock, at . or , whereas that
for manufacturing and commerce were  and , respectively. 
e equivalent
numbers for coffee and non-coffee agriculture were about half the latter ratios. 
us, in
terms of loans per unit of output manufacturing was not the most favoured group, but
it received  more than what it contributed to the economy’s total output. 
is first
proxy, though useful is unsatisfactory, for different economic activities are bound to have
different financing requirements.
By comparing the relative loan shares of different economic activities with their sectoral
incremental capital-output ratios (ICORs) it is possible to assess whether the loans advanced
were proportional, at least, to capital requirements. 
ough far from perfect, this
methodology allows for a more nuanced assessment of the financial needs of these sectors
and the extent to which these were met or not, in relation to their investments in fixed
capital. Row A in Table . confirms natural intuitions about the capital intensity of
different economic activities in a developing economy, such as Colombia. 
e low average
See chapter  for the allocation of credit by the CB, as captured by loans outstanding.

is methodology is used in a study on Korea by Cole, D. and Park, C. ‘Financial Development in Korea, –’
() pp. –.
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ICORs registered by coffee and livestock-farming are aligned with the production
practices of these activities: the predominance of small-scale, family-based and labour
intensive production of coffee-farms in Antioquia, Caldas, Cundinamarca, Valle and
Tolima, on the one hand; and the extensive cattle-ranching methods prevailing in practically
all areas where this activity was important, such as Córdoba and the Eastern Plains on
the other. 
e higher ICOR for manufacturing ought to indicate the larger value of
investments needed in the sector: machinery and equipment of increasing sophistication,
as the industrial ‘sequencing’ takes place. Even higher ICORs for services, are also expected,
given the large amounts of capital required for systems of sanitation, electricity and transport
to be operational. Row B, in turn, shows the sectoral ratio as compared to the all-activities
ratio. For example, the sectoral ratio for manufacturing was  the overall one, whereas
the sectoral ratio for coffee was only . Finally, comparing rows D and B allows the
identification of the activities that obtained a larger than proportionate share of credit, if
the benchmark for allocation had been fixed capital-output ratios. As shown in the D/B
row, livestock farmers received an inordinately higher proportion of loans than their share
suggested (more than five times its investment requirements). Similarly, coffee was highly
favoured with more than three times its share; whereas industry and agriculture were only
moderately benefited with the allocation of loans. In conclusion, given their investment
needs, the country’s banking system did not prioritise manufacturers through their credit
operations. Instead, cattle ranchers, followed by coffee growers, received the most generous
treatment.
Exploring the Road Not Taken: What If
As noted earlier, Colombia’s constellation of internal forces engendered a state that though
fiscally weak, was capable of imposing macro-economic discipline. 
e legitimate political
power of a large and well-organised number of small agricultural exporters, coffee growers,
had bestowed the state with the capacity to maintain key macroeconomic variables such
as the exchange rate and the prices of foodstuffs close to their market equilibria or, as

is is also in line with Berry’s findings about coffee production being hardly technical; see Berry, A. ‘Agriculture ...’
Ch. .
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was the case with moderate inflation rates experienced during the period, checked in line
with prudent economic thinking. A disciplined macroeconomic environment, according
to Davies, was a critical factor explaining the success of East Asia’s late-industrialisers
and the relative failure of Latin American countries. 
e former had it the latter
did not. Colombia, then, seems to be a special case within Latin America and this
prompts the formulation of conceivable counterfactuals: What if the state had been more
interventionist? Would a truly state-led industrialisation strategy have paid off? Could
industrial upgrading have been successfully completed? In other words, had the policy elites
committed themselves to fully-fledged industrialisation would have Colombia attained
riches?
Sound counterfactual reasoning ought to have firm historical and contextual bases to
prevent it from being mere fantasising. In this case there are three conditions that seem
relevant, and for which there are grounds to believe the counterfactual is probable: first;
was the disciplinary macroeconomic regime in place fostering efficient industrialisation?
Secondly; was there actual room for industrial development in mid-century Colombia?
And lastly; was there a political movement or leader at the time willing or likely to alter
the status quo and its remarkable record of continuity in economic policy? Regarding
the first issue, evidence from Ocampo and Tovar suggests that despite high theoretical
levels of protectionism the country’s industrialisation had been relatively efficient. 
ey
find that the prices of national, as compared with international, industrial goods fell
throughout, and that productivity played a role in this. Concerning the second point, in
the s United Nations conducted research on global industrialisation and comparing
theoretical or expected levels of industrial development with actual observations. 
e
results of the extensive survey yielded interesting results for Latin America — and for
Colombia in particular. 
e study found that once per capita income, total population,
urban population and the import coefficients were controlled for, Colombia showed a
strikingly low level of industrial development vis-à-vis its expected value — of over .
It was, along with Venezuela, the only middle- and large-sized economy in the region to

e core argument of Davis has been dealt earlier on this chapter.
Ocampo, J. A. and Tovar, C. ‘Colombia...’ p. .
As reported by CEPAL in CEPAL. ‘
e Process...’ pp. –.
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exhibit such significant level of industrial underdevelopment. Countries that have been
more typically associated with state-led ISI and its excesses, such as Brazil and Argentina,
effectively registered industrial outputs whose actual values were between  and 
higher than expected.

e third point has been the subject of debate, primarily surrounding the rise of a con-
troversial, leftist and charismatic politician in the s: Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Hobsbawm
argues that Gaitán could have been the agent of change, the man capable of breaking
with the status quo. 
e author states: “In Colombia the great people’s tribune Jorge
E. Gaitán so far from choosing the political Right, captured the leadership of the Lib-
eral Party and could have certainly as president have led it in a radical direction, had
he not been assassinated.” 
e precise direction towards which an eventual Gaitán
presidency would have steered economic-policy has been indicated by Drake, who claims
that like Peru’s Haya de la Torre, Ecuador’s Velasco Ibarra, Venezuela’s Betancourt and
the Chilean socialist party, Gaitán’s political movement, populism, was characterised by
“integrationist, reformist, nationalist development programs for the state to promote simul-
taneously import-substituting industrialization and redistributive measures for populist
supporters.” 
us, if as alleged by Drake and Hobsbawm, Gaitán embodied the kind
of politician required to shift economic-development strategies, the critical question is:
had Gaitán not been assassinated would have he pursued as president a state-led ISI
strategy, that together with the disciplined macro-economic regime in place mentioned
earlier, would have put Colombia on the road to becoming a developed nation?

e short answer is no. It was unlikely that Gaitán would have pursued full-fledged
industrialisation. 
e reason is twofold: first, a significant measure of Gaitán’s rise in
politics at the national level occurred once he became part of the political establishment,
that is, after joining the Liberal party. Arrubla sustains: “...radical populism marked
Gaitan’s politics when searching for an audience, but distinctive conciliatory inclinations
CEPAL. ‘
e Process...’ p. .
Hobsbawm, E. ‘
e Age of Extremes’ () pp. –.
Drake, P. ‘Comment’ in Dornbusch, R. and Edwards, S. (Eds) 
e Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America”
() pp. –.
An authoritative biography of Gaitán and his gaitanismo suggests that had he not been assassinated he would have likely
become president in ; see Braun, H. ‘
e Assassination of Gaitán: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia’
().
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prevailed when gaining notoriety... [this] permits to predict that his conduct in the
presidency would have been prone to the latter mode...” 
is in economic policy-
making would have probably meant continuing with the ‘balanced growth across sectors’
path of previous governments. Secondly, the kind of political alliance required to sustain
an industrialisation project was simply not viable: on the one hand, because organised
labour was not sufficiently large and the middle class was tied to the ruling class through
employment. On the other hand, and most critically, because rural voters remained an
electoral majority. Further, Hylton claims that the message of class struggle of gaitanismo
was powerful in the countryside, especially for proletarians, share croppers and tenants
excluded from private ownership. 
us, Gaitán’s initially radical political movement
was partially co-opted by the Liberal party and even then the alliance required for an
‘industrial mandate’ was not feasible. 
e missing variable for any strong mandate was
the countryside, which would have been excluded or partly discriminated against in any
industrial ‘push’, but gaitanismo did not count on it — in fact, what it needed was to court
it. It seems Gaitán tried. Evidence from the political thinking of Gaitán recollected in the
Anthology of the Liberal Party’s 
ought and Programmes, said to display the most
significant of the programmatic and ideological speeches of the party, contains one speech
by the charismatic leader, declaring: “the Liberal Party recognised that agriculture and
livestock-farming must have a preferential place in national economic-development plans”,
adding “Liberalismo considers that state-managed financial institutions should have the
policy of re-balancing economic inequalities aiding the less privileged classes with personal
credit, especially with agrarian credit for those working the land...”
To summarise, the fact that Colombia enjoyed a remarkable record of macroeconomic
stability and that the state was capable of imposing macroeconomic discipline opened the
way to considering what looks like a rather valid and feasible counterfactual: what if policy
elites had pushed for full-fledged industrialisation? Empirical evidence suggesting that the
Arrubla. M. ‘Síntesis...’ p. .
Abel, C. and Palacios, M. ‘Colombia...’ p. . 
ese authors also argue that such populist alliance needed a
substantial rural component to achieve power via elections, and Gaitán did not have control over the informal network
of Liberal caciques — at least not until .
Hylton, F. ‘Evil Hour in Colombia’ () p. .
Jordan, F. (Ed) ‘Antología del Pensamiento y Programas del Partido Liberal, –’ () p. .
Jordan, F. (Ed) ‘Antología...’ p. . Speech given in Bogota in , known as ‘Plataforma del Teatro Colón’.
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country’s actual industrialisation was efficient and that the sector remained underdeveloped
in regional perspective, coupled with the appearance of a maverick politician that in the
s, and with a populist-industrialist agenda, seemed destined for political power, renders
the ‘what if ’ reasoning relevant. Wishful thinking about Colombia’s probabilities of having
turned into a South Korean-miracle like, alas, must be cut short. In a country, where
the countryside remained the electoral majority, politicians — even the like of Gaitán
— had to keep industrialising visions in check. Mid-century politics made industrialism
non-viable. 
is amounted to a structural obstacle, of which all shrewd politicians were
well aware of.
Conclusions

is chapter has argued that in mid-twentieth century Colombia, contrary to what the
current literature sustains, the state did not promote industrialisation. 
is is particularly
so in the case of credit and financial policy. 
e paper’s main hypothesis claims that the
existence of an incompatibility between the financial requirements of advanced industri-
alisation and the clientelistic nature of the domestic polity prevented policy elites from
adopting a pro-manufacturing economic regime. To substantiate these claims, first, a
modelling of qualitative evidence on the preferences and interests of the governments of
the period was displayed. 
e historical record showed that industrialisation, as reflected
in the language of national development plans, ministerial statements, cabinet documents
and presidential speeches, did not constitute a public preference under any political party
or regime. Secondly, a characterisation of the type of state required for developmental
interventionism, emphasising the role of the countryside, sought to explain why the Colom-
bian state would fail to provide its manufacturers with large and cheap supplies of credit.
Well-entrenched and politically powerful agrarian groups within the state, particularly the
export-oriented coffee-growers, guaranteed that no systemic pro-industry bias was created
in the macroeconomic policy environment. Meanwhile, at the micro-economic level, these
same rural producers would attempt to direct public financing to themselves and away
from other credit demandeurs. A closer look at the nature of the CB suggests that the
kind of CB functioning throughout most of the period, a private and independent bank
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concerned with monetary stability, did not represent the interests of manufacturers either.
Evidence on the institutionalised representation of its board of directors, as well as evidence
on the differential rediscounting rates demonstrated this and hinted that the likely winners
from preferential-financing schemes originating in the CB would be agrarian interests.
Attention then focused on the power of credit demandeurs. It was argued that the
relative share of sectoral output in the economy is too raw a proxy to assess the political
influence of economic groups. A closer, preliminary look at the organisational strength
and social bases of power proved more insightful. 
e largely democratic structure of
coffee-cultivation, in addition to the fact that coffee generated the overwhelming majority
of the foreign exchange and that the well-funded FNC enjoyed high levels of legitimacy and
remained uniquely entrenched in the political system, suggest that this group were to be
the prime beneficiaries of public credit schemes. In contrast — and somewhat surprisingly
given generalised perceptions about the economic and political weight of the sector —
industrialists appeared to lack effective means over which to influence financial institutions
en masse to extend credit on favourable terms upon themselves. Punctual concessions by
the CB to a few of the largest industrial companies in the country are evidence of the
limited range of manufacturers on this area. 
e well-coordinated actions of private banks
via ASOBANCARIA to counter (and pre-empt) potentially damaging legislation were
also examined. 
eir position as ‘insiders’ in the Banco de la República — at the core
of the financial system — and their public scaremongering on the dangerous financial
consequences of government intervention in their affairs placed bankers in a privileged
position. Consequently, it was argued, bankers often managed to “control reforms from
within”.

e last section presented quantitative support for the hypothesis that manufacturing,
as expected given the insight offered in previous sections, was not favoured by the banking
system. Specifically, a new dataset considering marginal capital-output ratios for the main
economic sectors, complemented with data on loan allocation, demonstrates that when
judged under the strict criteria of fixed investment needs, manufacturing did not receive a
substantially larger than proportionate share of loans. Instead, amidst an alleged era of
state-led ISI, as the current literature has it, the generously favoured sectors were cattle
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ranchers and coffee producers. One important implication of this finding relates to the
non-critical attachment that large parts of the literature on states and late-industrialisation
have with theoretical frameworks that assume state actions and quasi-inevitably prejudged
their following failure. An economic strategy of development, such as that of state-led
ISI, is a myth that the Colombian historical record does simply not bear. New evidence
presented in this chapter, supported by the review of theoretical advances associated with
the study of state capacity and state-led development in East Asia, confirm that there was
no industrial ‘big push’ in Colombia.

7 Conclusions

e aim of this dissertation is to enhance the current understanding of the roles of states in
late-development. 
rough the case study of Colombia, primarily via its state actions on
the financing and funding dimensions of the catching-up process, empirical findings sub-
stantiate a novel and revisionist interpretation about public protagonism at this endeavour.

e research strategy involved a ‘big picture’ view, conducting a comprehensive assessment
of the set of elements comprising a development strategy. 
is intended to permit ‘seeing
the woods from the trees’ whilst examining the most important ‘tree varieties’. Concretely,
it meant separately examining the central policies that conform the ISI model: direct
promotion of industrial ventures (Chapter ), credit allocation policies (Chapters  and
), and foreign exchange and trade policies (Chapter ). In doing this and in comparing
across the policies, the shortcomings incurred by the existing literature — identifying a
single policy or economic manifestation associated with ISI, to be representative of the
wider industrialisation orientation led by the state — have been eschewed.
‘Getting history right’ turned some of the findings into significant empirical contribu-
tions, as they clashed with conventional wisdom. In the first instance, the rectification
of the historical record is circumscribed to Colombian historiography. Key examples
of these evidence-led realisations, which emerged gradually during the primary stage of
research, constitute: First, the revelations about the actual state of finances of the country’s
allegedly most important agency for industrial development, IFI, which contrary to current
knowledge was found to be inadequately funded (Chapter ). Secondly, both the registered
intentions and sometimes accomplished attempts (if only briefly) at liberalising trade,
along with the recognition that hefty tariff levels were caused by a wide range of factors,
of which as the traditional view has it, deliberate commercial protectionism was only a
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subsidiary element (Chapter ). 
irdly, and most critically for this thesis perhaps, is the
unearthing of evidence pointing at actual credit difficulties faced by industrialists from
sources as diverse as studies by Banco de la República, foreign missions, official bodies
and manufacturers themselves. Further, demonstrating that, when resources from public
and mixed financial institutions are integrated to the aggregate numbers in the allocation
of loans to the industrial sector, industry came out a relative loser (Chapters  and ).
Individual findings as these have intrinsic value for the reconstruction of history, when put
together, however, their significance becomes larger than the sum of the parts.
In the second instance, the assortment of new and/or confronting facts like the above,
encouraged and provided grounds for the thesis to question the existing literature on state
and late-industrialisation, particularly the ISI and state-led industrialisation branches. It
should be made clear that challenging this literature was not and end in and of itself, but
more a necessity forced by the piecing together of the empirical findings in the different
‘compartments’ of policy — referred to above. 
e consensus on ISI through the case study
was first fractured with substantiated arguments (Chapter ) on the largely non-policy
forces determining the trajectory of the Colombian peso (overvalued but not far from the
equilibrium) and the well-founded contention that in comparative perspective, Colombia
remained as much of an open economy as its foreign-exchange resources allowed it. Further,
it was argued, the ‘apparent closure’, when it happened, was more the result of fiscal- rather
than trade-protectionism, and this explained in no small amount the high (yet in a regional
comparison relatively modest) levels of tariffs prevailing during the period. Finally, it was
contended, that often contrary to the preferences of the authorities, who intended to
liberalise the trade regime, external pressures dictated them, in practice, how best to curb
imports.
Further undermining of state-led ISI interpretations materialises with the yet untold
history of IFI as direct industrial investor. In failing to distinguish the institute’s operations
and trajectory between  and  from its later role as a development bank, the
existing literature conferred to IFI a prominent role in the country’s industrialisation that
the historical evidence displayed here simply does not match. 
e preliminary re-assessment
of IFI’s promotional activities (Chapter ) portrayed an agency whose financial position
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was weak and consequently looked poorly positioned to sustain the major contribution the
conventional wisdom claims existed. 
e findings ratified this view: throughout its  years
as direct promoter, IFI successfully intervened in no more than a dozen ventures; further,
the ordinary status in the business associations it realised with private capital was that of
junior partner; and more tangibly, the impact of IFI in the total of industrial investment,
as proxied by the equity capital it subscribed in the markets for industrial securities,
averaged a modest .. 
ese facts do not lend support to views presenting the planning,
entrepreneurial and productive capacities of the Colombian state as developmental, neither
in intent nor in outcome.

e next ISI-foundation to be struck is one sustaining that government policies in-
centivised and/or forced different agents in the financial system to secure wide financing
access to industrialists, as well as offering them preferential lending terms and conditions.
Carrying out a comprehensive examination of banking, in a financial system that was
overwhelmingly credit-based, findings on the patterns of sectoral credit allocation (both
ordinary and subsidised), as well as on the organisation of newly created public financial
intermediaries, and the directions that ‘legislated credit’ followed, the above argument
was not borne out by the evidence (Chapter ). Synthesising, the findings reveal, that;
first, the macro structure of the financial system did not single out industrial businesses
as preferred clients, that is, no specialised bank (either public or private) was founded
between  and , to cater for the financing needs of this sector, which contrasts
rather starkly with the formation of public producer-association banks or bancos gremiales
in the s for coffee and livestock-farming interests, as well as the constant support given
by governments and the CB to the already established Agrarian Bank. Secondly, within
this institutional-financial structure preferential credit schemes targeted agribusinesses
in general, and coffee growers and cattle ranchers in particular — from funds that often
originated in the Banco de la República. In short, neither extensive access to credit nor
subsidised lending to manufacturers in the alleged state-led ISI frameworks characterises
the Colombian banking system of mid-twentieth century. 
is occurred despite first-hand
qualitative evidence showing that credit constraints appeared to be a recurrent problem
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for industrialists, and that the fixed investment requirements of these activities were larger
than those of the privileged sectors (Chapter ).
In striking down ISI and state-led industrialisation interpretations about Colombia’s
own industrialisation, this thesis achieves a punctual contribution to the literature on late-
development. By arguing that the state chose not to prioritise manufacturing as recipient
of preferential or ordinary financing, that it provided only modest industrial promotional
support through IFI, and that in trade and foreign exchange policies external concerns
tended to dictate courses of action, the study demonstrates that ISI, as broad economic
strategy or development model was not attempted or implemented. 
is advances knowl-
edge in the field by stripping off Colombia the label of ‘failure’ that comes attached to
those countries that pursued ISI. In the case study examined here, the state could not have
failed at industrial transformation because it did not embark on such an endeavour in the
first place. In effect, thus, the widespread notion of ‘government failure’ cannot be applied.
Locating this in the wider literature on industrial policy is due, and will be done next in
brief manner.

e debate on industrial policy is said to have come full circle, according to Shapiro.
During the late s and s Prebisch-Singer’s arguments about secular deterioration
in terms of trade combined with views about endemic market failure prompted pro-
industrialisation policies inspired by theories about a ‘big push’ and the needs to coordinate
investments. A resounding theoretical and empirical backlash quickly followed and was
led by the likes of Krueger and Balassa, who — emphasising the macroeconomic imbalances
and inefficient distortions and extensive opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour that
interventionist industrial policies (particularly guided by import-substitution) generated
— shifted the pendulum back to policy prescriptions prioritising free trade and unfettered
markets. State failure had proved worse than market failure. More recently, however, a
rehabilitation about state activism rolled back the debate, at least half-way, refashioning the
justification for intervention in critical areas where markets do not always deliver; mainly,
Shapiro, H. ‘Industrial Policy and Growth’ () DESA Working Paper, No.  pp. –.
Shapiro, H. ‘Industrial...’ p. .
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technological capacity, and learning and knowledge accumulation at the firm level. 
e
return of market failure and of the state as the ultimate response squares the circle. So
where does the contribution of the dissertation highlighted above fit in here?
Figure .: 
eories of Industrialisation: Full Circle
1. Market Failure 
2. State Response (Assumed) 
3. State Failure  (No Failure Possible) 
4. Market Solution 
5. Revamped Market Failure 

e answer is sketched in the diagram above. 
e case study examined represents an
instance where the literature assumed ‘state response’, that is, ascribed to the state the role
of leading ISI, and in line with the generalisations found in other developing countries,
‘state failure’ followed. 
e point is precisely this: A pro-industrialist state has been assumed
in this case, thus, this state could not have failed at attempting ISI, for it did not try the
strategy in the first place. In other words, this is an instance of alleged ISI and consequently
not of state failure. To prescribe policies is considered overstretching at this stage. However,
the insight for policy-makers must be: to approach industrial and economic policy where
intervention may be needed without the instinctively-neoclassical expectations of failure
and inefficiency that surround ‘publicness’, for the economic history of mid-twentieth
century Colombia is one of relative competence in macroeconomic management in the
Bruton, H. ‘A Reconsideration of Import Substitution’ () Vol. , No. , p. ; and Shapiro, H. ‘Industrial...’
pp. –.
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face of volatile external pressures. 
is message might be more effective if placed in regional
comparative perspective.
In explaining the actual path taken by Colombia, private- or market- led industrialisation
or endogenous industrialisation; a contribution is also made to theory. 
e ‘state-in-
society’ approach favoured in the thesis to explain why Colombian governments did
not choose ISI offers an insight to industrialisation theory. Concretely, the contribution
at this level is about the suitable political-economy conditions for successful industrial
transformation. 
e discussions considered in Chapters  and  on this theme established
that effective developmentalist states exhibit internal cohesion, are staffed by technocratic
and meritocratic bureaucracies, and enjoyed of clearly institutionalised purposiveness and
power to turn their preferences into authoritative actions. 
ey also sustained that fluent
exchanges with private industrial capital, whilst keeping labour militancy checked mattered.
A central feature of the relationship between these states and society is the proven capacity
they possess to discipline capital, especially, of the recipients of subsidised intermediate
assets, which in Amsden’s framework are the firms undertaking the industrial upgrade, as
these are subject to rigorous performance standards. Davis’s approach to effective state
intervention underlined the need to ensure that discipline is exerted at both the macro- and
the micro levels. In the macro dimension, this means securing an economic environment
of realistic food prices and adequate exchange rates that bolster aggregate demand, whereas
at the micro level it refers to Amsden’s ability to extract high economic performance from
firms in exchange for subsidies. 
ey key insight offered is that of the role played by the
countryside in achieving this disciplinary regime. She argues that the presence of a powerful
class of small-agriculturalists entrenched in the state, and wielding substantial political
power, was the key factor underpinning both disciplinary dimensions; since they were
interested in avoiding subsidies to industry to turn into give-aways, whilst defending a
macro environment that is also sound for primary producers. 
e findings of this case
study suggest some tweaking of this theory. Although the macro element of the disciplinary
regime was (largely) attained, the theory does not function for the allocation of preferential
credit. 
is is because agriculturalists were powerful enough to prevent the re-allocation
of financial resources — away from other sectors and into industrial firms. 
e very
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same ‘mechanism’ that ensured macro-discipline, in other words, precluded the transfer
of resources to industry, over which micro-discipline is exercised. Alas, this stage is not
reached. 
e suggestion is to model the preferences of governments or of policy elites
to overcome the theoretical problem. 
e commitment of the state to industrialisation
cannot be taken for granted (Chapter ).

is author identified two lines of future research with potential mileage during the
course of research. 
e first is to frame and to complete analyses of the state according
to their various capacities. 
is was to some extent initiated in the present study. For
example, through the assessment of IFI’s contribution to industrialisation, the state’s
planning and productive capacities were explored and tested. Most evidently, allocative
capacities were also gauged in the examination of credit sectoral flows and sources. 
e
refashioning or rather update of this approach, in line with the progress of the economic
history and development studies disciplines, would include as facilitative capacities not
only assessing the deeds and policies on the provision of infrastructure, as indicated in the
original version, but also the provision of economically significant public goods, such as
property rights. 
e advantage of the ‘differentiated capacities’ approach lies in the need to
recognise that the state is not a unitary entity and that its capacities can vary enormously
depending on concrete historical and environmental conditions. 
e appeal of this kind of
analysis is even greater when thinking about the possibilities of comparative studies across
states’ capacities.

e second path is thematic and somewhat distant from the core topics considered here.

is is the study of the role of banking, particularly of the growth of public banks and of
the credit these advanced since the s, on the construction of the nation-state. Insights
into the development of state- or party-dispensed patronage via the allocation of credit
from agrarian banks formulated in Chapter , must be considered as one the ‘building
blocks’ in the creation of the extensive and effective clientelistic networks. And this to
a certain degree amounts to the construction of the Latin American state. 
e example
surveyed in the dissertation focus on Colombia, but this could have been a generalised

is promising approach was schematised by Gereffi and Wyman, unfortunately, no known works to this author have
followed their suggestions; see Gereffi, G. and Wyman, D. ‘Determinants of Development Strategies in Latin America
and East Asia’ in Pacific Focus () Vol. , No. , p. .
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phenomenon, which remains understudied. Equally interesting remain the links to be
established between this type of clientelism and the construction of fragile democratic
polities or the praxis of these politics in early-stage democratic polities.
Marichal and Topik represent a partial exception known to this author, though their work concentrates on the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; see Marichal , C. and Topik, S. ‘
e State and Economic Growth in Latin
America: Brazil and Mexico, Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’ in Teichova, A. and Matis, H. (Eds) Nation,
State and the Economy in History ().
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
A Appendix
Table A...: Colombia: Tariffs & Fiscal Yields, –
Evolution of Average Tariff Rates & Government Revenues (Percentages)
Year Average Tariff Share in Total Government Revenue
 .
 .
 .
 
 .
 .
 .
 .
 .
 .
 .
 .
 .

 .
 .
 .
 .
 .
 .
 .
 
 .
 .
 .
 
 .
 .
 .
 .
Continued. . .

A
Evolution of Average Tariff Rates & Government Revenues (Percentages)
Year Average Tariff Share in Total Government Revenue
 .
 .
 .
 . .
 . .
 .
 .
 .
 .
 .
  .
  .
 . .
  .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
Sources and Methodology: 
e series on average tariffs used data from Montenegro, S. and Ocampo, J. A. ()
for – and Cárdenas, M. () for –. No data for this variable was found for –. Share of total
government revenue is the ratio of import duties collected as percentage of central government tax revenues.

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Table A..: Latin America: Incidence of Custom Duties & Other Charges
Levied on Import Values, – (c.i.f., - Percentages)
Country Total
Argentina .
Brazil .
Chile .
Colombia .
Ecuador .
Mexico .
Venezuela .
Sources and Methodology: 
e total includes the incidence of custom duties and other duties or charges of equivalent
effect, such as the cost of financing prior deposits, in countries applying this restriction; except in the case of Chile.

e values represent the arithmetic mean averages and cover three broad categories of goods: primary goods; capital,
intermediate and durable consumer goods; and manufactured goods for current consumption.

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Table A..: Latin America: Economic Openness, –
Selected Countries: Imports as Percentage of GDP (Constant Prices)
Year Mexico Colombia Brazil Argentina
 .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
  .
 . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
  . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
Sources and Methodology: Series for Mexico in constant prices of  from Moreno-Brid, J. C. and Ros, J. ()
Table A. For Colombia data are in constant prices of  from GRECO (). Brazil’s series are in  constant
prices, obtained from Studart, R. () Tables A and A. For Argentina no one series was found for the entire
period; CEPAL () is used with constant prices of . 
is is obtainable on-line from http://www.eclac.org/deype/
cuaderno/esp/index.htm. In the series for Argentina and Brazil criterion of precision prevailed over completeness.
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Table A..: Colombia: Evolution of Foreign Trade, –
Exports, f.o.b. & Imports, c.i.f (Current US  Millions)
Year Exports Imports
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . .
Sources and Methodology: Data from GRECO (). Exports includes goods and gold. Imports of goods only.
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Figure A..: Colombian Exports: Volume & Coffee Prices, – (Index
=)
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Source: see Table A.. below.
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Table A..: Colombian Exports: Volume & Coffee Prices, –
Index =
Year Exports Quantum External Coffee Price
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sources and Methodology: GRECO (). External coffee prices in US dollars. Exports include oil and gold.
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Table A..: Latin America: Agricultural Protection, –
Incidence of Custom Duties on Import Values (Percentages)
Country Unprocessed Foods
Argentina .
Bolivia .
Brazil .
Chile .
Colombia 
Ecuador .
Mexico .
Paraguay .
Peru .
Uruguay .
Venezuela 
Sources and Methodology: 
e coefficients are the arithmetic mean averages of the incidence of custom duties and other
duties or charges of equivalent effect on the c.i.f. value of imports expressed in percentages.

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Table A..: Colombia: Evolution of the Prices of Exchange, –
Index =
Year Terms of Trade Annual Change ()
 
  .
  -.
  -.
  
  .
  
  .
  .
  
  .
  -.
  .
  .
  .
  -.
  -.
  -.
  -.
  -.
  .
  -.
  -.
  -
  .
  -.
  -.
  .
Source: GRECO ().
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Figure A..: Colombia: Export Matrix, –
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Source: Ocampo, J. A. () p. .
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Figure A..: Real Exchange Rates
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
19
40
 
19
42
 
19
44
 
19
46
 
19
48
 
19
50
 
19
52
 
19
54
 
19
56
 
19
58
 
19
60
 
19
62
 
19
64
 
19
66
 
19
68
 
19
70
 
CHILE: Real Exchange 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Sources: Own calculations based on data from IMF. International Financial Statistics, various years; Pick’s Currency
Yearbook (, ) and OXLAD.

A
Table A..: IFI: Developmental Activities, –
Firms Founded And/Or Nurtured With Equity Capital
Year Number of Firms
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source and Methodology: IFI. Informe, various years; and Informe y Balance, various years, except – for which
Superintendencia Bancaria. Informe, were used. 
e real series uses  as base year and GDP deflator by Berry ().

A
Table A..: Contribution of IFI to Industrialisation, –
Share of all Stocks Issued (Millions of Pesos)
Year All Stocks IFI’s Stocks IFI’s Share ()
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
Sources and Methodology: For data on stocks see Table A...  includes data from Medellin stock exchange. And
IFI. Informe, various years; IFI. Reseña, . Data from firms Pulpapel, Sucroquímica, Forjas and National Cables
were included in , though the original source captures them in .

A
Table A..: IFI’s Funding, Selected Years, –
Resources Gruped by Origin, (Percentages Unless Stated Otherwise)
Year All Re-
sources
(Mil-
lions of
Pesos)
Capital
Contri-
butions
IFI
Bonds
Paz Del
Rio
Bonds
Credit &
Deposits
Promissory
Notes
Profits Total
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
Sources and Methodology: Data for years ,  and  from Superintendencia Bancaria. Informe. All other
years from IFI. Consolidated Balance Sheets. Profits with no values imply years or semesters in which losses were incurred
or in which the values were too small.

A
Table A..: IFI’s Performance, –
Income Statements & Returns to Capital (Nominal Pesos)
Year Paid Up Capital Profits & Losses Returns to Capital
()
 ,, , .
 ,, , .
 ,, .
 ,, , .
 ,, , .
 ,, -, -.
 ,, -, -.
 ,, , .
 ,, , .
 ,, , .
 ,, , .
 ,, , .
 ,, , .
 ,, -,, -.
 ,, -, -.
 ,, -, -.
 ,, -, -.
 ,, -, -.
 ,, , .
 ,, , .
 ,, -,, -.
 ,, -,, -.
 ,, ,, .
 ,, ,, .
Sources and Methodology: For years – Superintendencia Bancaria. Informe; and IFI. Informe. For – IFI.
Income Statements. All calculations in nominal pesos. Significant differences between the columns Returns to Capital
of this table and the entry Profits on Table A.‘. may be due to the use of different bi-annual reports. Data for 
unobtainable.

A
Table A..: Valle & Cauca Coal Plant: Capacities vs. Actual Processing, –
Volumes of Coal Purchases for Processing (
ousand Tons)
Year Monthly Average Minimum Maximum
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
 .  
Sources and Methodology: Corporación Autónoma Regional del Cauca () and IFI. Informe, various years.

A
Table A..: Stock Exchange Transactions, –
Bogota & Medellin (Millions of Pesos)
Year Stocks Bonds Other Securities Total
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
Sources and Methodology: Data from BRep. IAGJD, various years. 
is was cross-checked with data from Contraloría
General de la República. Anuario General de Estadística, various years. 
e values are not exactly the same, but the
differences are minor and remain unexplained. Stock exchange transactions consider stocks, bonds (municipal and
national) and other securities (mainly mortgage securities and industrial bonds). From  to  the Bogota Exchange
was the only one operating, in  the Medellin Exchange opened and data was included. Credit series are new loans
from private commercial banks, Agrarian Bank and BCH.

A
Table A..: Developmental Credit Legislation & Resolutions (–)
Date Measure Content Entities Involved
 Law  Establishes an additional reserve requirement of  in
bonds from the Agrarian Bank
Commercial Banks
 Decree  Authorises -year loans for irrigation Works, Wells, electric
plants, distribution networks, extractive and agricultural
industries, and urban housing
Banks
CB discounts these loans at a rate of one percentage point
lower than those fixed for comercial operations
Maximum  of sight and term deposits may be invested
 Decree  Authorises -year ‘developmental’ loans (as for Banks under
Decree )
Banks’ saving
sections and Saving
Banks
CB discounts these loans at a rate of one percentage point
lower than those fixed for comercial operations
 Decree  Authorises -year loans to transformation industries (under
Decree  conditions)
Banks
Authorises the use of loans under Decree  to pay off
short-term liabilities
 Decree  Authorises direct credit operations with provincial Cattle
Funds
CB
 Decree  Adds to Decree  -year loans to cattle-breeding Banks
 Decree  Authorises fiduciary sections to issue -year industrial
bonds
Banks
Obliges to purchase and hold industrial bonds for no less
than  of deposits at sight or term
Banks
Evaluation and approval by the CB CB
 Decree  Obliges allocation of  of deposits at sight and term to
agriculture and livestock farming
Banks
Late crops: rubber, olives, cocoa, palm oil, oily nutsand
coconut
Intermediate crops: sugar-cane and banana
Annual crops: maize, beans, wheat, potatoes, corn, rice,
tobacco and barley
Rediscountable at one percentage point lower than ordinary
operations
Derogates Decrees  of  and articles ,  and  of
Decree  of 
 Law  Obliges allocation of  of deposits at sight and term yo
agriculture, livestock farming and fishing
Banks
CB discounts these loans at one percentage point lower
than ordinary rediscounting operations
 Decree  Regulates investments of new deposits:  mortgage se-
curities,  housing and savings bonds,  agricultural
bonds,  public obligations,  optional (agricultural
or industrial bonds),  at will,  cash
Banks’ saving
sections and Saving
Banks
 CB Resolution
No.  & 
Placement of new savings:  general-deposit warehouse-
bonds,  on Decrees  &  (popular credit) and
Law , and  ordinary operations
Banks
 CB Resolution
No. 
New placements:  general-deposit warehouse-bonds,
 Decrees  &  (popular credit) and Law ,
 ordinary
Banks
 CB Resolution
No. 
Diminishes the rediscounting limits with the CB Banks, Agrarian
Bank exempted
Continued. . .

A
Date Measure Content Entities Involved
 CB Resolution
No. 
Creates the Private Investments Fund Commercial and
Development Banks
 CB Resolution
No. 
Creates the Agrarian Financing Fund Credit
establishments
 Decree  Creates the Exports Promotion Fund Export Promotion
Agency
 CB Resolution
No. 
Creates the Industrial Financing Fund Credit
establishments
Sources: 
e monthly review by BRep. provides an index and brief synthesis of the executive and legislative measures
of economic importance. 
is was used between  and . To detail some of the measures the full texts were
examined using material available in the Diario Oficial. For the – period the relevant measures and details were
obtained from Muñoz, C. and Bolívar, A. () Annex .

A
Ta
bl
e
A
.
.
:A
llo
ca
ti
on
of
C
re
di
tb
y
Ec
on
om
ic
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s,


–

N
ew
Lo
an
sb
y
C
om
m
er
ci
al
B
an
ks
(P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Sh
ar
es
)
Ye
ar
N
on
-C
off
ee
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
Li
ve
sto
ck
C
off
ee
Ag
ra
ria
n
M
an
uf
ac
-
tu
rin
g
C
om
m
er
ce
C
on
st
ru
c-
tio
n
M
in
in
g
O
th
er
To
ta
l


.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.


.

.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.


.

.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.


.

.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.


.

.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.


.

.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.


.
.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.

.


.



.

.

.


.

.

.
.

.


.

.

So
ur
ce
sa
nd
M
et
ho
do
lo
gy
:D
at
a
fro
m
BR
ep
.I
AG
JD
,v
ar
io
us
ye
ar
sa
nd
BR
ep
.R
ev
ist
a,
va
rio
us
iss
ue
s.
D
efl
at
ed
us
in
g
G
D
P
de
fla
to
rw
ith


as
ba
se
ye
ar
.

A
Table A..: Allocation of Credit by the Banking System, –
New Loans: Commercial Banks, Agrarian Bank and BCH (Nominal Pesos, Millions)
Year Coffee Non-
Coffee
Agricul-
ture
Livestock Industry Construction Commerce Services Total
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . ,.
 . . . . . . . ,.
 . . . . . . . ,.
 . . . . . . . ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . ,. . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . ,. . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . ,. . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . ,. . ,. ,. ,.
 . ,. ,. ,. . ,. ,. ,.
 . ,. ,. ,. . ,. ,. ,.
 . ,. ,. ,. . ,. ,. ,.
 . ,. ,. ,. . ,. ,. ,.
 . ,. ,. ,. . ,. ,. ,.
Sources and Methodology: 
e ‘Services’ column includes ‘Construction’ and ‘Commerce’ entries. For commercial
banks data from BRep. IAGJD, – and BRep. Revista, various issues. Data for the Agrarian Bank from DANE.
Anuario General de Estadística, various years (see also Table .). Data for the BCH from BCH. Informe y Balance,
various years [the  issue was particularly useful] and complemented with BRep. IAGJD, various years. No data on
new loans are available for the Central Bank.
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Table A..: Central Bank: Sectoral Distribution of Credit, –
Loans & Discounts to Private Agents (End of Year - 
ousands of Pesos)
Year FNC Non-
Coffee
Pledge
Bonds
Cattle
Funds
Development
Banks
Other Total
– ,     ,
– , ,    ,
– , ,    ,
– , , ,  , ,
– , , ,  , ,
– , , , , , ,
– , , , , , ,
– ,  , , , ,,
Sources and Methodology: Other includes credit to co-operatives since the early s, to employees of the CB for
housing, and to Paz del Río steelworks in the late s. Cattle Funds gained access to CB’s funds by law since  but
data were not obtained for this until , therefore for these years the shares of Cattle Funds are part of Other. All
data from BRep. IAGJD, various years. Data are incomplete for the early years and the series for some are not always
identical. Often the break-downs are inconsistent. To obtain the most complete series possible some years used data
from Balances as of June  and not year-end.
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Table A..: Operations of the Central Bank, –
Loans & Discounts (End of Year - Millions of Pesos of )
Year Affiliated
Banks
Non-
Affiliated
Banks
Private
Agents
National
Govern-
ment
Other
Official
Entities
Total Public
Debt
Invest-
ments
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . ,. .
 . . . . . ,. .
 . . . . . ,. .
 . . . . . ,. .
 . . . . . ,. .
 . . . . . ,. .
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 ,. . . . . ,. ,.
 ,. . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. .
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
Sources and Methodology: Data are from BRep. IAGJD, various years. In this table Development banks are included in
Private agents in the original source from December  onward. Non-affiliated banks include the BCH, the Popular
Bank and the Colombian Savings Bank. Other official entities include the Stabilisation Fund. Converted into real pesos
of  using GDP deflator from Berry, A. ().
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Table A..: Subsidised Credit Allocation, –
Discounts of the CB (Millions of Pesos of )
Year Victims Decree
/
Agrarian Industrial Other Total
 . .
 . .
 . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
Sources and Methodology: BRep. IAGJD, various years. 
e Victims entry merged the Discounts for Victims sub-entries
of Decrees  and  of  with the Decree  of . Entry Decree / includes related regulations
 of ,  of ,  of ,  of , and Law  of . See Table A.. for further details of
these decrees.
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Table A..: Gross Fixed Investment, – (Nominal Pesos, Millions)
Year Agrarian Coffee Livestock Non-
Coffee
Agricul-
ture
Industry Services All Sec-
tors
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . ,.
 . . . . . . ,.
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . ,.
 . . . . . . ,.
 . . . . . . ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . . ,. ,.
 . . . . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . . ,. ,. ,.
 . . . . ,. ,. ,.
 ,. . . . ,. ,. ,.
 ,. . . . ,. ,. ,.
Sources and Methodology: Agrarian, Industrial and Services series are from Londoño, J. L. () converted into nominal
pesos. Coffee and livestock-farming series are the author’s own calculations; see Tables A.. and A.., respectively.

A
Table A..: Investments in Coffee, –
Year Total
Hectares
()
Added
Hectares
()
Cost of
Clearing
Land  (per
ha)
Total Cost
of Clearing
Land 
(Millions)
Investment
in
Plantation 
(per ha)
Total
Investment
in
Plantation 
(Millions)
Total
Investment
 (Millions)
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
 ,. . . . ,. . .
 ,. . . . ,. . .
 ,. . . . ,. . .
 . . . . ,. . .
Sources and Methodology: For area under coffee cultivation  was used as base year from Palacios (, p. );
and an annual rate of change was calculated from data on coffee production (area) from Orozco () between 
and . 
at rate of change was assumed for –. Data from UN/FAO () for  corroborates the area
estimates. Total investment was calculated as the cost of clearing new land for cultivation [extrapolating with data from
ECLA (, Table )] and adding the costs of establishing the coffee-crop, for which a compound annual growth
rate was calculated based on observations from Arango (, p. ) for Antioquia and from UN/FAO (, Table
). UN/FAO estimated that the costs of establishing the coffee crop amounted to around  of the investments of
coffee farms.
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Table A..: Allocation of Credit by the Banking System, –
New Loans: Commercial Banks, Agrarian Bank and BCH (Percentages)
Year Coffee Non-Coffee
Agriculture
Livestock Industry Services Total
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
Sources and Methodology: See Table A...
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Table A..: Allocation of Credit by the Agrarian Bank, –
Year Livestock Agriculture Other Value of Loans 
(Millions)
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . ,.
 . . . ,.
 . . . ,.
 . . . ,.
 . . . ,.
Sources and Methodology: See Table A...

A
Table A..: Mortgage Bank: Industrial Credit, – ()
Year Industrial Credit All Credit
 , ,,
 ,, ,,
 , ,,
 , ,,
 , ,,
  ,,
  ,,
 , ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,,
 ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,, ,,
 ,,
 ,,
 ,,
Source and Methodology: Industrial credit series calculated from BCH. Informe, various years, which have total credit
data, and from BRep. IAGJD, and BRep. Revista, various issues, which have data for all credit advanced exclusive of
industrial financing. Data were not available for – and –.

A
Table A..: Allocation of Credit by the Banking System, –
Outstanding Loans: Commercial Banks, Public Banks and Central Bank (Nominal
Pesos, Millions)
Year Agrarian Industry Services Total
 . . . ,.
 . . . ,.
 . . . ,.
 ,. . ,. ,.
 . . ,. ,.
 ,. . ,. ,.
 ,. . ,. ,.
 ,. . ,. ,.
 ,. . ,. ,.
 ,. . ,. ,.
 ,. ,. ,. ,.
 ,. ,. ,. ,.
 ,. ,. ,. ,.
 ,. ,. ,. ,.
 ,. ,. ,. ,.
 ,. ,. ,. ,.
Sources and Methodology: Public banks include the Agrarian Bank, the Popular Bank, all mortgage banks and other
entities. Calculations are from the author based on BRep. IAGJD, –. See Table A.. for Central Bank’s
calculations.

A
Table A..: Banco De La República
Outstanding Loans and Discounts to Private Agents, – (Nominal Pesos, 
ousands)
Year Coffee Pledge Bonds
(Coffee
Exclusive)
Cattle Funds
and Other
Development
Banks
Total
 ,
 ,  ,
 , , ,
 
 
 ,
 
 ,  ,
 ,  ,
 , ,  ,
 , ,  ,
 , ,  ,
 , ,  ,
 , , , ,
 , , , ,
 , , , ,
 , , , ,
 , , , ,
 , , , ,
 , , , ,
 , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 ,  , , ,
 ,  , , ,
 ,  , , ,,
 ,,  , , ,,
Sources and Methodology: Most data are from BRep. IAGJD, , Vol. , and –. Break-downs for the early
s are very rare, however, the CB’s reports note that the majority of the operations consisted of advances made over
guaranteed coffee with the Federation of Coffee Growers; see for instance, BRep. IAGJD, –, p. . After 
the series for provincial Cattle funds and other corresponds to the former entirely.

A
Table A..: Outstanding Loans to Output by Economic Activities, – (Ra-
tios)
Year Agrarian Industry Services Total
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
Sources and Methodology: See Tables A.., A.. and A..

A
Table A..: Incremental Capital-Output Ratios by Economic Sectors, –
Year Coffee Livestock Non-Coffee
Agriculture
Industry Services Total
 . . -. . . .
 . -. . -. . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . -. . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . -. . . . .
 . . -. . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 -. . -. . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 -. . . . . .
 . . -. . . .
 -. . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . -. . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
Sources and Methodology: Services include commerce and construction. Proxies for marginal capital are gross fixed
investments from Table A... 
e annual variations in sectoral output were calculated from Table A...

A
Table A..: Incremental Capital-Output Ratios by Economic Sectors, –
Year Agrarian Industry Services Total
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 -. . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
 . . . .
Sources and Methodology: See Tables A.., A.. and A..
Table A..: Comparisons of Loan Ratios to ICORs, –
Agrarian Industry Services All Activities
ICORs [A] . . . .
Sector to Overall ICORs [B] . . . 
Loans to Output [C] . . . .
Sectoral to Overall Loans to
Output [D]
. . . .
D/B . . .
Sources and Methodology: ICORs = Incremental Capital Output Ratios. ICOR values are the sectoral averages for the
period –. ICOR calculations from the World Bank ‘Economic Growth in Colombia: Problems and Prospects’
() p.  corroborate the author’s own calculations. 
eir total ICOR average for the intervening period is .,
compares favourably with the datum . obtained in this study. 
e loans to output ratios are averages from Table
A... It uses outstanding loans from all public and private banks in addition to outstanding loans from the Central
Bank.

